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

The areas at 1500 metres (4921 feet) and over are hatched. Except in the coastal strip and on the Kavirondo plain, land at a lower level than 5000 feet is practically valueless. Even above that height there are large areas unfit for cultivation, from being mountainous, or waterless, or forest covered.

KENYA

BY

NORMAN LEYS, M.B., D.P.H.
(FULANI BIN FULANI)

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

PROFESSOR GILBERT MURRAY

"And the dwarf said, Something human is dearer to me than all the wealth of the world."—GRIMM'S TALES.

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PREFACE

This book has been preparing for fifteen years. The list of its helpers and critics is, accordingly, a very long one, ranging from the nearest of relations and the oldest of friends to casual acquaintances of an hour. For years I measured the heads and noses of all Africans who allowed me to, and whenever there was opportunity I took soundings of what their heads contained as well. On some subjects the method of direct questioning is quite unreliable in the case of Africans. Opinions likely to be unwelcome to Europeans can be got at only by listening to Africans talking among themselves. But questions like how much a man's wages are, how many people's taxes he has to pay, even why he is a Christian, or a Moslem, can as a rule be asked without offence of an African by any European with a fair knowledge of the man's language who is careful with the preliminaries considered requisite to good manners in African society. Thousands of answers to such questions, and many of the arguments that frequently resulted, have gone to the making of this book.

Even excluding Africans and Indians, a list of European informants and helpers could only be incomplete. Some are dead. Of others the names are forgotten. Some few might rather have no mention in a book containing what this book contains. Some, whose names might by inadvertence be omitted, would wonder why. Of my

gratitude none will have any doubt. But there is one name that must be mentioned. I had wished my brother, Mr. Kenneth Leys, of University College, Oxford, to let his name stand with mine on the title-page. The researches he made in the Bodleian Library into the early history of Kenya were impossible to me and invaluable to the book. Besides that labour he has given infinite care, patience and skill to amendments and suggestions and criticism of every kind.

One other prefatory explanation may be allowed. Some of the statements in the book will be found surprising. It has been difficult to know how much proof of them to give to the reader. Partial quotations are apt to be misleading. But speeches and letters to the Press are often too long to quote in full, even in footnotes. As a rule, the more important proofs and sources are quoted in the text. But readers who prefer to form no judgement without proof will do well to pay attention to the footnotes. And when statements of mine stand alone and unsupported, special pains have been taken to leave the reader in no doubt that no independent proof of them is offered.

NORMAN LEYS.

BRAILSFORD, NEAR DERBY.

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INTRODUCTION

This book belongs to that extremely small and valuable class which embody in concentrated form the experience, the emotion and the hard thinking of a lifetime. Dr. Leys has spent some twenty years in the medical service in different parts of Africa, both Portuguese and British. He has felt deeply the difficulties, the complexities and the horrors which still seem inseparable from the contact of white and black, and he has proved his sincerity more than once by opposing the authorities on whom his employment depended and taking the consequences of his action. And he has not only felt. Feeling alone makes men rebels, and mere rebels are little use. He has from first to last thought, and thought hard, with sympathy for both sides, in order to understand and, if possible, devise better ways of handling the vast problems that obscure the relations of governors and governed in Africa.

And the problem which he treats is one of those which we must needs master, or else it will master us. It will master us not gradually and half-imperceptibly like the problems of over-population or of eugenics. Its challenge will be violent and bloody. At present, according to that attempted humanisation of the existing World Order which is embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations, we of the advanced races of mankind have definitely accepted the task of governing and guiding, in their own interests

and not in ours, those peoples which are " not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world ". We have formally accepted the principle that " their well-being and "—what is much more—" their development form a sacred trust of civilisation ". Very suitable language if the object is advertisement; but a momentous and difficult pledge if we seriously mean to carry it out. I doubt whether there is in the world a single mandatory Power in which the preponderant political forces can be kept true to the spirit of this treaty except by constant vigilance and unsparing criticism. If Great Britain, as compared with most other nations, has on the whole in these matters so creditable a record, that is due in part to the lessons she has learned by her greater experience; but in part also to the constant supply of Englishmen who have been ready to face unpopularity in exercising, for the protection of the subject and unprotected races, such vigilance and such criticism.

Most English people at home, I should conjecture, accept the doctrine of Article XXII. of the Covenant, quoted above. They accept it with some mental reservation, such as they are in the habit of applying to all fine language, whether in political programmes or sermons or the New Testament. But they do, on the whole, accept it. Many colonials, I fear, regard it as pernicious rubbish. There is at any rate a real and dangerous opposition between average colonial opinion, based on knowledge of the facts and daily intercourse with black people, but exposed to perversion by prejudices of race and class, and very often by economic self-interest, and public opinion at home, sentimental, disinterested and genuinely anxious for justice, but grievously crippled by ignorance and lack of understanding. Dr. Leys seems to me to have the

power of possibly helping these two opposites to understand one another. The colonial will not resent a real effort to see the native's point of view, to treat him fairly and even to help him towards a higher development, if he can be sure that it is made with knowledge of the conditions and difficulties. The British philanthropist will listen to a statement of the case for " going slow " and putting practical utility above abstract principles, if once he is convinced of the absolute good faith of the speaker.

The rule of black by white appears to be, for the present time, an absolute necessity. If the great Governments abandoned it, it would fall into the hands of adventurers and speculators. It is also a road, and apparently the only road, forward towards a safer and healthier condition of co-operation. But it is a road not yet fully made, a road through bush and desert, a road stained with blood and beset by wild beasts. It is hampered by sentimental theories about the equality of mankind. It is threatened with fearful dangers from the insidious habit, so characteristic of modern civilisation, of regarding natives exclusively as providing " markets " for our goods or " labour " for our speculative enterprises, and in general living, working and dying for the enrichment of their white masters.

I am far from saying that Dr. Leys is always right in his opinions. I am sure he would not say so himself. But I think there are few readers of imagination who will not rise from this book with their pulses quickened and their minds alive with questioning.

G. M.

CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL AND GENERAL

Near the beginning of the age of discovery a Papal Bull divided the countries then still unknown between the kings of Spain and Portugal. The sovereignty of undiscovered Africa fell to Portugal. The gradual exploration of its western shore encouraged without satisfying constantly increasing hopes and ambitions. Then, suddenly, in 1492, the discovery of the New World opened to every adventurous Spaniard the prospect of wealth and glory. Rivalry spurred the Portuguese to as great and nearly as venturesome an effort. Vasco da Gama sailed in 1497, found his way round the Cape of Good Hope, and reached India.

The Spaniards soon learned that they had found not a new way to the East, but a new world, ripe for conquest and spoliation. Da Gama, on the other hand, realised at once that the newly discovered ocean route to India and the Spice Islands would be far easier and safer than the old overland route through India and Persia, or by the Red Sea. He planned the occupation of the chief ports that lie on the East African coast, in order both to provide for the refitting and provisioning of the fleets on the journey to and from India, and to prevent the ships of other nations from engaging in the trade. Already on his first voyage he had made a friendly arrangement with the sovereign of one East African town and had picked quarrels with the sultans of several other towns.

These ports had been colonised centuries before the

Portuguese arrived in them, mainly by Arabs from Muscat and Hadramaut. The religion of Mohammed had given a common civilisation to all the countries on the littoral of the Indian Ocean. But these countries had no political unity. Each considerable town on the East African coast had its own sovereign.

The situation of these towns, strung separately along the coast and unable to communicate except by sea, rendered their conquest by the Portuguese an easy one. Their civilisation was unprogressive, perhaps even then decadent. In none of them was there any sign of that efflorescence which sprang from the mingling of European with Semite all along the racial frontier between European and Asiatic, the monuments of which, from Granada to Delhi, still excite our admiration. The Arab settlements in East Africa were mainly built on islands set close in to the land. Each was surrounded by a fringe of plantations, in which slaves cultivated grain, coconuts and pepper. Trade with the interior scarcely existed.

The Portuguese found these towns easier to conquer than to hold. Their policy wavered between two main objects. On the one hand they were compelled to make as many friends as possible among the inhabitants of so long and so exposed a frontier of their empire. On the other hand, both religious principle and inclination drove them to attempt the extermination of all Moslems, of whatever age or sex, whether chanced on at sea in a ship or in a captured town. Colonisation was hardly attempted. Portugal had no men to spare for it and the profits of slave labour on plantations were too small to be tempting. Gold was the great magnet of discovery and conquest. The trade in it was a Government monopoly. Surprisingly large quantities were obtained by native barter from the southern part of the East African coast. But increasing corruption in the public service made the trade in gold an

injury rather than an advantage to the State. The revenues of the coast seem never to have covered the cost of its occupation, in human life, money, munitions and ships.

For two centuries and more the Portuguese attempted to sustain the monopoly of the increasing trade by sea between Europe and Asia. Every year their country was drained of its strongest and bravest for the conquest and holding of all the coasts of the Indian Ocean, from Sofala to Malindi and Lamu and from Ormuz to Cambay and Comorin. Even in the China Seas they found footholds. Few of those who went ever returned to Portugal. The soldiers and priests of the earlier period were as heroic as they were cruel and rapacious. In the later period, when it was seen how hard and dangerous the service of their country was, such virtue as was possible to religious and patriotic fanaticism was lost in a general abandonment to the pursuit of wealth. Avarice and cruelty led to risings in which the Portuguese were murdered or driven into their island forts. Even impregnable fortresses like Mombasa and Mozambique had to stand sieges. In one of them seven thousand souls, mainly native allies, men, women and children, defended themselves in Mombasa fort for two years until only twelve of them were left alive. A year after its surrender the fort was again captured and garrisoned. But efforts so heroic proved too great for the strength of a small nation. Portugal had no vast tribute in gold and silver such as supported the cost of the Spanish fleets and armies. As time went on English, Dutch and French adventurers made inroads on the Portuguese monopoly of trade in the Indian Ocean. The Dutch once even captured Mozambique. Portuguese patriotism was weakened by the absorption for a time of Portugal in the Spanish kingdom. Resistance in the conquered countries increased rather than diminished, after two centuries of Portuguese government. Lack of political wisdom even

more than inadequate military strength compelled Portugal in the end to abandon the effort to defend her scattered possessions from the attacks of other European States as well as from Arabs, Africans and Indians. The northern part of the East African coast fell into the hands of the Mazrui family, Arabs long settled on the coast. The settlements in the Persian Gulf and in India were finally lost except where, as in Goa, religion had given a stronger footing than conquest. When East Africa once more, in the XIXth century, became of importance to Europe, the Portuguese still held only a few scattered fortified posts between Mozambique and the Zambesi. Farther north they were scarcely a memory. The noble fort of Mombasa, much altered, is now a prison for long sentence criminals. Here and there along the coast, in the thick undergrowth, one may stumble on the ruins of a governor's house, or of a chapel, or of a cistern for rain water. Nothing else remains of the long Portuguese occupation but some dozen words embedded in the coast language.

This first failure of Europe in tropical Africa is significant. No attempt could have been more determined or heroic. Nor do the vices of the Portuguese explain their failure. They were no more cruel and greedy of gold than the Spaniards, who so rapidly and successfully overran and colonised Central and South America. And the Spaniards had stronger and better organised opposition to overcome in America than the Portuguese in Africa.

The Zambesi is the largest river in East Africa. The Portuguese founded large settlements on its banks and got large quantities of gold in the neighbourhood. The Jesuits had flourishing missions. Nothing remains of so much endeavour and devotion but a river boat song in honour of the Virgin Mary and some enrichment of the local language and folk-lore. The commercial development in that district in recent years had to make a fresh start on

new foundations. The Zimbabwe and other ruined gold workings in the same district show that in some prehistoric age Africa defeated and stamped out a still older civilisation. All the invasions of Africa tell the same tale. The conquests of Romans and Vandals stopped at the Tropic of Cancer. The Moslem Conquest was for long checked near the same line, and when at length it again advanced, moved only by slow stages in the course of six centuries, and left undisturbed the forests and swamps of the Upper Nile, to pass westward to the highlands above the basin of the Niger.

The one invasion that did succeed is the exception that proves the rule. Maize, tobacco, the banana and the potato, introduced from America into the coast ports, east and west, in the XVIth century, spread rapidly to nearly all the tribes of the interior, proving that communications were everywhere open, and that there were no physical hindrances to penetration and conquest.

The diseases of Africa explain the fate of its invaders, and provide the key to the history and present condition of the African race.

The epidemic and endemic diseases of Africa differ in kind from those of temperate climates. Sufferers from smallpox, plague, typhus, enteric, relapsing fever, diphtheria and influenza—these the chief destroyers of life in Europe in historical times—either die or recover completely. These diseases scarcely ever take the form of chronic infections. Mental and physical efficiency are completely restored among the survivors. There are only two important exceptions, tuberculosis and syphilis, and of these syphilis was introduced into the old world only after the discovery of the new.

By contrast, the chief infections of the tropics last for many years, often for life. They are caused, as a rule, by creatures of a higher type than those which are the cause of the infections of Europe. The vegetable organisms

proved or assumed to be the causes of the epidemic diseases of Europe give rise in the bodies of those attacked to protective substances that bring about not only the cure of the attack, but also, as a rule, lifelong immunity from other attacks of the same disease. The animal organisms that cause malaria and dysentery, on the contrary, produce illnesses of indefinite duration. No immunity is acquired, even after repeated attacks. At best there is acquired a tolerance of the disease by the tissues, that allows, in spite of some degree of chronic poisoning, a measure, often considerable, of mental and physical activity. Probably not one child in five born between the Zambesi and the Sahara escapes malaria in infancy. A fifth or sixth of those attacked die, and the rest grow up with some loss of natural energy. Yaws, a disease related to syphilis but differently caused, gives years of disablement to millions of Africans. So do leprosy and the dysenteries. Perhaps a sixth, perhaps a third of the whole population suffers a constant but unrecognised drain of blood from an intestinal parasite called the anchylostome. The trypanosomes of sleeping sickness cause in some parts of Africa a chronic infection like malaria, while in others the disease depopulates whole countries. In addition, of course, Africa has always been swept by many of the epidemics that once swept Europe. But these merely thin at intervals a population weakened and dispirited as well as reduced in number by the characteristically African diseases.

Yet another character of the African infections is noteworthy. The epidemics to which Europe is liable are nearly always conveyed by discharges from the nose, mouth or anus of the infected, so that it is easy to protect the healthy from the sick by disinfecting their discharges. But the parasites of most African diseases are as a rule conveyed by insects, so that the protection of the healthy is complicated and difficult.

These facts provide the chief reason for the failure of all foreign invaders of tropical Africa, until the XIXth century, and for the absence of foreign influences, whether coming from the belt of temperate climate in the north or from either coast. They explain, in part, the gradual loss of energy and hardihood among the Portuguese. And they also explain—what is far more important than the fate of invading armies—why the African to-day is industrially inefficient and socially backward.

It is true that the chronic infective diseases of the tropics have a wide distribution. But except in the Amazon Valley, where human society shows a like retarded growth, these climatic diseases prevail elsewhere over more limited areas, and one or two of the worst of them are unknown outside Africa.

It is also true that tropical Africa contains, on mountains and plateaus, islands of healthy country. But no rich civilisation is ever indigenous to a mountainous country. It is significant that the first communities of the world to attain a high civilisation lived on the banks of the Nile and the Euphrates, where, though population was dense, the scanty rainfall would check the prevalence both of malaria and of water-borne diseases.

This immunity of Africa from invasion has been a great disaster to Africans. The great conquerors, from Cyrus and Alexander to Napoleon, did far more to stimulate and fertilise than to destroy. The countries where the Roman eagles once flew still enjoy a birthright no others have. Even in the most stagnant ages of the ancient world produce was exchanged and new inventions and ideas were circulated that alone made possible each partial and hesitating advance. But in Africa men waged the long fluctuating struggle with disorder and unreason and injustice under the threat of extermination by pestilences, and under the weight of chronic infections, that retarded progress as in no other

continent. And these slow advances were made and sudden retrogressions suffered, unhelped by those many world-wide influences to which we and our ancestors owe all we have and are.

The African societies with which the Portuguese came into contact in the XVIth century did not strike them as being notably different from their own. No doubt they assumed conditions that often did not exist. The kingdoms that existed at that time in the upper Niger were of course partly of foreign origin. But elsewhere in tropical Africa, both East and West, the faint and uncertain light thrown by the early records shows us feudal monarchies as then existing in various parts, of the same type apparently as explorers found in Uganda and Ruanda fifty years ago. In other parts there were tribes at a much earlier stage of political development. Iron and copper were in use, and it seems tolerably certain that iron was used in Africa earlier than in Europe, certainly earlier than the period—about 400 B.C.—when its use was introduced into Britain. Some scanty remains of the African art of that period preserved in the museums of Brussels and London prove that, independently of foreign influences, work of considerable merit in stone and wood was done. Many of the tribes of tropical Africa had attained in the XVIth century a far higher level of civilisation than that of the North American Indians at the time of their discovery, a considerably higher level than our Saxon ancestors had reached in Caesar's time, and perhaps as high a level as society had reached in the more backward parts of Europe in the Xth century.

Soon such scanty light as the early Portuguese records throw on the condition of African society is lost in the gloom of the great African catastrophe.

The methods of exploitation followed by the Spaniards in America destroyed by the million the peoples they

had conquered. But the exploitation was so profitable that the demand arose for workers who would last longer in slavery on plantations and in mines. That demand, reinforced a little later by Portuguese, French, English and Dutch officials and adventurers, was supplied from West Africa.

Domestic slavery no doubt existed in many African tribes in the XVIth century, just as it existed in Scotland and Russia at the same time. Serfdom is an institution found in every human society at a certain stage of civilisation. But serfdom, or domestic slavery, is a totally different thing from industrial slavery. In the African society of that time slaves were not an article of commerce. The traffic in African slaves with America was an extension, not of any African slavery, but of the industrial slavery long established in the Mediterranean countries. In the warfare between the Cross and the Crescent that lasted, in the Mediterranean, from the IXth to the XVIIIth century, prisoners were usually sold as slaves, by both sides. Immense numbers of Christians were captured and enslaved during the later Crusades. The expulsion of the Moors from the Peninsula left large districts uncultivated. As early as the XVth century Moorish and other slaves were imported into the south of Portugal to cultivate the soil. The first slaves to be sent to the New World were Moors from Portugal, not the West Africans shipped much later by Hawkins, as is sometimes erroneously stated.

In spite of the heavy death-rate among the slaves in the notorious middle passage from Africa to America, the profits of the African slave trade proved so large that soon every seafaring nation in Europe sought to engage in it. A share in it, or a monopoly of it, became one of the chief prizes of success in war. After a victorious war with Spain we compelled the Spaniards in the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) to grant us a monopoly of the slave trade with

America. That monopoly lasted for forty years. As Ramsay Muir shows in his *History of Liverpool*, it made that city one of the richest in the world. People of every class engaged in it. Muir quotes a Liverpool writer as writing in 1795 : " It is well known that many of the smaller vessels that import about 100 slaves are fitted out by attorneys, drapers, ropers, grocers, tallow chandlers, barbers and tailors ". Nelson considered the slave trade necessary for our Navy, in which in his time many Africans served. Many families of influence to-day owe their wealth to the slave trade, and many town and country mansions, churches and chapels, in Southampton, Bristol and Lancashire especially, were built out of its profits. In America itself the French, Dutch and English had the name of being more cruel to slaves than the Spanish and Portuguese.

In Africa the method followed was to give the people of the coast tribes guns and powder and encourage them to make war on their helpless neighbours farther inland. In America the ferocity of the first conquerors was often rebuked by priests, who, if they scarcely ever could save the victims of the avarice of their Christian conquerors, at least gave them hope of heaven and kept alive some sparks of human feeling that in a later age allowed the growth of a common society and civilisation in Spanish and Portuguese America. But the business of slaving in Africa was conducted with the ruthlessness of a purely commercial transaction. The motive force of the trade was the profit, at that time considered praiseworthy by the most pious, of the owners and managers of plantations and ships. These men created an ever-widening circle of cruelty and destruction that at length wrecked African civilisation nearly everywhere. On the coast, the chief means of livelihood, and often the only means of safety, lay in pursuing the life of a slaver, in which brutality and courage were the only

qualities necessary for success. Men could prosper only in so far as they threw off both the restraints of tribal law and custom, and every vestige of natural sympathy. An abundance of cheap rum and gin added to the general degradation. At times men even sold their nearest relations.

The smaller and less warlike tribes were either enslaved wholesale or dispersed into forests and mountains. The larger were compelled to subordinate everything to defence. Of necessity an autocrat of some kind replaced in tribal government the more primitive kind of authority in which the chief or the priest had, as his chief function, the duty of interpreting tribal law and voicing tribal opinion. A military character and a military organisation were everywhere in the end, as far as the great lakes and the central watershed, the conditions of tribal survival.

The West Africa that at a later time the first explorers of the interior made known to Europe was a region inhabited by the survivors of two and a half centuries of massacre and anarchy, relieved only by inevitable tyranny. The pictures of society we get from Mungo Park, Denham and others, the stockades surmounted by human skulls, the holocausts to demon gods, are of a savagery compounded of primitive ignorance and fear with cruelties and terrors the creation, however unwittingly, of Europeans. Eight million Africans, at the lowest computation, were sold in America, and at least five times as many persons perished in the slave wars, on the way to the African coast, and in the middle passage.

The abolition of the slave trade at the end of the XVIIIth century was the work of Evangelicals and Rationalists in England and Scotland. Their victory seems almost miraculous now. Nonconformity was divided. The Church and the trading interest were practically solid against the reform. A generation later, in 1833, the first

reformed Parliament abolished slavery itself in British colonies at a cost of twenty million pounds, paid in compensation to slave owners. No compensation has ever been paid to the inheritors, in Africa, of so great loss and degradation.

Our national repentance was quickly followed by efforts to compel repentance and amendment in other countries. In the XVIIIth century we made use of victory to compel other countries to buy slaves from us. In the XIXth we inserted in every treaty a provision that made it illegal for any one to buy or sell a slave. Our warships soon made the West African slave trade too dangerous to be continued. But the demand for slaves in America, North and South, did not cease with the proscription of the slave trade. At the beginning of the XIXth century, when the trade from West Africa had nearly ceased, a new and abundant source of supply of slaves was provided by the Arabs of East Africa.

At that time the sovereignty of the Arab settlements on the coast belonged to the sultans of Muscat, one of whom had built the town of Zanzibar as the capital of his new dominions. The coast Arabs still lived, as they had for centuries, a life that, if it was neither very virtuous nor very civilised, was neither ostentatious nor oppressive to their slaves. These worked shorter hours and enjoyed greater liberty than the workers in most times and countries. The law ensured them protection from want in old age. A considerable proportion of them got education in the mosque schools. Slaves of ability were employed in positions of trust, as merchants, captains of dhows and so forth, and shared in the profits of their enterprise. Some slaves were given social consideration that made them influential in the community. There was probably less social distinction between slaves as a class and their masters than there is in this country between people with a hundred

pounds a year and people with a thousand pounds a year.

The great defects of the system were that the slave had no recourse in law against a master for cruelty or for withholding customary rights, and that marital relations both among freeman and slaves were so impermanent. Sexual vices have long been rampart among the Arabs of the coast. As regards cruelty, the fact that escape into the interior was always easy proves that it cannot have been common. In famine years, indeed, parties of natives from the interior would sometimes sell themselves and their children for food. The coast Arabs were, and are, a very unambitious people, much debilitated by various diseases and with a very low birth-rate. It is hard to believe that their ancestors often defeated the armies of Christendom, and watered their horses in the Tiber and the Loire.

Some part of the produce of the coast plantations, grain, cocoanut oil and fibre, red pepper, and also dried fish, was exported to Arabia, the Persian Gulf and Western India. But wealth was difficult to acquire and impossible to accumulate by such means. Rich men could deck their women folk with gold or bury a hoard of rupees or Austrian dollars. But they had no way of investing wealth so as to acquire an income without exertion. Slaves ate all they produced unless they were well watched, and as the narrow strip of fertile land along the coast had for generations been fully cultivated the purchase of more slaves was useless.

Even fifty years ago in Mombasa no one except the Baluch soldiers in the fort worked for wages. A slaughterer was paid so much for killing a beast, a water-carrier so much for every load. One bought cloth from one man and paid another man for making it into a shirt. So with the makers of pots, mats, furniture and everything else. Seamen got their proportion of the profits of each voyage.

Cultivators of the soil were nearly all slaves. Town

workers were half slave, half free. If slaves, their masters provided their material and tools, and got from a third to two-thirds of the proceeds of their labour.

The reigning family and the few officials appointed from Muscat were Moslems of a very primitive sect that regarded the use of even coffee and tobacco as sinful. The rest of the population were lax in religious observance and very superstitious. The only revenue of the State was an *ad valorem* duty on all exports and imports, and its only expenditure, in Mombasa, the salaries of governor, judge, customs clerk and garrison. Life was easy and sensual, shortened by vice and disease, scarcely ever darkened by fear of want, but filled to overflowing by the fear of innumerable spirits and demons.

Such was the society to which the demand for slaves from America brought new opportunities. The slave trade had existed for centuries on the coast, on a small scale. It supplied slaves to the coast plantations, to the pearl fisheries of Bahrein, and to the few wealthy households of the towns of Yemen and Asir. A few East African slaves in the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries were also shipped to America. Early in the XIXth century the trade to America enormously increased.

Two coincident changes furthered the East African slave trade at the time. The use of machinery in the manufacture of firearms immensely cheapened them. After the close of the Napoleonic Wars they could be got for practically nothing. And the introduction of the cultivation of the clove to the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba opened the eyes of the Arabs to ways of making profits and spending them on luxuries until then unknown. Slaves could not eat cloves, and as these islands are out of sight of the mainland, escape was impossible, and cruelty and overworking brought no penalty upon their masters. The profits of these clove plantations were for years very great.

Deaths among the slaves from disease and starvation were many, and large numbers had to be freshly imported every year.

The northern part of the Swahili coast, now the Kenya Protectorate, was scarcely involved in the slave trade. Behind the narrow strip of fertile land on the coast there extends a deep belt of waterless country, almost uninhabited. Beyond there lay the vast grazing grounds of the Masai, the terror of whose name protected a large territory to the west of their own.

There was indeed an ancient trade route far to the north, up the Tana River to the slopes of Kenya, and beyond by Baringo to Nyanza. For a few years just before the British occupation of the country a number of caravans of slaves and ivory were brought to the coast over that route. Round the camping places upon it some villages of Kikuyu and Kamba still profess Islam, introduced a generation ago by these slaving caravans. Slavery of course still exists in Arabia and in the Persian Gulf. So late as 1910 a large party of Kikuyu was recruited by some one who professed to represent a plantation on the coast, put on board a dhow when it reached Mombasa, and shipped thence to the Persian Gulf or Jeddah, there to be sold into slavery.

The slave coast proper extended from Kilimanjaro to the Zambesi. During the first three quarters of last century Arabs carrying letters from the Sultan of Zanzibar attempted the conquest of the whole area between that part of the coast and the great lakes. Tipu Tipu at the end of the period even crossed the central watershed and conquered large areas in the upper part of the basin of the Congo. These Arabs founded permanent settlements at places like Tabora, Ujiji and Kota Kota, where routes converged, and there established depots, where smaller parties of slaves were organised into large caravans. Some

of them acted as sultans with independent authority, and made alliances with the more warlike tribes for the conquest and enslavement of the rest. In theory the slaves were captives in war waged in the name of the Sultan of Zanzibar, whose African allies were suitably rewarded with guns and ammunition as well as with calico and beads. The slave routes converged on the ports of Pangani, Bagamoyo, Kilwa, Lindi, Ibo and Quilimane, whence the slaves—and the ivory, the spoil of the buried hoards of chiefs for centuries—were shipped for sale to Zanzibar or Muscat, or sent to the Mozambique channel, where they were transhipped into American vessels. The large profits of the trade compensated for the risk of being caught by British cruisers. First class slaves at one time fetched £60 in New Orleans. Even during the first two years of the American Civil War several cargoes of slaves were successfully landed in the Confederate States.

There were several reasons why the East African slave trade was so long of being suppressed. The east coast, unlike the west, is full of islands and creeks, unsafe for ships of the size of the cruisers used by the Navy but practicable for native dhows. Most of the towns on the coast were in Arab hands, and the only armed forces in East Africa were those of the slavers. The price of slaves kept pace with the danger of capture and so tempted the officials in some of the Portuguese ports as to involve them too in the trade. In 1902 the writer had a small boy offered him for two pounds in Portuguese territory. His parents had been killed or were supposed to have been killed in the suppression of a native rising.

In Livingstone's last journal we get a picture of the Arab slave trade when it had begun to decline. We also get a picture of a man who, like Garibaldi, belonged in both heart and mind to the age of chivalry. His princess to be rescued was the least attractive of humankind. Her rescue

he saw clearly to be no knocking off of shackles, no spectacular triumph over any dragon that he could drag out and destroy. He wrote down his conviction that even then, a generation after slavery was supposed to be dead and was universally execrated, many, perhaps most Englishmen would welcome its return in some other guise. He deliberately gave his life, after hardships that would have daunted the bravest man who ever fought in Flanders, to cut off but one of the dragon's heads, and died content.

Livingstone notes, in that remotest corner of Africa, the wholesale demoralisation of society, the abandonment of cultivation in open valleys and plains and of such arts as spinning and weaving, the frequent treachery, the universal brutality and loss of natural feeling. He also notes how civilised and courteous, and how generous to himself many of those Arabs were who were engaged in so filthy a trade. They, of course, were not mainly responsible for a system which, like an immense machine, was actuated by distant forces. The sole motive of the long shame and agony of the African slave trade was the desire of profit in the hearts of men in Europe, Asia and America, who from their wealth were counted respectable beyond the ordinary, good husbands and fathers, God-fearing, church-going. That motive was blessed by the Church and encouraged by the State. Those who pursued it would have found it impossible to believe that results so pleasant to themselves, so highly rewarded by public reputation and public honours, were won, out of their sight in Africa, by unimaginable tortures and lusts and crimes. Lazarus still lies, unseen, at Dives' gate. The race that has fallen among thieves still sees the priest and the Levite pass by.

Africans in general have no memory of that age. Scarcely any, perhaps fortunately, knows what Europe owes Africa in return for wealth that cost so much destruction and degradation. But there is such a thing as racial

memory. On it the past has burnt, in the mind of all Africans, a picture of the European. It is of a person wonderfully clever, impossible to resist though sometimes successfully to be lied to, sometimes kind and sometimes cruel, but always inexorable in his demand that the African should labour for his profit. And that is the character which, in spite of emancipations and missions and schools, and the best intentions of the British public and the British Parliament, the European, as such, still bears in Eastern Africa.

In the main body of this book a description will be given of the aims and methods of the various groups of Europeans living in Kenya, official, missionary and those engaged in business of all kinds, of whom the chief are the owners of alienated land : the results of the activities of these various groups will also be described : and an account will be given of the controversy caused by the political and economic claims of the Indian community. One more preliminary chapter, however, is needed to explain what kind of people they were who during the past generation have been subjected to these influences from Europe and Asia, what they thought, how they governed themselves, how they were employed.

CHAPTER II

EAST AFRICAN LIFE OF YESTERDAY

Astonishingly little interest is taken in anthropology in Kenya. Every one recognises that missionaries are the people who know most about the particular languages and customs of the tribes they live among. A number of officials spend their leisure in studying native life, but those who do so rarely stay long enough in one place to get to know the people really well. It is very rare to find a European farmer, even when he lives near native villages, knowing the language spoken in them well enough to understand the people talking among themselves.

The works of Hollis on the Masai and Nandi, Hobley on the Kamba, Routledge on the Kikuyu are the best known books on Kenya tribes. But such books scarcely profess to give a picture of life. Their authors belong to the school of those whose aim is the exact description of objective facts. In Routledge's book, for instance, one finds pages of description of the patterns on Kikuyu shields, and a long list of the Kikuyu names for the various kinds and colours of trade beads. But if one wants to find out what happens when a Kikuyu builds a new house, whether it is only his nearest relatives who help him, or whether every one in his village does, and whether these helpers are paid and how they are paid, one cannot learn the facts from the book. Similarly, if one wants to know if the women who make and sell pots, or the men who dig and smelt iron-ore, or the men who make iron wire have to grow their

own food like other Kikuyu or if they buy food with the pots or wire they sell, the book is silent. One reason is no doubt that the Routledges never learned to speak Kikuyu, and of African languages only knew the impossibly inadequate speech called Swahili up country. But the chief reason for such omissions is that the Routledges were "observers" who gave things the primacy over people, and thought of people as productive of anthropological data, the queerer and more inexplicable the better.

One can of course get a true picture of *primitive* life from Tylor or Frazer. But there is nothing specially African about so general a survey of the primitive. Reading Frazer's *Golden Bough* in fact leaves one with the feeling of having been listening to an interminable series of variations on some simple tune, all so much alike that to catch any particular African variation is difficult, and to remember it scarcely possible.

The plan of this book demands a general account of what is distinctively African in the ideas and behaviour of Africans in Kenya. What is peculiar to Hamites or to Nilotes must be ignored. Most people in Kenya are Bantu, and all Bantu not merely speak languages that are closely related, but also have a common stock of ideas and culture. The reader of course will realise that this chapter is little more than a summary of what the writer has learned from books and in conversations.

Surnames of a kind are used in most tribes and many of them are the same in different tribes. Some are the names of animals that are in some loose sense totems. Others are words of which the meanings are lost. Natives of different tribes with the same surname regard themselves as distant relations. Except for that uncertain tie, membership of a tribe is an exclusive relation. All its members feel themselves to be related, and are supposed to be related by blood, even when differences of origin are known to have

existed. And by contrast people of other tribes are enemies as well as strangers, so that while it is thought disgraceful to let a fellow-tribesman go hungry, it is quite proper to let a stranger starve, even if he dies. The tribe is united by the use of a common language and a common law, and by intermarriages,[1] but scarcely ever acts together unless threatened by common danger or disaster.

Normally a tribe is divided into septs or clans, consisting of one or more villages. Villages vary in size from one household to hundreds of households. A village is the normal unit for the things a household cannot do alone, such as building houses and bridges. Pasture-land is always used in common by all the stock owners in a village, and all villagers have a common right to cut firewood in it. But arable land is not communal except in certain senses of the word. The rights of the individual occupier lapse if he abandons cultivation so that the land reverts to the wild state. Also, tribal law rarely allows an occupier to dispose of any rights in land to any but his rightful heir. And of course it allows no stranger any rights in land at all.

Among the Kikuyu, as with other tribes with a restricted area of arable land, the occupier is really a freeholder who is forbidden to alienate his land. In general, one may say that in Bantu Africa individual rights in arable land predominate over communal, so that, for instance, in the case of a man with two wives, each of them has her own land just as she has her own hut. Absolute ownership of land is an idea foreign to the thought of all the tribes in Kenya.

The Bantu tribes of Kenya are so homogeneous that scarcely any social distinctions exist among them. The only office found in every tribe is that of the medicine-man and in most tribes it is not usually hereditary.

Livingstone wrote that he knew of only two tribes

[1] But unions between men of one tribe and women of another were not unknown in former times and are to-day common.

in East Africa among whom slavery existed before the Arab invasion. The full facts about the various kinds of slavery indigenous to and introduced into Eastern Africa are accurately given in the chapter on the subject in Lugard's *Rise of Our East African Empire.*

The status of a slave is so vague in most of the tribes among whom slavery existed that it is often hard to find why people are called slaves at all. Livingstone notes that among the Wemba and Wanyamwezi a slave may divorce his master by breaking a bow in his presence. Once the divorce has taken place the old master can only get the slave back by buying him afresh.

One is safe in saying that slaves are nearly always the descendants of captives in war who are in process of losing their disabilities. Among the Yao, for instance, a certain chief had it alleged against him that his mother had been a slave, so that by the strict law he had no right to succeed. Actually, as he was an able man, the blot on his scutcheon was conveniently forgotten. In West Africa there have even been slave dynasties, ruling over their masters while still slaves.

Among the Kikuyu purity of descent from none but Kikuyu is so insisted on that one of the men whom thirty years ago the British Government appointed chiefs had to rent land, as by law he could own none, because his mother had belonged to some other tribe. On the other hand, in most tribes, adoption into a family, after an elaborate and expensive ceremonial, confers all the tribal privileges normally acquired at birth.

In some tribes people with a special craft, *e.g.* salt miners or workers in iron or copper, have a separate and inferior status, though they are never called slaves.

The prevalence of polygamy depends wholly on war. In no race in the world does the female birth-rate exceed the male, so that there can be no considerable excess of

adult females unless there is a large excess of deaths or migration among males.

Among the Kikuyu there were no chiefs until the Government appointed them for its own ends, and among the Kamba chiefs are of recent origin and have little power. Roscoe, describing what he found on a journey in 1884 through what is now Tanganyika territory, writes: "Until Unyamwezi was reached, a distance of 400 miles, there was not any chief commanding the respect of an entire tribe. . . . The people live in communities, which consist of clusters of huts." And again: "The office of chief carries no power or right to levy taxes or to control arable land. There are no taxes or tribute of any kind.[1] There is no difficulty in securing a field, the only restriction in occupying land is that of previous occupation. No chief lays claim to uncultivated land in his neighbourhood." Even of Ankole, a country with a regular hereditary monarchy, he writes: "The education of a prince differed in no wise from that of any ordinary herdsman; he had to learn how to manage cows and lived exactly as did the son of a herdsman in every respect; the only difference being that he was dressed in a mantle of coloured cow hides".

These descriptions suggest that personal or dynastic authority was neither long established nor fully developed. All the evidence, in fact, suggests that in Eastern Africa monarchy is the consequence of war (as it was among the Jews and in other races), particularly of the slave wars. Livingstone notes that "chiefs have scarcely any power unless they are men of energy". Early explorers often found chiefs because they expected to find them, and because Africans were as ready as other people to accept deference and gifts they had no right to. There is really no room in Bantu society for personal authority, except when, as formerly, external circumstances demanded a

[1] An inaccurate statement.

dictator, and when, as now, an alien government demands a native agent and mouthpiece.

Real authority rested with the tribal law, of which the source was the general opinion. But it so happened that just when Europeans first explored Eastern Africa the slave wars had led to the institution of chiefs or kings or tyrants in many East African tribes. In most cases the chief was elected, but with certain restrictions on choice. In some cases, especially when a strict system of hereditary succession rendered it necessary to surround the monarch with an elaborate ceremonial expressive of special sanctity, chiefs were arbitrary and bloodthirsty tyrants.

The main function of the chief of the more ordinary type was judicial. He voiced tribal opinion and, in some tribes, executed the tribal will when any tribesman suffered injury at another's hand. And he received, as a rule, certain fees of office, gifts of sheep or fowls or beer, as court fees, or on any one's marriage, also the skins of lions and leopards killed or found dead, and the tusk found next the ground of every dead elephant. In the tribes with political arrangements of the more primitive kind, such as the Kikuyu, the judiciary was composed merely of the elders of the families to which the parties to the suit belonged.

The basic conception of Bantu law is the duty of the community to protect private property in articles of purely personal use, proprietary rights in land, rights of control over others, such as wives and children, and, of course, the right of every tribesman to live without molestation or assault. The use of words, such as buying or selling, that are expressive of proprietary rights, is wider than with us. That is because the most obvious aspect of every human relationship is felt to be the proprietary rights that spring from it. Thus when a girl is spoken of as bought, or when ten cows are said to be a murdered man's price, it is erroneous to imagine that Africans think of women merely

as chattels. To some extent they do. But the dowry paid by a bridegroom to the bride's father is as essentially compensation for the loss of a food producer as when a similar sum is paid when a man loses a hand by the innocent act of another. In nearly every if not every tribe a girl can refuse a man as a husband. And though women have by custom a good half of the heaviest work to do, the carrying of water and firewood, most of the hoeing, and, hardest of all, the pounding and grinding of grain, they are fully as influential in both domestic and public affairs as they were in Victorian England. No man, for instance, dare touch his wife's food-store or cooking-pots. If she is cross and refuses to grind or cook, he must either appease her or starve, unless he goes to his mother's hut to live. In most tribal risings there is some old woman at the bottom of the trouble, who claims to have had the way to victory revealed to her. Men look after cattle, sheep and goats; and women as a rule may not eat meat. Men also do the first clearing of new land of stumps and bushes, a heavy task with nothing but wooden crowbars to do it with. They help with the hoeing, build houses and grain-stores, prepare skins and sew them as well as cloth into garments; and of course they defend the community from enemies, four-footed and two-footed.

Women are jealous of their customary rights and duties. European influence is of course disturbing the division of rights and duties between the sexes that was formerly customary. But as it acts by drafting males out of the villages it does not tend to reduce the share of work done by the woman for the support of the family.

Europeans not altogether disinterested often allege that Africans have women do all their heavy work for them, and that in any case the necessities of African life are easier got than with us. The first allegation is so far true that in an average tribe we may reckon the women's work to be

60 per cent, and the men's 40 per cent of the whole. No European who has had to depend for the necessities of life on wringing a livelihood out of African soil will agree with the second allegation, that nature in Africa is specially bountiful, and specially responsive to human art and endeavour.

The food supply is of course what gives most work. It is a constant anxiety. To quote Mr. Wilson:[1] "Night and day the fields must be watched, from the sowing, in November or December, until the maize is safely stored at the end of May. Baboons and monkeys are ever on the watch to sneak in by day. Wild pigs may swarm in by night. Then as the grain forms and ripens, birds must be scared away. One day or one night may be long enough to destroy most of the crops if the villagers neglect to watch." Planting is done by dropping a couple of seeds into a little hollow made by the toes in the ground, and then covering them over and pressing them in with the foot. Some Europeans when they see that being done imagine that is all the crop needs. But whenever the crop sown is high enough to be told from weeds, these have to be hoed in. This first hoeing is the chief one. But every month or so hoeing has to be repeated, or the weeds would smother the crop. It is very doubtful whether maize and millet would grow better on half-acre plots such as Africans use by a different method. Lack of fertilisers is of course a serious matter since it encourages the use of new ground every few years. Instead of changing crops altogether Africans generally grow beans or other legumes among maize or millet.

These three are the chief foodstuffs, but sweet potatoes and yams are much grown and specially relied on in dry years. It should never be forgotten that years of average

[1] *A Missionary's Life in Nyasaland*, by the Ven. G. H. Wilson, by far the best half-crown's worth in print on native life in Eastern Africa.

rainfall are rare in Africa. Floods are nearly as common as droughts. Rats and mice cause immense damage to growing crops every year, and occasionally increase incredibly so that one cannot walk about in the dark without treading on them. Growing a family food supply in Eastern Africa is no light task. Africans when at home never eat grain by itself. They either stir the flour into hot water and leave it warm all night, which partly malts it so as to be ready for drinking the next day, or make a thick porridge of the flour mixed with wild leaves and roots to flavour it. This thick porridge can be carried to work in lumps, wrapped in leaves.

Leaves and roots, though of no calorific value, are most important food ingredients. The lack of them in the rations issued to native workers by Europeans is a serious source of ill-health. The lack is easiest supplied by a frequent issue of sweet potatoes. It is often very difficult for large employers to grow green food.

Children in a Bantu village have a good time of it. Their schooling is just to follow their elders about and watch them at work. They may play whenever they like, except when crops are ripening, when all hands are needed, by night and day, to scare away birds, and rats, and larger animals. The little boys have also to herd the villagers' live stock, when there is any. Most of the time children roam about in bands, living sometimes in huts, where they eat and sleep together, and by day playing hand-ball or hunting birds and rats with bows and arrows. Children are rarely scolded and scarcely ever beaten.

Africans do not really live in houses. Their huts are used only to sleep in and for storing tools and cooking-pots and baskets. They sleep on the ground or on platforms of wood to keep fleas and ants away. Fowls are always kept in the huts at night to eat these insects. All work, of course, stops at sunset, when the chief meal of the day is

eaten. Then follow long talks round the fire in the village courtyard, when news is exchanged and everything in the narrow African world is discussed and decided on, while the naked children chase one another in the shadows until one by one they tire, creep unnoticed into the circle of talkers, fall asleep athwart people's legs and arms and get carried asleep to bed.

African life is too haunted by fear of disease and of other spirit-sent dangers to be happy after youth is over. Old age is never hale and has no comforts as with us. But for a few years youth takes its fling, dances through long moonlit nights, none too decorously, makes up dancing and singing parties that tour the countryside, and forgets all else but pleasure for as long as a month at a time. While after harvest, and at other special times, there are dances for all but the old, who instead have beer for their cold blood.

Some tribes, notably the Kikuyu, have markets, the smaller for a group of villages, the larger frequented by thousands at a time, at which once a week or oftener everything a Kikuyu wants is spread out on a bare hillside, and where grain and other foods, tobacco, firewood, sheep and fowls, skins dressed and undressed, baskets, pots, wire, beads, knives and now, of course, trade goods, calico, thread, needles, combs, mirrors, crockery, enamelled ware, umbrellas, are sold for cash or bartered. It is really remarkable how among perhaps two thousand people chaffering at the top of their voices in these markets there never is any quarrelling. Africans think worse of displays of temper than we do. Children get into passions as they do all the world over. Men very rarely do. Sulking is commoner and is openly laughed at.

Only two distinct trades are found in every Bantu tribe, including the most primitive like the Kikuyu, the making of clay pots, always done by women, and the smelting and working of iron, always done by men. The artistry of the

Kenya tribes is low compared with other Bantu. Evidence that native iron was used thousands of years ago is so strong that the best authorities believe its use to have spread from Africa to Europe and Asia. Every Bantu is a handy man. As Livingstone wrote: "We should be sorely put about if, without their skill, we had to maintain an existence here. All Africans have a good knowledge of soils and agriculture, hut building, basket making, the manufacture of bark cloth and skins for clothing, as also making of nets, traps, and cordage." African traps for catching small animals are marvels of neatness and ingenuity. And how many people in Europe could contrive to make water-tight baskets out of plaited grass or fibre?

Unhappily but inevitably all these arts and crafts, like spinning and weaving in the more advanced tribes farther south, are dying out. The making of hoes, wire and knives from native ore is already nearly obsolete everywhere in Eastern Africa.

As far as we have gone in this account of tribal affairs there has been nothing to suggest that tribal life is not free. There certainly is no outward sign, in tribal life, of servitude or tyranny. In actual fact, however, Africans live under a constant, all-pervading tyranny of their own inventing.

It is peculiarly hard for us to realise how profoundly the content of an African's mind differs from ours. Life to most Europeans is like a map with all the important places clearly charted. We know what the stars are made of, we can make lightning, can shut up the cause of disease in a test-tube, can predict eclipses: in a word, we know the processes of the material world so well that its forces are no longer dangerous to us. Our only real dangers are from one another. But to the African the whole material world is moved by unseen forces. Rain and sunshine, rivers and growing crops and disease are not mere things. They are things in action. Most Europeans do not ask

whose action, as Wordsworth remarked, who preferred paganism to insensibility. The statement that the actions are mechanical and purposeless contents them. That notion would seem quite unreasonable to Africans. For to them nature too obviously does things, things that determine human destiny. Rain may destroy by flood or it may enrich, dreams may terrify or reveal, smallpox may spare or ravage a valley—and these seem to the African not merely events, but acts. To us a spring in a rock is a thing, explained by the action of gravity on water restricted by impermeable strata. To Africans gravity would seem a far more fanciful hypothesis than his own that the spring is alive, breathing in its breaking bubbles. Their whole world is alive. A pebble is the child of the rock as clearly as a kid is the child of the goat. In their view we never see the whole of anything any more than we can see the whole of a man.

Be it observed that on that view life is by no means inexplicable. On the contrary, it is full of a multitude of things that can be known by what they do, and sometimes, though never with certainty, controlled by what men can do. It seems strange to us that men should believe that curses can cause disease, or sacrificing a goat bring rain. And indeed there is no real explanation of the fact that people think that by magic they can move material things. Mascots are believed in by a certain kind of people in our own age just because they are wholly inexplicable and irrational. Europeans who believe in them consider themselves sensible people. They at least should be able to understand why an African turns back on a journey if he sees a certain bird on his left hand, or shrinks from letting any one's shadow fall on him. So also with another character of primitive African life. To civilised people beliefs and opinions exclude their opposites. In the African's mind contradictories are not felt to be in-

compatible. They are even felt to be necessary. The world he knows is so various, and the actions he encounters so conflicting that their explanations are naturally contradictory too.

An African's life thus moves among and collides with a vast number of what we can only call forces in action. As evil haps in life far outnumber good haps, these forces are plainly for the more part malevolent. They must be evaded or defeated somehow. Thus disease and death, these the chief of all evils, as well as rain, famine, wild beasts—everything that makes the life of man painful or unhappy or short, is the work of living forces that can sometimes at least be countered.

Plainly to steer one's way safely among so many invisible dangers is no easy matter. So the African invents a host of rules and prohibitions to meet the host of his enemies. Speaking generally, diseases and all other misfortunes are due either to the sufferer's own wrongdoing, innocent or not, or to some one else's malevolence, or to the spirits either of the dead or of unknown origin.

The most numerous class, perhaps, of all human troubles is due to one's own faults. These sins are endless and often to us trivial, wearing clothes outside in by mistake, for instance, or eating food cooked in a cracked pot: many are sexual in origin, such as catching sight of a woman before her purification after labour: some, though few, are what we call moral, such as eating the new crop before village or tribal authority has signified permission. The moral law is, in fact, sanctioned and enforced by the same beliefs and the same penalties as in the case of purely ceremonial offences. To a Kikuyu, treading on a human bone by accident is just as sinful as theft or adultery, and its guilt is purged in the same way, by a purifying sacrifice as expensive as is required by a moral offence.

In the primitive stage of society, of course, most sins

are not moral wrongs. King Saul, for instance, was punished by God's prophet for sparing a prisoner's life. Hence the difficulty of knowing whether among Africans the disgrace of having committed a sin, the sense of uncleanness, is accompanied by any feelings of guilt and penitence. We justify the moral code by the anti-social character of the acts it prohibits. We prove its necessity by pointing to the consequences of its infraction, although in fact we dare not allow ourselves to determine each act's rightness or wrongness by examining either our own motives in performing it or the results of its performance. But in African tribal society the results of touching a dead body are just as universally recognised to be bad as the results of theft. One supposes that even in the most primitive societies people feel some penitence for anti-social behaviour that is not felt for other sins, for eating food cooked in a pot into which a bead had fallen, for instance. But certainly Africans have not by themselves reached the stage so plainly marked in Jewish history by the Decalogue, an achievement so striking that, in spite of its obvious faults and omissions, it is even now used in worship in every country in Europe, and venerated as sacred by most of mankind.

Our unlettered ancestors could leave no record of that stage of their civilisation which, two thousand years ago, corresponded with African life thirty years ago. But we can breathe its atmosphere still in the ancient Jewish Scriptures. In the first book of Samuel, for instance, we are told about the ark or box of wood that symbolised the presence of Jahveh with His people. After losing one battle the Jewish army sends for the ark so as to be invincible in the next. But a flaw in ceremonial procedure leads to an even heavier defeat and the ark itself is captured. Its presence in the temple of the victorious Philistines makes their god Dagon fall to the ground so that his hands

are broken off, and brings an epidemic of plague on the people. Anxious to be rid of the ark, the Philistines send it back together with images of rats in gold to appease the god that sent the plague. The people of the first village over the Jewish border look into the ark and 50,000 of them perish because of the impiety.

The whole story is exactly in tune with African ideas. The golden rats express the visible form of the epidemic, as the closest contact with its hidden reality possible to man. Twice over, thousands of innocent people die for some ignorant man's breach of etiquette. To Jews three thousand years ago, as to Africans to-day, all life's mishaps and dangers were the penalties of sin, with, of course, the great difference that while with Israel Jahveh was a jealous God, who forbade and punished the fear and worship of other spirit powers, in Africa these still fill the earth and sky and underworld, though known only by the evil they do.

The sufferer's own wrongdoing, or the unintentional profanations of others are not the only causes of evil. Some misfortunes are due to the malevolence of others. Disease in particular is often due to an enemy's machinations, with or without a medicine-man's help. Some fragment of the person's body is a necessary ingredient in the best charms, so Africans always carefully destroy nail parings and shaved hairs, in case some one might use them to do them hurt.

A third source of ill is spirit power. In some tribes spirits are excessively numerous, and one sees everywhere little flags or heaps of stones on the ground to keep them away, or tiny shelters with occasional handfuls of food in them for the spirits' use. More universal is the fear of the spirits of the dead, who are liable to transmigration and to endanger their acquaintances in animal form.

West African tribes have built upon these fears of witchcraft and of evil spirits a hideous pantheon of malig-

nant demons, delighting in cruelty and only appeased by human blood. The imagination of the purely Bantu tribes is less fiendishly inventive. The Kikuyu are conspicuously free from the worst kinds of witchcraft and demon worship, and never use poison, as most tribes do, in trials by ordeal.

How, it may now be asked, is a sufferer to tell in which of these many ways his suffering has arisen? How can he know, when taken ill, whether it was because his bedstead broke last year and he was too lazy to get purification, or because some one has bewitched him, or because a snake somebody killed in the village the week before was really his dead grandfather? Or if a bridge breaks and a man is drowned, is the stream angry, or was the man bewitched, or what?

All these questions are answered and appropriate remedies provided, in return for the proper fees, by witch-doctors or medicine-men. In the writer's view these are people of exceptional intelligence who make their living, just as palmists do to-day, by encouraging superstitions they do not share. Certainly true of the Africa of to-day, that view was probably also true of the Africa of yesterday. One never now sees a wizard in his glory. His bag of tricks is merely a horn and a tail or two and a few old knuckle-bones. This description[1] may serve for the palmier times of witchcraft:

> Hence, when any native dies, his friends are certain that he has been slain by witchcraft, and at once call in the witch-detective, who will discover the guilty witches and remove their dangerous horns.
>
> Although a male detective has appeared in the past history of these tribes, all the witch-detectives that I have seen were female. They are in one aspect the most important personages in the country. At present two reside at Lake Chirwa; they belong to the same fraternity, one is called Chipembere (Rhinoceros), and the other Tambala (Cock). Many speak as if the office now belonged entirely

[1] Pp. 207-211, vol. i. of Duff Macdonald's *Africana*.

to females. A native in ordinary conversation often remarks, "If I have any misfortune I will go to the woman", and when pronouncing a person guilty, the terrible functionary ends her speech with the words, "Thus saith the woman". The detective, when called to investigate a case of death, appoints a day for the ceremony. She goes with a strong guard of armed men, and although her meetings are frequent, people crowd to them from great distances. Her approach causes as much excitement as a public execution would do in a quiet English town, with this difference, that the assembled multitude cannot tell who will be the victim. At sunrise the drums begin to beat and are heard over the whole countryside; about three hours after, all the villages in the district are deserted. Their inhabitants, men, women, and children, are to be seen hurrying to the "witch-dance". On arriving they sit in a circle, and leave a large space in the centre for the "Woman". She is waited for with breathless anxiety. After a time wild screams are heard, and there rushes before the spectators the maddest-looking person conceivable. A stranger concludes at once that one witch has been captured already and is now driven before the detective. The wretch looks as if she were haunted by all the Furies and Demons of Pagan Mythology. Her face, breast, and arms are marked with patches of blood-red. Her head is covered, not with short negro wool, but with snaky tresses which hang down her back. Her loins are girt with leopard skins. Her legs are overhung with "rattles", which sound at every step. In her hand she grasps a scourge of tails, which she waves wildly about her. Her eyes roll and stare in her fierce frenzy. She is evidently surrounded by fiends, which though invisible to others, are dreadful realities to her. With them she maintains a desperate struggle, ever trying to beat them off with her scourge. After wrestling thus she utters shrieks of the most unearthly character, and with a terrible bound dashes into the circle, and we have before us the witch-detective herself. Once in the middle of the crowd, she shouts and rants, sings and dances, eats grass and chews branches for several hours. Of her chants some are common in the district, others, in the Walolo language, contain a sound of the letter *r* that the Yao cannot pronounce. She chaffs them for their awkwardness, and notwithstanding the grave nature of her ceremony, she succeeds in drawing smiles from the multitude. In some of her chants she boasts of her power. "Let the bewitcher

become a leopard or a carrion crow yet", she cries, "there can be no escape". A large part of the crowd are in a state of terrible suspense. Each person knows that from three to five people will be "detected", and what if he be among the number? The first time I was at a witch-dance I was not free from concern! The bewitchers, however, will either be relatives of the deceased or persons that had had a quarrel with him.

As the decisive moment arrives, the detective asks the hand of every one in the crowd as she chants the appropriate words:—

"Pasa manja Chipembere (Give Chipembere your hand). Pasa manja Chipembere."

Response.—"E, e, e, e, e, e, e."

The instant she touches the hand of a bewitcher she leaps back with a terrible start and utters a wild scream. Another method of detecting is by smelling, and this she brings into use at various stages of the investigation. Soon after feeling the hands of the spectators, she retires from the scene literally drenched with sweat. She has found out the whole secret. But the triumph of her art is not yet fully disclosed, and soon she proceeds to reveal where the witches have hid their horns. Taking a hoe and a pot of water, she marches off for the purpose, followed by hundreds of the crowd whose curiosity is most intense, and who begin to share her savage manner. She goes to the forum, to the stream that supplies the villagers with water, and to their various houses. At a spot where she wishes to dig she pours out water to soften the ground. During her digging, she groans, shrieks, and gesticulates in the most frantic way. She succeeds in finding the horns most readily. One set she digs up at the stream; "they were placed there to bewitch the water drunk by the deceased". Another bunch she finds under a tree in the village. She looks up, and pointing to some fading branches at the top, she exclaims, "No wonder that this tree has begun to wither". Every spectator is dumb with astonishment and terror. No one will dare to touch these horns. It would be fatal to do so. They were buried by the bewitchers, and are the very means by which the deceased was killed. All are greatly relieved when these potent spells are removed by the "Woman", who will doubtless find them useful on another occasion.

The witch-detective always spends one night at the village where

she is employed. She is then permitted to wander about at midnight, under the pretence of going to watch at the graves. Should she find any one out of his house at that hour, she catches him and brings forward this suspicious circumstance against him. To be found at night by the witch-detective is one of the most unfortunate things that could happen to any man. Even if he has not been already recommended as a victim, he is certain to be now among the guilty. While the detective goes about at midnight among the houses, she is supposed to be unknown to the witches. Sometimes she begs for food, and the witches, thinking she is one of their own fraternity, give her some human flesh. This hospitality she ungratefully rewards, for the flesh said to be thus prepared she produces as evidence against the person that gave it.

Besides horns, the detective may dig up arms, legs, and other portions of human bodies in suspicious places in or near the houses of the witches. The whole process of unearthing is of a nature to satisfy a craving for magic, and if more harmless, would be intensely humorous. There is no saying what the witch-detective may "find", and she seems as much surprised at her discovery as any of the spectators!

People who glorify primitive life as free and happy forget the weight upon it of these unseen forces and the results of belief in them. They make all life a succession of escapes from confused, conflicting and uncertain dangers. Worse even than the gloom and horrors are the cruelties and injustices they give rise to. All over Africa labour pains are believed to be proportionate to a woman's virtue, so that an easy labour is proof of good character while a difficult one, or a still-birth, or a malformed child is proof of infidelity.

A boy was once brought to the author with the following history. A woman in his village had given birth to a child feet first. Several years later she had got this boy to wash a cloth her child had worn. Soon after the boy was taken ill with a skin disease, alleged to be leprosy. The boy's father demanded compensation for the injury done to his child

from the father of the child that had been born feet first. In African opinion the woman had been shockingly selfish and careless, and her husband was legally and equitably liable to pay compensation for the suffering his wife had caused.

Ignorance, and its offspring, fear, are far greater evils than many imagine, even in our own life. People who suppose that Africans are proved by their superstitions to be their inferiors should remember how little more than two hundred years ago our country disgraced itself by burning many innocent women as witches every year, and how the great majority of those who were convicted of poisoning in Europe before the XIXth century were unjustly executed.

Primitive African religion is thus in the main this mass of rules and prohibitions, due to the conception that man is at every point in contact with living things in action. Out of that belief, which is supported by the universal opinion, there arises a code of conduct which comprises, without distinction, creed, ethic, law, patriotism, religion and good manners.

There are two other elements which we distinguish in African religion, though Africans themselves do not. Dreams about dead people are undoubtedly the origin of belief in their survival as spirits. A good son would daily sprinkle a little flour on the ground for his dead father and would often pray at the little hut he had built for his father's spirit.

The African spirit world is vague and dark and cold. Its inhabitants would fain return to sunlight and old friends, and are often heard and even felt in the village at night, when a leaf brushes past, or boughs groan, or flutterings and rustlings are heard in the wind. One can meet them, too, on mountain ridges at dusk, flitting behind the trees and bushes, or pattering uncertainly like driven leaves

along the path. Most of all, perhaps, they frequent caves, gorges and waterfalls in the hills, remote from living society. One story told all over Africa is of two men who went to cut timber near a gorge in the hills. One of them, on his way home, remembered he had left his axe behind. The other, hoping to steal it, said good-night to his friend when they parted, but instead of going home went back to find the axe. When he got to the gorge it was nearly dark. As he stooped down for the axe he was seized by dead men, who wanted to drag him away, but let him go on his promising to say nothing of what he had seen and heard. When he got home he behaved so strangely that people asked him what had happened to him. He shook his head, but in the end they bothered him so much that he told them everything. In three days he was dead.

The last element in African religion is belief in and worship of the supreme being. He is known of in every tribe, vaguely, as creator and general supervisor, and as the author of the more general forces of nature that affect human life, sunshine, floods, famine, smallpox. He lives on some mountain-top and speaks in the thunder. Only important people may address him. When they do so they ask him publicly for the blessings of life, good harvests, long life, security from war and pestilence.

Belief in one God is of course the invariable result of reflection upon the fact that the world is one, however variable and apparently capriciously the forces it contains may behave. But as Africans had no books through which men who think things out might have taught the world's unity they do not think of God as in complete control of everything, as the great religions teach. To them the universe is emphatically not the work of one mind, nor do they regard experience as part of one consistent plan. Rather is their idea the one the unreflective majority of

people in Europe have too, with the difference that while in Europe people think of God as occasionally intervening in a natural order that is itself mechanical and automatic, Africans think of these forces as vital and multiple and of the great God as merely one of them.

The foregoing account of African religion is of course not a picture, but a dissection. That is the only way people like us can deal with the subject. Unhappily the result of the dissection of ideas is a parody of the ideas themselves as they really exist in life, just as the result of the dissection of a man's body is quite unlike a man.

The reader must be warned that no right judgement about the quality or value of the mind of an individual or of a group of individuals can be derived from the study of the content of a mind or minds. Most people imagine that the fact of Africans believing things we have disproved proves their mental inferiority to Europeans. Anthropology proves that such ideas prevailed, even with astonishing identity as to detail, in every human group, tribal, national and racial. And there is no scrap of evidence to suggest that mental capacity and ability in any group have improved in the course of the evolution of its ideas. The opinion of scientists, anthropologists and philosophers alike is that the minds of our ancestors five thousand years ago were not inferior to our own. Our sole gain lies in a laboriously acquired and precariously as well as laboriously transmitted mass of knowledge and ideas and habits, no part of which is ever the sole achievement of any single man or of any isolated community. No one owes his mental heritage to his own ancestors alone. He is in debt to the whole civilised world.

Thus the fact that East African society thirty years ago was at the same stage of civilisation as existed among the peoples of Northern Europe two thousand years ago does not prove that an ordinary African child to-day is unable to

learn and practice what an ordinary European child learns and does. He may in fact be the inferior of the European child, in character or in mental capacity, or in both. But the fact that he lives in a less civilised community does not prove it.

Those who wish to examine the available evidence on the question of the character and capacity of Africans as a race must consult *The Black Man's Place in South Africa*, by Peter Nielsen.[1] It is the first impartial and scientific investigation of the relevant facts to be published.

One can only say that the whole question is still open, as open as any question can be. All the alleged physical proofs of inferiority have broken down. No mental tests of a scientific kind have as yet been carried out. There is hope that the lack will soon be supplied by the use of the "Binet" tests of intelligence for children of school age. Their fault is that they cannot exclude the influence of environment on intelligence. But when applied, as in South Africa they might be, to large enough groups of children with parents having approximately equal incomes, and so differing only in racial origin, results of the greatest importance may be expected. Nearly every one in Africa who may read these words will be shocked with the doubt they express of the postulate so universally accepted in Africa, that the average African is inherently inferior to the average European. No one, however, who is familiar with the ordinary data of comparative anthropology can feel certain that the common view is right. Take, for example, the subject on which rightly so much stress is laid by those who believe they can prove the inferiority of Africans, the place of women in African society. Wives are bought, and widows pass with other property to the husband's next male heir. These statements are substantially true. But does it not make the facts appear in a different light to know that

[1] Published by Messrs. Juta & Co., of Capetown, for 4s.

two, three or five thousand years ago, Roman, Greek, Jewish, and in fact every other people of whom we have knowledge, followed the same customs, down even to minute detail? Vinogradoff[1] writes thus of marriage among all the Aryans in early historical times: "Marriage by purchase, the 'coemptio' of Roman law, is well established as the most common form. At first sight it seems exceedingly brutal, as if the woman were treated as a slave or an animal. Some notion of this kind underlies certain of the facts under discussion, but it is not the principal one. The object of the transaction was in reality not a person, but power, 'manus' or 'mund'. The very name of a legitimately married wife in old Norse law, 'mundi Kjobt', implies that the legal wife is one whose 'mund' has been purchased." So also with the Levirate, as it is called, the inheritance of a widow by her dead husband's brother. In the story of Ruth, the heroine, in search of a home amid the alien corn, offers herself to her dead husband's cousin Boaz. But he, though willing, may not take her until a still nearer relation of her husband's has publicly repudiated his rights or duties. By a reference to the law in the New Testament we know that it was even then scarcely obsolete. Hundreds of other similarities and identities might be adduced. Do they not suggest that they all grew in the same mental soil and that in such matters differences of race scarcely exist? The fact of this matter is that neither people who believe that their prosperity depends on Africans remaining under the political and economic control of Europeans, nor those people who are accustomed to authority over Africans, are very safe judges of their capacities and characters. Wealth and authority are the two great corrupters of the mind. Those who are blessed, or cursed, with neither find that increasing intimacy in time dissolves the envelope that at first hinders a European's

[1] Sir Paul Vinogradoff, *Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence*, vol. i. p. 248.

attempt to understand Africans. One comes somehow to assume that there is nothing in their life that greater sympathy and knowledge and a more reasonable imagination would not explain, that in fact one is, in dealing with Africans, in the presence of no other difficulty than the common human incalculable.

Nor can one ignore certain objective facts which, so far as they go, certainly do not suggest mental inferiority in Africans. Over most of Africa a game is played, called "Bao" in Swahili. There are various kinds of "Bao", which is played with counters on a board or on the ground, just as there are various card games among us. The easiest kind of "Bao" is about as complicated and difficult as draughts. The harder kinds are harder than chess. The author has only known one European who could ever beat a good native player at one of these harder kinds. Yet these difficult kinds are enthusiastically played among the more primitive tribes.

Again, hypothetically there must have been a stage in human development when language consisted of a few simple sounds. Of that stage we have no actual evidence. The most primitive people of all, in Australia and in North America, speak languages with so intricate a grammar that scarcely any European can learn one after childhood. A Bantu language is less intricate than these. But it abounds in case and tense signs, different ways of forming the plural, and other devices that, while they succeed most admirably in their purpose of expressing exact meanings and relations, are most difficult to people whose language, like English, has only the broken fragments of a grammar. Some of the formations, such as the expressing of the relative by a syllable embedded in the verb, between its personal prefix and its root, are very neat and clear, and obviously superior to our device of turning interrogatives into relatives by merely changing their place in a sentence. But it is a less

admirable feature to have no tense for the past in general, a lack that is not supplied by a superabundance of particular past tenses, one for events of this morning, another for those of yesterday, another for those of last week, and still another for things done long ago. It is most remarkable how well the terms of Latin and Greek grammar fit a Bantu language. The African subjunctive is, for instance, nearly identical with the Latin.

One learns a good deal from trying to learn an African language, especially when difficulties of translation remind us that words like " impression " and " spirit " began as metaphors, and one has to hunt about for similar metaphors, hoping that they will be no more misleading to Africans than our own are to us. By comparing their language with ours we can see as in a mirror the road they have to travel. It matters little that like Homer's Greeks they have no exact words for the primary colours. The chief thing they have to learn is to give exact meanings for things of the mind to words that now only mean material things. Missionaries find the task of doing that for them extremely difficult, and often cut the knot by introducing new words from English just as the priests did for our ancestors. One wonders whether, in spite of the opposition it would arouse, it would not be better for missions to teach more English, if only as a general mental stimulant and enlightener.

There are stupid people in every human society, but somehow they seem less prominent in African society than in ours; there certainly are fewer purely or nearly meaningless phrases in common colloquial use. The probable reason is that in the more primitive Bantu tribes, such as those in Kenya, there is no class owing special influence to wealth, whether inherited or acquired by the various methods that among us the law allows. In South and West Africa, of course, class distinctions have grown up which endow men of birth and men of wealth with special

privileges and influence. But in most East African tribes it is very noticeable, even when rank is already recognised, that the tendency is to make little of it. Thus a chief may, though fully qualified by ancestry and the public choice and official approval, lose all his influence in a few years to some nobody with nothing but a public reputation for sagacity and just dealing.

In African conversations wit and humour play a large part. Ironic speech, among us curiously confined to certain sections of the population, is very common. With Europeans whom they dislike Africans pretend to be excessively stupid, wear a vacant face and give fatuous answers. This kind of rudeness is partly defensive.

A very high proportion of Africans are capable of engaging in public debate. They are tremendous talkers. The great feature of their public speaking in their judicial proceedings, and in their ordinary conversation as well, is not so much rhetoric as vividness in describing people in action. A judicial trial is mainly a series of eloquent descriptive pictures by witnesses on both sides, each trying to explain the facts in such a way as to convince the audience that his side is wholly in the right of it. Witnesses are not expected to state relevant facts within their own knowledge, and are neither examined nor cross-examined. In fact they are not expected to speak the truth in our sense of the word. In our view, a judge should give weight to nothing that is not adduced in public evidence. African judges are supposed to know everything about a case before the trial begins. But it would be bad form for the party in the wrong to admit anything until it has made a creditable defence. So, after spending days in proving out of many mouths an artistic and surprisingly coherent falsehood, the prosecutor or defendant withdraws with his friends, and after private talk decides to admit that his story, though as all, he hopes, will admit, admirably fabricated and

skilfully presented, has to his regret the one slight defect of being totally untrue.[1]

There is no doubt at all that Africans, in East Africa at least, have less shame in telling lies than civilised people. Even after they learn that shame, they are apt to be truthful only to people whom they like or respect.

Duff Macdonald writes (*Africana*, vol. i. p. 262):

"Telling lies" is much practised and is seldom considered a fault. The way in which it comes before the European is like this. He enters the country with half-a-dozen bath-towels expecting them to last for a long time. In a few weeks the majority of them have disappeared. He then begins to open his eyes and in a short time he sees his "boy" making off with the last of them. I have been much amused at the earnestness with which the new-comer will exclaim: "I actually saw him take it and found it in his hands, and yet he denied!" In such cases the denial of the native is made all the stronger. What is wanting in probability must be supplied by boldness. The negro often thinks that he is flattered by being accused of falsehood. So, when natives wish to pay a high compliment to a European who has told them an interesting story, they look into his face and say, "O father, you are a great liar!"

[1] Stubbs (*Constitutional History of England*, vol. i. p. 609) writes thus of the earliest English Courts in England: "They were tribunals of fully qualified members of the Community, a selection it might be from a body of equally competent companions, able to declare the law or custom of the country, and to decide what, according to that custom, should be done in the particular case brought before them. They were not set to decide what was the truth of facts, but to determine what action was to be taken upon proof given. The proof was itself furnished by three means, the oaths of the parties to the suit and their compurgators, the production of witnesses, and the use of the ordeal.

"The complainant addressed his charge to the defendant in solemn traditional form: the defendant replied to the complainant by an equally solemn verbal and logical contradiction. The compurgators swore, with joined hands and in one voice, to the purity and honesty of the oath of their principal. Where the oath was inconclusive, the parties brought their witnesses to declare such knowledge as their position as neighbours had given them; the court determined the point to which the witnesses must swear and they swore to that particular fact. They were not examined or made to testify all they knew, but swore to the fact on which the judges determined that evidence should be taken. If the witnesses also failed the ordeal was used."

That was written nearly fifty years ago. By this time one may say that perhaps most Africans in Kenya are beginning to think it scarcely right to tell lies.

Many Africans are avaricious, but on the whole the fault is not specially conspicuous among them. In any case, it is condemned by native opinion, and greedy people are always made fun of.

Pilfering from Europeans is very common. It is due to the common opinion that all Europeans are very rich, rich enough, that is, never to be in danger of going short of food and clothing, even if they do no real work, or what the African regards as real work. We shall perhaps look on this fault more reasonably if we remember how many among ourselves do not feel it wicked to defraud a railway company or the income tax people.

The fault that every one recognises as the most serious in the African character is one that can only be described by a number of negative terms. The African is lacking in initiative, has little or no sense of personal responsibility, is unreliable. He is not a man of his word. He cannot be trusted to carry out an undertaking to the end if the end is a long way from the beginning, if a more attractive competing project presents itself, if he gets tired or feels unwell, or if for any one of a hundred other reasons the desire of accomplishment fails for a time. He is very good at finding a way round or a way out of a thing, very bad at seeing a thing through and sticking it out. And he is, as a rule, quite unashamed of cowardice.

These statements are of course only true of tribal life. African soldiers soon learn to be as brave as anybody. Their astonishment when, at the beginning of the War, they saw their officers deliberately face the risk of being killed soon turned into admiration and emulation. Also it must never be forgotten that in African opinion an open conflict of opinion is very bad manners. Rather than annoy a

European by a refusal an African will eagerly promise anything. No one with experience of backward European communities will be able to regard this weakness of character as racial at all. The capacity to conceive and carry through a plan directed to an ulterior end is entirely proportionate to civilisation. What else can have converted the instability and frequent treachery of the earlier periods of Irish nationalism into the unconquerable determination of the Irish in recent years?

We must realise, furthermore, that this fault or weakness is the reverse side of a primitive virtue. That tribal solidarity which makes it impossible for any to starve so long as any one else has food left also makes it impossible for one man to stand alone, and, since division neither of opinions nor of interests can be allowed, turns minorities into outlaws. What happens daily in every English village, where some have less food than they need while others have far more than they can eat, would seem to Africans too atrocious to be credible.

Nor as regards liberty of opinion does the English village come so very well out of the comparison. For centuries the squire and the parson, and now the larger farmers, have decided and arranged everything. In an African village, though unanimity is felt to be a strict necessity, it is normally preceded by free discussion in which all partake. In an African village nothing is decided without infinite talk. A parish meeting in England merely endorses what a few people have decided beforehand. In neither case do individuals deliberately try to think for themselves. Certainly Africans never think of forming separate personal judgements. Nor do they feel it a duty to form a personal code of conduct. Hence they are specially liable to fall into vice and crime when plucked out of tribalism and transported to the world of European ideas where the responsibility of separate personalities is insisted on.

Foreign, and especially Christian, ideas are of course rapidly transforming these conceptions. They give men separate souls, to be separately saved or damned. It would be miraculous if the change were wholly for the better. But already the essential ideas of civilisation are widely prevalent. There are thousands of Africans in Kenya who are as trustworthy as any European. Ordinary Africans are not. One is very apt to forget how weak and helpless ignorant people are. It is perhaps, indeed, permissible to doubt whether in any society, of whatever race, it is either reasonable or right to expect virtue to be solitary and unaided.

Related to this lack of what we call individualism in Africans is their docility and humility. Unless they are Christians or Moslems they scarcely ever resent being treated as inferiors, and often do not seem even to resent injustice, which merely encourages those who deal unjustly with them. That partly explains why they so often seem to expect injustice, and why some of them, expecting to be defrauded, act fraudulently themselves.

Education is of course a miracle worker, and the Indian agitation is happily, though with first results that are by no means happy, beginning to make Africans realise that their servitude need not last for ever, and that some day they may win back both their country and their liberty.

Africans for three centuries have suffered wrongs unequalled by any other people. Such wrongs do not purify. They stain and sear and blacken men's hearts and minds. The worst crime oppression commits is to make men unfit to be free. Yet it is only liberty itself that can lift the curse. A new air is blowing in the world. Any people who, like the Africans of Kenya, are determined to learn to read will soon be determined to be free.

CHAPTER III

RECENT HISTORY

As was noted in the first chapter, a large sector of Africa lying north and east of Lake Victoria Nyanza practically escaped the slave trade. Both Kenya Colony and the Uganda Protectorate lie within that sector. This immunity was partly due to geographical conditions. And as these conditions have been determinant of events to an even greater degree since slavery was abolished, some account of them is necessary.

In the Uganda Protectorate, as it happens, there are, in the kingdoms of Uganda and Ankole, societies more advanced than any others with a purely African origin of which we have certain knowledge. In them feudalism and caste had, by the time they were discovered by Europeans, completely supplanted primitive tribal democracy. No such political evolution had taken place in any tribe now included in Kenya.

An account has already been given of the coastal strip, still nominally subject to the Sultan of Zanzibar, and inhabited by a people of mixed racial origins called Swahili. All along this part of the East African coast, from the Italian boundary at Kismayu on the north to the former German boundary at Wasin on the south, both population and industry have greatly declined.

Under Moslem law all occupied land on the coast was the freehold property of the owners of the slaves who cultivated it. The legislation by which all the land in the

rest of British East Africa was expropriated to the Crown could not be applied to these occupied areas. Waste land, however, was expropriated under the laws referred to. And the term was interpreted so widely that even large parts of the island of Mombasa, which only measures three miles by two, and contained an ancient city of 24,000 people, were adjudged by our courts to have no private owner and hence to be Crown land. Much of the Crown land on the coast with any value has already been disposed of to concessionaires. And nearly all the land formerly belonging to Arab slave owners has passed, by sale, into the hands of European syndicates and individuals. Indians own a number of small estates.

A range of low hills overlooks the East African shore.[1] In these hills the soil is rocky and, in the northern parts, rainfall is scanty. They are sparsely inhabited by a group of primitive Bantu tribes. Behind these low hills that overlook the shore lies the Taru Desert. In the northern half of the colony this nearly uninhabitable belt of country stretches right to the head-waters of the Nile, cutting off the mountains of Abyssinia from the Kenya highlands. These highlands themselves are the northernmost part of a huge irregular area of mountain and plateau that is seen, on a contour map, to extend, between the central lakes and the Indian Ocean, from Kenya Mountain, on the fringe of the desert, to Basutoland. Along the frontier between Kenya and Tanganyika Territory (formerly German East Africa) the desert encroaches on the highlands—where the soda deposits worked by the Magadi Company are—and nearly cuts off the Kenya highlands from the central plateau. So this area, that already in one generation has cost our country many millions of money and Africa hundreds of thousands of lives, is really a fertile island set in a desert sea, with deserts north, east and south

[1] The frontispiece map will make the following pages clear.

of it. Kenya Mountain rises from its north-eastern corner, covered with eternal snow though exactly on the Equator. Standing on one of its north-eastern spurs, where the same swallows that visit us in summer chase among the cedars, and in the glen below the torrent runs clear and cold from off the snow, one can see, in the clear air that follows the rains, the desert stretching illimitably north and east, shimmering and blistering in the sun's intolerable heat. While seen far off from the desert the mountain looks like the landfall of some island continent, rising from a sea of broken hills covered with thorn-scrub.

This, then, is the picture of Kenya Colony the reader must keep in view. Of its 240,000 square miles the greater part is desert, some of it nearly rainless, some affording scanty pasture for nomad tribes just as the interior of Arabia does. Apart from the narrow coastal strip, the only land of any value in Kenya lies in this island of mountain and plateau and in the small plain lying between the highlands and Lake Victoria Nyanza.

The shores of this island are 4000 to 5000 feet above sea-level. Its highest peaks are 12,000 to 15,000 feet high. Down the middle of the island there runs, from north to south, the Rift Valley with some half-dozen lakes, but no river on its floor, a broad cleft in the earth's surface with walls sometimes straight and precipitous, sometimes lost in a jumble of hills of fantastic shape. Geologists trace this valley, which Gregory was the first to describe, from the Dead Sea, through the Red Sea, to Tanganyika Lake and the Zambesi.

Thus Eastern Africa is quite unlike the Africa of tradition and romance, a region of steaming river-valleys and dense forests. Except on the sea, the low country in Eastern Africa is desert, and nearly all the people live thousands of feet above sea-level.

This, then, in summary is what Kenya is like. A strip

on the sea-coast, too dry in the north, with rain enough in the south; a vast desert in which the lion, the rhinoceros, the zebra, the giraffe and the antelope far outnumber its human tenants, a desert that covers nearly 200,000 square miles out of the total area of 240,000; in the south-western quadrant a fertile island of mountain and valley and lake and plateau and forest some 35,000 square miles large; to the west a lake as large as a sea, with a fertile plain between lake and mountains. The Economic Commission, an official body representing both the Government and private interests, set up just after the war, estimates the area of the colony lying over 5000 feet above sea-level as 35,000 square miles. Some 5000 square miles are at 8000 feet and over. Above that height life is difficult, partly from the exertion that labour involves, partly from the extremes of temperature, 80° to 85° soon after midday and frost before sunrise on clear nights. Three thousand square miles are covered with forests and lakes. Many thousand of the remaining 27,000 square miles are either so broken and hilly or so lacking in permanent water as to be useless.

The Commission estimates the total area under cultivation in the colony as less than 3000 square miles. There is no official estimate of the total area of land that can be considered arable. Excluding the coast lands, 10,000 square miles would be a generous estimate of the total arable area.[1] Of that 10,000 square miles of arable land more than half is included in the 7500 square miles alienated to Europeans, chiefly on the Uasin Gishu and Laikipia plateaus in the north of the highlands, in the Rift Valley, and round Nairobi. The foothills of Kenya Mountain, a mass of steep hillsides and ravines, and the Kavirondo Plain are the only large areas of arable land now in native occupation.

[1] England, with an area of 51,000 square miles, has 16,000 square miles of arable land. Australia, with an area of 3,000,000 square miles, has only 60,000 square miles of arable land, an even smaller proportion than in Kenya.

Fifty years ago the central part of the highlands was inhabited by the Masai. How they were dispossessed is told in Chapter IV. The eastern part of the highlands is still in great part occupied by the group of tribes, Kikuyu, Kamba, Meru and others, whom we found in occupation, though both Kikuyu and Kamba have had to surrender considerable areas. The western part of the highlands contains several tribes who, like the Masai, at various past times came from the northern desert and to a greater or less degree have acquired agricultural habits. The great bulk of the alienated land in this area was under no native occupation when alienated. But all these tribes have lost comparatively small areas of land granted by Government to Europeans, the Nandi a considerable area since 1914, as was revealed in an answer to a question in Parliament in 1922.

The population of the country is distributed thus: the Kikuyu group number rather more than a million. The Kavirondo Plain and the hills on its fringe contain rather less than a million. All the other tribes together, coast people, nomads in the northern desert, and the pastoral and agricultural tribes of the western highlands, number rather less than half a million souls.

These tribes belong to three different so-called races. The pastoral tribes are called Hamite. Perhaps a third of the Kavirondo are Nilotes, so called from their having recently migrated from the Upper Nile. The other tribes are Bantu. All these are linguistic terms. The inference that racial correspond with linguistic distinctions is even more fallacious in Africa than elsewhere. The original types believed to produce by blends or mixtures the tribes we know are purely imaginary. So far as we can judge, all over tropical Africa for tens of thousands of years tribes have been migrating, conquering, incorporating other tribes, being conquered and being incorporated. No

simple solution of alleged racial distributions, such as the dispersion of the Bantu from a single original "home", is in the least likely to correspond with the facts. Even an apparently homogeneous tribe, like the Masai of forty years ago, may well have won its homogeneity, as we in our own island have already partly won it in less than a thousand years, by amalgamations of many strains during many millennia. That these original racial elements were themselves pure, ten thousand or a hundred thousand years ago, is itself an improbable assumption.[1]

In any case we know enough to be sure that racial origins are the cause of none of the important differences between human societies. History and circumstances, not race, explain them. The Hungarians, though Asiatic in race, are as thorough Europeans as Prussians or Spaniards. The Persians are European in racial origin but are yet in every real sense Asiatic. Cranial and other data prove that the populations of Scotland and Ireland contain the same racial elements in the same proportions. National differences, in the case of these two countries, must therefore be due to differences in history and circumstances, such as differences in the characters and aims of invaders, to physical features, to the pressure or absence of mineral deposits, and so forth.

Judged by language, art, folk-lore, and every other branch of anthropology, there is nothing specifically African about Africans' minds. The more one knows them the more obviously they are "just people", and the more obviously any special racial "psychology" is an assumption based only on superficial dissimilarities and on the fact that various human societies have had unequal opportunities of social development. There is no basis of fact for the theory of special racial mentalities.

[1] This view of the subject is supported by anthropometric data. The writer published his collection of several years in *Man* of November 1910.

The area thus briefly described was, with its inhabitants, estimated fifty years ago as numbering four millions as compared with two-and-a-half millions now, quite unknown to Europe before 1870. Then, far more suddenly than ever happened before in history, the air of the outer world and the forces and currents of its general life burst in and overflowed the land.

The slave trade to America rapidly declined after the Civil War in the United States, but did not finally cease until the abolition of slavery in Brazil in 1888. The traffic in slaves eastward was even longer of being stamped out. In the end, indeed, the only way it could be destroyed was by establishing mission stations at its sources. In the seventies of last century Roman, Anglican, Presbyterian and Independent missions were established on the shores of Nyanza, Tanganyika and Nyasa. Their staffs lost heavily from hardships and disease, and the survivors were threatened with destruction by the Arabs. The stations on Tanganyika had to be abandoned, and those on Nyanza and Nyasa were only saved by the arrival of Indian troops officered by civil and military agents of the British Government.

In the district between Tanganyika and Nyasa a Scottish trading company with the help of the Livingstonia missionaries and two volunteers, who are now Sir Frederick Lugard and Sir Alfred Sharpe, crushed the Arab power. In the dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar on the coast slavery itself was abolished by stages that were only completed in 1910.

Our intrusion into East African politics was due partly to the desire to stop the slave trade and to protect the missionaries who were in danger from the slavers, and partly to the demands and needs of Indian traders. Lord Salisbury was for some reason specially anxious to further the trade between Eastern Africa and India, and the

missionaries' hardships and dangers excited wide popular sympathy.

In the early eighties, just after the downfall of the Arabs, and when opinion in this country was much divided on the question whether the expeditions sent in relief of the missionaries were to be withdrawn or developed into regular administrative governments, the "scramble for Africa" began. The causes of that episode demand analysis.

The industrial revolution in Europe and North America was, at the time referred to, practically completed. It became increasingly difficult to find, in these parts of the world, ways of profitably re-investing the profits of capitalised industry. The raw materials of European industries also, such as cotton, oils and rubber, were derived each year in greater degree from abroad, from tropical countries. Yet another influence was the rise of a political movement that threatened the profits derived from industries in Europe. For these reasons the attention of European capitalists, and of the Governments they increasingly controlled, was directed to the exploitation of those countries that were without free institutions. In the larger countries of Europe more people than formerly came to believe that it increased a country's strength and glory to exercise political and economic control over others than its own citizens.

Coincidently with this diversion of capital to the countries of the tropics, and with the changed attitude of the governing classes in Europe to their inhabitants, Laveran, Manson, Ross and others discovered the life-history of the parasites that cause most of the tropical diseases, and the means of their prevention and cure, thus enabling Europeans to live in the tropics with little extra risk to life. These interacting causes produced modern Imperialism. The changes in political thought and practice

that the new Imperialism has brought about are often unrecognised. In our earlier territorial acquisitions in the tropics, in the XVIIIth and early XIXth centuries, the only economic motive was the protection of trade and traders. Even when our conquest was complete we used our power merely to prevent the evils that interfered with trade, such as war and slavery. Economic control, in these earlier times, was not attempted at all, so that the indigenous systems of exploitation of land and industry, which in turn were the expression of indigenous conceptions of society, were left untouched, or at least not seriously disturbed. But for Burke, perhaps, the ownership of the land and other means to wealth in India, for example, might have passed into the hands of individual Europeans. In point of fact it did not. In those times the evils that had resulted from the use of natives of the tropics as instruments of profit were widely deplored, and for long afterwards vividly remembered.

Such were the political conceptions that prevailed when, a hundred or more years ago, our first governments in West Africa were set up. There indeed, as in India, they still largely prevail. But by the time, forty years ago, that we acquired our East Africa possessions, our Imperial policy had undergone a silent revolution.

The root ideas of the new policy were that the peoples of the tropics were, essentially and permanently, inferior to Europeans, in every human sense, and in particular both that they were incapable of free institutions and that they conducted their own institutions so badly as to justify alien government irrespective of their wishes, so that, in Burke's phrase, they were "doomed to live upon trust". It followed that the wealth of the countries inhabited by these "lesser breed without the law"—and it was soon found to be enormous—should not be left for hands so incompetent to neglect and abuse.

These conceptions were fixed in the public mind by

Mr. Joseph Chamberlain when he called our dependencies "Imperial Estates". Up to that time they had been thought of as belonging to their inhabitants, not to the people of this country. Lord Cromer, that arch-enemy of the concessionaire, was the last prominent exponent of the earlier Imperial policy. The new policy was directed by Mr. Chamberlain and exemplified by Mr. Cecil Rhodes and the Chartered Companies of South Africa and Borneo. It was made popular in certain sections of English society by Mr. Kipling, who yet in his early work, as, for example, in "Gunga Din", wrote his best verse when he was most a humanist.

The reason the public failed and still fails to grasp the nature of this change in Imperial policy is that it was assumed that slavery was the sole root of the evils that have arisen from the earlier contacts of Europe with the peoples of the tropics. And slavery was defined as meaning the ownership by one person of the body of another. As everybody knew, slavery in that sense had been abolished. And just as, in the days of slavery, virtuous and intelligent people assumed that when so much wealth and prosperity resulted to one party in the slave system the other party must be enjoying its own appropriate benefits, so during the past generation have people assumed that the new kind of control to which the inhabitants of some tropical countries are now subjected must be beneficial to the controlled as well as to the controllers.

These new ideas were shared by other countries in Europe than our own. Nearly everywhere, however, by that time, except in China and the Moslem world, where European intrusion had been resisted with greater or less success, the countries of the tropics had already been parcelled out among European countries. Eastern Africa only remained. As, except for Tibet, it was the last large habitable area in the globe to be explored, it was the last

to be given European government, and between 1885 and 1895 it received from its new governors, British, German and Portuguese, a policy in conformity with the ideas of their time unhindered by the different traditions of the older Imperialism.

The first explorers of what is now Kenya Colony, as of the rest of Eastern Africa, were missionaries, stimulated by Livingstone's appeal and by the heroism of his last journey and death. A very little later the whole area was rapidly and systematically mapped out by the official and semi-official agents of Britain, Germany and Portugal, seeking in rivalry to establish claims to suzerainty by making treaties with native chiefs. Some of these chiefs were men of real authority. Others were either pretenders or, as in tribes where there were no chiefs at all, puppets, set up by the patriotic zeal of their European visitors. To each chief there was given a flag of the protecting Power together with suitable material gifts which no chief in his senses would refuse. As a rule, in the treaties mineral rights were conveyed to the protecting Power, but nothing was specified about tribal or individual rights in land nor about taxation. Some chiefs made exclusive treaties of that kind with both Britain and Germany and enjoyed alternately the bounty of both and the even more bountiful promises of the benefits and advantages to be derived from the protection of empires so powerful, wealthy and benevolent. It was of course quite impossible for the African signatories of these treaties to understand their terms or to realise their implications.

This method of extending empires inevitably led, as can easily be imagined, to hopeless confusion. It was soon abandoned for the less arduous method of a conference at which the Great Powers decided among themselves which of them the various tribes of Eastern Africa should in future have to obey. In the Treaty of Berlin in 1885 many of

these agreements concluded with native chiefs were disregarded and all Eastern Africa was divided up between Britain, Germany and Portugal.

In 1888 the British Government, averse from new responsibilities, transferred the sovereignty of British East Africa to a Chartered Company. Its political task was to administer the area assigned to Britain at the Berlin Conference and to keep touch with the missions in Uganda, then an independent native kingdom.

The Company, though ably directed and well served by its agents in Africa, found itself in great difficulty from the start. At the Berlin Conference Britain and Germany had succeeded in imposing the policy of the " open door " on all " middle Africa ". In consequence, the Company found its revenues restricted to the already existing small *ad valorem* export and import duties, out of which had to be paid the rent of the ten-mile coastal strip to its sovereign the Sultan of Zanzibar. Of trade there was none except at the coast, where the new opportunities of living by wage-earning tempted the slaves away from the plantations, thereby diminishing their productivity. In the interior the natives at first had little desire to buy trade goods, and there was practically nothing of theirs worth Europeans' while to buy and transport on men's heads to the coast. In addition, relations were made very difficult by the general belief, to which Lugard testifies, that the Europeans had come to impose some new kind of slavery.

In spite of every effort, the Company found it could not pay its way. The frequent armed caravans that it was necessary to send to Uganda from Mombasa, a journey of 800 miles that took three months, were a constant and heavy drain on both its military and its financial resources. In 1893 the British Government was induced, after an agitation in this country, to take direct responsibility for the government of the British East Africa Protectorate

(now Kenya Colony) and Uganda. A new motive had appeared to reinforce the old aims of protecting missionaries and helping Indian traders. The French, at that time our chief rivals in Europe, were ambitious to extend their West African empire to the Nile, and French missionaries were openly organising a pro-French party among the Baganda. But as regards British East Africa itself the despatches and debates of the period show clearly that its future was then regarded in the closest relations with India. Then and for years later practically all the trade of Eastern Africa was in the hands of Indians. Indian troops had just saved the situation in Uganda. European colonisation was undreamt of, and Sir John Kirk, British Agent for a generation at the Court of Zanzibar, to whom more than to any other man we owe our position in Eastern Africa, used to refer to East Africa as India's America.

The decision to build a railway to Uganda was one of the fruits of Liberal Imperialism. It was a wise and merciful decision. Railways and courts of justice are the two great boons our Governments have given to the people of tropical Africa. The Uganda caravans were enormously costly in life. Apart from deaths among the porters themselves—two thousand of them once died of dysentery in a single caravan—they were the means of conveying epidemics all along the route and into the villages the porters belonged to.

Except for the decision to build the railway the Government seems to have laid down no special line of policy to be followed in East Africa. The new Imperialist ideas had not yet been clearly formulated by Mr. Chamberlain. Most of the early governors and most of their principal subordinates were men with Indian, not colonial, experience. The country, in fact, looked towards India rather than towards Europe. The currency was naturally Indian, and

the Indian Penal Code was taken over bodily.[1] It is still in force in the colony. Indians built the railway to Uganda, and Indian armed police were attached to every important Government station. Indian traders and shopkeepers spread over the country, selling the calico of Lancashire and buying hides for export in return.

Sir Charles Eliot seems to have been the first in authority to propose, and partially carry out, the policy of introducing an aristocracy of European landowners into the country. His next two successors, Sir Donald Stewart and Sir James Sadler, opposed that policy with more or less resolution. But it was greatly advanced by Sir Percy Girouard between 1909 and 1912, and firmly established under Sir Edward Northey just after the War. Some account of the working out of that policy under its author, Sir Charles Eliot, will be found in Chapter IV., wherein the history of the Masai tribe is given in some detail. That policy was rendered possible by the expropriation by the Crown of the whole of the land in British East Africa, except certain small areas which the coast Arabs succeeded in proving to be their private property. The following are the steps by which that expropriation was carried out. An Order in Council in 1898 directs that as the (Indian) Land Acquisition Act of 1894 has been applied to the Uganda Protectorate, "and whereas it is expedient that provision should be made for the vesting of land taken for public purposes under the provisions of the said Act", any such lands "shall vest absolutely in the Commissioner and Consul-General . . . in trust for Her Majesty". Under the powers given by this Order in Council, land was taken, without compensation, for Government buildings, roads

[1] An Order in Council in 1897 established Her Majesty's Court for East Africa, and decreed that procedure in that court should be the same as in the case of courts set up by the Governor of Bombay. It also decreed that "any other existing or future enactments of the Governor-General of India in Council, or of the Governor of Bombay in Council, shall also be applicable to the Protectorate".

and so forth, and when the route of the Uganda railway was decided on, a strip of land a mile wide, on either side of the line, was similarly taken.

The Order in Council in 1898 gave the Government, apparently, power to acquire but not to alienate land. Alienation was legalised by an Order in Council made in 1901. That Order decreed that the expression "Crown Lands" should mean all public lands "which are subject to the control of His Majesty", and provided that "the Commissioner . . . may make grants or leases of any Crown Lands on such terms and conditions as he may think fit, subject to any directions of the Secretary of State". That Order was followed by the "Crown Lands Ordinance" of 1902. Under its provisions nearly 6000 square miles were alienated during the succeeding thirteen years. But it was only in the "Crown Lands Ordinance" of 1915 that the term "Crown Lands" was specifically defined as including "all lands occupied by the native tribes of the Protectorate, and lands reserved for the use of the members of any tribe", although, of course, several thousand square miles of land formerly occupied by various tribes had been alienated before 1915. Generally speaking, in fact, each successive Order in Council and Ordinance legalised powers which the Government had already assumed and exercised. Sir Robert Hamilton, M.P., for many years the Senior Judge in the Protectorate, allows me to quote these words from a letter, as expressing what in his view is the true legal position as regards the ownership of land in Kenya. He wrote:

I have a keen recollection of the difficulty that I had on various occasions in satisfying myself as to the meaning of "public" lands. Speaking widely and generally, I think it may be true to say that the proprietorship of public and Crown lands had not, perhaps, been definitely assumed in a legal sense, but practically the control and administration of these lands was reserved to the Government in

such a way that the net result was very closely akin to actual proprietorship.[1]

Acting on these powers of control, the Crown in Kenya has granted rights in land which may be summarised thus: To Europeans, some 2000 square miles in freehold and some 5500 square miles in leasehold; to Indians, 22 square miles, either freehold or leasehold; to Africans, no land at all. The courts recognise that certain Africans have rights of occupancy of certain areas as against other Africans. But they recognise no rights of occupancy or of ownership as against the Crown. The only occasion on which the Government granted any apparent right in land to any African person or tribe was when it entered into a treaty with the Masai in 1904. As Chapter IV. will show, the apparent right in law then created proved illusory. So that it is true in substance to say that the Crown is the absolute owner of all the land in Kenya except of those areas which the Government has itself alienated. Nevertheless, it seems to be impossible to fix any date on which the Crown acquired the land, or to point to any Order or Ordinance which gave it the power to do so. What seems to have happened was that, as the Government found no difficulty in acquiring the strip of land for the railway, it simply continued the process of appropriating land, since it met with no opposition by native claimants. Those areas of Crown land called reserves and closed areas are merely areas that have been so proclaimed in the *Gazette*,

[1] The following, as reported in the local Press, is quoted from a judgement of the High Court of East Africa, in a civil action heard in 1921: "In my view the effect of the Crown Lands Ordinance, 1915, and the Kenya (Annexation) Order in Council, 1920, by which no native rights were reserved, and the Kenya Colony Order in Council, 1921, as I have already stated, is clearly, *inter alia*, to vest land reserved for the use of a native tribe in the Crown. If that be so, then all native rights in such reserved land, whatever they were under the Gathaka system" [the term refers to the system of inalienable freeholds among the Kikuyu] "disappeared, and natives in occupation of such Crown Land became tenants at will of the Crown of the land actually occupied."

which, nevertheless, the Government is free to dispose of without notice or compensation to its occupiers. The events narrated in Chapters IV. and V. will illustrate the fact that the word reserve is in Kenya a totally misleading term. One has to use it because there is no other single word for unalienated Crown land in native occupation. In point of fact there are few tribes in Kenya which have not suffered, during the past twenty years, some contraction of their " reserves " or " closed areas ".

The policy that has been followed in regard to land in Kenya proved to be decisive of the whole history of the colony. The same policy has also been followed in the other British Dependencies in Eastern Africa, though nowhere else than in Kenya have its implications been so thoroughly explored and its consequences so clearly made manifest. This common policy in regard to land has given society the same pattern in all the various political divisions of British Eastern Africa. It has created the circumstances which have given shape to an unprecedented economic system. It is, in short, the clue to the true interpretation of all that is characteristic of life in Kenya to-day, and to some extent in all Eastern Africa.

By that policy every vestige of legal right in land, whether belonging to tribe, chief, or individual tribesman, was obliterated. It allowed successive governors, as will be described in later chapters, to dispose as they thought fit of the whole country and its inhabitants, irrespective of either their equitable rights or of their wishes. And it has resulted in the abandonment of Imperial traditions which were the growth of centuries.

The legal position of the Government was at first a most anomalous one. The elder tradition had so far prevailed as to prevent the country from being annexed outright. It was placed under the charge of the Foreign Office and called a Protectorate. (Its affairs were trans-

ferred to the Colonial Office in 1904 and its name changed to Kenya Colony at the end of the War.) Thus the area and its inhabitants were a foreign country and foreign subjects over which the British Crown had acquired, possibly in part by certain treaties with its tribes, more certainly by international agreement, certain rights and duties. This foreign Government acquired the absolute ownership of the whole of the land by merely behaving as its owner. The inhabitants were subjected to certain serious disabilities by their foreign status, as the history of the Masai shows. The protecting Power, on the other hand, exercised from the first sovereignty more complete than any other Government outside Eastern Africa has exercised in modern times. The title of Protectorate corresponded with nothing whatever in fact or law.

Certainly circumstances made the policy of so-called indirect government followed in West Africa specially difficult to be followed in East Africa. In West Africa we began with trading posts on the coast, and in large measure extended our sovereignty step by step with the expansion of trade, which in turn provided an increasing revenue to the Governments. In East Africa we assumed the powers of sovereignty over an immense area simultaneously and in response not to the needs and desire of its inhabitants, but mainly from political ambition, and we used these powers to found a British colony. The mere rapidity with which the occupation of the country was carried out made the preservation of indigenous tribal authorities very difficult. And that rapidity was due to the wish to forestall the French in Uganda. The same forces that sent Kitchener to Khartoum and Fashoda sent Jackson and Macdonald to Uganda, and compelled the subjugation, with no opportunity for persuasion or parleys, of all the tribes over the 800 miles of country that lie between Uganda and the Indian Ocean.

This hasty pursuit of a political end was, however, not the only factor determining the relations between protecting Power and tribal authorities. In some tribes, like the Masai, the governing ideas of tribal life and the structure of tribal society were so incompatible with civilisation that interference with internal tribal affairs was unavoidable. In other tribes, such as the Kikuyu, the absence of any tribal authority, except an impersonal tribal law as interpreted by the general opinion, made it so difficult to ensure obedience to the decrees of the protectorate Government that chiefs were created by the Government for the purpose of acting as the means of conveying the orders of the executive to the tribe. Chiefs of such a kind are given no respect except the fear their power commands. They must always be in the most direct dependence on the Government to which they owe their authority.

These, however, are all superable difficulties. The superiority of civilisation enjoyed by Europeans in tropical Africa was so great that many African tribes rendered them from the first an almost instinctive obedience. The docility of the " unspoilt " African is notorious. In West Africa there are areas where European occupation has been as rapid as in East Africa, and tribes as primitive as the Kikuyu. Yet there tribal authorities survive with functions but little impaired. There indeed the danger is lest their natural development should be thwarted by Europeans mistrustful of the inevitable influence of foreign ideas.

What made indirect government through chiefs or tribal councils impossible in East Africa was the demand made on tribal authorities to supply labour for objects not regarded as beneficial by the labourers. Closely bound up with the requisition of labourers is direct taxation, which in East Africa has always had an industrial rather than a fiscal object. It both makes wage-earning unavoidable and ensures that the bulk of the wages earned finds its way

into the Government treasury. Here, however, we are only to note the political result of making every able-bodied man a tax-payer and wage-earner. The tax and the labour for wages have become the primary necessities of every man's life. These, and not any duty to his tribe, are his unescapable obligations. He cannot, as when indirect government prevails, pay his dues in money or work to his tribe, which then by its executive pays tribute and obedience to the remote protecting Power. In Kenya the direct personal obligation of the individual to the State has been driven home by a Registration Act which compels every man to carry on his person a certificate that contains his industrial history. In every native's opinion that certificate is the badge of his status as the servant of the Government, and of those to whom Government has given the industry of the country to control. His tribal authority, like himself, has to do the Government's bidding. So transformed, it cannot survive as a living force.

The contrast between the two political systems, the British West African and the British East African, is of course most clearly revealed in the difference in their land policies. The immediate reason for the abolition of native rights in land was no doubt to avoid the difficulties that would arise from the building of the railway through privately owned land. In West Africa the courts had insisted in cases of a certain kind on the payment by Government of compensation to native occupiers and owners. It was the easiest way of avoiding such complications to ensure that no native tribe or person should have any right of ownership or occupation as against the Crown. One may safely hazard a guess that the Foreign Office was told that the real motive of expropriation was to prevent native chiefs from selling land to the injury of the tribe. But it was always open to Government to pass legislation forbidding the sale of land by Africans to non-

Africans without official sanction, as had been done in West Africa. Expropriation by the Crown could in fact only be justified by success in preserving rights that would have been unsafe in any other hands. The measure of that success may be judged by the contents of this book.

How different our earlier Imperial policy was may be judged by the following quotations from a Blue book on land rights and land policy in West Africa, written some ten years ago by Sir Conway Belfield,[1] who himself was Governor of Kenya during the War. Describing the desirability of concessions by native authorities in the Gold Coast being subject to the Government approval, he writes:

> On no account must the fact be lost sight of that the land is the property of the people; that a concession is a contract between the landowners and the applicant to which the Government is no party; that intervention must therefore be limited to supervision and guidance only to the end that improvident alienations may be prevented and only such terms sanctioned as will ensure adequate protection of the rights and requirements of present and future generations.

These words were written of a colony where, as Sir Conway observes, "the powers of the Government have never exceeded those of a protecting authority". In Ashanti, he notes, on the other hand, "had the lands of the country been proclaimed at the time of conquest to be the property of the Crown, they would unquestionably have so vested". "Nevertheless", he adds, "the claim to ownership . . . was waived, and cannot now be asserted". So that, he concludes, "the system of land tenure prevailing in Ashanti is in no material point dissimilar to that which obtains in the colony" (*i.e.* the Gold Coast). To that statement it is only necessary to add the explanation that when Ashanti was conquered no school of thought in

[1] His predecessor, Sir Percy Girouard, resigned rather mysteriously. Some connected the resignation with the Masai move, and attributed Sir Conway Belfield's appointment to his acquaintance with West African land policy.

England regarded our country as having any right at all to land in any part of tropical Africa, unless it was needed for public purposes.

NOTE TO CHAPTER III

Mr. C. L. Temple, formerly Lieut.-Governor of Nigeria, writes thus in the chapter on indirect rule in his book, *Native Races and Their Rulers*:

" In the primitive groups it is unavoidable that the Resident in charge interfere more with the tribal institutions than is the case in the more advanced sections. Their habits are more at variance with humanity and reason. So the Resident finds it necessary to interfere and all such interference weakens the hold of the Chief or elders of the tribe as the case may be. It is, therefore, doubly important for him, once the preliminary stage is past, to avoid the temptation of posing as a great native Chief. The true measure of his success will be the respect and regard with which the populace hold their own Chiefs and elders, and not him. . . . This is a hard lesson to instil into the mind of many a political officer."

The instinctive comment on Mr. Temple's advice that would be made by the great majority of administrative officers in British Eastern Africa, and in Rhodesia, is that through no fault of theirs the following of his advice is impossible. The demands the Government compels them to make on the tribal authorities are never due to their being " at variance with humanity and reason ", but to the insatiable appetites of the Government for taxes, and of both Government and private Europeans for land and labour.

CHAPTER IV

THE MASAI

In a book that is mainly a description of the results of European influence, official and other, over numerous tribes with widely differing customs and cultures, it is impossible to give an account of each. The only tribe of which an official account has been published is the Masai. This tribe is a pastoral tribe, whereas most tribes in Kenya are agricultural. But the existence of a large Blue book published in 1919, and called *An Administrative and Political History of the Masai Reserve*, outweighs the claim of any larger and more typical tribe to detailed description. There are a few notable omissions in the story as told by the Blue book, but in the main it is candid and impartial as few official statements are. Its account of the critical phases of Masai history has here been closely followed and freely quoted. It is indeed fortunate that the reader can be given from an unimpeachable source the facts that will enable him to judge for himself the character and results of the policy of the Government of Kenya during the last generation.

Not a tribe of importance between the Vaal and the sources of the Nile holds the position and occupies the area it held and occupied a hundred years ago. Like Europe in the Vth century, Africa in the XIXth was like a seething pot. Tribes suddenly rose to greatness, by conquest, or by absorption of neighbouring tribes, and, after a generation or two, sank, almost as rapidly, into former insignifi-

cance or totally disappeared for ever. About a hundred years ago the Galla thus rose to power in Eastern Africa only to sink again before any exact knowledge could be got of them. As the power of the Galla fell the power of the Masai rose.

The Masai, like the Galla, of whom now scarcely the smallest remnants are discoverable, are what anthropologists call Hamites, and are regarded as a blend of the main stock of the African race with that race which from Abyssinia to Mauretania inhabits the high country of North Africa. However that may be, they are lighter in skin than ordinary Africans, are longer in the head—in fact the longest in Africa—have thinner lips and narrower noses, and are taller, the men averaging 5 feet 8 inches in height. Physically they are among the handsomest of mankind, with slender bones, narrow hips and shoulders and most beautifully rounded muscles and limbs. The warriors, burnished with grease and scantily draped in the skins of animals, have, almost to a man, the graceful carriage of athletes and the elders are scarcely ever fat. But the women are much cumbered and, in our eyes, disfigured by wearing immense masses of iron wire, of which from twenty to eighty pounds weight are coiled round necks, arms, legs and thighs. Until recently they were unusually free both from ordinary diseases and from the common tropical infections, and many of them live to a great age.

The food of the tribe consists wholly of sour milk, meat, and blood drunk warm from incisions made in the necks of cattle. Certain leaves, bulbs and roots that grow wild are used as flavourings, but no grain is eaten.[1] Iron-workers are a subject caste and marry among themselves. The sole concern of the rest of the tribe is the care of immense herds of cattle, sheep, goats and donkeys, these last being used to carry the villagers' scanty household gear when on the move.

[1] The use of grain for food has now begun and is rapidly spreading.

The tribe, now numbering some 45,000 souls (with other 15,000 in Tanganyika Territory), is divided into septs, over each of which one or more chiefs of a kind have some authority. Each sept, or section of a sept, lives to some extent as a single family. The children, soon after they can walk, leave their parents to live in large huts of their own. Boys, when they reach the age of from fifteen to eighteen, are initiated, at an annual ceremony, into the rank of warrior and thenceforth live in large bands, together with the unmarried girls, promiscuously, but with certain precautions against conception, which is regarded as criminal. The warrior age lasts from seven to fourteen years, depending on the interval between initiation and the septennial ceremony, the greatest event in the life of the tribe. At that ceremony warriors become elders and may then marry. Thenceforth they live in the married people's encampments, each family in its own hut, a number of which form together a stockaded village into which flocks and herds are nightly driven.

The warrior grade is, or rather was, a standing army, under no parental authority and with no family ties. In the camps of the warriors there were cattle, of course, to be tended and milked ; and they took immense pains in preparing their full-dress uniforms, these most effective contrivances of paint and feathers and fur. They also hunted, though not ordinary game, which they never ate. Lions and leopards they still hunt and kill in company, in the open, with spears. But war was the true function of the warriors.

The wars of the Masai were, like those of the Scottish clans, purely plundering expeditions, but without the Highlanders' excuses of poverty and over-population of their narrow valleys and rocky islands. Cattle were the great object of these raids. Men were scarcely ever attacked unless they attempted to defend their cattle. Thomson

states that the Masai never touched the women of the Kikuyu tribe, their neighbours and enemies.

Raids were undertaken, not by the tribe, but by one or more warrior bands, with the approval of the medicine-men. Each band, like the *comitatus* of our German ancestors described by Tacitus, consisted wholly of the youths and young men in a single sept, or sub-sept, who lived together when at home, and fought with mutual rivalry in war.

Prisoners were never taken, and there were no slaves among the Masai. As not even the most temporary kind of subjugation was attempted, these Masai raids were simply interminable. The tribes that lived within easy reach, such as the Kamba and Kikuyu, dared keep no cattle, built their villages on hill-tops and hid their few goats and sheep in the bush-covered rocky ravines of the foothills of Kenya and other mountains. From about 1830 to 1890 all the tribes in an area of about ninety thousand square miles, from the desert north of Kenya Mountain east to the sea and south far beyond Kilimanjaro, were restricted to the cultivation of the soil. Several Masai raids reached the sea, where the Swahili and Arabs, though they had guns, never succeeded in defeating the raiders but once. Their superior physique enabled them to cover distances that seemed miraculous. Perfectly trained and organised, they were always certain of victory, and were regarded as invincible. They even boasted of never attacking without giving notice.

The slaughter of primitive warfare and the numbers of the combatants are always greatly exaggerated. Most uncivilised warriors run away after the first casualties are suffered, and the reputation of the Masai made most of their raids easy and nearly bloodless victories. But when sept fought sept, as often happened, the case seems to have been quite otherwise. Some at least of their stories of whole septs having been exterminated are certainly true.

The only counterbalancing power in the tribe to the warriors was that of the priests or medicine-men. Their great influence in the tribe and the fact that the office was of necessity hereditary, as the secrets of their art were handed on only when death approached, misled Europeans at first into regarding these medicine-men as secular chiefs. Normally a medicine-man's influence was confined to his own clan, but frequently some priest of character and ability would win authority over the other septs or clans and thus for the time unite the tribe. The real power, however, generally rested with the warriors, who despised their elders as living a life of inglorious ease. It was thus impossible for the tribe to develop into a monarchy or an aristocracy, as is the usual course in political growth, and as conquest could neither enrich nor add to the glory of the warriors it was never attempted.

Large collections of ivory were known by the coast Arabs to exist in the countries east and north of Victoria Nyanza, which could only be reached by traversing Masai-land. Tempted by the ambition to bring that ivory to the coast on the heads of its former owners, whose enslavement it was known would be easy, a number of large and heavily-armed caravans from the coast did venture the journey during the last century, paying tribute in wire and cloth and beads to each band of Masai warriors encountered. These caravans never challenged the Masai but were often attacked by them, and their losses from cold and starvation, as well as in warfare, were very heavy. A certain amount of barter trade was done by these caravans. But as ivory was their great object, and as enslaving people was the only way of getting it carried to the coast, this trade between coast and lake was really no better than filibustering. Only during the few years that elapsed between the wane of Masai power and the firm establishment of British authority was the trade actively engaged in. Fifteen years ago there

were many men still living in Mombasa who had travelled in these caravans by Baringo to Nyanza between 1880 and 1895.

Europeans first came into contact with the Masai when in search of a direct route to Uganda. The first to cross Masailand successfully was Joseph Thomson. His book, *Through Masailand*, is one of the best books of exploration in existence. It is a wonderful record of what patience, courage, ingenuity and persistent friendliness can achieve with the most fearless and truculent of savages. A galvanic battery and other parlour tricks, which later travellers naturally found less persuasive, won for him the reputation of being a great medicine-man. To that fact he owed the success of his journey, though during it he suffered greatly from the insolence of the warriors, and once had to run away by night to escape from them.

By this time the "scramble for Africa" had begun, and Britain and Germany were in active competition for exclusive treaties with East African kings and chiefs. Already there were English Protestant and French Catholic missions in Uganda, whose converts, as well as those Baganda who had become Moslems by contact with the caravans from the coast, had each formed a political party. Quarrels between these three parties had already begun.

Dr. Karl Peters was in command of the first official German, Mr. Jackson [1] of the first official British expedition to Uganda. Peters was a valiant and determined man who was not afraid to shoot, and in fact preferred to give Africans the kind of impression that rifles make. He was later given high office in German East Africa, and, to the honour of Germany, was eventually dismissed from office and punished for cruelty to certain Africans. The impression made by Peters' determination and ruthlessness seems to have convinced the Masai that Europeans could not

[1] Now Sir Frederick Jackson, recently Governor of Uganda.

profitably be resisted, and threw into relief the no less determined but humaner methods of Mr. Jackson.

It is stated, and certainly is now universally believed among the Masai, that a great medicine-man of theirs predicted in several oracles, some fifty years ago, the coming of the Europeans, in a parable of a flock of large white birds; the building of a railway, represented in the tradition as a snake reaching from sea to lake; and the eventual destruction of most of the tribe at the hands of the strangers, after rebellion against them. These stories, the fulfilment of the last of which is greatly dreaded, have had and still have a strong restraining influence over the warriors. But the decisive factor in their attitude to the British Government was undoubtedly the character, the humanity and intelligence, as well as the courage and coolness of the first British agents, especially Jackson and Lugard.[1] In time the Masai, like other wards of Empire, learned to distinguish. They now know some Europeans, official and other, whom they find definitely good and others whom they find definitely bad. But it is thanks to Jackson, Lugard and one or two others with less fortunate careers that the Masai decided on submission. In the words of the official historian in the Blue book:

> No punitive expedition has ever been undertaken against the Masai, an omission which was very largely due to the authority and sagacity of Lenana, the chief medicine-man at the time when the European Government was first encountered, who survived long enough to keep his people in check until such a degree of administration had been effected as to render the despatch of a punitive expedition a measure that would only be resorted to in the last extremity.

That sentence should be carefully studied. It reveals the exact standpoint of the authorities during the past twenty years.

[1] Now Sir Frederick Lugard, who has been Governor of various African Protectorates and is now British representative on the League of Nations Mandates Commission.

The importance the chronicler gives to Lenana is justified. No other African in Kenya has had so great an influence over both the Government and his own tribe. As will be explained later, the decision of the warriors to follow Lenana's advice in submitting to the Government was partly due to causes other than Lenana's influence over them.

A single incident is known to have decided Lenana's attitude. It is thus described in the Blue book:

In November 1895 a large caravan consisting of some 1400 Swahilis and Kikuyu was cut up by the Masai in the Kedong Valley. . . . Nearly all the Swahilis lost their lives but a fair number of the Kikuyu escaped and reported the incident to Mr. Gilkison, the officer in charge of Fort Smith. Mr. Ainsworth, the Sub-Commissioner . . . together with Mr. Jackson conducted an inquiry into the matter, at which it was established that the Swahilis were the aggressors, the headman having taken two girls from a Masai kraal. These had been handed back as a result of representations made by the Masai, but a renewed attempt to capture them had been made the following morning before the caravan started on its journey. This attempt was unsuccessful, but a shot was fired in the village which killed a cow, and the Masai attacked the caravan as a retaliatory measure.

Mr. Andrew Dick, an English trader, who was travelling in the neighbourhood . . . attacked the Masai, and succeeded in capturing from them a number of cattle, but he was killed by the Masai in his retreat. . . . As a result of the inquiry into these two incidents it was held that the Masai had been acting under such provocation that no great punishment was necessary. They had lost a considerable number of men in their encounter with Mr. Dick, and the only punishment that it was considered necessary to inflict was the confiscation of the cattle that had been captured from them by Mr. Dick, which cattle were paid to the relatives of the Kikuyu who had lost their lives in the massacre as compensation for the loss sustained.[1]

[1] The details of the story as given in the Blue book are not wholly accurate. Mr. Dick was a charming but troublesome person whose adventures among the Nandi were the cause of the first Nandi "expedition". The choir stalls in Mombasa Cathedral are dedicated to his memory.

One important result followed the "Kedong Massacre". Lenana, the Masai Laibon, who had for some time expressed his intention of visiting the Government officer at Fort Smith, had overcome the reluctance shown by his followers, and had actually arrived at that station just before the news of the massacre reached Mr. Gilkison. There he was instructed to stay until an inquiry had been held, but when the result of the inquiry was known he was so impressed with the impartial hearing given to the Masai witnesses, and with the justice of the decision, that he vowed allegiance to the British Government, a vow which he faithfully kept. British justice on this occasion gained the friendship of the most powerful man in the Masai tribe, and rendered his influence warmly loyal to the administration from that day to the day of his death.

In a word, Lenana and his tribe had confidence that in the British Government Mr. Jackson and his kind would be powerful to prevail over Mr. Dick and his kind.

Very typical is the immediate recognition by a savage people of a standard of justice higher than their own. To these Masai it at once seemed obviously if surprisingly right that enemies should be given the same standard of justice as friends. One often hears in Africa that Africans do not understand generosity, which is merely what justice is called when it includes knowledge of men as well as knowledge of law. On the contrary, nothing is so disturbing to Africans' confidence in both our courts of justice and the executive authority as the influence over both of racial feeling. In any similar case to-day most Europeans in Kenya, official and other, would think Mr. Dick's death most inadequately avenged—whatever provocation those who killed him had suffered—by the confiscation of cattle and their bestowal on the relations of Africans who had suffered in the dispute though certainly quite innocent.

In the year 1890, just when the first official relations

between the British and the Masai began, rinderpest broke out among the Masai herds. (The epidemic swept through all Africa.) Nearly all their cattle died, and many thousands of the Masai themselves died of starvation. Smallpox followed the cattle plague and the pandemic of influenza took toll of the survivors of famine and smallpox. Some good judges believe that from these causes three-quarters of the population of the tribe died. The Kikuyu and the Kamba seized the opportunity of revenge. The remnants of the Masai warrior bands, now in desperate straits for food, met with resistance previously unknown and were often defeated. During their absence from home the villages that contained none but elders and their families were attacked, the old people killed, and the young sold to Swahili traders or kept as slaves in Kikuyu and Kamba villages. The Masai in turn retaliated, when they could, by wholesale massacres such as formerly they had never committed.

Just at this period the first British agents came on the scene. Their first thought was for the safety of the caravans to Uganda, impossible so long as this intertribal warfare and slaving continued. Forts were built between the Masai country and the villages of the Kikuyu and Kamba. These tribes too had suffered heavily from the epidemics, but at the moment they seemed to be getting the best of it with the Masai. Some believe that if the Europeans had not arrived in time to save them the Masai would have followed the Galla into destruction and oblivion.

After a few years of increasing control of affairs by the British, raiding practically ceased, and it is noteworthy that the Masai never offered any resistance when officers of inferior character or intelligence were put in authority over them. One such officer made serious trouble with the Kikuyu, in whose case accordingly a punitive expedition was not " omitted ".

These are the circumstances in which the Masai warriors were induced to follow Lenana's advice. The bulk of the tribe put themselves under his authority, settled between 1897 and 1901 near Nairobi, then just beginning to be built, and set themselves to restore their ravaged flocks and herds.

The problem of their ultimate fate in a civilised world began thus early to trouble those in authority. The early administrators naturally assumed that the agricultural tribes, accustomed to manual labour, would easily be induced, not only to provide labourers for making roads and forts and carrying loads to Uganda, but to serve our needs also by selling, as in West Africa, the produce of their land for local consumption and for export, and by buying in exchange from Indian and European traders the manufactures of Europe and Asia. But the Masai could not be induced to work with tools. Like all purely pastoral people, they held their use to be degrading.[1] It was hoped at first that trained troops could be made of the warriors, and for years large numbers of them took part in the suppression of the six or eight tribal risings that occurred between 1895 and 1906. Many officers had the highest opinion of them as troops. But it was found that they were apt to disobey officers they disliked, and after a few years the last Masai company was disbanded.

The obvious policy was of course to civilise. But the Government in these days did nothing for native education —did nothing indeed until four years ago. Some faint efforts were made to interest the tribe in the improvement

[1] Most if not all primitive peoples agree with the author of Genesis that labour on the soil, and indeed the use of tools in general, as distinguished from the free pastoral life, was imposed on mankind by some primaeval curse. Mahomed is quoted by Peisker, in the *Cambridge Mediaeval History*, as having written, "Wherever this instrument" (*i.e.* the plough) "has penetrated, it has always brought with it servitude and shame".

of their stock, and Lenana on one occasion was actually a judge at a cattle show in Nairobi. But with the adoption, under Sir Charles Eliot, of the policy of making East Africa a European colony all idea of getting the Masai to breed for beef and wool was forgotten. The problem of the destiny of the tribe was simply for the time ignored. When in 1906 the late A. J. M. Collyer, then in charge of the northern section of the tribe, asked permission to import merino rams to cross with the woolless Masai sheep, he was forbidden to do so, on the ground that if the Masai began to breed for wool they would begin to steal sheep from their European neighbours.

The difficulties and loss of life involved in carrying munitions, European food and trade goods the eight hundred miles from Mombasa to Uganda compelled the building of the Uganda railway. It was begun in 1895, only twelve years after the first European had crossed Masailand, and finished in 1901. The Masai alone among the tribes whose land the railway crossed neither interfered with those engaged in its construction nor stole any of the articles used. Other tribes stole so persistently and on so large a scale as to need punishment by frequent military expeditions. Be it remarked that many of the articles used in building a railway, especially telegraph wire, were immensely valuable in these people's eyes, both for use and for personal adornment.

It seems quite incredible to us that Europeans were invited to come to Kenya as planters and farmers without investigation beforehand of native rights in land and without the making of any arrangements for their settlement. Yet so it was. What seems to have happened was that the Governor, Sir Charles Eliot, determined to make the country a European colony and applied to the British Treasury for money to prepare for the reception of European colonists. The Treasury refused to make any provision

for European immigration until it occurred. Sir Charles then sent a senior officer, the chief of Customs, to South Africa to find people who could be persuaded to accept grants of land and live in the country. A year after his resignation, when he had been responsible for all that had been done in what is now Kenya Colony for three years and a half, Sir Charles Eliot wrote a book. In it he says: "We have in East Africa the rare experience of dealing with a *tabula rasa*, an almost untouched and sparsely inhabited country, where we can do as we like, regulate immigration, and open or close the door as seems best. This lessens the difficulty of administration, but it increases the responsibility and the need for reflection."

Any one reading these words would imagine that Sir Charles Eliot, as Governor, had worked on a plan. In reality he was content to have discovered that the climate of the highlands of Eastern Africa was agreeable to Europeans and simply assumed that it was wise and right to parcel out the land among them. He writes that he is "not sanguine as to the future of the African race", and is "as a general principle opposed to the creation, in this Protectorate, of native reserves". His general idea was to give Europeans land close to native villages, whose inhabitants would naturally become their labourers.

There is no evidence that any Foreign or Colonial Secretary supported such ideas, but the fact that they were acted on shows clearly the absence of any guiding principles among those in ultimate authority. Throughout East African history, in fact, with rare exceptions, policy has depended on the personal opinions of governors, opinions that were frequently in open conflict with British public opinion. Interference from Downing Street, often reasonably complained of, has been confined to petty details and financial matters. Over policy in questions of real import-

ance, such as land disposal, there has been no effective control at all. The maxim " trust the man on the spot " proves fallacious when a man on the spot with less knowledge of the country than the most junior of officials sets himself to reverse the principles and traditions of experience.

In Sir Charles Eliot's time the main body of the Masai lived in the centre of their formerly extensive territories, in the Rift Valley between Nairobi and Naikuru. The railway traversed their best grazing grounds.

All pastoral people follow some system, not merely of annual migrations to the sources of streams in the dry season and to the waterless plains after the rains fill the pools and old stream-beds, but also of rotation, whereby pastures are rested after years of use. That system, necessary of course even in mixed farming, involves the abandonment of large areas for part of each year and of others for several years. In Africa especially the profusion of insect life makes land in too long use unhealthy. Also, as has been explained, the Masai between 1897 and 1904 were only beginning to recover from epidemics among themselves and their stock.

Thus the pastures of the Rift Valley, the rich volcanic soil of which had never been cultivated, had not only been kept in perfect condition, but also displayed areas immense, empty and apparently ownerless to the eyes of European immigrants from South Africa and England. The Governor, who had invited many of these people, showed them hospitality by giving them land, in areas of 10,000, 25,000, and even 100,000 acres. None of these early grants were even surveyed beforehand. The theory was that there was plenty of room for everybody. When the land officer, or a district officer, made objection he was simply overruled from headquarters. The Government, in short, acted as if no native rights in land existed. In law, of course, they were soon completely swept away.

In a sense the Kikuyu were the worst sufferers from this strange generosity, since land rights among them are personal. Some tens of thousands of them are now living as tenants on land to which, in equity, they have an indefeasible claim. In regard to area, however, the Masai were the biggest losers. They soon began to complain when they found Europeans laying claim to the ownership of land in the Rift Valley, their favourite home in the very centre of their country. Difficulties were increased by the action of the Foreign Office (then in charge of African Protectorates), which, encouraged by its agents in Africa to believe that everybody could easily be satisfied, made grants of land, roughly defined on an imperfect map, to people in London without informing the Governor, in particular one grant of 500 square miles in the very middle of the Rift Valley to a syndicate of titled people and financiers. (To this day that huge estate is more thinly populated both by men and by stock than it was when the Masai left it.) This and other smaller grants made by the Foreign Office were found to conflict with the Governor's grants. The Governor, Sir Charles Eliot, attempted to insist on the superior claims of the genuine farmers (with from 10,000 to 100,000 acres each) as against financial syndicates, and was compelled to resign. The consequent publication of despatches revealed a situation that shocked public opinion. The Foreign Office even suggested to the new Governor that all the grants in the Rift Valley should be annulled and the Masai allowed to occupy it in peace. But interested parties both in London and in Africa proved, not for the last time, too strong for ill-organised public opinion. Both sets of grants were confirmed. The Masai were thus left with no more than patches here and there in the Rift Valley. At last it was seen that some definite scheme of delimitation must be come to. The new Governor, Sir Donald Stewart, reported that the only thing to do was to move the whole

tribe right out of the Rift Valley and away from the railway, and that as the area remaining to the tribe north of the Rift Valley was too small and that to the south too poorly watered, two reserves should be created. Several of the old friends of the Masai protested. Sir Frederick Jackson wrote thus in a despatch dated February 1904: "The Masai will never give us serious trouble so long as we treat them fairly, and do not deprive them of their best and favourite grazing grounds. Up to the time I left Mombasa the large grazing areas applied for in the Naivasha district were 320,000 acres by the East Africa Syndicate, 100,000 acres by Lord Delamere and 32,000 acres each by Messrs. Chamberlain and Flemmer, and I pointed out to Sir C. Eliot that these areas not only embraced the best and most favoured grazing grounds of the Masai between lakes Naikuru and Naivasha, but also embraced both banks of the only four rivers in the vicinity." And again: "Apart from the just cause for complaint that such action" (namely, removal from the Rift Valley) "would give them, it would be a great mistake to push them on one side and away from the close vicinity and control of the Government stations".

But all protests were in vain. The Foreign Office directed the move to be carried out, but not until the consent of the tribe had been given and a treaty had been drawn up and signed in which the Government should pledge itself never again to disturb the settlement.

This treaty of August 1904 embodied ideas precisely the opposite of Sir Charles Eliot's. It designated two areas to be exclusively in the occupation of the tribe, and to be theirs "so long as the Masai as a race shall exist", and it promised that a road half a mile wide should be beaconed off, by which communication between the two reserves could freely be carried on.

These two reserves together comprised an area about a tenth of the land the tribe occupied before the epidemics of

1893 to 1897. By 1904 their stock was rapidly increasing again, and between 1904 and 1911 it probably trebled in number. The Rift Valley was most unwillingly evacuated, and those who were sent to the northern reserve, the Laikipia Plateau, at once found themselves short both of grazing land and of permanent streams. Each year until 1907 the Government was compelled either to enlarge the reserve southwards or to allow the Masai to occupy the untenanted land alienated to Europeans.

The Blue book states that the Masai failed to carry out the terms of the treaty, but the only instance it cites is the refusal of one section to leave Naivasha for the admittedly overcrowded northern reserve on Laikipia.[1] The Government, on the other hand, not only failed to demarcate the half-mile wide road provided for in the treaty, but alienated the land through which, for some sixty miles, it would have to pass. It broke the treaty, furthermore, in another instance. The great septennial festival of the Masai fell due in 1909. The treaty specified that during the festival representatives of the whole tribe, and the animals they should bring for sacrifice, should meet at the place held sacred for the purpose, called Kinangop. The Government forbade the meeting because of the danger of disease being conveyed to the cattle of Europeans whose land would have to be traversed by the Masai cattle. Great unrest and mistrust were thus caused, and these were increased by the rumour, then freely talked of in the country, that the northern reserve was to be given to Europeans. The late Mr. A. J. M. Collyer, in whom the Masai had complete confidence, made a special tour round the reserve to give assurances that the Government would keep its solemn pledge.

[1] A senior official, now retired on pension, writes, after reading this chapter in manuscript: "It is monstrous to say the Masai failed to carry out the treaty. The failure was all on the part of Government."

The rumour, however, was not baseless. The Blue book is most remarkably candid at this point. It remarks:

> The suggestion to move the Masai was undoubtedly made in the interest of the European settlers, some of whom had cast envious eyes on the grazing grounds of Laikipia, as Sir Donald Stewart had prophesied when submitting the Masai agreement of 1904.

Sir Percy Girouard, who at this time (1909) was the Governor, shared Sir Charles Eliot's views and freely expressed his devotion to the ideal of a self-governing British colony in East Africa. He approached the Colonial Office, to which by that time East African affairs had been transferred, proposing the removal of the Masai to an extended southern reserve. He was told that the treaty of 1904 must stand and that no suggestion of any alteration would be listened to unless it came unprompted from the Masai themselves. By this time the proposal was common knowledge, and had the unanimous support of the Governor's chief advisers and his friends among the European concessionaires. An article supporting the removal of the Masai from Laikipia appeared in the *Nineteenth Century* magazine.

Sir P. Girouard then sent two officers to examine and report upon the area lying to the west of the southern reserve, which already contained numbers of Masai. They reported, as stated in the Blue book, that it "comprised some 2300 square miles, of which 1300 were waterless. The Masai already on it numbered 2270 souls. The land as a whole was unsuitable for European settlement, though several areas might be regarded as good farming land, but these were so disconnected as to render impossible their proper supervision. Further, permanent streams were so far apart as to preclude the possibility of allotting such farms on a continuous system. The land was generally suited to the requirements of a nomadic and pastoral tribe such as the Masai."

The Colonial Secretary was all along assured by the Government in Africa, and he transmitted his assurance in turn to Parliament in the debate on the subject in 1910, that the Masai themselves wished to leave Laikipia and were the first to suggest the proposal. But, as the Blue book truthfully says, "on the 4th of January, 1909, the Governor mentioned the proposal to Lenana, and somewhat to his surprise, found that the Laibon" (*i.e.* Lenana) "was entirely in favour of it". Lenana of course knew what was common knowledge and would have supported the proposal because he knew the Government wished him to, if for no other reason. But he had another reason. He knew from the refusal of the Government to beacon off the promised road and from the increasing restrictions on intercourse between the reserves that his influence over the Masai on Laikipia would soon be irrecoverably lost if they were allowed to stay there.

Legalishu, the most influential Masai in the northern reserve, was present during Lenana's interview with the Governor, but, in the words of the Blue book, "could not be induced to give his opinion on the subject". No European in the country imagined for a moment that the Masai on Laikipia wished to leave it. The area, though small, is as fine a piece of country as there is in Kenya, with rich soil and perennial streams, vastly superior in every way to the country south of the Rift Valley where it was now proposed to send the whole tribe. Certainly the Masai would prefer to keep together. That was the reason the half-mile strip was promised in the 1904 treaty. For the Masai to move without cattle was impossible. And since August 1908, as the Blue book notes, all movement of cattle between the two reserves was absolutely prohibited. It would probably be a mistake to see a political motive in that prohibition. Officials under an autocracy are far more prone than officials under a democracy to act up to the adage,

" Go and see what Johnny is doing, and tell him not to ". But in any case this prohibition accorded well with the plans of the authorities, and was regarded by the Masai as a hint not to be disregarded.[1]

In February 1910 the consent of the two chief leaders of the Masai on Laikipia to evacuate that area was at length obtained. The methods by which that consent was obtained are not specified in the Blue book. Nor is it stated whether the Secretary of State agreed to the tearing up of the 1904 treaty.

In any case, the move was at once begun. Troops were in readiness to check any rebellious refusal. None were needed. That year the rainfall had, exceptionally, been abundant in the southern and scanty in the overcrowded northern reserve. Some sections of the tribe began to move south before they were ordered to.

In April 1910, while this move was in progress, the Secretary of State for the Colonies stopped it by telegram, and in a despatch directed that the Masai were to be allowed to stay in Laikipia unless and until a new treaty was made in which new territorial arrangements were provided for. These orders created consternation in Kenya. Undoubtedly Nairobi had intended to present Downing Street with a *fait accompli*. Some one had evidently given information and spoiled the scheme. For once, it seemed, the representatives of British opinion had defeated the plans of the local authorities to destroy the only remaining vestige of legal right to any land of any tribe in Kenya.

[1] The Veterinary Department professes to work for the benefit of European and African stock-owners alike. The claim is sheer nonsense. Nine-tenths of the Department's work consists of free preventive and curative treatment given to the property of the Europeans, who own, according to official returns, only 5 per cent of the stock in the country.

The Department is strongly of opinion that bulls for breeding from should not be introduced from Europe for the Masai to use. The reader may guess the motive of this advice.


1890
2°N
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RIFT VALLEY
LAIKIPIA
UGANDA RAILWAY
NAIROBI
TO MOMBASA
TANGANYIKA TERRITORY
DESERT
3°S
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1906
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RIFT VALLEY
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UGANDA RAILWAY
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TANGANYIKA TERRITORY
DESERT
UGANDA RAILWAY
TO MOMBASA
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

The first three of these maps show the areas occupied by the Masai at the dates mentioned. The eastern and southern two-thirds of the existing reserve is waterless desert. The fourth map, of the northern section of the existing reserve, shows how all the streams in the reserve, nearly all of which run dry in a few miles, have their rise on land belonging to Europeans.

But these authorities were not idle. Whenever the Colonial Secretary's despatch was received, in May 1910, they called the Masai to a conference. (In what follows the statements of the Blue book are closely adhered to and sometimes quoted.) At that conference, Legalishu, speaking for the Masai on Laikipia, said he did not consider the proposed enlarged southern reserve good enough. The Government representatives then asked him to nominate men to inspect the proposed new area. He did so. These men reported " that the proposed area was too small and that there was an insufficiency of water ". Mr. Collyer reported that the Masai on Laikipia " were ready to go if the Government ordered them to do so, but that they did not wish to leave Laikipia ". Such statements were obviously unlikely to induce the Secretary of State to consent to the removal of the tribe from Laikipia.

The importance of these events in the eyes of the European community in Kenya can be judged from the following extracts, taken from a letter written at the time (May 1910) to the Governor by a subordinate official:

A large body of settlers takes the view that their rights in the country have been gradually won by pressure and struggle against a Government whose resistance has been professedly due to its position as guardian of native rights. They anticipate that as more of them enter the country, pressure will induce the gradual surrender to them of the choicer parts of the land now in native occupation. A belief of this kind, however mistaken, is a serious fact. It is greatly encouraged by the special circumstances of the case of the Masai. The most prominent of these are, that the Masai left the Rift Valley five years ago in obedience to the wish of the Government, and that in return for that surrender of their best land they were given by Government a promise never again to be disturbed; that most of the Masai now in the northern reserve prefer to stay where they are; and that they are to go from country ardently desired by Europeans to country hitherto in large part open to European settlement, which has not proved valuable enough to be made use of. A move of such

a kind inevitably encourages illegitimate anticipations. If the average settler believed that land in native reserves would be as immune from disturbance on political grounds as is land in the occupation of a European freeholder, one prominent cause of undesirable political unrest and racial antagonism would be eliminated.

There is another and more serious consideration than the misconception of many settlers on the subject. The great bulk of the natives who have experience of the nature and working of our occupation of the country believe that it is designed for the advantage and profit of officials and their fellow-countrymen. If one tries to explain the contrary one is met with almost universal incredulity, though it is often hidden by assent for civility's sake. One of the chief contributory causes of this attitude of more intelligent natives is the gradual occupation by Europeans of much of the best land. Their general belief is that the limit to our acquisition of land is set by the demands of our fellow-countrymen, just as they believe the Government increases taxes whenever it thinks it can get more money. In this country natives are so docile and unwarlike and have so little opposition of mind to the conceptions we impose, that the only way for the Government to learn native wishes and opinions is to conceal its own. In the case of the Masai the ordinary native of the country has no doubt as to the wishes of the Government. The careful deliberation of the Government, its conferences and consultations, the very kindliness of its representatives, will by many natives be put down as the hypocrisy and guile of those who prefer to take without the trouble of using force. In the view of some men this attitude is more serious than sedition.

These views were not, and are not, shared by the authorities in Kenya. Since that letter was written the Nandi, Kamba, Kamasia, and several other tribes have suffered by the alienation of large areas of land, though of course by no means the whole of the areas alienated to Europeans since 1910 were in effective native occupation. In these other alienations the Government was hindered by no written treaties or agreements. It was only with the Masai that the Government bound itself by a solemn pledge to respect the tribe's rights in land. How that pledge was kept will soon appear.

A year after Mr. Collyer's frankness had confirmed the suspicions of the Secretary of State Lenana died, expressing with his last breath the wish that his people should always obey the Government, especially by leaving Laikipia. Mr. Collyer was displaced, to his great sorrow. By a variety of means the Masai were taught that life on Laikipia would never be comfortable for them. In fact the diplomacy and secrecy shown by the Government, and the known fact that its orders had been reversed by the Colonial Office, had so unsettled the tribe that parties of Masai began to wander outside the reserves and to visit the land in the Rift Valley that had been abandoned to Europeans though scarcely any of it was at that time occupied by them. These incursions were punished by heavy fines in cattle. Sir Percy Girouard represented to the Colonial Office that the position was serious and that all his advisers concurred in regarding the evacuation of Laikipia as a necessity to the prestige of the Government. Prestige is a word with a meaning in Africa quite different from its meaning in England. Here it means having a reputation for honour and intelligence. There it means the kind of reputation in the eyes of Africans that the Government won by its success in getting the Masai out of Laikipia.

Further conferences with the Masai were held and at length in April 1911 Legalishu agreed to leave Laikipia. The day after his consent was given a new treaty was drafted, and the day following that, April 4, the treaty was duly signed, largely by the same men who had signed the treaty of 1904. The Colonial Secretary's approval, however, was not got until May 29. The move then began. The great defect of the new reserve is that all the streams in its western half rise in a mountain mass (see the map on p. 107) that then belonged and still belongs to two rich Europeans.[1]

[1] The local government had for years resisted one of these grants, which, in fact, had not been actually made in 1911.

Only a small fringe lying just below the mountain had perennial water and good grazing all the year round. The first Masai to reach this fringe of really good land refused to move their cattle farther on to the drier country on the plains. Unusually heavy rain fell, and in the highest parts hail fell and lay in wreaths. All roads and tracks became impassable with mud. Over a million live stock cannot be moved successfully without organisation. One of the routes followed got hopelessly blocked with a mob of dying cattle that could not be extricated. Others in large numbers could be given no grazing.

Many thousands of cattle died, and of old people among the Masai themselves not a few also. Exactly how many thus died of exposure and hunger no one knows. The late town magistrate in Nakuru in a private letter described the loss of human life as "very heavy". The medical officer sent to investigate estimated the loss of life at 2 per cent to 4 per cent of the population of the villages concerned.

These misfortunes determined the Masai to resist their orders. They began, such as were able, to break back to Laikipia. In the cautious but candid words of the Blue book, "a desire appeared, particularly on the part of Legalishu, to return to the North". Many settled on the alienated land in the Rift Valley and refused to go either back or forward. Troops of course could have been used, and with undoubted success, but that the Government was tied to the theory that the Masai ardently desired to leave Laikipia, and as the Secretary of State had solemnly assured Parliament of their enthusiasm to depart, it would be difficult for him to defend the use of machine-guns to support their flagging spirits. All would go well if things could be done quietly. But if the facts did happen to get published, just at that time, some very promising careers, in some of which fulfilment has since succeeded promise, would have been wrecked.

So there was nothing for it but to allow the return to Laikipia. The Secretary of State then inquired whether the proposed boundaries of the southern reserve could be enlarged. He then learned to his surprise that to the west of its proposed western boundary there lay a considerable area, largely uninhabited but fairly well watered, which the Government intended to grant to Europeans, and which indeed had not already been thus alienated only because it was so far from the railway. He insisted, contrary to the advice of Nairobi and to the great indignation of the settlers, on this area west of the Amala River being added to the southern reserve.

Legalishu was again told to send men to report on the southern reserve, thus still further enlarged. When they came back " they returned nothing but evasive answers " (Blue book). At one more conference, in February 1912, Legalishu was still obdurate. By this time the situation had become quite impossible. The new treaty in which the tribe had surrendered Laikipia had actually been signed. Certain Europeans of the very greatest importance in the eyes of those in authority had for long been promised definite areas on Laikipia. The Governor went home, represented the situation in its true light, and succeeded in persuading the Secretary of State, in May 1912, to order the move to be carried out. In the same despatch the Colonial Secretary stipulated that none of the land on Laikipia was to be promised to Europeans. But it had been promised already, some of it years before. A year later, when in March 1913 the last Masai left Laikipia for ever, it was all securely in European ownership. One more year passed, and our country went to war in defence of the Belgian treaty.[1]

[1] It may amuse the reader to know that, according to the local Press, Rumuruti, the only township on Laikipia, contained, in June 1922, a population of ten European adults, who shared between them four liquor licences.

Legalishu and several other Masai chiefs made one last effort to retain their land. At least two Europeans, one of them an official and the other a settler, advised them to appeal to the Courts of Justice.[1] They did so, and sued the Crown for restoration of Laikipia, for the general enforcement of the treaty of 1904, and for damage and loss suffered during the various moves. The Court of first instance granted a nominal injunction, but the suit was dismissed with costs in the Court of Appeal on the grounds that the Masai were not British subjects and owed no allegiance to the Crown, and that the treaty of 1904, being a compact between two sovereign states, was not cognisable by any British Court. An appeal to the Privy Council was entered. But the greatest pressure was used to induce the Masai to go no further. A number of important reputations, as the reader can imagine, were at stake. The Masai were told, what indeed must have seemed to them abundantly proved, that the Government was irresistible, and they abandoned the appeal.

The state of mind of the Masai may be judged from the following extracts from the official directions circulated to the officers in charge of the move:

> The elders will be informed that the Government has issued orders for the move to be carried out, and that they are expected to co-operate. Every endeavour will be made not to wound their feelings or lower their prestige, but if they refuse to assist, Ngaroya will be placed in charge of the northern reserve, and Legalishu and Masikonde will be told they will have to forgo their subsidies. They will also be informed that if the Masai refuse to move, troops will be sent to Laikipia. Legalishu will be allowed to move first of all if he so desires, in which case he will be given the Lemek Valley.

The comment of the chief newspaper in the colony on the conclusion of the new treaty was:

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[1] The author never at any time had any communication with any Masai chief.

For this we have to thank H.E. the Governor, who placed the case so clearly before the Masai tribe as to cause them to realise the advantage to them of settlement in one reserve. A fine area of grazing land is now open for white settlement.[1]

The barrister who conducted the case for the Masai, Mr. Alexander Morrison, was most scurrilously abused in the official report on the case to the Secretary of State, though he had previously been a highly responsible Government official, and though he had undertaken the case knowing well that for some time at least much profitable work for Government would be barred to him. In justification of his advice to the Masai chiefs to proceed with the case, the following opinion on it, by the lawyer generally regarded as the highest authority in England in such matters, may be quoted here:

In my opinion the agreement of the 10th August 1904 between H.M. Commissioner[2] for the East African Protectorate and the chiefs of the Masai tribe amounted to a contract of such a nature as to be enforceable by proceedings in the Protectorate corresponding to those in a Petition of Right in this country. It appears to me not to be in the nature of a treaty with another Power, which would not be enforceable in the Municipal Courts. The Masai were subject to British rule and to the law administered in British Courts, and the Commissioner with the subsequent approval of the Secretary of State expressly agreed to the terms of the instrument. I do not think that the agreement constituted the Government of the Protectorate a trustee of the Masai in any legal sense of that term. The Government, however, entered into a contractual relation with the tribe, of which the Courts of the Protectorate can take cognisance.

It is scarcely necessary to remark that Masai sovereignty is a legal fiction to which there is nothing whatever in fact to correspond. Masai taxes are paid to, Masai murderers hanged by, the British Government. The legal status of a

[1] *East African Standard* of June 10, 1911.

[2] So the Governor was at one time termed.

protected tribe, in fact, gave to the Government the power to do exactly as it pleased, power greater than any Government over British subjects can acquire, while it debarred the tribe from acquiring any rights in land of which a British Court could take cognisance.

Before further guidance from the Blue book fails us we may take note of its description of Masai history during the War. A tendency to drift north in 1913 is mentioned. In 1915, we are told, "grazing throughout the reserve became inadequate", and we learn that both in 1915 and 1916 the Masai had to be allowed to use both Crown and private land. Early in 1915 "a determined attempt was made to return to Laikipia in defiance of Government orders". Indian troops were sent, but Legalishu and other elders persuaded the wanderers to return without the use of force.

In 1913 a Savings Bank was started among the Masai. Whoever was responsible for the idea must have prodigious faith in thrift as the panacea for social ills when we remember that the live stock owned by the tribe must be worth at least four million pounds.

As the Masai had been employed by us in practically all our minor East African wars, they naturally thought themselves entitled to join in the war with the Germans, especially as their tribal boundary coincided with the international frontier. In spite of official prohibition they raided over the frontier some half-dozen times and suffered pretty heavily from German machine-guns.

During the War the Government passed a conscription Ordinance in Kenya, under the name of the Native Followers' Recruitment Ordinance. A resolute attempt was made to enforce the Ordinance among the Masai. In describing what happened in consequence the official chronicler shows, very naturally, one of his few lapses from candour. He admits that troops were sent to recruit 250

warriors as donkey drivers. But he does not reveal the fact that they were withdrawn only when, after thousands of pounds had been spent without result, it became obvious that further efforts would produce a general rising in the tribe.[1]

The Blue book—it was published in 1919—states that " the Masai problem has not yet been tackled ". But the reason the tribe presents a problem at all is simply that it has failed to fall in with the accepted ideas about the status and duties of Africans in Kenya. Every one of influence and authority in Kenya has, until recent agitation at home produced some slight effect, assumed that every tribe must find useful occupation in industries controlled by Europeans. That is the only kind of destiny for Africans for which, in 1919, provision was made. And the only reason the Masai in 1919 presented a problem while the Kikuyu, for instance, in the official view, did not was that by a variety of means the Kikuyu had been persuaded to become wage-earners *en masse* while the Masai had refused. As the Blue book puts it, " In the past no compulsion had been brought to bear on the Masai to go out to work, and very few settlers had much use for them ". The fact was that the " compulsion " that proved effective in the case of other tribes would have been unsafe in the case of the Masai.

This, then, was the Masai problem in 1919. Some 45,000 men, women and children, with 700,000 cattle and 2,000,000 sheep and goats, inhabited an immense area, largely waterless but still immensely valuable, that was useless to the world at large except that it provided the towns of the country with inferior beef and mutton, and

[1] A correspondent who was on the spot at the time says that the military did not want the men, that the reason for trying to get them was that it was thought that conscription would do the Masai good, and that at least several scores of Masai men, women and children were killed by rifles and machine-guns before the attempt at compulsion was abandoned.

supplied Europe and America with a number of skins and hides.

The story of the attempt since the evacuation of Laikipia to solve the Masai problem must be told, though no guidance to either reader or writer can be got from any Blue book or other official reports. Every effort has been made to learn and state the facts of these last four years of Masai history as accurately and as impartially as possible. Names will only be mentioned when without them the narrative would not be clear. And while it is impossible, in such a book as this, to state some facts that are open secrets in the colony, the reader will understand that parts of the story must rest on the writer's own statement alone.

After the move to the enlarged southern reserve special administrative arrangements were made to deal with the tribe. The tax was raised to 20s. a head, and all the revenue raised in the tribal area was assigned to a special budget, out of which all administrative expenditure is met, though revenue from indirect taxation is excluded. The Colonial Office insisted on considerable expenditure on irrigation in the reserve and on the appointment of a veterinary officer and a veterinary bacteriologist for work in the reserve. Unfortunately difficulties in keeping dams and water channels in repair have rendered them nearly useless. The Masai are no craftsmen, and their immense mobs of cattle are constantly breaking down the perhaps insufficiently substantial earthworks originally built. Since the move, Mr. Rupert Hemsted has been in charge of the tribe, and while, as will be seen, his hands have been far from free, the policy that has mainly been followed is his.

The fundamental idea of that policy is that the organisation and power of the warriors must be destroyed and replaced by a tribal council composed of elders. When, a generation ago, raiding was prevented, the evil results of organised licentiousness were aggravated by idleness, and

wholesale demoralisation set in. There seemed to be nothing for it but to break up the whole system. Fortunately the elders were in favour of that course and it was vigorously pursued. The encampments in which the warriors formerly lived together with the unmarried girls, of which the largest were always kept near the Government stations, were dispersed, and the youths and maidens returned to their parents. The ceremonies at which boys became warriors and warriors elders were forbidden. A tribal council of elders was formed and given large powers. A number of these elders were given judicial responsibilities.

Coincidently with these political changes an economic policy was attempted. A primitive kind of creamery was set up at the chief Government station, where ghee (melted butter) was made. A specially selected herd of 2000 cattle was kept at the station for the improvement, by breeding from the best animals, of the stock belonging to the tribe. Efforts were made to find a commercial firm which would set up a factory for canning beef and making beef extracts, but without success. Trading centres were established at various points and shopkeepers welcomed to them. The people were encouraged to spend money, like other African tribes, on the trade goods they had hitherto felt no need for. Obviously, so long as they had no wish to buy anything they had no inducement to sell their surplus stock for cash.

The veterinary bacteriologist was withdrawn during the War. After the War the buildings that had been built for him were turned into a boarding-school for 120 Masai boys with a junior district officer in charge. So far as the writer can learn, the education given is rather what is taught in a boy scouts' camp than in an elementary school. Those who are responsible for it seem to claim no very brilliant success. When one thinks of the habits and traditions

these boys learn at home, one feels that the mere existence of the school is a brilliant success. One Masai lad was given several years of education in America. He is well reported on.

When, soon after the end of the War, Mr. Hemsted went on leave to England some of the warriors took the opportunity to return to their former undesirable liberties. The Government then did a most extraordinary thing. It withdrew all its own officers from the reserve and allowed Lord Delamere to have sole charge of it for a fortnight. The reader will remember his getting a free grant of 100,000 acres in the Rift Valley. (Other grants bring his total holdings up to double that area.) He has always kept in touch with tribal affairs and has a kind of bodyguard of Masai on his estate. He is the recognised leader of the European colony, was the mentor, in turn, of Sir Charles Eliot, Sir Percy Girouard and Sir Edward Northey, and, largely through their agency, has been the architect and director of the policy of making Kenya a colony governed by its European residents.

This incident is recorded because it shows what it is most important for the reader to grasp, the unlimited influence, not only over policy but in the course of ordinary administrative affairs, of the richer concessionaires. It is beside the point to cite the opinion of some people that Lord Delamere is an expert in Masai affairs. Others naturally estimate his knowledge less highly. The point is that to give any person, however wise, responsible to neither Governor nor Parliament for his advice and actions, the sole charge of a tribe in the throes of a rapid and compulsory revolution involves confusion in tribal affairs, disheartens the officers in regular charge, wrecks both the confidence of the tribe in them and their confidence in the Government.

A minor incident that happened about the same time

will also throw some light on affairs. An area of 250 square miles on the boundary of the reserve, that was formally added to it in 1915 by Sir H. C. Belfield, then Governor, was granted to an influential group of Europeans during Mr. Hemsted's absence. The grant was cancelled on his return.

Lord Delamere's intervention produced no results of value. He could only repeat to the elders the advice others had given them, advice they had always been eager to follow. The turning of a tribe of predatory freebooters into peaceful shepherds was going on as fast as could be expected—too fast, indeed, perhaps. For in 1922 the anticipated revolt happened, fortunately on a quite minor scale. One or two resisters of Government orders who had been imprisoned escaped from jail and killed the sergeant in charge of a pursuing party of police. They persuaded 300 warriors with a retinue of young girls to go with them to a mountain covered with nearly impenetrable forest. A company of troops was brought from Nairobi which, after some vain parleying, drove the rebellious warriors out of their stronghold. They then scattered all over the reserve in search of hiding-places.

At this stage Mr. Hemsted advised that the troops should be recalled and the rounding up of the fugitives left to the ordinary police, part of whose ordinary work it is to ferret out and arrest deserters from work and other "wanted" persons. A further point was that the pay and allowances of the troops were a charge on tribal funds, which were badly needed for education and other purposes. The response of the Government to the request to have the troops recalled was an order to send all the police out of the reserve and for the troops to remain. Eventually, after a period of some weeks, the troops were withdrawn, and the fugitives were caught by the tribal police. The heavy fines of stock imposed after this escapade were reduced by

the Secretary of State, according to the London press, at Lord Delamere's request. He was in London at the time, negotiating most successfully with the Colonial Office on behalf of the Europeans in Kenya, who had threatened armed rebellion if Indians were given the right to buy land and to the franchise equally with Europeans.

In 1923 Mr. Hemsted again went on leave. During his absence his policy was completely reversed. The warriors and maidens were allowed to form their joint encampments once more. The experimental herd was sold and broken up. The officer in charge of the school previously referred to protested against these changes and was promptly transferred to another part of the country. Meanwhile the Government announced that an inquiry would be held into the causes of the recent disturbances. The Committee is to be composed of senior officials and of some of those unofficial Europeans whose deep and lasting interest in the tribe and its land has been shown in these pages. It is to be hoped that the more perspicacious of their readers will have grasped without further explanation the motives of the inquiry.

Some comments on this last phase of Masai history may be allowed. Deliberately to break up a tribe's organisation is on the face of it a dangerous proceeding. Many would say that the final results on balance must always be bad. But what, in this case, was the alternative ? The existence in East Africa of a tribe with the political and social system the Masai had ten years ago was as preposterous and nearly as impossible as a herd of elephant would be in Hyde Park. Violence and lust were the deliberate objects of the warrior organisation, through which every Masai male had to pass. And every Masai girl on reaching puberty was forbidden to be chaste. So long as this warrior organisation existed, the raiding of a European's cattle or, if he was very unpopular, his murder, was possible at any moment.

In East Africa these are not reckoned as ordinary crimes and they are apt to have incalculable political results.

And the political situation was no more urgent than the economic. There is a cattle disease in East Africa called East Coast fever. It is very fatal. It is carried by a certain kind of tick, which lives in some parts of the country and not in others. In affected areas the disease can be controlled, but not eradicated, by frequent dipping of all the cattle in the area. So far the Masai have refused to dip their cattle. The result is that some of the best pasture in the reserve is untenanted, except by immense herds of zebra and gazelle, since cattle grazed on it die of East Coast fever. Quite apart from these infected areas, more than half the total area of the reserve is lying useless from lack of water. In some of these parts the soil is too alkaline to be of any value. In other parts, however, the provision of perennial water, by pipes or in open channels, would allow the land to carry hundreds of thousands of cattle.

As the result of these circumstances the reserve is overcrowded with stock. The quarantine imposed by the veterinary authorities forbids the exportation of live cattle from the reserve, so that other tribes in the country cannot get cattle. And the leaders of the European colony point with indignation to the shocking waste of good land. In point of fact, however, the proportion of land in European ownership not put to any useful purpose is far larger than in the Masai reserve or in any other area in purely native occupation.

Now the reason the Masai refuse to dip their cattle, and to spend money on irrigation, is simply that they have little or no use for money and what money buys in Africa. What was a virtue in Diogenes is a vice in the modern world. The cure of that vice, the only cure, is education of the kind now fashionable. Its great object is to create new

appetites, for tea, and cigarettes, and gramophones, and spotted waistcoats, and ribbons, and hand mirrors, and umbrellas, and Worcester Sauce—all the innumerable objects with which modern civilisation has enriched the world. Many of us are gravely dissatisfied with that civilisation. But with all its crimes and follies it is better than Masai civilisation. And there is no room for both in the same world. That statement is impossible of proof. Some gentle readers will dispute it. One can only advise them to live for a year in Kenya Colony, and they will be convinced that the only alternatives, for the Lumbwa, Nandi and other tribes as well as the Masai, are civilisation or destruction.

One has to admit, of course, that if the world were governed by reason and justice, the Masai would be given a hundred years instead of ten in which to learn to be industrious instead of being brave. In fact, if British public opinion cared to exert itself, the whole process could be made safe and easy. Hitherto all changes have been resisted because so plainly they were intended to make the Masai our obedient servants. Why, they think, should they learn our ways in order to herd our cattle rather than their own?

The only real difficulties in the way of a policy less hasty than Mr. Hemsted's lie with those who, like Sir Charles Eliot, are " not sanguine as to the future of the African race ". The reader may already have been reminded of the history of a race with virtues and vices and culture similar to those of the Masai—the Indians of North America. They too refused the servile place in society. They too were pushed into corners where they could continue the brutalities and immoralities which, it was assumed, they would always prefer to the decencies and cleanliness to which in some degree our civilisation has attained. They throve no better than caged animals.

Then men came into power who actually believed that schools and teachers could turn savages into civilised men in one generation. That has been done. All over the south and west of the United States homesteads are replacing wigwams in the Indian Reservations. Already their population is once more increasing. Most of their inhabitants now lead the lives and enjoy the privileges of ordinary American citizens.

Why not do for the Masai what has been done for the Redskin? Their wealth can quickly be made a boon, both to Africa and to the world. But not by seizing it, nor, as the settlers demand, by taxing it. In time, no doubt, the cattle of both rich Masai and rich Europeans in Kenya will be taxed, as now they are not. But the first, nay, the only necessity for the Masai is for them to get new ideas about women, and wealth and law. Schools are the only means by which these new ideas can be implanted. The warrior of twenty can scarcely ever be induced to learn. But Masai children are just as malleable and just as capable as English children.

By the time this book is published the Commission of Inquiry will probably have reported. It is not likely to advise that the world and everything in it to be learned and used should be as open to Masai children as to ours, and everything in Africa more theirs than ours. Persuade the Masai elders of that and they will soon send their children to school.

Land worth several million pounds once belonging to the Masai now belongs to our countrymen. It is not taxed, and its owners pay no direct taxation. It would be unjust to educate Masai children out of taxation paid by other and poorer Africans. But, in view of the history narrated in this chapter, would it not be just to lay upon the owners of land in Laikipia and in the Rift Valley the cost of educating the 6000 children who will form the next genera-

tion of Masai? So far, thanks to the intervention in Parliament twelve years ago of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and Mr. T. E. Harvey, now both, happily, again in Parliament, they still have wealth in land and stock. Will British public opinion see that they are taught how to use that wealth?

The chief needs of the situation are two.[1] First, a really adequate scheme of education, under which in, say, six years every Masai boy and girl will have begun to spend five years in a boarding-school. Opinions will differ as to whether such schools should be run by Government or by Missions. Why not divide the work and compare results? Second, a chilled beef and canning factory with an instructional farm attached. These could be run either directly by Government or by a concessionaire with guarantee against loss. Both these proposals will involve large expenditure at first. Of its recovery in time by the State there can be no doubt. And in any case it is a debt that we owe the Masai tribe.

[1] Really, properly constructed waterworks are a third.

CHAPTER V

AN EPISODE IN THE HISTORY OF THE GIRIAMA

THE official "Report of the Malindi Commission of Inquiry" narrates, with even greater candour than the Blue book on the Masai, an episode in the history of the Giriama tribe that illustrates the policy of the Government in regard to native reserves.

One has some compunction in stating the facts as they stand. Their disclosure created a minor scandal in the colony, as revealing incompetence and inhumanity that are fortunately rare in the administration. But cases where facts can be quoted from official documents are so few that they cannot be neglected. After all, the Masai and the Giriama are not the only tribes to have suffered. And if the reader will bear in mind that some of the administrative officers concerned in the story are examples of a type that is in a minority in the service, he is not likely to be seriously misled.

The Giriama tribe is one of a group of small tribes inhabiting the range of low hills that overlook the fertile belt on the coast formerly cultivated by the slaves of the Arabs and Swahili. Fifty years ago the Giriama lived mainly to the south of the Sabaki River, where the land is very rocky and infertile. Indeed, the food gardens are little better than pockets of soil, and partial famines due to shortage of rain are common. North of the river the land is more level and fertile. But the north bank was exposed in former times both to Masai cattle raids and to slave raids by

coast Arabs. For these reasons the Giriama were afraid to live beside such food gardens as they did have on the north bank of the Sabaki. Even on its south bank they lived in isolated groups of huts, hidden away in the bush. Only when our own Government gave them security from both Arabs and Masai did they begin to settle permanently on the north bank of the river. There they were joined by people from other Nyika tribes, by remnants of Galla and other broken people who too took advantage of new-found safety to make settled homes, and by parties of runaway slaves from the coast plantations. Between 1880 and 1900 all these people, the bulk of them Giriama, founded large villages north of the Sabaki and engaged with great success in growing grain for export. The grain was shipped, mainly to Arabia, from the mouth of the river, in dhows.

But the Giriama remained, as their history and circumstances had made them, extremely ignorant, superstitious and suspicious of strangers. The few who came under the influence of missions tended to leave their tribal homes, and failed to influence in their turn the general life of the tribe. The Giriama had for so many centuries lived in hiding from hostile neighbours on both sides of them that they had acquired a hatred of everything foreign.

As the tribe was a small one and the revenue it paid in hut and poll tax was also small, it received little attention from the Government. District officers given charge of the tribe were often transferred to more important districts when there was any shortage of staff. And as they knew they would not stay long enough to let them get to know the people, scarcely any of these officers ever made friends with them. They found the Giriama unsociable, and the collection of the tax, always a district officer's first duty, very difficult; especially when, as sometimes happened, two years' taxes had to be collected together, owing to the absence for a time of any district officer. The tribe was

in fact difficult to handle, and was not getting easier to handle.

A bare transcription of the Report already referred to will best describe how the tribe was handled in 1914:

In 1913, when it was desired to bring the tribe under closer administration, it was found that the settlements of the Giriama to the north of the river offered considerable difficulties to the accomplishment of the object in view, it was therefore decided with Your Excellency's approval to bring the Giriama, and members of other allied Nyika tribes who had got mixed up with them, back south of the river.

Your Excellency's despatch to the Secretary of State of 4th May 1914 would show the numbers of the persons involved by this decision to be 5000, but from the evidence before us and the hut tax figures supplied by Mr. A.[1] we believe that a fair estimate of the total number of souls would be between 15,000 and 20,000, probably nearer to the latter number.

This move it was arranged should take place early in 1914, but as the people concerned showed a natural disinclination to leave their homes, the date was postponed till after the crops should have been harvested, that is to say, in late August or early September.

In the meantime Mr. A., as Provincial Commissioner, was endeavouring in other ways to bring the tribe under closer administration.

In the first place, a more thorough collection of the Hut Poll Tax was enforced; secondly, every endeavour was made to get people to work outside the Reserve, as well as in making roads, carrying material for and building Government houses in the Reserve; and finally, the Kaya, or sacred place of the tribe, was destroyed. One of the officers mainly concerned in the carrying out of this policy was Mr. B., whom we were unfortunately unable to call as a witness owing to his absence on leave. This officer appears to have acted with great energy, and to have attracted in consequence the particular dislike of the tribe.

These various proceedings, combined with the order for the

[1] The proper names mentioned in the Report are shown here by the letters of the alphabet taken *seriatim*.

Sabaki move,[1] greatly disturbed the tribe, and though the persons best acquainted with the Giriama, with the exception apparently of Mr. B., anticipated no serious resistance being offered, and that the move would go through, an incident happened near Mangea which supplied the match to the inflammable discontent and a rising took place as reported to the Government by the Acting Provincial Commissioner, Mr. C., on the 26th August 1914.

From this date all thought of effecting the move peaceably disappeared: troops were sent North of the Sabaki, and according to Mr. D.'s evidence some 400 huts were burned and the people scattered in different directions.

After the military were withdrawn and when Mr. E. was endeavouring to enforce the terms of peace and to collect the fines imposed, the work of driving the people from the north bank was carried on by Police patrols. Some few went north to the Tana,[2] but of these the great majority were headed back, and eventually few, if any, Wanyika were left to the north of the Sabaki.

In the course of the evidence we took as regards this move we were much struck by the absence of any adequate preparation beforehand for moving such a large body of people.

The general idea apparently was (as set out by Mr. F.), that the people from the north should become absorbed where and as best they could among the main body of the tribe living to the south of the River.

We observed equally an absence of any control or direction either by Mr. C. or Mr. A. over the move subsequent to the rising.

The sole instruction conveyed to Mr. D. as to how the people north of the Sabaki should be dealt with was contained in a copy of a minute by Your Excellency sent to him by Mr. B.

In short, we are of opinion that inadequate preparations were made beforehand for the move, that the people were first driven out by the military as a consequence of the rising, and that the move was finally effected as one of the conditions of peace by the civil police, and that no proper control has been subsequently exercised for the re-settlement of the people.

The additional fact that unfortunately there have been two bad

[1] The removal of the tribe, that is, to the less fertile land south of the Sabaki River.

[2] Two hundred miles of desert lie between the Tana and the Sabaki.

harvests in succession in 1915 and 1916 has doubtless added to the sufferings which the Giriama from the north bank have undergone.

The Report then goes on to describe other smaller moves with less serious consequences in the same neighbourhood, of which one at least was carried out "with great care and consideration" by a certain officer.

Finally the Report states:

In conclusion the Commissioners desire to bring to Your Excellency's notice that the area to the north of the Sabaki, which formerly contributed in no small degree to the large export of grain from the Malindi district, is now spoken of as the "dispossessed Territory", is practically empty of inhabitants, and is not being in any way made use of. The various removals of natives referred to in this report have undoubtedly interfered largely for the time being with general cultivation in the district, but the present position has been rendered precarious by the failure of two successive crops, and we have evidence before us that, should there be anything like a general failure of the crops now sown, there is danger of a serious famine in the immediate future.

One or two features of the case not mentioned in the Report must be explained. The phrase "closer administration" means that district officers are expected to get their people to live in large villages instead of in huts scattered about wherever there is any soil worth cultivating. Huts can be counted more easily, and the hut tax more quickly collected, when people live in large villages. Also this closer administration makes it less easy for those who are reluctant to leave home to work for wages to escape the watchful eyes of district officers and chiefs. The Giriama in particular were notoriously averse from wage-earning. And in their case the high direct taxation that in the case of other tribes compels men to leave home to seek work failed to have that effect. Living as they do only some thirty or forty miles from a natural harbour, they can, or could until

the " move " under discussion, grow grain for export, which Indian middlemen collected and shipped. That was the sole reason the tribe was concentrated in the less fertile land south of the river rather than on the more fertile northern bank. The usual reason for moving a tribe, to give the land evacuated to Europeans, does not apply in this case. It is true that a syndicate does own an immense area north of the Sabaki and that the Giriama feared that it would be given more land. But the real reason for the move was not to make more room but to increase the supply of labourers. This case of the Giriama disproves the common allegation that the tribes in Kenya cannot be got to engage in production for export themselves but must become wage-earners in order to become useful citizens of the world. It also proves that the Government does not, to say the least, smile encouragingly on Africans who prefer to grow crops for export on land in their own occupation rather than work for wages.

The " large export of grain " had been going on for centuries, to such places as Makalla and Muscat. It probably reached its maximum some forty years ago. It has now, like all the other industries followed on the coast, greatly declined. And as the land south of the Sabaki is in most years quite inadequate to support the tribe, " closer administration " is admirably calculated to induce the able-bodied males of the tribe to leave home in search of work.

Some confusion of mind is natural in such people when those in authority try to instruct them in the virtue of industry. And the unfortunate district officer who may some day be told to revive the " large export of grain " is not likely to find his task an easy one, even if he is no longer expected—to quote the words used by the Commissioners—to " make every endeavour to get people to work outside the reserve ".

Two paragraphs in the Report dealing with one of the minor moves may help to complete the picture of the situation of the Giriama tribe:

> The people numbered in all about 700, and included among them were some Giriama. These Giriama were sorted out and settled near Gaji with a view to providing labour on the land to the immediate west of the Baratumu Line, which had been applied for by the Magarini Syndicate.
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> The remaining Wanyika appear to have settled down where Mr. T. placed them, and we received no complaints from them except that some of them wished to go back north and stated that they were afraid if the Magarini Syndicate land was extended they might be moved from where they now are. The empty huts of these people were burnt after their owners had left them.

This fragment of the history of the Giriama, together with the history of the Masai, will have explained to the reader what a Reserve is. It must not be thought that every tribe in Kenya has been moved about as these have, though there are few or none that have not suffered some dispossession. The point to observe is the total lack of any security of tenure. Without enforceable legal rights such as the Crown grants to Europeans, no security of tenure is possible to Africans in Kenya. Natives are constantly being assured by governors that their reserves are secure. One can understand such a man, sorely beset on the one hand by a Colonial Office timidly anxious that no occasion should be given for awkward questions in Parliament, and on the other by the leaders of the local European community whom he dare not openly oppose, reluctantly resorting on rare occasions to deceit. But, in face of the events described in this chapter and in the previous one, how can any governor expect to deceive any one into believing for a moment that any tribal land is safe? Africans are not the imbeciles most governors seem to think them. And the only effect upon their minds

of these ridiculous assurances that their rights and interests are protected is to implant the suspicion that some new demand, for land, or labour, or money in taxes, is to be made upon them.

This occasion may serve for the discussion of two related matters so delicate and difficult that it is tempting to ignore them, but so important that they cannot be evaded.

What is a public servant in Kenya to do when the orders he is given would, in his judgement, do some serious injustice if carried out? The question of course arises occasionally in every service. But in Africa for one obvious reason it is bound to happen often enough to form a special problem. At home publicity is the great disinfectant of the service. The worst kinds of corruption and the worst abuses of authority are only possible when they are unlikely to be publicly known, or when public opinion is apathetic. No one, for instance, can imagine that certain people would have done and left undone certain things in the case of either the Masai or the Giriama if they had known their actions were to be described in Blue books, and especially if thereafter the facts were to be given to the British public in an ordinary book. In any investigation of African affairs, obviously, a great deal depends on the accuracy of official statements. No one would expect to find the whole truth in a governor's account of his own administration. If people wrote their own obituary notices they would no doubt be very interesting and even very informing, but they might contain some omissions. Similarly, answers to questions in Parliament about East African affairs are often astonishingly unilluminating. Indeed, it is only when, as happened in the second case described in Chapter VII., a man of exceptional courage and honesty must be allowed to give an account of the facts that questions in Parliament elicit answers of any value. It is to the same man, now a

Member of Parliament, that we owe the account of the Giriama move.

It is easy also to understand that official papers published after a governor has left the country may be expected to contain impartial accounts of events, so long as they mention nothing discreditable to those who continue in office under the new governor. That is how the Blue book on the Masai happened to be written with so much candour and impartiality.

These things have to be stated to explain not only why it is so difficult to reach political facts about countries like Kenya, but also how the lack of publicity inevitably leads to evils impossible in a country with free institutions. People are never so virtuous as when every lapse from virtue is certain to be found out. It is asking too much of human nature to give men practically absolute authority over people with no power to criticise or protest, and expect them to behave exactly as they would in the fierce glare of publicity. It is scarcely too much to say that if the full facts of the situation in Kenya were known to the British public, most of the problems or so-called problems of Kenya would disappear. Once on a time missionaries might have been relied on to provide martyrs for the truth. Most of them nowadays regard subservience to authority as their duty whatever happens. Nor is the method of writing a book like this free from grave disadvantages. If the Masai move had happened two years ago instead of twelve, the true facts could have found no place in these pages. Recent events of equal importance have in fact, for obvious reasons, been excluded.

Indeed, there would appear to be only one means of keeping the public informed of the true situation. Our Imperial policy in India was formed mainly by the reports of Royal Commissions. A whole series of them revealed dangers and defined reforms. No other means

will reach the facts of the political situation in Kenya to-day.

Meanwhile, what is an officer to do who is faced with some such case as those of the Masai and Giriama? He cannot demand a Royal Commission. What ought he to do? And what can he do? Perhaps the importance of these questions will permit of the publication, in answer, of a few sentences from a private letter, written, just before the final Masai move, by the late A. J. M. Collyer, then in charge of and greatly trusted by the Masai on Laikipia:

> As regards the Masai move, this sudden change of front has staggered me though I hold it was the right thing to do, if done long ago. The manœuvres, etc., that have been employed with regard to the Masai have sickened and embittered me. I have always said that the policy of putting the Masai into one area was right, but I cannot uphold the methods that have been employed to bring this about. If in five years' time you write a book and I am in a position to give you the information on the Masai, you shall certainly have it.

That letter reveals the kind of difficulties honourable men in the service often feel in Africa. Every one recognised that the failure to mark off and protect the half-mile road between the reserves was fatal to the earlier Masai treaty. Collyer had come reluctantly to believe that the Government had never meant to carry out its promise to make the road. Two years of intriguing had convinced him that the very men who had signed the earlier treaty would stick at nothing to destroy it. He was suffering from a fatal disease and saw no way of making any protest that did not involve resignation from the service. Finally, when that letter was written, he had just been ordered to hand over charge of the impending move, and of the whole tribe thereafter, to another man, and knew that any protest from him would be attributed to thwarted ambition. So

he thought it his duty to take no public action. But he did mean, if he lived, to give the facts to the British public, and he promised to write for this book the chapter on the Masai that has had to be written without his help.

The undoubted fact is that no other course would have done any good. The fact that every one, in this country as well as in Kenya, has to face is that on every single occasion when the Government of Kenya has come into conflict with British public opinion it has won.

During the War a certain district officer refused to carry out an order that he thought involved injustice, was, naturally, rebuked, was transferred in disgrace to a lonely post usually kept for those unpopular with authority, and shot himself through the head. That sort of thing is not common, of course. But probably most administrative officers in Kenya have suffered some discomfort of conscience from the orders they have had to carry out. Certainly many of them have repeatedly protested about forced labour and about being compelled to collect the tax from people who are quite unfit to earn it.

Any one, of course, may write to the Governor about anything. But as the evils and injustices from which the natives of Kenya suffer are the direct result of the deliberate policy of those in authority, that procedure is quite futile. It is just as futile to write, through the Governor, to the Colonial Secretary. What can he do in opposition to his chosen experienced advisers? How can he question their version of the facts? And what chance of promotion would a man have who would do such a thing?

There remains one thing more a man can do, which most of those in authority would stop if they could or dared, and that is to write to a Member of Parliament, get him, if possible, really interested, and, at the least, get him to ask a question in the House. That plan succeeds, in some degree, often enough to be always worth trying. The

speech made by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald in the House of Commons at a critical stage in the Masai affair probably enabled Lord Harcourt to discover and acquire for the tribe an extension of the area the Government originally proposed to give it, and probably also led to Sir Percy Girouard's resignation, and to the publication of the Masai Blue book, without which the true facts of the case would have been impossible to prove.

The man who is given an unjust order to carry out is not as a rule the best man to take any step in protest beyond a letter to his immediate superior. Further steps are best taken by some one else, though never, of course, without first laying the facts before the local authorities. No one in the public service may use any information that has been acquired in the execution of his duties. But it is quite unreasonable to extend that rule so as to cover facts generally known in the colony.

One has to admit that the results of protesting are often bad, so bad that one is apt, for a time at least, to regret having done anything. African Governments are Humpty Dumpties that suffer very heavily from the shock of exposure. The writer had some share in providing the Secretary of State with the information that led him to stop the Masai move when it was first attempted. The results of revealing the fact that the Colonial Office and the local Government were in serious opposition were so bad that at one stage the writer recanted and expressed regret for his action. He does not regret it now. The conflict of opinion then revealed was no isolated instance. It disclosed a deep gulf between fundamental ideas that influence the whole range of African politics.

Whether it was right or wrong to protest against the Masai move may be doubtful. In any case, the reader who may live and work in Africa should be warned that if he ever takes a similar step he will do harm as well as good.

If he feels he must, then he should. But the fact is that there is very little use in trying to stop these things. What is needed is rather to appoint governors and others in authority who will not attempt them.

This, indeed, is one of the urgent questions for the readers of this book to answer. Assuming that the facts described in these two chapters alone prove that at least two governors followed a policy that British opinion of all shades will condemn, how is it that such men are appointed?

The question is as urgent now as it was ten years ago, or twenty. A definite type exists of men who in London and in the company of missionaries profess the strongest sympathy with native rights, but in Africa emulate, before the hardy settler, the behaviour of the maiden who "swearing she would ne'er consent, consented". It is not as though most governors were chosen for their knowledge of Africans. Those who have any such knowledge have generally got it in the service of the Chartered Company of South Africa. Astonishing as it may seem, the first consideration in the choice of governors in East Africa is a man's ability to satisfy and serve financial interests in London and in Kenya. That inevitably follows from the conviction held by those who appoint them, that the prosperity of the people of a country like Kenya mainly depends on the degree and rapidity of its absorption of European capital. Other guiding principles are regarded as applicable when circumstances allow. But to make and keep capital so secure and its profits so large that it pours into the country in a steady flood is thought of as a principle in a category by itself.

Governors with such conceptions of their functions naturally choose for promotion in the local service men of similar ideas. There are plenty of good men in the service in Kenya. In the technical departments technical ability

is, quite properly, the chief if not the only ground of preferment. In the administration, unhappily, knowledge of African life and readiness to defend the rights and interests of Africans are not the qualities that mark men for promotion.

CHAPTER VI

THE EUROPEAN COLONY

At the census of 1921 the European population of Kenya was 9651, of whom 3851 were females and 2112 children. 5241 persons claimed to have some occupation. Of these, 1078 were public servants, civil and military, 307 were clergy and missionaries, 1634 had some professional, commercial or industrial occupation, and 1893 gave their occupation as connected in some way with the land. Three-tenths of the Europeans in the colony lived in Nairobi and its suburbs.

Thus the whole European colony, official, missionary, commercial and agricultural, is no more than equal to the population of a large street in a European city. The third part of these people, the 1893 who make their living out of the land, include both landowners and leaseholders and their agents and employees, with the wives of some persons of both classes. The figure does not include absentee landlords of one kind, those who live out of the country.

In 1921 the number of actual landholders resident in Kenya was about 1300. The number of original holdings must be about double that number, while in addition there has been a great deal of dividing of concessions by sales and leases.

The policy of alienating land to Europeans for commercial purposes was adopted in 1900. It continued until, by 1920, practically all the land in Kenya capable of cultivation which had no native occupiers or very few had passed

into the ownership of Europeans, either as freehold or on leases for 99 or 999 years.

The total area of the alienated land is differently described in various official publications. A pamphlet published in 1922 by the Land Office puts it at "about ten thousand square miles", and also states that "apart from the little known areas of Tanaland and Jubaland,[1] the area of Crown Land available for alienation is very small". The most recent annual report of the colony states that "areas surveyed into farms amount to 11,859 sq. miles; 7487 sq. miles have been alienated and there thus remains an area of 4372 sq. miles for alienation".

The discrepancy is to be explained in two ways. Most of the land not yet alienated is worth very little, and some of it is probably promised but not yet registered, or, in other words, is what Sir Percy Girouard in his report made in 1911 called "unregistered areas".

To understand this and other points it will be necessary to explain how the alienation came about. The official theory in Sir Charles Eliot's time was that unoccupied and sparsely occupied land in East Africa could be made use of only by giving it to Europeans with capital, and that such people would not live and work in the country unless they were given large areas on easy terms. It must be remembered that twenty-five years ago no one foresaw how in West Africa Africans themselves would build up large-scale industries on the fruits of the oil palm, the cocoa tree and the ground nut, without any help from European capital except for transport to Europe. Sir Charles Eliot and Sir Percy Girouard held strongly that the prosperity of the country depended on persuading Europeans with money to accept grants of land and on persuading Africans to work under European direction on estates in European ownership. The Colonial Office naturally listened to these

[1] Jubaland is now promised to Italy.

predictions of rapid prosperity, made, it must be remembered, by men who themselves knew nothing of Africans. The Protectorate had not only received the free gift of the Uganda railway, for which the British tax-payer has paid over nine million pounds in interest and sinking fund. It also was receiving from the Imperial Treasury sums needed to balance the annual Protectorate budgets, sums that ultimately aggregated nearly three million pounds. Sir Charles Eliot predicted that if his advice to found a European colony was followed the country would pay its way, certainly in ten years, perhaps in less. We shall learn in a later chapter how far that prediction has been fulfilled. All we are concerned with now is to understand how and why the alienation policy was adopted.

We must picture, accordingly, a steady stream of more or less wealthy people arriving from England, travelling in the country, fixing upon the areas they wished to possess, and opening up negotiations with the Land Office and Government House. Some governors received them warmly. Sir James Sadler was reluctant and mistrustful. The areas demanded were frequently unsurveyed, and administrative officers, anxious to protect native rights, had more influence over Sir James than over Sir Charles Eliot or Sir Percy Girouard. But he had poor support from the Colonial Office, which for long failed to realise that the area of unoccupied land of any value was strictly limited. So it became a common practice to make contingent grants, conditional on results of survey and investigation of native claims. Sir Percy Girouard in a return made in 1911 puts these unregistered areas at 2500 square miles. Thus each successive governor has found himself faced by the problem of how to fulfil the promises of his predecessors without flagrant disregard of native rights. The story of the Masai abundantly illustrates the point. And the land grants at the expense of the Nandi tribe made at the end of the War,

large grants made mostly to men already in possession of immense areas, are thus to be explained. By what right, in equity or law, a European Government with the rights and duties of a protector could assume the ownership of all the land in the country in order to give it away or to sell it for trifling sums to its friends and countrymen, used to be a question much debated in the houses of public servants in Kenya. No precedent could be found in British Colonial and Imperial history for such an expropriation. In America and Australia, of course, we seized the land. But European immigration into these countries was one of cultivators of the soil, not, as in East Africa, of people who expected the natives of the country to use the plough and the hoe while they themselves were mere supervisors or even continued to live in England. And America and Australia were nearly empty continents, while the arable parts of East Africa were, in 1900, far more thickly populated than the arable parts of Australia at the same date.

We may take it that all the land of any value in the colony that is not in native occupation is already alienated and that the alienated area of some 10,000 square miles includes more than half the first-class land in the colony.

The Land Office pamphlet gives the area of native reserves as " about 31,250 sq. miles ", or one-eighth of the area of the colony. That figure is either far too large or far too small. It is far too small to include the nearly rainless volcanic wastes where Turkana and other nomad tribes manage to exist. But it does appear to include large areas in the Masai reserve that are just as arid and useless. Sir Frederick Jackson wrote about these areas that " no sane European would accept a free gift of 500,000 acres in such a place ". The writer is confident that 5000 square miles would be an overestimate of the arable land in reserves. And in fact the two largest tribes in the country, the Kikuyu and the Kavirondo (counting Luo and Bantu together),

have certainly no more than 5000 square miles of land, good and bad, between them. So we get the extraordinary contrast of 10,000 square miles alienated to Europeans and populated by 1893 occupied Europeans, with 5000 square miles, reserved, somewhat precariously, to nearly 2,000,000 Africans. And this, be it remembered, in a country never conquered, as most of India was conquered, but which we occupied with the professed object of protecting its inhabitants.

In certain exceptional cases small sums have been paid by Government to Africans whose homes were on land alienated to Europeans, in compensation for the loss of the right to its free use. These sums bore no relation to the value of the lands concerned, and, even in the aggregate, are of negligible amount.[1]

It is unfortunately impossible to give figures of the total sums received by Government in payment for grants of land whether freehold or leasehold. There are about 2000 square miles of freeholds. But as leases run for either 99 or 999 years the distinction is not important. An official return made in 1911 states that 1,963,817 acres (3000 square miles) were leased during the preceding five years at a total rental of £6640. By 1914 the land on lease to Europeans amounted to 3,412,728 acres (5000 square miles) and the rentals came to £17,334, or, on a rough average, a penny farthing an acre. The great bulk of the land alienated before the War was granted in large blocks of from 10 to 500 square miles, though near Nairobi many farms of 640 acres were allotted. Since 1914, though a number of large areas have been granted, many of them to men who had large estates already, most of the land has been alienated under the Soldiers' Settlement Scheme, for which Sir Edward Northey, the last Governor,

[1] So far as the writer can learn the most ever paid has been at the rate of 6s. 8d. per acre, up to a maximum of £4 for any one family.

was responsible. The Land Office pamphlet says that "about a thousand farms have been allotted under the Soldiers' Settlement Scheme". Under the Scheme ex-service officers and men, most of them officers, got free grants of from 160 to 300 acres, and in addition were free to lease land up to as much as 5000 acres, in some cases. These leaseholds could be turned into freeholds by the payment at any time within ten years and without interest of from four to fifty shillings an acre. How small a degree of success was reached by the Soldiers' Settlement Scheme may be judged from the fact that the European population of these thousand or so farms is included in the number of 1893 described in the 1921 census as that of the total number of Europeans occupied in some form of agriculture in Kenya. Soon after the Scheme started the Government remitted the purchase money due by the leaseholders. Everything possible was done for these men. Their machinery has been imported free of duty, their produce carried on the State railway at less than cost, and so forth. Yet most of these farms have been abandoned and their European population is now less than it was even in the census year, 1921. Some of the beneficiaries never went to Africa; some only went with the intention of selling their land to others; some took things easily and expected their African labourers to do all the work. But most worked steadily and hard, and many of even these failed. Many lost all their capital. Some scores had to be given free passages home again, by Government or by the charitable. Most of those who still remain have other means of support than work on the land in Kenya.[1]

[1] As more men applied for these thousand or so farms than there was land for, a lottery was held in 1919. Residents in the country who drew blanks in that lottery have ever since been agitating for permission to take over the abandoned farms on the original terms. The agitation has not been successful. The Government recently (May 1924) held an auction of some of these forfeited holdings, when, for the first time, quite substantial sums were paid for the leases.

The rest of the land alienated, the eight or nine million acres granted mostly in large areas before the Soldiers' Settlement Scheme was launched, comprises, the writer estimates, some seven hundred separate grants. The law has so often been changed, and its terms so habitually disregarded, and official returns are so incomplete and misleading, that the true facts about these land grants are very hard to reach. Rents of Government land, for instance, as shown in official returns, appear to include revenue from urban as well as agricultural land.

Little need be said about the two or three million acres granted in large freehold estates before 1912 to about two hundred individuals, more than half of whom are no longer in Kenya.[1] Many of these estates are now divided by sales and leases to more recent immigrants.

Leaseholds come, some under the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902, some under the Ordinance of 1915. (All land in Kenya, of course, is Crown land.) Under the earlier law leases run for 99 years at rents varying from a halfpenny to twopence an acre. In the case of some leases, conveying estates comprising nearly a million acres, the Crown reserved the right to revise rents after 33 and again after 66 years. Areas up to 1000 acres could be bought outright for four shillings an acre.

The Crown Lands Ordinance of 1915 provides for leases of 999 years at rents of twopence halfpenny up to 1945. From that date for thirty years the rent is to be 1 per cent of the unimproved value, then 2 per cent for other thirty years, and for the rest of the millennium 3 per cent. All the various land laws contained provisions requiring leaseholders to improve their holdings, and the earlier laws forbade holders to sell, sublet or transfer their land in any

[1] Most of the freeholds were granted without payment, except for survey fees of a fraction of a penny per acre, which of course never nearly covered the cost of survey to Government.

way, and required them to live on their holdings. All these restrictions were soon abandoned, except that improvement (fencing, buildings, clearing, etc.) to the value of £1 an acre for the first 300 acres and 4s. an acre for land in excess of 300 acres is still required by the law and to some extent enforced.

Really the only reason the other restrictions were allowed to lapse was that they prevented certain people from getting most agreeably rich. The first to be exempted were, of course, the hard cases that proverbially make bad law, men, for instance, who had to leave the country for their health. Others soon crept through the breach in the law thus made. Secret sales were made, to come into effect when exemption could be got. The wise foresaw from the start that all restrictions would go by the board, and by "dummying" and other devices got much larger grants than the Government intended. At various times attempts were made by the Government to get larger sums for leases than the annual rents of from one halfpenny to threepence an acre.[1] Auctions of these leases were instituted to obtain for the community some part of the market value of the land. But restrictions on free sale made it easy for buyers to arrange bids beforehand, and it is only since the War, when it became obvious that alienation was likely soon to cease altogether, that substantial sums have accrued to the State from these auctions. These sums, paid as a rule in annual instalments over ten years, are reckoned as part of the ordinary revenue of the colony.

What, it must next be inquired, is the value of the alienated land? Obviously all land values in Kenya are speculative and depend on a variety of political and economic factors, notably the rate of Africans' wages. The pamphlet

[1] Very little if any land in Kenya pays rents to Government as high as threepence an acre.

published by the Land Office offers an answer to this question of the value of the alienated land.

It must be remembered that, as the pamphlet states, all the land of any substantial value in the colony that is not in actual native occupation is already alienated. That pamphlet was written for the use of intending European immigrants. Its purpose is to encourage European immigration, which in effect amounts to persuading people in England to buy land in Kenya for sums on an average at least thirty times greater than those received by the Government from the original concessionaires. In 1922 the Legislative Council actually passed, with the full approval of the Governor and his official advisers, a scheme for having an office in London, to be kept up out of the revenues of the colony, where land could be unloaded on greenhorns thus encouraged to believe that their bargains had the approval of the authorities. The scheme passed the Legislature but was disallowed by the Colonial Office.

The prices of land given in the pamphlet referred to are, for the reason given, favourable to sellers rather than to buyers of land and therefore unduly high. It states that "the value of undeveloped land suitable for coffee in the most favourable districts varies from £10 to £20 per acre. Mixed agricultural propositions suitable for maize, flax, and partly for coffee may be obtained at from £2 to £5 per acre. In other areas more remote from markets and transport facilities land can be obtained for as low a price as £1 per acre."

Few experienced residents believe that such prices for land are justified. But it is certainly true that large areas have been sold at these and even higher figures. Probably a third, perhaps a half of the alienated land has been sold by the original concessionaires. The following instances are illuminating:

The Leader of February 7, 1914, a newspaper then

published in Nairobi, reports the proceedings in an action in the High Court of the colony brought by a certain William Hall against the Crown. Mr. Hall had been granted 642 acres of land in 1906, for which he paid Government £171 as well as survey fees of £12. Years later he found that his farm measured 582 acres instead of 642. The surveyor had been at fault. Mr. Hall sued the Crown for damages for breach of contract and for the value of the missing 60 acres, since it happened there was no contiguous area the Government could grant to make up the full amount. Mr. Hall won his case and was awarded £300, or £5 an acre, for the missing area.

By contrast the following case shows that though the public of Kenya received little from the sale of rights in land, those who received these rights were more successful in re-sales.

A farm of 640 acres in Kiambu, eight miles from Nairobi, was sold by Government in 1903 to A for £85. Half the farm was under valuable forest, the rest having been cleared of forest many years before by Kikuyu. A had no money to pay for the improvements he had to carry out in order to get his freehold title, so he sold the land to B, a richer man, for £640 in 1905. B built a stone house on the estate, and in the course of eight years laid down 150 acres in coffee. His outgoings and incomings during these eight years just balanced one another. The improvements, ground crops, buildings and machinery he estimated to be worth £5000. He sold the estate in 1913 for £17,500.

The following advertisement appeared in the London *Times* of April 1, 1922:

Earl Kitchener, Soy. P.O., Kenya Colony, wishes to let two partly developed farms of 1000 acres each at rent of £150 a year, and one undeveloped farm at £100 a year, on the Nzoia River, twenty miles from proposed station on the railway extension now in course of

construction. Also for sale, for £6000, a developed farm of 1500 acres, nine miles from proposed railway station.

The usual rent paid to Government for land in the district where these farms of Lord Kitchener are is one halfpenny an acre. At that rate the undeveloped farm, for which Lord Kitchener asked £100 a year, brings in £2 1s. 8d. to Government.

More recently still, on June 7, 1924, the following appeared in the London *Times*:

KENYA COLONY.—6000 acres, mainly deep volcanic soil, with adequate water, in the healthiest district, comprising the best agricultural land in the colony: 1500 acres under cultivation maize and coffee, easy distance from railway and in proved rainbelt, to be sold as a going concern, including house, buildings, stock, implements, etc.: rent, £70 per ann.; returns from 1923 maize crop of 850 acres, over £6500: suitable for capitalist or syndicate: owner in England: can be subdivided subject to being unsold. Apply, etc.

How much money has been made in that kind of way none can guess. Land in Nairobi itself, and in Mombasa, has sold, exceptionally, for £10,000 an acre. The minimum price of land within two miles of Kilindini harbour is at least £200 an acre. Yet 100 acres fronting the shore of the harbour itself were granted rent free some years ago by Government to a certain eminent colonial politician. The grant was conditional on certain expenditure by the concessionaire. The specified conditions were not fulfilled. The Government withdrew the concession just before the War, but, in compensation, allowed the concessionaire to retain half the area as a free gift, without condition of any kind, but on the understanding that the land would be exploited as quickly as possible. As these fifty acres overlook a harbour which has a monopoly of the foreign trade of some seven million people and have a market value of anything from £10,000 to £30,000, their exploitation is not likely to present insuperable difficulties to their fortunate owner.

The banks in Kenya estimated that credits to the amount of £3,000,000 were transferred to Kenya from England during 1919 and 1920. Most of that money was undoubtedly spent in buying land from private owners.

Sir Charles Eliot was the first governor to allow officials and their relations to own land in the Protectorate. Sir Donald Stewart stopped the practice, and before his early death managed to get some of the grants of his predecessor cancelled. Sir Edward Northey restored the privilege, which still exists. In fact, officials are encouraged to buy land, with the objects both of identifying the interests of official and non-official Europeans in the colony and of inducing officials to settle in the colony when they retire on pension.

The reader may by this time begin to suspect that there is corruption in the public service. There is quite possibly little or none. There is, it is true, a perhaps unparalleled prevalence of favouritism, not only in regard to grants of land but in regard to such matters as railway routes and railway contracts. But no official is likely to have retired from the service much richer than he entered it, except indeed by getting land at less than its market value. Foreigners would refuse to believe that such prodigality as successive governors have shown in disposing of the land in the country is otherwise explicable than by gifts made by concessionaires in return. It is extremely improbable that any such gift was ever made. No supporter of the existing system would dispute the fact that most of the 10,000 square miles of alienated land was alienated in exchange for sums that were ridiculously trivial as compared with the prices prevailing in the free market at the time of sale. Even if one grants that it was wise to invite European colonists and to tempt them by free grants, or by grants made in return for nominal sums, it must be admitted that after a very few years, one might almost say a few months,

the rush of applicants had begun that overwhelmed the Land Office for years.

One is compelled to assume that the true explanation is that those who were in authority, in Nairobi and in Downing Street, were totally ignorant of the lessons to be learned from the experience of the older colonies. No other explanation can account for their eagerness to get rid of immense unsurveyed areas at prices far below market rates. Even in our own country candidates for Parliament often successfully adduce their ignorance as good reason for their election. Not all colonial governors, of course, are ignorant of politics. But many of them in Kenya seem to have thought it better form to follow the simple rule of making one's friends happy by land and railways, and by taxing others better suited for the purpose by poverty and ignorance, than to study the history and land legislation of the self-governing colonies.

The reader may be assured that there is material in the story of the Uasin Gishu railway, not to speak of the income tax and currency affairs, for a Blue book that would quite eclipse the Blue book on the Masai. These Blue books are never likely to be written. A Royal Commission in ten years from now might reach most of the facts.

Judging by the figures quoted, the total value of the alienated land in the colony would be at least thirty million pounds. If one is to pay any regard at all to the prices actually paid, one cannot estimate the total value as less than twenty million pounds. The influence of the fact that the land has so high a value on the general political situation will be discussed in a later chapter. Here the point necessary to be made is that many of the owners of land have paid large sums in cash for it. That fact seems to the writer to rule out any sudden or drastic treatment of the problem created by the improvidence of the Government. It is perfectly true that the unimproved annual value of the land

is equal to at least half the colony's revenue from taxation, and that the owners of the land have in a sense no right to that unimproved annual value. To remind ourselves that the country was not even conquered and that the Government's only rights were those of a trustee with the duty of protecting people in their political minority, permanent or temporary, is beside the point. These are valid considerations which should be given due weight when public opinion gives its verdict on past policy and determines what in future is to be done. But they do not affect in the least the rights of those who own property with the best of all legal titles, direct grant from the Crown. It is natural to wish one could get at ill-gotten gains and restore them to the community. But by this time perhaps half of these gains are invested elsewhere and could not be traced. And some of those now in possession sank their whole capital in land at prices most unreasonably dear and are having no easy time in making a living, not to speak of the fortunes they hoped for. Justice and wisdom both demand changes in the incidence of taxation that must diminish the value of the alienated land. If investors in London, for instance, paid £60,000 for a freehold forest concession, the certainty that the taxation of their property would diminish the value of their shares does not prove its injustice. But it certainly would be unjust to take such measures, fiscal or other, as would make it impossible for the man who has paid large sums for land in Kenya to make a living by employing his energies upon it.

It is necessary to state that the Europeans who live in Kenya are just ordinary people. Eager reformers at home may naturally assume that they are specially bad, or at least have more bad people among them than usual. They themselves think they deserve to have an influence in the colony and in the commonwealth out of all proportion to their number. Both views are false. The great bulk of

the Europeans in Kenya are neither more nor less virtuous, neither more nor less well educated, neither more nor less intelligent than the people in any area in England or Scotland with a population of 10,000 souls. One does not expect to find many people of exceptional ability in a town or district in England with a population of 10,000, and one does not find many in Kenya.

The political constitution is as follows. Kenya is a Crown Colony, by which term is meant a country governed by a Governor under the direction of the Colonial Secretary and with the help of a Legislative and an Executive Council. Of the former just over half the members are senior officials. The minority is composed of eleven Europeans, five Indians and one Arab, who represents the former slave-owning aristocracy of the coast. Since the Wood-Winterton agreement[1] was thrown over the Indians have refused to elect the members allotted them. The European members are elected by an electorate comprising all adult Europeans, without distinction of sex, property or education. Several unofficial Europeans also have places on the Executive Council, the Inner Chamber where confidential information is discussed, official policy elaborated and administrative action decided upon.

The Europeans of Kenya are, of course, in a unique situation, and that situation has reacted on their minds and habits. That situation will be described in Chapter VIII. Also, there are, it is true, minorities among them each specially distinguishable in some way. There are, for instance, about a hundred Dutch families, mainly on the Uasin Gishu. Some of them travelled overland from South Africa in wagons drawn by twenty or thirty span of

[1] Two years ago Major Wood and Lord Winterton, two Conservative members who at the time were the Under-Secretaries for India and for the Colonies, came to an agreement, after inquiry, about the claims of the Indians in Kenya to the franchise, the right to buy land and other matters. The next Government repudiated the agreement.

oxen, a thing not one English family in a thousand could have done. The big game shooting element may be disregarded. Their money does a certain amount of harm by diverting the energies of many, both European and African, from more useful ends. And the opinions about the country which they are apt to publish on their return to Europe are as valuable as the opinions of pleasure-seekers always are.

A much more important minority is that of the public school and ex-officer type. They provide the country with horses for racing and polo. They also impart the pepper and ginger which form so large an ingredient in colonial politics. A number of them are very rich, and probably most have incomes from property outside the colony. To the earlier arrivals of this group the whole government of the country has gradually fallen. To them belong the largest and best estates. This kind of man is the lineal descendant of the old gentleman adventurers, who colonised Virginia, singed the king of Spain's beard, exacted homage from those people who are compendiously called " natives " and ended their careers, some in Westminster Abbey, some at a yard-arm. It is a serious mistake to imagine that types of men ever die out. There are more of the kinsmen of Hawkins and Clive in Kenya than of Wilberforce and Sharpe. It takes all sorts to make a world, and the various human vices and virtues are pretty evenly distributed among the sorts. The conspicuous types in the colony, missionary, Boer, pleasure-seeker and so forth, are, however, minorities. The bulk of the Europeans in the colony are none of these, but shopkeepers and shop-hands and artisans in Nairobi and working farmers in the country parts. These all work as hard as people of the same occupations at home, and most of them, when relative prices are considered, get no more for their labour. That was abundantly proved, unless the revenue authorities were either dishonest or incompetent,

during the brief period when the income tax was in force, when nearly the whole of the farmers and planters successfully claimed that they had no income to tax.

That lack of prosperity makes the political self-effacement of the working sections of the European community most astonishing. The reader will notice that these people play no part in the outstanding events of the colony's history, such as the Masai affair. Their plums are of the smallest and sourest. Not for them are frequent holidays in Europe, made profitable by sales of farms and forests. When the income tax was withdrawn three years ago, and the money generously remitted to those who with excess of honesty had admitted to an income, the Government, at the behest of the political leaders, chose as a substitute source of revenue a general protective tariff. Though obviously the income tax bore on people in proportion to their wealth, while the tariff would increase the cost of living for the poorer kind of European by at least a quarter, not a protest at the change was heard, not even when the Legislature imposed an *ad valorem* duty of 100 per cent on imported wheat and flour to protect an infant industry largely conducted on a single immense estate. If these people play no part in the account given in this book it is their fault, not the writer's. In the course of the story we see a succession of important personages of State weaving their plans: still greater personages appear and reappear at critical moments, as a rule, with admirable modesty, in the background: most potent of all, there can be felt though scarcely seen the influence of that mysterious entity the Syndicate. But the working farmer, the clerk, the skilled tradesman, the people who live wholly or mainly by their earnings, do not appear. If they have evaded their responsibility for events, they have at least avoided the disgrace of the events to be narrated in the next chapter.

ADDENDUM TO CHAPTER VI

One of the very earliest of the settlers, Mr. Robert Chamberlain, has indeed from time to time spoken and written in frank protest against the subordination of the European community to the interests and dictates of a handful of specially rich and favoured people. He was always regarded as a truthful person but never had any following. His standpoint may be judged by the following quotations from a letter published in April 1919 in the *East African Standard*. Mr. Chamberlain was answering a letter from the leader of the landowners of the colony, whose name is here omitted in pursuance of the rule that names should only be published when their omission would obscure the narrative.

"In 1903 A obtained a grant of 100,000 acres at X. The present sale value of this land is from £2 to £4 an acre. . . . A introduced into this Protectorate the gentle art of the dummy applicant for land. His grant of 150 square miles of rich agricultural land was not enough. As long as the Land Office would yield juice, A was there with insatiable powers of suction. In 1907 I called the attention of the Local and Imperial authorities to this aspect of our defective land laws, and urged that here, as in New Zealand, dummying should be treated as a criminal offence, punishable by imprisonment and confiscation of land. A new draft law was sent out from the Colonial Office, and this draft included a clause reproducing the New Zealand treatment for the dummy and his supporter. The Bill was dealt with by the Legislative Council, of which A was a member. It went into committee in due course, and the dummy clause was heard of no more. It was quietly strangled at its birth. A can tell his own story of the murder. Anyway, he went on his way rejoicing, and the dummy system waxed strong. By his adroit and persistent use of the dummy applicant A

has accumulated perhaps another 100,000 acres—or more? His private acquisitions of land in this manner have been made at the public expense for no obvious consideration.

"Now if public trust means anything at all—and A has enjoyed such trust in full measure and running over—it cannot extend so far as to cover with its generous mantle transactions of the sort referred to. It is true that the dummy applicant and his receiver have been acting within the four corners of the law. But none the less their acting is to be condemned. It is not in any sense patriotic: it is not moral: it is not public-spirited: it is not good citizenship.

"Too long has the Imperial System been regarded 'as a gigantic storehouse of outdoor relief for the aristocracy'—to use the words of John Bright. It is time that some one else should get a chance. There is the principle of equality of opportunity. We might try the principle here, for a change.

"In his letter to you A makes a great point of having mercifully refrained from the pursuit of his dummying business during the period of the War. He is very considerate. He prates of the fact that he has done no injury to the cause of the ex-soldier. That cock won't fight. The ex-soldier of to-day was the average British tax-payer yesterday, when A got his work in—in the Land Office, in the Legislative Council and elsewhere. Anyway, it is nauseating talk—these tarradiddles of the concern felt for the ex-soldier by the ex-dummy. Dummying may be lawful. The public estate may not have been looted during the War. But why not, if lawfulness is a defence? The quality of the act—lawful or unlawful, moral or immoral—remains the same."

A community that refuses to face the facts thus clearly and fearlessly set before it is likely to find it has a heavy penalty to pay.

CHAPTER VII

BLACK AND WHITE

From time to time there is reported by the Press in this country some murder of a native by a European in Kenya that is visited by what people in this country consider disgracefully inadequate punishment. The subject is a disagreeable one, but it must be discussed. The facts when clearly seen explain as no others do the true nature of the central problem created by the existence of a colony of European landowners in tropical Africa.

The facts of two cases of such murders, or alleged murders, will first be described briefly.

In the year 1911 there were many complaints by European landholders of stock thefts by natives. It must be remembered that ranches in Kenya in these days were never fenced—nor are they now as a rule—and that the actual care of the flocks and herds that belong to Europeans was and is in the charge of native herdsmen. Also most of the land used for stock-farming is in the Rift Valley, where the ground is much broken and the view obscured by thorn-trees and bushes. An unknown proportion of the losses reported as theft were due to careless or insufficient herding. Cattle and sheep would stray, perhaps into thick bush, where sooner or later leopards or lions would find them. In one case some native employees were actually under arrest for theft when the five missing cattle turned up after a week's absence, safe and sound. Thefts, however, undoubtedly did occur, especially thefts

of sheep, which of course were eaten, not sold, as European sheep are quite different from African sheep and easily recognised.

In this year 1911 a certain large landowner who had suffered, or believed he had suffered, from stock thefts was riding one day in his estate. He had his rifle with him, as is customary with such people. He caught sight of a native, some distance away, and hailed him, to know if he was one of his own employees or a stranger and therefore a probable thief. The native promptly bolted. He fired on him twice, hit him the second time, rode up to where he lay and found him shot through the stomach, from which the bowels were protruding. He left the wounded man, and on searching the neighbourhood found the carcase of one of his sheep, partly cut up. He went home and did nothing further about the matter.

The story first came out a week later, when the friends of the murdered man—if one may so describe him—got home to their village which was his as well, and reported to the district officer that when travelling through the estate in question they had heard the shots, and found their friend lying dying on the ground. The police were informed, the man's body was found, and the European who was suspected of the murder admitted quite frankly in response to inquiry the facts already stated here. He was brought to trial. At the trial he gave evidence in his own defence and adduced his losses of stock and the discovery of the carcase near the place where the man was found. The man's friends denied the theft of sheep, of course. But on the facts of the shooting there was no dispute. The accused stated with perfect frankness that he had fired twice and fired to hit. He was unanimously acquitted by a jury of his fellow-countrymen.

It was very noticeable at the time that it was only

among the missionaries and some of the officials that one heard any criticism either of the crime or of the verdict. The Press, which had reported the case fully, expressed no dissatisfaction with the outcome.

The writer of these lines wrote an account of the case to an acquaintance in Parliament, Mr. T. E. Harvey. Mr. Harvey got the Colonial Secretary to call for a report on the case from the judge who had tried it, and to publish the report as a White Paper. Whenever Mr. Harcourt, then Colonial Secretary, read the judge's report on the case he ordered the European whom the jury had acquitted to be deported from the country.[1]

The publicity given to the contents of the White Paper by Mr. Harvey and others made some stir in that section of the Press and the public that cares about such things. It soon died down and the proposals for reform of the judicial system were forgotten. In the colony the deportation caused great anger, but it was realised that, in the state of public opinion at home, a movement of protest might injure the prospects of self-government, then for the first time being recognised by the European community as their political goal.

Soon afterwards the Governor of the time made a public speech about stock thefts. He discussed the value of more drastic remedies, and expressed great sympathy with those who had suffered losses of stock, but said no word of sympathy with the relations of the murdered man, nor did he suggest any measures either for the protection of Africans from armed Europeans or for ensuring justice in cases where Europeans were accused of offences against natives.

The European who had been acquitted of murder after acknowledging that he had committed it, and who had

[1] The law of the colony permits the Governor to deport any one from the colony without trial, as in India.

then been deported by the order of the Secretary of State, was allowed back to the colony during the War.

The case has a curious sequel that throws light on another aspect of affairs in the colony. When, after the War, the controversy over the political claims of the Indians was being waged, the editor of a paper written in the colony by Indians referred to the acquittal and deportation as proof that the claim of the European community to moral superiority over the Indians was unfounded, and as evidence that it was unwise to allow to Europeans resident in the colony a preponderant influence in the colony's affairs. But the name mentioned as that of the murderer was not his but his brother's. The brother sued the editor for libel and was awarded £2000 by the court. It was a remarkable conclusion to a remarkable case.

The second case to be described happened only in 1923. It concerns a considerable landowner in the colony who here will be referred to as S. S. sent an employee of his called Kitosh to the railway station, 17 miles away, with a mare that was in foal. (At the trial S. stated in cross-examination, as reported in the *East African Standard* of August 11, 1923, that "Kitosh was on contract and had worked for witness for 18 months before. He had run away and been brought back last April. His reason for running away then was that he said he had been beaten by witness. S. admitted that he had beaten the boy.") On Kitosh's return from the station a neighbouring farmer reported to S. that Kitosh had been seen riding the mare. (It was brought out in the trial that the mare was none the worse.) S. called up Kitosh and asked him, "Who gave you permission to ride the mare?" The boy refused to answer until on being asked some twenty or thirty times "his first retort came in the most impudent manner, that he was not a thief". As the newspaper report of S.'s evidence puts it, "that did annoy witness, who got up, got hold of him, opened a

door in the long building and pushed the boy in". (Kitosh was a man of about thirty.) S. then got a lash made of double ox-hide and began to beat Kitosh, after no less than five other employees had had to be called on to put him on the ground. S. continued to beat the boy for about fifteen minutes, when he became tired. To quote the Press account of his evidence again, he " realised that it was not worth it and told one of the native accused to beat the boy because he, S., was naturally fagged. Accused No. 2 "—an employee of S.—" was not putting anything into his strokes so witness called one of the other accused to take hold of the reim.[1] He was worse than useless and witness put the third accused on to it."

The reader will by this time have had enough of S.'s evidence. Briefly, what then happened was that after S. and three of his employees, these with obvious reluctance, had beaten Kitosh, he fainted, or, as S. put it, " played possum ". S. flung some buckets of water over Kitosh, who then revived. S. then ordered Kitosh to be taken to a store and tied up. He fell on the way and S. kicked him. He was tied up with his hands tied behind his back and his legs tied to a stick. After his supper S. visited Kitosh, found that some one had untied him, and tied him up again, but tighter. The kitchen boy visited Kitosh in the night and gave him water to drink. He was rolling in pain and said that if he had a knife he would kill himself. He died at four in the morning.

No details of the report of the medical officer who examined Kitosh's body need be given. He said the body was that of a well-built native, that the injuries received in the flogging and kicking had caused death, and that the buttocks would have become gangrenous if the man had survived.

S. was tried, by a judge and a jury composed, of course,

[1] Strip of ox-hide.

solely of Europeans, on a series of alternative charges, six in all, ranging down from murder to " simple hurt ". He was found guilty of " grievous hurt " and sentenced by the judge to two years' imprisonment. The law of the colony allows the jury to determine the charge on which the accused is found guilty, thus allowing murderers to be convicted of " grievous hurt " and those who commit " grievous hurt " to be convicted of " simple hurt ". Otherwise no jury would ever convict a European of an offence against an African, since European opinion, as reflected by juries, does not support the theory that Europeans and Africans should be punished equally for the same offences.[1]

Other even more revolting cases than these two have

[1] It was only in February 1924 that it came out, in an answer to a question in the House of Commons, that the Colonial Secretary at the time, the Duke of Devonshire, had written to the Governor of Kenya in strong condemnation of the trial and verdict in this case. He wrote that the crime appeared to him to " offer no extenuating circumstances ", and that his legal advisers " are of opinion that a verdict of anything less than manslaughter is quite irreconcilable with the facts ". He recognises that " cases of this kind are of rare occurrence in the history of the colony "—a far from accurate statement. He continues: " I am, however, bound to record my opinion that such cases as have occurred in Kenya have been marked by great brutality and that no sufficient punishment has been meted out to the offenders ". He concludes by stating that the jury system in Kenya can only be regarded, so far as cases of this nature are concerned, as on its trial, and hints that it may have to be abandoned. His Grace is not the first Colonial Secretary to have written such a letter. All such letters are useless unless they are followed by reform of the judicial system. In the colony they have no effect, for two reasons. No body of men in the colony, official, missionary, commercial, or other, ever does anything to mark its disapproval of the course and issue of such cases. And, second, obviously none of these Colonial Secretaries has any inkling of the reason why justice, in such cases, miscarries in Kenya and not elsewhere. The Duke, in this despatch, writes that he is sure " that the vast majority of the British settlers are as free from any tendency to ill-treat natives as are British settlers in other parts of the world ". He might have written with equal truth that all the British in Kenya are as free from that tendency as are our countrymen anywhere else in the world. The brutality he stigmatises is not due to anything unusual in the characters of the minority discovered to be guilty of it, but to the economic system in which all are equally involved. Is it reasonable, moreover, to expect such a warning as this despatch to have any result, when one of the men to whom " no sufficient punishment has been meted out " was recently absolved by the authorities from the only punishment he received—that of exile from the country? One strange and

occurred in Kenya. These two have been chosen partly because they were fully reported in the Press and partly in order to repel the suggestion that such offences are committed by the less reputable kind of European in the colony. It is not so. On the contrary, the more wealth and authority a European has in Kenya the more likely is he to fall to the temptations they bring. Of the two men whose cases have been described, one was the son of a bishop, the other the son of a peer. They had every advantage that birth and education and wealth can give. In fact they were not specially bad men. Some will regard that statement as preposterous, others as offensive. It is absolutely true. Their crimes, it is true, were revolting. The stain these crimes have left on the honour of the colony and of the Empire is so dark that no man should read of them without vowing to make their repetition impossible. That is the motive of their inclusion in this narrative, perhaps the only justifiable motive.

But the emotion that outrages arouse is by itself powerless and valueless. This subject, above all, demands the clearest and most resolute thinking of which we are capable. And we shall not face the facts squarely unless we realise that the reason these crimes happen in Kenya and do not happen in England is not that Europeans in Kenya are by nature specially cruel, or unjust, but that they live under conditions that thrust such crimes into their minds and drive them to commit them. In a word, many such crimes

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noteworthy omission from the Duke's despatch is of my reference to the fact that, during a previous term of contract service, Kitosh had run away from and been flogged by the master who afterwards murdered him. Such floggings are neither rebuked by the general opinion in Kenya nor punished by the law, while men like Kitosh, who try to escape from brutal masters, are hunted down by the police, severely punished, and compelled to complete their contracts of service. One would think that when faults in the economic system are so clearly responsible for a glaring evil, the futility of finding fault with its victims would be obvious. For Europeans who murder and Africans who are murdered are equally its victims.

are inevitable wherever men are given both political control over a subject people and the opportunity to profit by their labour. An account of the industrial system will be found in the next chapter. But before we go any further let us fix in our minds what may seem impossible to be believed, but is none the less true, the fact that any of us, in these men's places, might have behaved as they did. It is not new-comers to the country who do these things. They are impossible to men whose minds have not been so moulded by the idea that overbears every other in Kenya, the idea of racial dominance, the idea that Africans exist only to labour for our profit. Some Africans half-passively, like Kitosh, refuse to fill that place we thrust them into, though they dare not actively refuse. Hence the daily irritation, exasperation, infuriation that harden the hearts and blind the minds of their masters. The great mass of Europeans make admirable and successful efforts of self-control. But passion is not the real danger. Men do not shoot and flog to death all those in their employment who are careless or impertinent, but only those of them who, having been hired as mere tools and animals are hired, turn upon their master human faces with human resentment and passion written on them. Few of us who have lived in Africa have no reason to be ashamed of what we have done to Africans on such occasions. Some missionaries live among different ideas. And there are people who remain indefatigably good natured under every temptation to be exasperated. But with average people the prevailing attitude to average African employees, who refuse to regard work for Europeans as their duty, is one of strain. Many people in the colony are apt to say that these murders and assaults are very rare. In proportion to the European population they are far from rare. And what is so remarkable about them is not so much the crimes themselves as the way they are looked on by the juries. The damning fact is that they

are not publicly and privately reprobated. That is what involves the whole European colony in whatever guilt those who commit the crimes can rightly be said to bear.

One would assume that when manslaughterers are so lightly punished those who commit less serious injuries get off even more lightly. To some extent that is true. The distinction in the criminal code of the colony between simple hurt and grievous hurt is really the dividing line between those cases which the police may, on receiving report of them, bring before a magistrate and those which, as being less serious, a magistrate may deal with only if some complainant takes out a summons. A summons costs half-a-crown and is equivalent to more than a labourer's wages for a week. It is bad form for a native to summons a European—form so bad that, except among the mission-trained, it is rarely done. A grievous hurt is defined as a hurt that either endangers life, breaks a bone, or incapacitates for more than a week. So that the police have no power to take up a case of flogging or other assault if the assaulted person can leave hospital at the end of a week.

On the other hand, relatively minor cases of assault are usually more adequately punished than more serious crimes if they do go to court, since they are tried by a paid official magistrate without a jury.

Some think the climate has something to do with the way faults in Africans cause excessive irritation in Europeans. The tropic sun can scarcely be blamed, as the peculiar type of crime under discussion is unknown in many tropical countries. Altitude is perhaps a likelier factor. Living in the Kenya highlands at first produces a feeling of exhilaration that encourages one to expect from oneself and from others more in the way of both mental and physical exertion than is ever done. Most people find that in fact they can work harder in the dust and sweat of the coast.

Whatever the influence of the various factors that go to make up climate may be, it cannot be regarded as the main cause of atrocities in Kenya.

Deaths of Europeans at the hands of Africans are extremely rare in Kenya and are always punished by the extreme penalty. In the only case of the kind the writer was ever concerned in, the murdered European had robbed the murderer of his mistress. The fact was never mentioned at the trial and was unknown to the judge. The man was hanged. Some rivalry for a native woman is probably the explanation of most crimes of violence committed by Africans against Europeans in Kenya.

The lower courts frequently inflict very heavy penalties for comparatively slight offences on the part of Africans. The local newspaper reported the following cases among those brought before the Nairobi town magistrate on a single morning. Three native men were each fined 10s. for being drunk and incapable, another, 40s. or seven days' rigorous imprisonment for the same offence. Two women for the same offence were sentenced, one to 7s. or seven days' imprisonment, the other to 40s. Two Europeans were fined 10s. and 1s. respectively, the one for driving a car without a rear light, the other for letting the lamp of his motor bicycle go out. It should be borne in mind that 40s. is equal to an ordinary labourer's wages for five months. European drunkards are not arrested unless they are violent or otherwise dangerous. The women drunkards are sure to have been prostitutes. The police estimate their number in Nairobi, a town with 15,000 inhabitants, to be 700.

The *East African Standard* of May 23, 1922—soon after the Thuku episode—reported the following case: A man called Tarare was one of the crowd that persisted in staying in front of the jail where Thuku [1] was confined.

[1] See next chapter for an account of Thuku.

He was convicted by the Nairobi magistrate of remaining in an unlawful assembly and sentenced to two years' imprisonment. The judge who heard the case on the appeal found that the appellant " did not identify himself with any effort to overawe the authorities ". He had been one of a deputation who interviewed the Commissioner about getting a lawyer to defend Thuku, and on his return was stated by the judge to have " advised the crowd to disperse, and was accused of having been bribed,[1] and was up again at the Secretariat when the police dispersed the crowd ". As was observed by the judge, the maximum sentence for the offence of which Tarare was convicted was six months' imprisonment. The judge, nevertheless, upheld the charge but reduced the sentence to one of a £5 fine or six weeks' imprisonment. These reductions of sentence are bitterly resented by the European community, although, as a rule, appellants have already served their sentences before appeals are heard.

The same newspaper on the same date gives the following report:

> In the Supreme Court yesterday judgement was given in a revision case of sentence inflicted by the Lower Court upon a native on a charge of desertion. Acting Judge Barton held that the magistrate had not taken sufficient cognisance of the plea of the accused that his mother was reported to have been seriously ill. He considered that one month Rigorous Imprisonment would have been sufficient.
>
> Mr Justice Pickering, after reviewing the evidence, said that the conviction should be upheld.
>
> The sentence was reduced to one month Rigorous Imprisonment, the accused having already done two months.

This is a common type of case, of a labourer running away from his master before his term of contract service expires.

[1] Accused, that is, by the mob, who resented his change of attitude.

CHAPTER VIII

INDUSTRY

The labour situation in Kenya, to use a convenient if misleading phrase, cannot be understood without knowing how it has come about.

The first administrators had to use slaves and ex-slaves from the coast towns and plantations to carry munitions and stores on their journeys, and, when routes through the country were decided on, to make roads and bridges, and to build houses and forts. The people of the interior were not only highly suspicious of us at first, but apt, on nearer acquaintance, to find our ideas and methods of work uncongenial. Especially did they resent the idea of continuous work day in and day out. In their own life, while ready enough for a rush of work when its necessity is obvious, as during harvest, they never hesitate to take spells off work when they feel inclined, making up for them afterwards, just as we do when we can arrange our work to suit ourselves.

These and other difficulties would no doubt have been surmounted if there had been time for the operation of those forces which among us have trained men to rise from bed, start work and leave it off with the regularity of a machine. These Africans would in time have begun to feel that calico, beads and iron wire, at that time the currency they were paid in, were necessities of life for the sake of which it was worth while to work even when they were excessively disinclined. Unfortunately that process takes time. And

administrators and military officers had to hurry. They had to organise, without a year's delay, an 800-mile route through sandy desert and thick forest and over precipices, and to find several tens of thousands of men to carry sacks and boxes over it. Political arrangements with the various tribes had at once to be made. Sometimes fighting was necessary, though, thanks to the high average character and ability of the officers responsible, there was astonishingly little at first.[1]

With a maximum of speed, accordingly, and a minimum of force, routes were cleared, stockaded camping places were made where each day's march ended, and at longer intervals there were built forts, where stores of all kinds were kept.

In tribal custom each section of road is in charge of a group of villages, whose inhabitants turn out *en masse* once or twice a year to clear paths and ditches of grass and weeds, and to repair the bridges of a primitive kind that span streams too deep to ford. That work, of course, was a necessity obvious to the people who did it, to whom it would have seemed absurd to suggest that they should pay one another for doing it.

But this tribal custom only provided for paths that connected villages of the same tribe. It could not be made to apply to the case of the road to Uganda, that ran over mountains covered with primaeval forest and through waterless deserts; while, of course, tribal custom failed altogether to find the tens of thousands of men needed for other work than road making and clearing.

The hiring of individual labourers, on the other hand, was impossible. No African in tribal life conceives of undertaking by himself any task but the cultivation of his food garden. All other tasks are done by some larger unit than the individual and are paid for, if paid for at all, by a

[1] Eventually most of the tribes experienced either a punitive expedition or a military route march through their country.

feast of meat or beer for a dance, provided by those who benefit by the work. Even ten years ago labourers in Kenya were engaged nearly always in gangs, which often chose their headmen. So that the tens of thousands of men who were needed for the arduous work of making roads and bridges, carrying loads over them and building camps and forts at intervals along them, had to be engaged in batches, each of which belonged to a group of villages. In tribes that had chiefs, the chiefs were paid to use their authority to call people from their homes and ordinary employments. But tribes which comprised half the population had no chiefs.[1] And these happened to be the very tribes whose feud with the Masai had to be stopped. "As yet they had no king in Israel and every man dwelt under his own vine and under his own fig-tree." An alien will cannot be imposed on a tribe so constituted. There was nothing for it but to make chiefs and provide suitable means to ensure both that the tribes obeyed them and that they obeyed those who had appointed them. One Kikuyu chief began life as a donkey boy, and a very efficient chief he made. David, the son of Jesse, was such another.

So when gangs were wanted for a week's timber-cutting, or a month's brick-making, or the six months' journey to Uganda and back, the district officer sent for the chief, told him what he wanted, and got it. It was the only way. In this strange political problem, set for solution by our country to its agents in Africa, everything had to be improvised. Imperialism seems simple enough in Britain. Here the legend runs that Africans are very ignorant, which is very true, and that our direction of their affairs is

[1] The admirable photographs taken by Mr. Gedge, one of the early administrators, have been reproduced in various books of reference. One of them depicts "Officials of the Chartered Company making treaties with Kikuyu Chiefs". Janissary or mandarin would be quite as correct a term for the men in the picture as chief. There is no word meaning chief in any of the dialects spoken by the group of tribes of which the Kikuyu is the largest.

likely to be beneficial both to them and to us. But the legend had to be translated into facts in Africa, not in England. And the process met with unforeseen difficulties. The Kamba and Kikuyu wanted no forts and were not conscious of receiving benefits of any kind from carrying calico, wheat flour, and Snider rifles to Uganda. It is curious how easy it is for many people to believe that the fact of Europeans knowing many things that Africans are ignorant of proves that our arrangements for them are certain always to be superior to their own arrangements, as if their ignorance proved our wisdom. Such considerations were, however, no concern of the men whose duty it was not merely to further an Imperial policy themselves, but to see to it that every one in the East African Protectorate did so. The tribes of East Africa had to be persuaded to such behaviour. They could only be persuaded by authority, whether already to hand, as the chiefs of some tribes were, or newly introduced, as were European officers, Indian troops and Africans appointed by us to command obedience. Moved by these authorities, accordingly, Africans left home, worked on the various tasks we set them, received their meed of calico or cash, and returned home, hopeful that next year some other village would be called upon to serve Imperial ends.

We must clearly realise that the work of the administration could not be carried out by the normal process of enforcing the law. Africans knew of none but their own and no civilised code would have fitted the circumstances. Such law as there was took the form of Orders in Council, which to the African were just orders from the officer at the nearest Government station. In a word, every such officer had a plenary executive authority, which, in turn, chiefs were appointed to execute. It is highly to their credit that these officers scarcely ever abused their power. There are pages in our country's history of which we are not nearly

proud enough. There are others some of us would fain tear out, but that justice cannot be done unless we read them.

Imagine then, thirty years ago, a score or so of our fellow-countrymen, scattered in lonely posts strung out over 800 miles, some with a handful of Sikh soldiers, most with none but ill-trained African levies of uncertain constancy, ill-paid, most of them quite inexperienced in government, gallantly trying to do their country's work in keeping the road open and pushing goods along it, making levies for food and men on chiefs and tribes that were rarely actively friendly and were liable at any moment to resist their authority. To men so situated, whose orders had an absolute authority, personality counted for everything. In time, of course, a more regular method of government was introduced. Laws were made by the Commissioners or Governors, and gradually the usual means of their enforcement, police, magistrates and judges empowered to revise judgements and hear appeals, were appointed. Food-stuffs were soon brought to markets and paid for at market rates instead of being levied. But the old spirit long persisted, and is not dead even now. For long there was no African, of whatever importance, but did not think the directions of his district officer far weightier than any law. Nowadays, of course, such orders are rarely given. Most district officers deliberately try to give the law a higher standing than their own directions. And Africans, in spite of much discouragement from the working of the law, are fast learning to respect it. But the expressed wish of a responsible Government officer is still everywhere regarded as the test of loyalty. The law breaker is duly punished and is thus absolved. But disobedience to an order is essentially, in the eyes of both parties alike, sedition. In the view of Africans the Governor and those to whom he deputes his duties have still a plenary authority.

In one large range of relations between the two races it was impossible for law to replace the orders of Government agents. In free countries there are no laws which specify what labour one subject of the state should perform for another. No British Secretary of State could approve of any regulation requiring Africans to accept employment. But the men on the spot had to see that all the multifarious work necessitated by the European occupation was done. So the levies on chiefs and villages went on. For one great undertaking the method failed altogether, and tens of thousands of Indians were imported to build the railway. Even with that reinforcement there has probably never been a whole year from 1893 to 1924 when the demand of Europeans for wage-earners has been met altogether voluntarily. Until Europeans were invited to the country and given land to develop, compulsion was perfectly defensible. We sent people to govern the country who could not do it without houses and many other things that could only be built and made locally by the people of the country. If these did not offer for the work they had somehow to be made to do it. And it was done, in those days, without any great amount of trouble arising. It must not be imagined that compulsion in some form was always necessary. The young African likes to see the world, and engaging to work for some European is the only way he can see it. There are regular songs, half-humorous, half-boastful, sung on the return to the village, about the sea and the ships and the monsters of the deep, and the marvellous habits and devices of the Europeans. There has always been a large natural flow of young people into the Kenya labour market. But not, be it noted, all the year round. The dry season in Africa, like the winter in the case of the English farmer, is the slack time, when things are done that can be done at any time, like house building. In those months, in perhaps most years, voluntary labour

would exceed demand. But at other times, especially during the first hoeing in of weeds and during harvest, every man, woman and child is busy from dawn till dark, and on occasion all night long as well, in normal African society.

But the work Europeans wanted Africans to do, in these early years, was not seasonal. They wanted workmen to stay at work all the year round. At first they could never get them to, and even now most wage-earners in Kenya do such work for only four, six or eight months in each year. Thus from the first some pressure was needed to induce men to leave home when they were most needed there. This difficulty of course grew far greater when a demand for labourers by European landowners began. For they needed most labour for their crops at the very time Africans had most to do at home. Official reports written at the time fully acknowledge this fact.

Before the alienation of land to Europeans the proportion of the population called out to work at any one time was quite small. Only the younger men were engaged, and most only engaged for a month, as the tax, 2s. 8d. at first and then from 4s. to 8s., could be paid out of a month's wages.

But with the advent of Europeans seeking men to work for wages in developing areas ultimately comprising more than half the arable land in the country, the whole problem underwent a fundamental change. From that time it became, in the aspect under which people in Kenya conceive it, insoluble. For the form that problem takes is this. There are more than seven thousand square miles of land owned by people who bought it in order to make an income out of its development. Those whose estates fail of development can have no income from them, and that development, as at present conceived, means African hand labour. No single acre can, without such labour, be productive.

The fact stares one in the face that the people to perform that task do not exist in Kenya. The reason the problem is insoluble is that the demand is essentially insatiable. The very reason that was held to justify the alienation of land to Europeans was the fact that the country was half empty of people. In point of fact the number of Africans dispossessed by the alienation is comparatively trifling, perhaps no more than 50,000. There really was room for colonisation. There really was more land than the Africans of Kenya could use. But that very land that was in excess of their needs is precisely the area which the Government has for twenty years by every means in its power been trying to make them work upon for the profit not of themselves but of European grantees. The whole situation is essentially absurd. The chief fact that impressed the authorities twenty years ago was the existence in East Africa of ten thousand square miles of first-class land, nearly empty of people and accordingly nearly useless to the world. They met that fact by the proposal to fill these empty spaces by European colonists. And now, after twenty years, the 7487 square miles of alienated land are occupied by, and 335 of them are cultivated by, no more, and by now probably less, than 1893 Europeans. The real cultivators of the 335 square miles of alien land under cultivation are of course the fifty or sixty thousand African employees who work for wages, employed, most of them, in growing crops which they could and often do grow just as well at home.[1]

The essential facts about the numbers of labourers in Kenya, available and actually at work, are these. In 1920 the chief Native Commissioner, as reported in the *Daily*

[1] The "average number of units of native labour employed monthly on European holdings" is officially stated to have been:

1920 . . .	53,709
1921 . . .	67,388
1922 . . .	61,949
1923 . . .	70,957

Leader of Nairobi of February 27, made the following calculations in view of the working of the proposed Registration Ordinance. He believed there were 375,000 males in the country between the ages of 16 and 30.[1] Of these a proportion are not really available, such as the Masai and the small cultivators and petty traders of the coast. Mr. Ainsworth's figure for labourers actually available was only 209,000, "less medically unfit". Those unfit in European countries for such work as labourers do in Kenya are 15 per cent to 20 per cent of the age groups 16 to 30. The proportion is certainly greater in Kenya—Dr. Philp of the Scottish Mission put it at 40 per cent for the Kikuyu. If we accept 20 per cent we get 167,000 as the number of able-bodied labourers actually available. To that figure an addition must be made to include those brought under "closer administration" (as described in Chap. V.) during the last four years. Exactitude is obviously impossible. To escape the least suggestion of partiality, let us take an outside figure, and suppose that 250,000, or two-thirds of the total population of suitable age, is the true figure of men available as wage-earners. Deducting nomads and Masai, that is a proportion at least as high as of those who, in European countries far healthier than Kenya, are found fit for some form of military service. It makes practically no allowance at all for the kinds of work in native agriculture that are always done and can only be done by able-bodied men.

If we now turn to the figures of those in actual employment and of those on the register,[2] we find the following as reported in the local Press:

	April 1923.	May 1923.	June 1923.
Registered as employed . .	140,422	142,958	144,936
Total of registered men . .	455,884	458,044	462,504

[1] Above that age men in Kenya grow old and are little use at the kinds of work done for Europeans.

[2] The Registration Ordinance requires the registration of every wage-earner.

Here we find that there are nearly double as many men on the register as the most generous estimate would allow, many more in fact than can possibly exist, according to the official estimates of the population, which by now are tolerably accurate. The way the figures rise each month suggests that getting on the register is much easier than getting off.[1] The system of registration is in fact faulty. The register is not a "live" register. Returns of deaths from employers are, for instance, admittedly incomplete. But it is unlikely that the discrepancy can be wholly accounted for in this way. The number on the register, we may safely assume, includes many who are outside the age limits given in Mr. Ainsworth's estimate.[2] The hut and poll tax falls on old men and on women living alone, as well as on able-bodied males, and compels an increasing number not only of males over thirty, but of women and children, to seek employment.

The figures quoted as of those in actual employment are no doubt nearly correct. From them it would appear that more than half the able-bodied males of the agricultural tribe are in employment at one time, for even if one makes a liberal allowance for boys and elderly men, it is notorious that in many of the smaller tribes the proportion of wage-earners is very small. We may confidently assert that among the Kikuyu and Kavirondo, the two largest tribes in the country, the average able-bodied male works for wage during eight months of the year.[3]

[1] As individuals can only become registered by accepting employment, the close correspondence between the variations in number of employed and number of registered is highly significant.

[2] Figures published by the Agricultural Department in its census of industry are in complete conflict with those already quoted.

The census report states: "The number of labour engaged in agriculture in the twelve months under review was approximately: men, 540,064; women, 47,007; children, 57,439." Obviously many labourers have been counted more than once, and the figures are valueless.

[3] The following figures of employment in the Fort Hall district in 1917 were given the writer by a district officer:

The result of this withdrawal of men from their homes will be described in a later chapter. Here we may merely note that no district officer imagines it is possible to increase the labour supply still further without disaster. In fact the disasters are already happening. Yet—and this is the point to note—a labour force amounting to two-thirds of the possible maximum is required for the development of only 6 per cent of the alienated land. To crown all, exports per head from Kenya are lower than from any West African colony, even from Nigeria, most of which was first given a European administration a little later than Kenya, but which has not been provided with an aristocracy of land-owning Europeans, and has received no fertilising flood of many millions of European capital.

In such a situation it is strange to read in the last annual report on the Colony how, when " 5944 square miles were under actual occupation by 1380 Europeans who had brought under cultivation 214,709 acres—these figures are eloquent of the scope for new capital ". One could not have a more perfect example of the habit of thinking in terms of money rather than in terms of men. Even the Germans knew better. Before the War they were restricting the areas Europeans were permitted to plant because they foresaw, though the population of German East Africa was thrice as large as that of Kenya, and though the alienated

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Carrier Corps (Military)	8,711
Government Civil Transport	3,001
Farms in the Fort Hall district	5,400
Working on contract for private employers	2,009
In Mission Schools and service	1,417
Public works and railway	870
Employed in and near Nairobi and Kiambu district (estimated)	4,000
Employed in Naivasha Province (estimated)	1,500
At home in reserve	6,092
Total estimated number able-bodied males	33,000

area was far smaller than in Kenya, that there were not men enough in German East Africa to cultivate the area already planted.

It is most necessary to disabuse our minds of the idea that the economic system in existence in Kenya to-day is the result of the kinds of forces that we call natural or mechanical. It is true that certain processes seem to operate automatically. But they have all been set in motion deliberately by those in authority, both in Downing Street and in Nairobi. The writer of these lines had intended to confine himself to a description of events and their consequences. But his best valued critic insists that it would be unfair to the authorities not to give some account of their policy. He feels reluctantly compelled to comply with that advice. He is very conscious of the danger of misrepresenting the plans and motives of those whose policy he thinks unwise and unjust. That policy, and the system it has resulted in, were not publicly discussed in Parliament or elsewhere before they were carried out. In one sense, indeed, they are rather the resultant of forces elsewhere in the world than in East Africa kept under control, than the expression of any consciously conceived political theory. The mere fact that the Kenya system has never received public discussion and approval is of the first importance. It partly explains why the results of the system have been so different from what was intended. Even political programmes that have been hammered out during a generation of eager discussion in public, often work out quite unexpectedly in action.

The following quotations will to some extent explain the ideas of the authorities twenty years ago. Sir Charles Eliot in his annual report for 1903 asks in regard to the large expenditure of British funds on the Protectorate: "What solid hopes does it afford of commercial and financial progress?" And he answers: "Firstly, modern

East Africa is the greatest philanthropic achievement of the later XIXth century. . . . Perhaps political philanthropy is never quite disinterested. . . . I do not say that the natives admire our good deeds as much as we admire them ourselves. But there can be no doubt of the immense progress made in rendering the civilisation of the African at least possible, and it is a progress which need occasion no regrets, for we are not destroying any old or interesting system, but simply introducing order into blank, uninteresting, brutal barbarism." Sir Charles then observes that "a large part of East Africa is a white man's country, suitable for European colonisation". He describes the great potential wealth of the land and concludes:

But it may be argued that even if all this is true . . . it is no reason why we should spend money on the country. A colony should attract colonists: it is not the business of H.M. Government to attract them. If the country is worth anything people will find it out for themselves. This argument is true enough of an ordinary colony, but East Africa is not an ordinary colony. It is practically an estate belonging to His Majesty's Government, on which an enormous outlay has been made and which ought to repay that outlay. Many millions have been expended in the construction of the railway. That expenditure is a matter of the past and it is of no practical use to inquire whether it was excessive or not. But what is certain is that the railway[1] can only be made to pay its way by developing the countries through which it passes and by expending a reasonable sum in that development. . . . With an adequate administration, and proper investigation of the resources of the country and encouragement to European settlers and merchants, I consider it certain that the country will pay its way in ten years, and I have a good hope that it will do so in a much shorter period.

Another official report published in the same year, 1903, contains these words:

There is in the East African Protectorate no surplus labouring population beyond what is actually, or may potentially be required.

[1] The railway, as its name shows, was built for the sake of Uganda.

. . . For internal development, however, there is a steadily increasing labour supply. As the administration extends its control and consolidates its influence, the natives will come to understand Europeans and their methods better and better. The advent of settlers will encourage this tendency, and it is to be hoped that a few years will witness the initiation of some of those great agricultural enterprises for which this Protectorate is so eminently fitted, and the attainment of that most desirable of objects, the exploitation of the natural resources of the country by the voluntary labour of its inhabitants.

This report mentions that wages vary from five shillings and fourpence to six shillings and eightpence a month.

Two comments are suggested by the policy proposed in these reports. First, it is nowhere explicitly stated that the policy involves the transference of the able-bodied male population to the alienated area from its homes. No one in authority, in fact, seems to have realised that British colonisation in tropical Africa involves, not a transference of people from our overcrowded country to Africa, but a transference of African males from their homes, and from work upon the land near these homes, to work upon land belonging to aliens.

Second, the writers of these reports are clearly exclusively concerned with economic and financial ideas. That has always been noticeable in the politics of Eastern Africa as compared with the political ideas prevailing in other parts of the world. It is almost as though it were implicitly assumed that the people of East Africa, being incapable of any place but the lowest in society, merely needed in the world's interest, as their own wishes could not be considered, to be made wealth producers in the shortest possible time. It would be madness to ignore the importance of wealth production in any human society. But it is curious to find a governor predicting industrial and financial prosperity in ten years without considering whether the results of changes

so unprecedentedly rapid might not prove injurious to native society. One meets, of course, elsewhere with this idea that a prospective increase of wealth is an always reliable sign-post to human happiness and well-being, but elsewhere than in Eastern Africa that idea has never controlled events. One African ex-governor referred the other day to Africans as the greatest asset of Africa. That word exactly expresses the usual stand-point. It is no exaggeration to say that the policy which allotted to Africans the duty of working on land alienated to Europeans, and to Europeans the right to own the land and to reap the profits of its exploitation, was held to be justified solely by the expectation that it would pay.

It is natural and right to assume that people at a lower level of civilisation should benefit by contact with people at a higher level. But it is folly to assume that such a result is certain always to accrue when, since the dawn of history, such contacts have as often as not brought disaster both to the governing and to the subject race. Nor is there any mystery about the cause of these disasters. They arose, whether on the latifundia of Rome, in the silver mines of New Spain or on the plantations of Virginia, from the pursuit by the governing race of the profits of the labour of the subject race. In all these early reports there is no sign that the authorities recognised that the evils and disasters that result when the strong are encouraged to profit by the labour of the weak take new guise in each age, and are often covered by the cloak of a false philanthropy. This dragon has a hundred heads. It lost one when slavery was abolished. Others still remain.

It must be realised that Governors, Colonial Secretaries and Permanent Under-Secretaries can know very little about Africans. They never learn African languages and have no opportunity of intimacy with the masses of the people they govern. Like the emperor with no clothes in

the fairy-tale, they are told only what they want to hear. Though they cannot talk with Africans they have to talk with concessionaires. And they cannot follow Harun el Raschid's way of finding out for themselves. Men in elevated stations cannot know what goes on beneath them unless their eyes were well trained before they rose and their minds are resolved not to forget what once they knew.

It is important to note that not every East African governor was a hearty supporter of the policy that has been followed. Sir Donald Stewart was sceptical of its success. Sir James Sadler was known to be mistrustful of its wisdom. But by his time alienation of land on a large scale had already taken place. There was no logical stopping-place in the process of completing the alienation of all the land that was unoccupied or little occupied. Vested interests with great political influence in London had already been created. And no reversal of policy by Sir James Sadler or any one else was possible without the support of a strong and steady movement of public opinion at home.

One of the most striking features of the official attitude as shown in public reports is the evident resentment at tribal self-sufficiency. For a tribe to be content with its own produce is referred to almost as if it was wicked. To increase the wants of Africans was the universally approved object to be pursued. It is hard to see why a self-sufficient empire should be admirable and a self-sufficient tribe reprehensible; but one has to admit that Africans cannot reach the best things in our civilisation until they learn to spend money on things many of which are valueless, and some even injurious. But the real reason the authorities tried to persuade Africans to want money and what money can buy was not that these trade goods would do them any appreciable good. The object aimed at was to induce Africans to become wage-earners. That is clearly proved by the following quotation from a speech by Sir Percy

Girouard, at the time the Governor of the Protectorate, who next to Sir Charles Eliot is responsible for the Kenya policy.[1]

We consider that taxation is the only possible method of compelling the native to leave his reserve for the purpose of seeking work. Only in this way can the cost of living be increased for the native, and as we have previously pointed out it is on this that the supply of labour and the price of labour depend.

To raise the rate of wages would not increase but would diminish the supply of labour. A rise in the rate of wages would enable the hut or poll tax of a family, sub-tribe or tribe to be earned by fewer external workers, and as the payment of this tax is avowedly the reason for what labour we have seeking employment it follows that if we increase the rate of remuneration of the individual we decrease the number of individuals necessary to earn a given sum.

And again:

We consider that the only natural and automatic method of securing a constant labour supply is to ensure that there shall be competition among labourers for hire and not among employers for labourers; such competition can be brought about only by a rise in the cost of living for the native, and this rise can be produced only by an increase in the tax—say to Rs.15 or Rs.20 per head.

The sympathy with these views of Sir Edward Northey, a more recent governor, is shown by the following quotation from his inaugural address, as reported in the *Standard* of February 25, 1919:

The Protectorate has taken over the ownership of millions of acres of good land and the guardianship of a large native population. Is it our duty to allow these natives to remain in uneducated and unproductive idleness in their so-called reserves? I think not. I believe that our duty is to encourage the energies of all communities to produce from these rich lands the raw products and food-stuffs that the world at large, and the British Empire in particular, require. This can only be done by the encouragement of the thousands of

[1] The quotation is taken from the report of the speech in the *East African Standard* of February 8, 1913.

able-bodied natives to work with the European settler for the cultivation of the land and improvement of stock. . . . I find some of the native reserves not clearly defined. I propose to settle that definitely. Where there are doubts and disputes as to the ownership of land—title and tenure of natives, I propose to proclaim the area in question as reserve; that does not mean that I recognise that whole area as belonging to any native tribe or individuals, but it is Crown land.

Citations from the Press and other sources would show how widely the ideas of the three governors whose words have been quoted in this chapter are shared in Kenya. The reader must be careful to keep conceptions derived from European conditions out of his mind. In Europe every government seeks to establish agricultural workers in homes of their own on land of which their tenure is secure. In Kenya the Government found the people in occupation of as much land as they could use, and endeavoured, not to increase their security from disturbance, but to turn peasants into wage-earners. This principle, that it is the duty of the Government to induce Africans to transfer their productive energies from land of their own to land belonging to Europeans, was made palatable to public opinion by three assumptions rather than arguments. One of them—that working for Europeans would be educative to Africans—is partly, of course, true. It certainly is not true without qualification. The second was the assumption that work under European masters would produce more wealth than could otherwise be produced. West African experience has disproved that assumption.[1]

[1] Let no one, however, imagine that all West Africa is an earthly paradise. Of late years the ideas dominant in Kenya have penetrated wherever the Colonial Office rules. How far they prevailed in Sierra Leone during the War may be judged from the following words taken from *The Black Republic*, a book on Liberia written by Henry Fenwick Reeve, C.M.G., at one time Colonial Secretary in British Gambia: "Another instance of the high-handed treatment of that sacred question, 'The liberty of the subject,' occurred more recently when recruiting for the native regiments was in full swing in the neighbouring British colony of

The third is the doctrine that Africans in Kenya are lazy. This doctrine has been spread most industriously from an early date.[1] Lord Milner relied on it in his defence in Parliament of the compulsory labour regulations to be referred to later.

Now it is perfectly true that Kenya contains many of the most successful work shirkers in the world. Without constant supervision work is scarcely ever properly done by African wage-earners. The result upon the tempers and characters of their masters has already been described. But these same infinitely aggravating slackers work hard enough at home. After all, their masters try to get the most they can out of them for the smallest wage they can contrive among themselves to fix. Why is it so wicked for Africans, since they can do nothing to raise their wages, to take the only means of protest against the system that is open to them? It is no doubt deplorable that they should, demoralising to character as well as destructive of industrial results. But it is quite unreasonable to blame a man paid three farthings an hour, as most labourers are in Kenya, for doing only one farthing's worth.

Sierra Leone. Over one hundred Mendi boys crossed the frontier to evade the pressure, and arrived at Monrovia looking for work.

"They were detained and shipped off to Fernando Po by the Government of Liberia, or by its agents, and head money was collected upon them. These were British subjects seeking refuge in a friendly State, and were dealt with by the Liberian Government as if they were their own subjects."

Elsewhere in the book Mr. Reeve tells us that the Liberian Government got £5 for every labourer thus sent to the scarcely veiled perpetual slavery that prevails on the Spanish island of Fernando Po. The book gives a black picture of Liberian as contrasted with British methods in Africa. But it is interesting to learn from a responsible Government official, that recruiting on British soil went with such a "swing" that British subjects sought refuge from it. The liberty of the subject seems indeed to be a "question", as Mr. Reeve puts it, in various parts of Africa.

[1] Report of H.M. Commissioner on the East African Protectorate (ed. 769 of 1901), p. 18:

"It is to be hoped that . . . the apathy and indolence of the natives, when they are in comfortable circumstances, may disappear with the spread of civilisation. It will probably be long before they will understand such an idea as working in order to get rich."

They say now that discipline is curing these men of laziness. No doubt under heavy taxation, universal finger-prints, punishments for desertion, vagrancy regulations and so forth, they are learning to do four farthings' worth for three. They are learning other things as well.

It is difficult to write with restraint about this preposterous accusation of laziness. As regards the agricultural tribes it is ludicrously untrue. On the lips of men who spend most of their time in sport and pleasure it is a cowardly lie.

It is of course true that people suddenly introduced into a new industrial system take time to adapt themselves to it, especially when they had no wish to enter it. But why should most Africans in Kenya be called lazy because they work less willingly and energetically for Europeans than in their own food gardens?

Mr. A. R. Barlow, whose knowledge of the Kikuyu is admitted to be unsurpassed, wrote thus on the subject in September 1913 in the *Kikuyu News*:

> As regards the Kenya district, one doubts whether the number of natives leaving it to go to work could very well be increased. The maximum supply of labour has been obtained for some time back by means of a press-gang system put into force by the chiefs. This was nominally stopped by the Government recently.
>
> The usual argument one meets when urging that the native needs time to attend to his own affairs is that the male native while at home does no work, but lolls about watching his women slave for him. This is an erroneous idea.

Then Mr. Barlow gives a long list of the duties of the husband in a Kikuyu family and concludes:

> We believe that the home-life of the native should be preserved and allowed to develop its best characteristics, which is impossible when the father and sons of the family are at home only at odd times, separated by months of absence. We believe, again, that the moral

and spiritual development of the children of the soil is of as much importance as the financial prosperity of their conquerors.

The truth of this matter is that men in agricultural tribes can be said to have had an easy time of it for the period of five or six weeks after harvest. That is the very period of least demand by Europeans for labourers. During the rest of the year absence from home involves loss of food crops and hardship and injury to wives and children.

These explanations may still leave some readers unsatisfied as to the reasons why Government should have been so anxious to endow a handful of favoured Europeans with cheap land and cheap labour. One is apt to forget that some people still hold the theory that people with money have a kind of natural right to the services of others. After all, these European immigrants behaved in a way commonly regarded as legitimate, and when successful, as meritorious, in doing what they could to get rich. It must be remembered that they were invited into the country and that land was pressed upon them. Under Sir Percy Girouard and Sir Edward Northey both the Government and the semi-independent Administration of the Uganda Railway advertised the country, citing cheap land, cheap labour and good climate as attractions to Englishmen of the " public school type " with capital. What more natural than for these men to take all they could get of what was offered them? Could they be expected to see to it that Government made good bargains in its dealings as the trustees for the public and that native rights were not infringed? The Charter of the Imperial British East Africa Company contains the following words: " In the administration of justice by the Company to the people of its territories or to any of the inhabitants thereof, careful regard shall always be had to the customs and laws of the class or tribe or nation to which the parties respectively belong, especially with respect to

the holding, possession, transfer and disposition of land and goods ". Whose business was it to see that a Government under the direct control of Parliament obeyed that direction given to a Chartered Company? Certainly not men who were presented with opportunities by Government itself of rapidly acquiring wealth in its most stable form. Nor can these men be held to blame for demanding the use of the influence of Government in procuring labourers. They had been told labour was cheap and plentiful. Their land was useless without it.

And all these factors in their situation led inevitably to make them seek political control. Public opinion at home was notoriously suspicious of what little it knew of the policy pursued by several governors. The Masai affair, the Routledge case[1] and others had made many people uneasy. The position of the European colony, its monopoly both of land and of labour, would, it was clear, never be secure until it had legal as well as actual control of legislature and executive. That control had been given in Natal, to Europeans who form one-tenth of the population, and in Rhodesia where they form one-fiftieth. Why not in Kenya, say, by the time that the Europeans, when 5000 more of them had arrived, should become one two-hundredth of the population? That was the scheme which under Sir Edward Northey came within an ace of succeeding. Indeed it was only foiled by the Indian agitation which was the means of revealing a few of the true facts of the case.

The European colony in Kenya did not create this theory of domination by a racial minority. It is implicit in the conceptions of the dominant school in the political thought of the last generation. And in Kenya its emergence was inevitable, after the policy was entered upon of endowing Europeans with all the arable land in the country except

[1] Mr. and Mrs. Routledge had, in a letter to the *Times*, exposed the fact that a district officer, convicted of raping a native policeman's wife, had received trivial punishment.

what Africans needed to grow their own food upon. In every such country the European colony demands responsible government. Its members are accustomed to free institutions and resent being governed by a bureaucracy, however benevolent to them. In Kenya they brought about one beneficial reform. Twenty years ago the manners of officials, especially in Nairobi, were too often reminiscent of the libel alleged of Boston, where

> Lowells speak only to Cabots
> And Cabots speak only to God.

Finally we must inquire just how this central feature of the industrial situation in Kenya, the transference of able-bodied African males from work in the villages to wage-earning for the European colony, was brought about.

When the demand from private employers first arose, most district officers, when appealed to to use their influence to get labourers, refused to comply. Then an agitation began in Nairobi and in London. As a result of that agitation instructions were sent to district officers that, while no compulsion was to be used, " moral suasion " was to be resorted to, chiefs were to be " encouraged " to persuade their people to leave home to work for Europeans.

How Mr. Pecksniff would have enjoyed himself in Kenya in those days ! With what a blessed unction would he have discoursed of encouragement and moral suasion ! The unhappy district officers responded variously to the frequent and ambiguous circulars that at this period they received from Nairobi. A few qualified their " encouragement " by making it clear to chiefs and headmen that no man, according to the law, could be sent out to work if he preferred to stay at home. Such contumacy brought down the wrath of the concessionaires. These " unpopular " officers were usually removed to stations where they could do least harm, and where they could reflect upon diminished

chances of promotion. Others took the straightforward course of carrying out what they well knew to be the only way of making the wishes of Government effective. They simply levied so many men from each chief and did their best both to satisfy the competing claims of employers and to see that chiefs carried out their orders with as little oppression as possible. It must be remembered that this procedure was perfectly familiar to the people. Labour levies were a recognised institution to which in native opinion Government had a perfect right to resort in emergency. The only difference in the native view was that demands for labourers, formerly occasional and affecting only a minority, now became constant and affected all.

Probably most district officers recoiled from demanding definite numbers of men from individual chiefs for private employers. They simply called up the chiefs, passed on to them the wishes of the Government, and left it at that. The result was much the same in any case. To the chiefs an order was an order and their salaries depended on their obeying orders.

Just about the time when this shortage of labour was most acute, the Government instituted the tribal police, in theory an excellent institution. But as in practice their work in the main was the persuading of unwilling people to pay their tax and to leave home during harvest to work for Europeans, they soon became most unpopular. When their orders were resisted they retaliated by rape and looting, crimes to which in Africa native official agents are specially prone, since the common people dare not report them.

In the year 1919 there was a large inflow of men and money from England into Kenya. The shortage of labourers became even more acute than formerly. The chief Native Commissioner issued a circular stimulating district officers and others to still greater efforts. He wrote:

It is the wish of the Government that natives should come out into the labour field. . . . The necessity for an increased supply of labour cannot be brought too frequently before the various native authorities. . . . Native chiefs and elders . . . should be repeatedly reminded that it is part of their duty to advise and encourage all unemployed young men in the areas under their jurisdiction to go out and work on plantations.

These were the circumstances that led the two Anglican bishops in Kenya and the head of the Scottish Mission to issue a statement that, when it reached home, startled the religious public. For in it they wrote:

We believe that ideally all labour should be voluntary. We recognise that, at present, this is impossible, and that some form of pressure must be exerted if an adequate supply of labour necessary for the development of the country is to be secured. . . . We are strongly of opinion that compulsory labour, so long as it is clearly necessary, should be definitely legalised.

The whole statement, too long to be quoted in full in the text, is, with the official circular to which it refers, printed as an Appendix. These documents should be studied by all who wish to understand East African affairs.

People at home found it hard to realise that the proposals of the bishops were put forward as an improvement on the existing system. So they would have been, an immense improvement. They would have substituted a fixed and tolerable obligation for a system that encouraged chiefs to harry the whole population all the year round, and made bribery by those few who were able to buy exemption inevitable.

The bishops described this circular honestly enough. Although in point of fact it said practically nothing that had not been said often in previous circulars, they say that it " introduces compulsory labour ", even that " compulsion could hardly take a stronger form ". They give a hearty

denial to the slander of Africans' laziness. But their wording of a single sentence on this vital question unfortunately gave cover to the very argument they were concerned to deny. The reader will appreciate that the " days or months of practical idleness " to which the bishops refer constitute no source of labour power from which the demands of Europeans can be met. The necessity in their interests of a powerful system of veiled compulsion in spite of the influence of high direct taxation at once proves the inadequacy of voluntary labour and makes it impossible to estimate its amount.

But even the bishops could not escape from the mental atmosphere that surrounded them. Underlying every sentence in every document in this White Paper is the assumption that the whole basis of society in Kenya is the right of the Europeans in Kenya to the labour of Africans.

Soon afterwards the solution of the problem advocated by Sir Percy Girouard in the speech quoted above (that is, high direct taxation) was applied. For the time, indeed, direct taxation of the poorest people in the colony, up to the limit of endurance, and a Registration Ordinance that makes evasion of wage-earning impossible seem to have solved the labour problem in Kenya.

Before these decisive measures are discussed, other less important measures may be briefly mentioned. Fifteen years ago the most popular remedy for the shortage of labour was the cutting down of native " reserves ". The reserves have been cut down somewhat. But the result has probably been more than counterbalanced by the fall in the native population. By now, indeed, most people are beginning to see that further alienation of land formerly in " reserves " merely aggravates the situation. Another means of ensuring that natives seek employment is the vagrancy regulations, under which it is no exaggeration to

say that all the colony outside the reserves is closed to Africans who are not in employment. These means, as well as the "suasion" and "encouragement" already described, no doubt continue to operate as general influences in compelling men to seek employment. But it has been the raising of the hut and poll tax which, as Sir Percy Girouard long ago clearly predicted, has made wage-earning nearly as unavoidable as death to the great majority in Kenya.

The hut tax was first levied in 1901, at the rate of two rupees for each hut.[1] One of the officers who negotiated for the first payment of the tax by the Kikuyu once told the writer that the tribe only consented to pay on receiving the promise that it would never be increased above two rupees. He urged in excuse for the promise that unless they had been given it the Kikuyu would have resisted payment and so brought down upon themselves a military expedition. War with some sections of the tribe had recently taken place.

Since 1901 the tax was raised by easy stages until at the end of the War it was 16s. The rate also varied between one tribe and another, being raised as a tribe got accustomed to the habit of earning wages wherewith to pay the tax. The liability to payment of tax has also been extended so that two men in one hut must both pay, and so that an estate employee with a hut on the estate and a wife at home in his village has to pay two taxes. These extensions of the tax have had a deplorable effect on native administration. Every district officer knows that his reputation in Nairobi chiefly depends on the labour returns from his district and on his increasing the tax revenue. Hence many young boys and old men, even ex-slaves—people quite unfit to earn anything at all—are made to pay. In consequence, the number of separate hut and poll taxes

[1] In some districts it seems to have been one rupee for the first year.

paid by Africans in Kenya is at least 700,000[1]—a number about double that of possible wage-earners.

The Indian agitation and the War itself made some Africans in Kenya begin to think about politics. A Kikuyu called Harry Thuku, officially stated to be of bad character, started organising a political society in the Kikuyu villages. The grievances which the society put forward were high taxation, insecurity of land tenure, forced labour and oppression by the tribal police. The movement spread like a grass-fire. The Government arrested Thuku and lodged him in Nairobi jail. Some thousands of his supporters gathered round the jail, shouting and singing. About a third of the crowd were women. Some had sticks, but none, of course, had any more dangerous weapon. The crowd refused to obey orders to disperse, spent the night on the ground and renewed their cries the following day. Suddenly a section of them made a rush for the prison door. The police on guard fired, killed some thirty men and women and wounded many more. None of the defenders of the jail were hurt.

An official inquiry exonerated the police, who indeed had been on duty in an anxious position for eighteen hours, without relief. Thuku was shipped off to Kismayu on the Somali border on the coast, where he is still detained, though he has never yet been tried for any offence. Both the Government and the European colony were seriously alarmed and various native grievances received surprisingly frank discussion. The tax was reduced from 16s. to 12s. Talk of reform died away, however, when it was seen that the Thuku movement had collapsed.

[1] The writer has been unable to learn the exact figure. The number given is an estimate derived by dividing the total revenue from the tax (£506,000) by the sum payable on each hut. Some 2 per cent of the population pay more than 12s. and perhaps as many pay less. In Southern Rhodesia, where a similar system of taxation is in force, the official figures are: males only on tax register, 211,000; married males, 108,000. In both countries practically all males of suitable age are married.

The "Registration Ordinance" was designed as the cure for desertion. Pressure on chiefs and people had induced practically the whole male population to offer for work. But large numbers ran away. Some whole gangs even bolted when journeying to the place of work. The "Masters and Servants' Ordinance" had indeed made desertion a criminal offence. But the law was evaded by men giving false names to recruiters, hiding in strange villages and so forth. So there was devised—by a man who claimed to be the stoutest defender of native rights in the colony—and passed into law, an Ordinance which compelled, under penalty of a month's imprisonment or a 20s. fine, every adult African male to carry on his person—and as Africans have no pockets, that means in a tin receptacle—a dossier, consisting of finger-print, particulars of identity, and industrial history as given by past employers. The upkeep of a central bureau and the administration of the Act cost £20,000 a year, as compared with £24,000 which is spent on the education of Africans.

The Ordinance has been a brilliant success. Of 3595 deserters reported during 1921, 77 per cent were traced and duly punished. The number of deserters reported soon fell. It was only 149 in December 1922.

Now, whether we take Mr. Ainsworth's estimate of 210,000, less medically unfit, or the writer's of 250,000, as the number of those fully capable of work, and even if we add an allowance for elderly men, women and children able for light work, it is clear that the number of tax-payers is far larger than the number of wage-earners, of whom the immense majority earn less than 12s. a month.[1] The great majority of the able-bodied males work for wages for most

[1] The official pamphlet published in 1922 states that near any reserve wages are 8s. to 10s. a month without food, while at a distance of over 50 miles it may be necessary to pay 10s. to 12s. with food costing from 4s. to 8s. a month. Notices in the local Press in 1924 show that 8s. without food is still the usual wage in the Nairobi and Kiambu districts.

of each year, in order to pay not their own taxes only, but those of often several dependents, such as parent, wife, sister or brother's widow. If we work out a rough calculation we shall find that the average labourer's wages for between three and four months are entirely devoted to paying the direct taxation, which in Kenya falls almost exclusively on those of African race. The only direct taxation paid by the richest European is a poll tax of 30s.

Nothing more clearly reveals the nature and spirit of the accepted policy of the Government of Kenya than this fact, that the largest and poorest section of the population—people as poor as can be found in the world, who suffer heavily from diseases which their poverty makes irremediable—that this dumb African proletariat has to pay at least a quarter of its maximum possible earnings in direct taxation while the richest European in the colony escapes. That fact alone proves the subordination of a professedly independent Governor with his advisers to the European colony and its interests, and also shows how influence so potent has been used.

The claim that Europeans pay considerable sums in taxation is examined in Chapter XIV. It is true, of course, that the protective tariff is most burdensome to European workers, especially those with families. It also presses heavily on the Indians and adds appreciably to the taxation of Africans. But like all taxation by import duties it falls very lightly on the rich—and the proportion of Europeans who are rich in Kenya is far higher than in this country—and actually increases the profits of the farmers and planters by raising the prices of their produce.[1]

A general proof has been given of the fact that it is the deliberate policy of the Government to induce the whole able-bodied population of African males to work for wages for private employers.[2] The incidents about to be

[1] Be it remembered also that farmers and planters have no rates to pay.

[2] Further evidence on this point is given in Chapter V.

recounted may reveal the nature of that policy even more decisively.

After the publication of the bishops' memorandum the Government attempted to extend the provisions of the law by which, following old tribal custom, any native could be called up for Government work for a maximum of so many days in each year. As has already been urged, it is perfectly right that when work has to be done for which no one volunteers a Government should be able to resort to compulsion. The day may come when, in Europe, such work as scavenging, sewer cleaning and so forth may be done by young men, each compelled to give so many days or months to it. But compulsion is equitable only under certain conditions. Unpopular work, for the performance of which compulsion is necessary, should be paid at least as well as other work. And the compulsion should fall on all, without distinction of race or class.

The Compulsory Labour Regulations enacted by the Government wholly ignored these equitable conditions. They applied solely to Africans. But they did not apply to all Africans. They required sixty days' labour for any Government department only from those Africans who could not prove that they had worked for wages for at least three months out of the preceding twelve.

It is easy to see that there will always be some Africans who succeed in evading the force of such a general measure as heavy direct taxation intended to compel wage-earning by all. A minority of Africans in Kenya manages to earn the tax money by the sale of their own produce, mainly to Indian consumers and middlemen. These are the only men whom this regulation would have affected. In a word, its sole result would have been to make work for wages for sixty days in each year an unavoidable necessity to every able-bodied African in Kenya. And furthermore, it would be the less popular, more disagreeable and less well-paid

work that this minority of independent producers would have been compelled to perform, since obviously these are the kinds of work for which voluntary labourers do not apply.

These regulations were brought to the notice of Mr. J. H. Harris, the energetic organising secretary of the Anti-slavery Society. The Archbishop of Canterbury, Mr. J. H. Oldham and others also concerned themselves in the matter. They were debated in Parliament. Once more the wholly unjust accusation of laziness was thrown at people whose industry would shame their detractors and who are helpless to defend themselves. But the Colonial Office was obliged to admit that the local Government had gone one step too far. It seems to have thought that "interference from Downing Street" had gone for good. The grandmother's cap had slipped and shown something suspiciously like a wolf's ear. The Colonial Office directed the Governor to withdraw the regulations and to submit fresh ones of a more equitable kind. At frequent intervals during the past two years inquiry has been made in Parliament as to the terms of the new regulations. So far as the writer can learn, none have been framed. The reason is simple. To apply compulsion for public services to Africans in private employment would be most unpopular with the European colony. And, as a matter of fact, every one in the colony knows perfectly well that the offer of a shilling or two more than the ordinary rate of eight or ten shillings a month would produce all the labourers needed by Government. Of the fact that Government sides with employers against employed in this matter Sir Percy Girouard's speech quoted above is evidence as good as perhaps can be expected. Neither officials nor colonists, indeed, are often so indiscreet. Such partiality is not wholly the fault of the authorities. Until public opinion in this country exerts a countervailing influence to that of the local Europeans, it will be impossible for any Governor to follow the usual methods by which

labourers are attracted from less urgent to more urgent tasks, the methods, that is, of making work more attractive, by increase of pay and otherwise. The former Director of Public Works was the only man in the service who refused, when the standard wage rate was last reduced, to bring the wages paid by his department down to the figure demanded by private employers. That was perhaps the chief reason for his compulsory retirement, for which the ostensible reason was economy.[1]

Some insight into official policy and motives can be derived from an incident reported in the Nairobi Press in October 1920. The local correspondent of the paper in a district containing both European farms and a native "reserve" reported, merely as a piece of news, that two thousand natives had been "turned out by the Government to pull flax" for the European farmers. In point of fact such a procedure is nowadays no longer usual. The hut and poll tax and the Registration Ordinance between them render rarely necessary the directer methods of compulsion in common use before the War.

A few days later a missionary wrote to the editor pointing out the unwisdom of printing such a piece of news. If the story got into the home papers, he urged, the facts might easily convey a false impression. This missionary holds the view that agitation for reform should be confined to the colony and that reforms of which the European colony disapproves are impracticable and unwise. He is a strong opponent of the claim of the Indians to equal political and economic rights. The district officer whose energy was thus unwisely advertised received, of course, no official rebuke. Such actions as his are regarded as praiseworthy by the authorities so long as they give rise to no protest or exposure.

[1] Other reasons were his popularity with the Indians and the part he played in the controversies over the currency and branch railways.

For a year or two after the War the Governor and other high officials held frequent conferences with chiefs. During the last few years the papers have stopped reporting these meetings. An incident at one of them is thus reported in the *East African Standard* of July 15, 1921:

FORCING OF WOMEN AND GIRLS TO WORK ON PLANTATIONS

The Chiefs and Elders asserted in strong terms that this practice is still in vogue.

The Chief Native Commissioner replied that the Government was not responsible for this, and, moreover, would not countenance it.

The Government had certainly informed Chiefs that it was advisable that their women and children should work on farms close to their homes so that they could return home to sleep at night. He asked for specific instances of women and children being forced to work by instructions from the Government.

Chief Mukui stated that he and five Elders had been kept at Kyambu for a few days because their women and children had not been sent out to work. The District Commissioner (Mr. Campbell) replied that the reason for the detention of Mukui was that he had boycotted a certain planter and that he was detained at Kyambu pending the settlement of the matter. He further stated that a tribal policeman had recently been convicted before him of ordering women to work on plantations and had been severely punished and dismissed.

The Chiefs intimated that they had further instances of this compulsory labour by women and children.

The Chief Native Commissioner informed them that their correct procedure was to lay their complaints in the first instance before the District Commissioner, and if dissatisfied with his verdict, to appeal to the Senior Commissioner of the Province.

The District Commissioner stated that any cases of this description brought to his notice would be fully investigated and the guilty persons punished.

The reader will want to know why, as is implied throughout this chapter, Africans in Kenya cannot earn their tax money by growing food-stuffs and other crops for sale. No

complete answer to the question is possible. It is true that at intervals speeches are made by people in authority encouraging industry in reserves. But the greatest care on these occasions used always to be taken to explain that it was only the women and older men who were referred to. The young and able-bodied were to work for Europeans. As a matter of fact the energies of the people now left in the villages are barely sufficient to raise food enough for the whole African population. Food shortages have become common, and the country, once a considerable exporter of grain, has now to import large quantities of it. It is that fact, and the expense to the country caused thereby, that have from time to time led the authorities to urge more extensive cultivation in the reserves.

During the past few years, however, under pressure from the Colonial Office, more genuine efforts have been made to stimulate the exploitation of land in the reserves. Certain of the staff of the Agricultural Department have most courageously advocated production for export. In view of the events narrated in Chapter V., it is interesting to read in one official report on rice production on the coast that "this lack of population is the whole difficulty in rice production. The people of the Tana River . . . are estimated at 10,000. The figures for Sabaki are not to hand, but that area is poorly inhabited."

It is most important to realise that native production for export demands organisation. Verbal encouragement and even occasional gifts of seed are valueless. Produce has to be bought, collected, graded and shipped, first on the railway, then on steamers. All that work, for native produce, is mainly done by Indians. At one time native producers in co-operation with Indian merchants developed a considerable export trade from the Kavirondo province. The following statistics of this trade are quoted from a letter that appeared in the local Press:

	1916.	1922.
Exports of sesame . . .	3701 tons	150 tons
Value of sesame	£29,000	£1200
Exports of maize	9997 tons	1100 tons
Value of maize	£28,000	£4000
Exports of hides	794 tons	3 tons
Value of hides	£63,000	£300

The collapse of this trade was due to various causes. Railway freights were raised, on hides, for instance, from shillings 2·16 per cwt. in 1916 to shillings 9·83 in 1922. There was also an export duty on hides, which is now abolished. Also the European colony objected to the trade, partly because it allowed Africans to earn money without working for Europeans, partly because it was profitable to Indians.[1]

It would be unfair to suggest that the Government deliberately killed this trade. But the facts stated certainly prove—as do the incidents recorded in Chapter V.—that native production for export was treated none too tenderly. Indian merchants, of course, follow the accepted principles of paying as little as they can when they buy from Africans, and getting as much as they can when they sell. European producers, of course, know enough to demand the best market price from those to whom they sell.

It is to be hoped that the question of how natives find it difficult to earn money by work at home will be considered to have been answered as completely as is possible in the circumstances. It is also to be hoped that the reader is by this time able to answer for himself the question how much of the labour supply in Kenya is voluntary. The truth is not that the great majority of labourers are free, while the

[1] As in South Africa, there has been an attempt by some Europeans in Kenya during the last few years to drive Indians out of the smaller trading centres. The kind of Indian employed in these petty shops is very easily intimidated. Their disappearance would obviously diminish, and in some places destroy, opportunities of sale by Africans for export.

few, like the men "turned out" to pull flax, are forced, but that compulsion is an ingredient in the whole system, the effects of which are felt by all. That is clearly shown by the immobility of wages. In a free labour market they would rise during a shortage and fall during an abundance of labour. Nothing of the kind happens in Kenya. Private employers are few enough to be able, with the hearty co-operation of the Government, to fix the rate of standard wages as they please. A report by the private recruiting agency that works among the Kikuyu, published in the local Press in February 1924, shows that standard wages in the Kikuyu province were then still 8s. a month without food. That rate is nearly as low as it was before the War, though now Kenya prices, thanks in part to the tariff, are double pre-War prices, while the tax has been increased by a half, and at one time was double the pre-War tax.

The only estimate the writer knows of, of the total sum received in wages by Africans in Kenya, was made three years ago by the editor of the principal Nairobi newspaper. He estimated the annual sum at £1,500,000, of which from a half to two-thirds was paid in cash. Taking the mean of £875,000 as correct, and dividing it by 140,000, the known average number of wage-earners, we get the figure of £6 10s. as the average annual wage, or rather less than 11s. a month. That figure is probably approximately correct, considering that while the majority are paid round about 8s. a month, a considerable minority are paid much more.

Wages other than cash include minor items such as blankets, but must be mainly composed of food. Deducting £125,000 for these other items, we get £500,000 as the cost of feeding something less than 140,000 in a year—less, since some of them supply their own food. £500,000 as the cost of feeding 100,000 men for a year comes to £5 a head, a figure that closely corresponds with the higher limit

of cost given in the Land Office pamphlet. If, however, we ignore the editor's estimate, and take the mean of the figures, 4s. and 8s., given in the official pamphlet, we get 6s. as the cost of feeding a labourer for a month. That proves that the man paid 8s. a month without rations is paid much less than a subsistence wage for himself and two dependents, even if he works for wages the whole year round.

In short, the Government of Kenya exercises a nearly complete control of the industry of Africans in Kenya and uses that control to increase by every possible means the profits of a European colony that depends for its existence on its artificial support by the Government. It should not be forgotten that it is illegal for Africans, who often engage on contracts of from six to twelve months, to leave work without permission, and that under the Registration Ordinance punishment for doing so is swift, certain and severe.

It is happily possible to close this chapter encouragingly. During 1923 the Colonial Office directed the local Government to amend the Registration Ordinance. This Ordinance originally threw on the Government the onus of discovering deserters and ensuring their punishment. On some occasions employers were even repaid the expenses they had incurred in attending court. Police and magistrates were thus involved in frequent man-hunts. In so large and scantily populated a country, where the population sympathises with the deserters rather than with the law, these proceedings were arduous, expensive and distasteful. The law has now been changed. Desertion is now a civil, not a criminal offence, cognisable by a magistrate only when an employer takes out a summons. The writer has been unable to learn how far this change in the law involves changes in the duties of the police and other public servants. It seems clear, however, that unless police and magistrates are as active as formerly in running down deserters, the Ordinance will become inoperative.

It is satisfactory also to know that in some districts the growing of crops by Africans for sale is being encouraged. Here again it is too soon to estimate results. A recent paragraph in the London *Times* stated that unexpectedly good results have already accrued. The great majority of the European colony view them with extreme disfavour. There is, indeed, only one reason why East Africans should not produce cotton, maize, rice and other staple crops on the scale on which cocoa is produced in West Africa, and that reason is the influence in the local Government of Europeans who conceive that their prosperity depends on the abundance and cheapness of the supply of wage-earners. The success of schemes of native production for export would certainly diminish the labour supply and make it impossible to keep standard wages down at their present level. That is not to say that the interests of European farmers would thereby be injured.

To say, as the authorities say, that the interests of Europeans and those of Africans in Kenya coincide, or are complementary, is something less than honest, especially when these same people are constantly suggesting that the interests of Indians are inimical to the interests of both the other races. The real interests of every one in Kenya are complementary in exactly the same sense as are the interests of employers and employed in this country. No sensible person in this country thinks he has advanced matters by uttering so abstract a truism. What is relevant is the fact that what employers as a class believe to be in the best interests of both their workmen and themselves, and what workmen as a class regard as in the best interests of both employers and employed, do notoriously conflict, and that both cannot be right. So in Kenya, it is simply a fact that not merely the landed interest but many of those in authority would prefer to see the failure of any industry in the reserves which would make it easy for the able-bodied

to live at home instead of having to seek employment.[1] To ignore that fact is equivalent to giving consent to the murder of purely native industries. For past history has made their establishment impossible without both hearty support from the authorities and a considerable expenditure of public money. The experimental farms and veterinary work, paid for out of public money, and conducted to help the industries engaged in on the alienated land, have cost, in the aggregate, more than a million pounds. One-tenth of that sum, spread over five years, and spent under the direction, or at least with the help, of men who have done the same kind of work in India or West Africa, would, with the cordial co-operation of every Government Department, bring to Kenya a prosperity not otherwise possible.[2]

[1] Evidence of this statement is provided by the fact that the Government charges native cotton growers one halfpenny on every pound of cotton sold. The services it renders in return for that charge are no doubt of equal or greater value. But it has never attempted to impose any similar charge on the produce grown on land owned by Europeans, although the establishment of these industries has cost the Government directly and indirectly millions of pounds.

[2] It is instructive to note that the author of the Registration Ordinance, who also was responsible for the circular which introduced, as some alleged, a system of forced labour, has been employed by the Colonial Office, since his retirement from the Kenya Civil Service, in reporting and advising upon labour conditions in South America, Papua and elsewhere.

CHAPTER IX

CHRISTIAN MISSIONS

Except for the Roman Catholic Missions, the staffs of which are mainly Italian, Dutch and French, the Christian Missions at work in Kenya Colony belong to the school of thought and practice called Evangelical. Elsewhere in East Africa there is a mission belonging to the school that is called Catholic, though not in communion with Rome. But the Church Missionary Society, the Church of Scotland Mission, and a large American Mission with a loose ecclesiastical organisation but a strict Calvinist creed, which are the chief missions in Kenya, all derive from the Puritan strain in English and Scottish life.

The number of people in this country whose convictions induce them to go to foreign countries as missionaries, or to give active support to missions, is a very small one, though much larger in Britain and North America than elsewhere. In this country, contributions to missions amount to one eight-hundredth part of the national income, and probably less than a tenth of the population take any interest in them.

It is important to realise that the Evangelical party, as the inheritors of the Puritan tradition are now called, has always been a minority party in the national life, though its zeal and activity have often from time to time made it very influential. That party, in alliance with the Rationalists, made it possible for Fox to abolish the slave trade, and, more recently, gave powerful help to the

policy of Imperialistic expansion. But by itself, in our country, though not in America, as the instance of Prohibition shows, it is politically powerless. The fact is of importance, as people in continental countries often assume that Puritan and humanitarian opinion is dominant in England, and accuse us of hypocrisy when we act, as a nation, on quite different motives.

The Puritan tradition is, furthermore, notoriously unpopular among those classes of English people from which the Europeans in Kenya are chiefly drawn. It stigmatises many of their pleasures, such as horse-racing and the use of alcohol. The emphasis it lays on private judgement is difficult to reconcile with authority, and it is well known to be the parent of equalitarian and socialist ideas that are even more excessively disliked by Europeans abroad than by their friends in England. It may be added that most missionaries are adherents of the older theological ideas, now becoming less common in Europe.

From these and other causes the normal attitude of merchants and planters in Kenya to missions and missionaries is antipathetic, as it is elsewhere abroad. That is not surprising. A fashionable novelist in our time would as readily make a Bolshevik, or a Sinn Feiner or a Prussian officer his hero as a Nonconformist minister.

Perhaps a third of those employed by Protestant missions have had a university training. To these men we owe a good half of our knowledge of African languages and customs. Many of the less well educated are as good men as can be found in the world. Some are not. Churches at home realise imperfectly that the task of explaining Christianity to an uncivilised people demands exceptional ability of mind. The far from easy task of learning an African language thoroughly is wisely used to get rid of the less intelligent. Other qualities than intelligence are ensured by the nature of the work, its unpopularity and

the meagreness of the salaries paid. The Scottish missions pay University men £300 to £450 a year, much less than they would get at home. The other missions pay no more than just enough for the necessities of life. In addition, when missionaries are invalided, or get too old for work in Africa, many find work at home specially hard to get.

Protestant missions in Kenya would be happy to unite if the Churches at home would allow them. All profess the same creed, and follow the same methods, except that the Americans allow to individual missionaries a degree of independence in their work that many think results in waste of effort.

When a mission begins work in a new district in Africa it begins with a school. Nowadays a headman and his people have first to ask for a school, to build a school and a house for the native teacher and to undertake the whole or part of his salary, usually from 10s. to 20s. a month. The minimum attainments of a teacher correspond with what a boy in England knows in the IVth Standard. He is generally married. His task is to teach the three R's, first of all, to young and old. He has a blackboard, slates, one or two maps and charts with letters and numbers on them, and, for each pupil, a primer, a copy of one of the Gospels, generally Mark, and a small hymn-book—all of these in the local language.

The primary object of the education given is to enable each person to learn for himself and to understand the record, the character and teachings of Jesus and the chief doctrines of historical Christianity. (The Church Missionary Society also uses the Church Catechism and the Prayer-Book.) Explanations of Scripture and doctrine are given, and hymns taught by the teacher. Schools are inspected by a European missionary at variable intervals, sometimes monthly, sometimes not even annually. As a

rule, teachers are given an annual "refresher" course of a month, at the central mission station of the district, where the Europeans live.

Those who attend school regularly, and express the wish, are enrolled as "hearers": after from one to three years, if well reported on by the teacher and any church elder in the district, they may, after examination by the European missionary, become "catechumens": after several years more, they may be given a special course by the missionary and be publicly baptized.

Though many missionaries do not realise it, this method of Christian propaganda is unique. Until about a hundred years ago it was never attempted. That is the age of the modern missionary movement. Its results have been far greater than either its friends or its enemies realise. It is the creator of new ideas and ideals, moral, political and economic, in all the countries of the tropics, in a situation strangely similar to the time of Christian origins. Before it can be understood, before its results can, however cautiously, be appraised, before the alternatives it is faced with can be foreseen and estimated, it must be seen on its own historic background. It is a phase, inevitably a transitory phase with results however permanent, in the long and protean growth of historical Christianity. Its character can only be discerned in the light thrown by other times and other circumstances than our own to-day.

In the days of its early prime and rapid expansion the Roman Empire included, in the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, a large number of self-governing kingdoms, principalities and city states. One of these petty kingdoms was inhabited by a nation of Semitic origin, which, after living for some generations in slavery in Egypt, successfully revolted and migrated to the mountains and valleys in the south of Syria that overlook the only land route from Europe and Asia to Egypt. The Jews paid the

penalty of so dangerously placed a national home in repeated conquests and enslavements, but preserved, and in each period of disaster developed, their exclusive devotion to their ancestral God. This God they came gradually to regard as the creator and sustainer of the universe, whose will for mankind was expressed in their legal and poetic literature, while to them he had committed, as to those long tested and trained in his service, the achieving of his universal worship and obedience.

Under the influence for many centuries of these ideas the Jewish people had attained a national solidarity unique in that age, which yet included a wide diversity of idea as to the nature and method of attainment of the national destiny that all cherished. As all Jewish boys were taught to read, and as their only books were written to remind them of their duties and to revive their aspirations, a succession of popular leaders was able to evoke the widest enthusiasm, whether directed to some enlargement and enrichment of the national ideal, or to its fulfilment through the restoration of the national independence.

Though the policy the Roman governors were directed to follow permitted to ethnic and other groups liberties greater than those enjoyed in any later age, these popular leaders compelled the close attention of the Imperial authorities. More than any other people of that time the Jews were intolerant, exclusive and easily aroused. In the end their national aspirations proved inconsistent with the Imperial supremacy, and the Jewish State was destroyed in A.D. 70.

A generation previously a popular leader had arisen who professed to give the national aspirations and destiny a new and final content and meaning. He claimed to have a full and unique knowledge of God and of his will. He taught that the Jewish law, which gave the national unity its basis by prescribing for all alike, with precision and complete-

ness, on every occasion of family, social and industrial life, was itself to be judged by its satisfaction of human needs and justice, and was thenceforth to be interpreted in the light of a new law and ideal of universal validity. This ideal, which he urged on all equally for use in every kind of human association, he exemplified by his own behaviour, and by the affection and devotion shown in a family, of parent with child, husband with wife, brother with brother. He violently attacked the wealthy as those who allowed the enjoyment of their property and comforts to debar them from equal fraternal relations with others. He condemned the priestly aristocracy, and all who claimed authority over the common people, whether due to superior station, superior knowledge or superior fidelity to the law. And while it was chiefly to the poorer sections of the community, who attempted a less strict observance of the law than the more respectable and prosperous, that he directed his teaching of love to God and to all men irrespective of the special claims of family and nation, he repudiated unintelligent acquiescence in his teaching. He took special pains, indeed, to make it unintelligible to those who were unwilling to think for themselves, and unwelcome to those who were unready for personal sacrifice, and he disowned the influence over men's minds that his followers tried to give to the miraculous events that accompanied or were believed to accompany his work.

He ignored the most critical and most disputed question of his time, the attitude that ought to be taken to the Roman power, and though unmistakably a pacifist, in so far as he repudiated violence as an instrument of justice and asserted that enemies should be given the same treatment as friends, he still continually used, as best descriptive of his aims, a term that implied the founding of a society with social and political functions. Most paradoxically he described this society, on the one hand, as the means to the

knowledge of God and of the secrets of human existence, and promised to make it, by the endowment of his spirit, the unfailing guide to all future ages, until it should triumphantly transform the world, and yet predicted, on the other hand, repeatedly and with the greatest clearness, that in that society there should be men who would teach mankind, in its name and in his own, the very opposite of what he himself was trying to explain, that the lamp of the church should even extinguish the light it professed to convey, which yet should shine to the world in the lives of those who made no claim to transmit it.

At first he won the support of the common people of the country, by appealing to conscience rather than to the law, by sharing their pleasures though himself in poverty, and by relieving their sufferings and superstitious fears. But at length that support was discouraged, though never wholly alienated, by the demands made by his teaching on men's intelligence and will, by his repudiation of any immediate advantage to be won for his followers or for the nation, and by the steady and increasing antagonism of the better classes, including both the people of superior morality and patriotism and the families who conducted the national worship.

After wandering about the country for, some say, one year while others say three years, he visited the national annual gathering for public sacrifice at Jerusalem. The temple wherein the sacrifice was held had been built to symbolise not only the unity and unique privileges of the Jewish nation, but also, by the provision of a large court for the worship of foreigners, the ultimate extension of the worship of the true God to all humanity. The Jewish authorities, however, had allowed this court to be used for those financial arrangements which indeed were necessary both for supplying food to the immense concourse of people and for the trade in animals for sacrifice, of which some

60,000 it is believed were used annually. By driving these traders out of the court of the foreigners Jesus alienated the sympathies of the public of Jerusalem, which depended for livelihood entirely on supplying the needs of the vast national assembly, and gave the Jewish authorities an opportunity to arrest him without popular resentment. By these authorities, the heads of the Jewish State, he was accused of sedition before the Roman governor. He himself foiled the effort of the governor to save him, by refusing to withdraw his claim to be the founder of a kingdom, in spite of its so dangerous and ambiguous implications, and was executed as a criminal like many another dangerous innovator in that unimportant though turbulent province of the Empire.

Jesus' followers, though they had abandoned him at his execution, soon gathered by a common impulse at Jerusalem, and formed themselves into that society for which he had predicted so glorious and so shameful a destiny. They attempted at once to carry out as much as they could understand of the scheme of life that Jesus had described and exemplified.

The civilised world of that time was mainly composed of communities ranging in size from a group of families to aggregations of national size, some confined to their countries of origin and others widely scattered. In most of these communities the original bond was tribal or racial, and their social customs were given the sanction of some tribal or national god. But the Jewish was not the only religion which at that time had already incorporated people of different racial origins into a nation that had long since escaped from restricted geographical boundaries. In every city of importance there were Jewish and other communities of foreign origin that had their own laws, courts and officers, and were separate self-governing units. Nationality, in fact, depended, in these times, not on birth or residence

in a certain geographical area, but on membership of a community which might have and often had widely scattered colonies. In all of these communities the bond of a common religion was inseparable and even undistinguished from a common law, ethic and social code, from the use, generally exclusive, of a common language, and from nearly all the other signs and functions that in our time denote a common nationality. From all the Imperial authority required the additional obligation of obedience to itself, and that obligation, like all other reciprocal rights and duties, whether between parent and child or between a sect or nation and those who composed it, was then regarded, in the universal opinion, as a religious obligation. But neither the Imperial authorities nor most of the subjects of the Empire regarded that Imperial religion as incompatible with the corporate authority and culture of the national religions to one or other of which every one belonged. It was only the Jews and the Christians who, as they believed one God alone to be real, were committed implicitly if not always explicitly to the theocracy of a single will, and were thus committed to a conflict with the essentially polytheistic political theory of the Empire. That conflict, however, was long postponed. The Imperial authorities saw no need to interfere in the affairs of an obscure Oriental sect founded in the memory of a Jewish criminal, notoriously unpopular with the more reputable of the Jews themselves. They knew by experience that such enthusiasts give least trouble when left alone and allowed to weary ordinary men with their fanaticism.

The Church, accordingly, was left free to grow, and to develop, with one exception, all the functions of a corporate society, which now we distinguish by a variety of terms. Under the influence of a Jew who had had a cosmopolitan training and education, whose genius grasped both the spirit of his own age and the nature of the transformations

that the life and teaching of Jesus would create in the world, the Church burst the tie that bound it to the fortunes of the Jewish State, entered on its own free course and underwent the first of that long series of adaptations and interpretations and absorptions with the life and spirit of the time that mark the stages in the development of historical Christianity.

The character of the early Church was thus formed both by the character and teaching of its founder and by the conditions of the age. On the one hand, it attempted the corporate life Jesus taught for its own sake. Its members, that is to say, drawn from any race and class, attempted to perform together the whole business of living, as a team performs football or an orchestra music. Their joint reflection on their experience, and on Jesus' character, and on the plan for human life he laid down, gave them a creed. The products of industry, from which none were excused, and the property of those admitted to membership, were used, as the general will directed, to support widows, orphans and the sick, to find means of livelihood for new converts, and for the support of itinerant preachers.

And on the other hand, the Church sought, with increasingly conscious purpose, to fulfil those ends that were defined by the conditions of the age. It expressed its convictions in a creed that owed its terms and form to the philosophy of the time. It built, in obedience to outward necessities as well as to inward ideals, a new nation, whose members of however dissimilar origin were so united by relations of the closest kind and the widest range as to form a new and easily recognised race of mankind, fitted by diversity of type as well as by close unity and organisation for the aim of absorbing and supplanting the kingdoms of the world.

It is true that many of the functions of a corporate institution which we should regard as most important have

little or no mention in the early records. Thus we read of no schools, though we know that the education of the young was a corporate function of the Church. We may explain the inconspicuousness of the problems of industry in early Church life by the simplicity of the industrial system of that time. A more adequate explanation, however, is provided by the conviction, universally held by the early Christians, that the world was soon to come to an end. In that conviction they tried also to find a way of escape from a problem that grew more insistent as the Church grew stronger, a problem that still remains unsolved. The ablest of its leaders indeed at times hoped for a temporary compromise between Empire and Church that would allow the Church to transform and ultimately to supplant all its rivals. But the Roman authorities at length realised that, unlike the other religions and nations of the time, the Christian religion and the Christian nation laid claim to universal dominion. Christians rejected the oath that all others accepted, which the Empire used to test the loyalty of its subjects, and the Church began its endless struggle with the State. The last book of the Bible reflects a phase of that struggle so bitter and so hopeless that the author can see no end to it but by the subversion and destruction of all secular political authority. The Church, no longer leaven working silently to transmute, nor a seed growing imperceptibly into the habitation of the human race, was—so many Christians then hoped—to be the spectator of God's vengeance on its enemies.

The intermittent struggle between Church and State ended, after three hundred years in which the Church had gained the adhesion of perhaps a tenth of the population of the Empire, in its apparent victory. But it was not a real victory. By the time of Constantine those elements in the Church's life that were derived from the ideas of the age had overgrown and obscured the ideas of its founder.

Its officers claimed and exercised an authority which Jesus had expressly forbidden. Its creed had been given a fallacious exactitude that made the free thought of early days impossible. The rigidity that the Church, like all institutions, had gradually acquired was increased by the Imperial connection. The influence on the Church of those ideas on which the later Empire rested was far greater than the influence over the policy of the Empire which the Church transmitted from the teaching of Jesus. In the earliest period every Christian was a priest, and took an active part in the affairs of the fraternity. By the IVth century the idea had become so obsolete that it suggested to none that in the Christian State every Christian is a king. Fraternity either in practice or as an imperfectly realised ideal was impossible of survival in a world composed of ranks and grades, invented or sanctioned by the Church, to which all were expected to aspire since they brought with them wealth, privilege and authority.

For centuries thereafter the history of the Church is that of an institution that is the vehicle of the ideas of its time and unites through them the generality of men. Characteristically the Church cared far more to preserve an exact historical continuity with the forms alleged to have been adopted in the apostolic age than to express with fidelity the ideas of Jesus. The records of Jesus' life and teaching were known to few, even in civilised countries, and to the masses of the barbarian tribes that overran the Empire the Church never attempted to give the education that would have enabled them to understand either the early records or the orthodox creed. There is no reason to believe that the thought and practice of ordinary Christians in the Xth or the XVth centuries were in closer conformity with the teaching of Jesus than were the thought and practice of Buddhists and Moslems. Many of the leaders of the Church were exceptionally bad men and the

corporate influence of the Church was used as often for evil as for good in human affairs.

Constantly, however, men arose who startled the world by reviving old ideals. Some, like the founders of religious orders, gave to a few the hope of escape from the society of the time, Christian though they regarded that society as being. Others, like Savonarola and Hus, attempted to restore the Christian ideal in all the functions of society. All these movements failed, but they kept men's hopes alive.

Then, suddenly, the long-gathering storm broke over the Church. The printing press made the ideas of the New Testament widely known. Other knowledge as well, new and old, led men everywhere to question the authority of the great institution that, as they thought, was stifling the life it once had fostered and conveyed. All Christendom fell into confusion. In the end the Church survived, no longer supreme, and still thwarted by its hierarchical organisation and by creeds formulated in terms of obsolete philosophies, but yet alive and eager to renew its early hopes of conquest.

Where the old organisation failed of restoration the field appeared to be clear for the Church to attempt a new synthesis with the ideas of the age. But confusion of thought as well as political and social confusion made the task extremely difficult. One result of the publicity given to the ideas of the New Testament in the XVIth century was a widespread tendency among the common people to revolt against authority. A similar movement, for which both Franciscans and Lollards were considered responsible, had disturbed Western Europe two centuries earlier. The necessity of some superior authority for common men to obey seemed to be clearly proved, and the loss of the visible and formerly universally acknowledged organ of such authority in the Papacy was felt to leave an

intolerable void. In the result, in many countries, kings and princes assumed, each in his dominion, the supreme authority in human affairs, and in these States the Churches, warned by the past to trust no living pope or council as infallible, erected the records of Jesus' life and of the earliest Christian age into the authority for life in those human relations that did not fall under the exclusive concern of princes.

Thus there arose, and spread to Catholic Europe as well, that separation of the sacred from the secular, reflected in thought by the antithesis of the natural and the supernatural, which is the distinctive mark of the age just ended. The line of separation was at first neither recognised nor distinct. The secular authority had a religious character equally with the ecclesiastical. The civil authority executed the judgement of Church courts, the king was anointed, and membership of the national Church was the necessary condition of political rights. But the line of separation grew plainer and increasingly divided life more deeply. The State used its monopoly of the apparatus of force to compel civil conformity, while dissent from ecclesiastical authority proved neither possible to prevent nor incompatible with public order.

The reformed Churches found themselves in a dilemma. They could accept the position of so-called national Churches, each providing social organs of a restricted kind for a community that regarded itself as being, by universal baptism, wholly Christian. Or they could try to begin again as the first Christians did, as separate groups of people wholly devoted to a life designed on Jesus' plan. The former course was at first chiefly followed, but has become obsolete with the abandonment of attempts to enforce ecclesiastical conformity, while those who separated themselves to attempt a purer way of life not only fell into divisions and contentions, but lost sight of their full ideal.

The ideas of the age made certain phases of that ideal difficult to grasp, and in fact rendered almost impossible any such attempt as the first Christians made. In the XVIIth century no State, except Turkey, allowed a body of men to exist as a society, self-governed and self-sufficing, with its own officers, schools, laws and courts. In the Turkish Empire alone did the Church preserve the forms of a self-governing society, which indeed survived until the development of Turkish nationalism during the Great War. Elsewhere it was only on the outskirts of the known world that the Jesuits on the Paraguay and the Quakers in Pennsylvania established Churches which, widely different as they were, both attempted to express the teaching of Jesus in all the functions and by all the organs of a corporate society.[1] These attempts soon perished when the currents of the world's general life reached and overflowed them. Everywhere the civil authority became dominant as well as independent, and the word religion, which originally included all the obligations which the individual owes to society, and all the functions by which society renders its services in return, became restricted to those kinds of association for which the Church made provision.

So Christianity in Protestant countries came to correspond with a section in life called religious, a section at first shared by all, involuntarily, who were born within the area of the national Church but which later became increasingly restricted to voluntary adherents. And in every country, Protestant and Catholic alike, the dividing of life between the secular and the sacred has for centuries prevented the development of fully corporate life in the Church. Increasingly during the past age as great a variety of opinion and practice in every concern of life has been found among the members of a Church or sect as among those who belong to none. No Church now

[1] The early Methodists made a similar attempt, now long since abandoned.

attempts by the discipline of its courts to enforce any distinctive ethical standard or ideal. No Church provides organs by which its members can think and act in unison. In the modern world Christians, in the same degree as non-Christians, find such organs to express aims conceived in common and activities jointly pursued in an immense variety of institutions, schools of learning, political parties, societies and clubs for games, music and all the other objects on which leisure is spent, instead of in the Church. And those industrial activities in which, as in every preceding age, people normally spend most of their time are organised and engaged in by corporate bodies in no relation to any Church. Some customs survive to remind us of the different ideas of a past age. Monarchs are sometimes anointed and war vessels christened by officers of the Church.

As missionaries of necessity carry with them the ideas shared by the Church with the age, it is most important to realise that the conceptions prevailing to-day of its duties and functions are of quite recent origin. The method of propaganda described at the beginning of the chapter is itself a new one. What it offers is essentially the picture of a person in a book, with certain explanations. The earliest missions, by contrast, offered a visibly operating society that claimed to work on a divine plan and to be inspired, in its every corporate function, by a divine spirit. The line then drawn was between the Church and the world, not between certain things Christians did, called sacred, and other things they like others also did, called secular. The Church adhered to the Jewish doctrine that the land and everything upon it belonged to God, not to its possessors, and Christians enjoyed the corporate life, as they plied their trades each beside the other, in industry just as they did in worship. Books, except for the Old Testament, were at first unknown, and it was not until forty years after

the death of Jesus that any biography of him was available. To be a Christian then, meant to leave one's country and kindred in order to unite with people of every race and class who were working out together, with much argument and no little confusion, a certain plan of life of a new kind.

In later ages, while many kinds of propaganda were used, the Christian missionary, in Northern Europe at least, came as an ambassador to kings and princes, wearing the mantle of Imperial power and bringing with him the laws, the arts and the civilisation of a new social polity, as well as the worship of a new God. Sometimes a king and his court were first baptized and his whole people immediately after him. Those who refused to abandon their old faith were usually punished. In these circumstances the instruction of the common people had to be postponed, sometimes for generations, and they were never given the opportunity of free inquiry. Their part was obedience to priest as to king. Only the few who were expected to become servants of the Church and to abandon for its sake ordinary social ties and virtues were given the means of comprehending Christian doctrines. Nevertheless in these days was the Christian scheme of life, as then conceived, brought home to all. However we may judge it, and contrast it with the scheme described in the New Testament, it at least visibly operated in the thought and practice of society. The Church, for instance, attempted to regulate industry in accordance with its own ideas, as by forbidding the taking of interest on loans and investments. In thought as in practice, Christian theology claimed the supremacy of superior truth over the lesser sciences and so collided with a kingdom of knowledge growing beyond the rigid boundaries it had set up.

No contrast with either of these forms of Christianity or with the methods of propaganda followed by them could

be more vivid than the forms and methods of our day in Africa. The African, in some remote village, is neither attracted to share in the life of a new society with functions and services of national and supernational scope, nor urged to embrace a new creed and ethic by his own tribal authority. Tribal authority indeed is an influence contrary to change of faith. What is urged upon the convert is an almost purely inward relationship between his conscious self and the God of whom the book tells him. The missionary explains how the person of whom he reads is alive in heaven and can bring him into that relation with God. To that relation, which mystery does nothing to make unreal, there is in typical cases little in outward life to correspond. Mission teaching does, of course, inculcate certain ethical "principles". But these are derived from no social scheme in actual operation. They are for the convert to "apply", by the light of his own conscience, to his own personal conduct in the social and industrial relations of family, village and tribe. To the great majority these principles of conduct remain vague, as indeed they are to Europeans, because they are abstract generalisations, and because they are drawn, not from life that can be seen and shared, but from an ideal described in a book. It is quite unreasonable to expect a convert, or a small group of converts, to change the plan of their human relationships. For them the routine of village industry and most of the assumptions and conceptions of tribal life continue at first nearly unchanged.

Perhaps the chief distress that most missionaries feel in their work lies just here. They have constantly to regret that from candidates for baptism the only answers given to the question, How is it that Christians should live? are, "Not having more wives than one, not drinking beer or joining in dances, not believing in demons and their power", and that positive rules of conduct are described vaguely or in

extravagant terms, as, "Giving all one's food to other people".

New societies with corporate functions of large though of course less than national scope are, however, to be found in some of the mission stations where the Europeans live. In these a minority of converts are able to see and to share in corporate life. The writer was able, in the course of sixteen years in Africa, to visit for at least a day, and sometimes for weeks, over twenty of these mission stations. Life in some of them is as nearly Utopian as anything he ever hopes to see. The ideal mission station is composed of teachers, each trained for his work, one to explain Scripture and doctrine, another medicine and surgery, another carpentry, another building, another the cultivation of the soil. These all, men and women, married or celibate, gather from a large district, containing from twenty to a hundred village schools, the boys and girls with the best minds and the best characters. Together they learn, and work, and play, and worship. The whole plan of their life is based on the fact that the missionaries are where they are in order to give all they know and have. Out of that fact there spring the spirit and all the functions possible in the circumstances of corporate life. Not merely education and worship, but care in sickness, games, music, debating societies, are organised by the Church: the Church organises the food supply and the arts and crafts by which houses, furniture and clothing are made. And these all are made and done in pursuit of the ideal of common service.

Visiting Europeans often remark how polite and happy as well as industrious Africans are on these stations, but how difficult such a scheme of things would prove on a plantation or on a railway. So it would, since there the motive of self-interest is, though men are often better than their creeds, assumed to be pursued by all.

This revival of corporate life in the Church is the most significant feature of Christian missions in Eastern Africa. It is not due to any inspiration from the Church at home. In Europe indeed the Church is still in process of losing its former corporate activities.[1] For the dualism in the life of modern Christians is neither stationary nor mechanical. The age has witnessed a gradual extension of the area of life that is called secular and a proportionate loss of the area called religious. In even the darkest periods of its history the Church recognised that the care of the sick and insane and the education of the young among its members were its corporate concern. These and the multitude of other social activities of a modern society, support in sickness and old age, for instance, are now secular concerns. In Europe as a whole the corporate life of the Church has been too sluggish for it to supply the needs of the sick, aged, poor, insane and young among its members as fully and well as the State has provided for these needs among the whole population.

This transference to the State of functions formerly ecclesiastical has been accompanied by a transfer of those feelings of loyalty and devotion formerly conceived of as rightly evoked by the Church alone. Coincidently states have been transformed from principalities, of which the subjects were united by the duty of each to a Sovereign, into nations, in which the bond of unity is one of each with all, while any superior authority with divine right as the source of its peculiar power and authority is repudiated. Increasingly that bond is given expression in the equal conscious and active share exercised by each in forming the national will. It is indeed exalted and strengthened by none more than by the clergy, who seem largely uncon-

[1] Two generations or more ago in India the instinctive communism that is found whenever the original ideals of Christianity are newly seen was apparently destroyed by European missionaries.

scious of the changes through which the nation and other so-called secular institutions, as they have been given responsibility for the social services that discipline and unite men as well as serve them, have acquired the religious status. Patriotism of one kind or other is now the religion of most well-to-do Englishmen, or at least the dominant ingredient in their religion. Large numbers have no other creed, and are conscious of no superior loyalty. Many of those who preserve some connection with a Church do so, not because they believe its creed, or are concerned to understand and to carry out the teaching of Jesus, but because they regard the Church as committed to the defence of the existing social order (as in the case of Papal and Imperial Rome), so as to form a barrier against political and industrial change and to provide a sedative, in the hope of happiness in a future world, to those who are tempted by revolutionary ideas. If one judges by the test of readiness to sacrifice life itself, there is abundant evidence in recent events to prove that in the minds of the immense majority of Europeans the supreme claim is allowed to their country and not to any supernational religion, Christian in name or not.

The assumption by missionary Churches of functions abandoned by the Church in Christendom was, accordingly, an unlooked-for development and, especially at first, was frowned upon by many leaders of the Church at home. Nor must it be thought that every mission station is an earthly paradise. Some missions largely follow the plan of one-man stations. Isolated missionaries, even when married, often become cranky, autocratic and hard to work with.

Nor is the attempt of men with different functions to work together on one station always successful. Africa is perhaps the easiest place in the world to quarrel in. And there are men, in missions as elsewhere, who cannot or will not do team work. That is inevitable so long as

missionaries are chosen, not by the Church as those among its members best fitted for the work, but by themselves. Such men and women go out to Africa in intense enthusiasm, regarded by their friends, and sometimes by themselves, as heroes who have sacrificed their careers, and with far too clear a picture of exactly what they mean to do. There is little in the life and work of the Church at home to teach how in Africa every one must be a willing subordinate to a common will and purpose; how each man's value depends on his fitting into the lives of his fellow-servants and of those they serve. Emotions die quickly in Africa. Most of a missionary's work is drudgery, teaching in the smells and heat of a crowded room, or learning a language without a teacher. And uncivilised people are a heartbreak to teach, easily turned from their purpose to surrender to pleasure or lust or sheer indolence. There are also missionaries whom the most unselfish people find it almost impossible to live with. Only those indeed who are very ready to learn, and very good at giving in, can join in making a mission station what it can be, and sometimes is. What is seen and done on such stations is giving many, perhaps already most Africans in Kenya, a new moral standard.

There is one great source of difference in type between African and European Christians. In Europe comparatively few people join the Church as the result of discovering, after investigation of the facts, that Jesus' claims and teaching are right, and that conscience demands obedience to them. Most men's religious convictions are decided by the place and class they happen to be born in, and no free inquiry is possible to people who believe, before they begin to inquire, that it would be wicked to reach any other than an already known conclusion. The Church appeals to men's reverence for the past, calls for their obedience to the God of their fathers and reminds them of what they learnt at their mothers' knees. All

such appeals in Africa, as in the earliest Christian age, lead men not towards but away from the Church. Even when, as sometimes is the case, the missionary regards tribal religion as neither untrue nor valueless, the African himself feels the break with the past to be complete. His pagan neighbours also so regard it. Persecution, however, is rare. Tribal religion is in Africa a tolerant creed. The only penalty new converts often pay is some degree of social ostracism. Their elderly pagan relations sometimes feel very deeply the disgrace of a son or daughter's profession of Christianity. The writer knew of three cases in which these feelings led to attempted suicide. So the people who first become Christian in a tribe are apt to be of a type the very opposite to the commonest types of Church member found at home. They are people with unusual independence of mind and with unusual appetites for new ideas and ideals.

Just how far the average African convert understands Christian doctrines it is hard to say. The doctrines of the Trinity, the Atonement and others of the kind excite the keenest interest, and native preachers often devote sermons to them, generally very heretical sermons. Deliberate attempts to think things out are perhaps no more common than in Europe. Occasionally an African discovers that reflection has convinced him of the truth of ideas which in the view of the Church are heretical, and is expelled. One type of heresies has its origin in the Old Testament, which unhappily is often taught by missionaries to be of equal value and relevance with the New. In any case converts, whether they attempt independent thinking or not, are as a class conspicuously independent people, makers rather than followers of opinion. They can read while others cannot: they are taught to refuse conformity to certain tribal customs: they are told that heaven will be their reward if faithful, and, by some missionaries, that hell will

be the portion of their unbelieving neighbours. Yet most of these people are modest and unassuming, unaffectedly eager to learn and conscious of how much they have still to learn. And if many are not so submissive and unquestioningly obedient as European officials and employers would like them to be, that is not perhaps wholly discreditable.

Mission work on an extensive scale has not lasted long enough in Kenya to have had much influence on tribal life as distinct from individual lives. In Nyasaland, however, one can study the results of fifty years of mission work among tribes of the same race, and at the same stage of civilisation, as in Kenya.

There the fact that missions require from members a very difficult ethical standard and large contributions to mission funds, and the insistence on the conscious process called conversion, have resulted in the restriction of membership of the Church to what appears to be a permanent minority in tribes that are yet as Christian as any country in Europe is or ever was. Many of those baptized in infancy do not join the Church when they grow up. Nevertheless, in some tribes and sections of tribes, the whole community regards itself as Christian. All the younger generation has been taught in mission schools. Everybody believes what the missionaries teach, the old gods and their worship are disappearing or quite gone, many superstitions, especially belief in spirits and demons, are forgotten, and there is general recognition of a new moral standard. Old people are often so ashamed of their past as to deny that such savage customs as burying wives or slaves alive with their master ever existed.

In a tribe strongly under mission influence ideas change at startling speed. One can see a bride and bridegroom leaving church arm-in-arm, or a dead body being carried to the grave, or a man carrying water or firewood to his house. All such actions would, a short generation ago,

have been regarded as subversive of the best elements of society. So they were. In old days no decent woman ever stepped out of the background or let a man carry for her, and to touch a dead body was more horrible than among us smearing ourselves with ordure would be. Society cannot hold together unless all its members think the same things shameful. Sometimes Christian teaching turns shameful things into decent things and decency into shame. Once it was shameful for a woman to speak to any man but her husband, but decent for her in some tribes to be naked. Now it is proper to speak, but shameful to be naked.

The most obvious changes in the general life are seen in matters of sex and in matters of money. In a few tribes the standard of sexual morality was always high. In most tribes, including all with experience of the slave trade, boys and girls were encouraged in licentiousness. In one such tribe deeply under mission influence the district magistrate told the writer that most people are now chaste before marriage, though notoriously none were in former times. Chastity before marriage and marital fidelity are the hardest part of the Christian code for Africans. Breaches of it are by far the commonest cause of suspensions and expulsions from the Church, and many offenders are never discovered.

New ideas about money are due more to the influence of the new industrial system than to missions. But as most missionaries, in this as in other matters, share the ideas of their time, they are partly responsible for the spread of these ideas among Africans. Many missionaries realise the danger of encouraging the idea that money is the true measure of everything. The way of wisdom is very hard to find in this matter. It is right, of course, that the members of a society should help to support it. But is it right to charge as a boy's fees for a single term in a high school a sum equal to a labourer's total earnings for six

months? Whatever the cause, the new ideas on this subject are not better than the old. Formerly on visiting a village one received gifts and gave gifts in return. Now, too often, generosity is thought of as unprofitable and foolish. One is sometimes even asked payment for showing the road or for a drink of water.

Theoretically, all these changes in people's minds should lead to a period of confusion and moral laxity. The man who believes that if he steals, with however successful secrecy, a snake will visit him in his sleep and bite him unawares so that he dies in three days, might be expected to become less honest on learning that the snake is imaginary and that God's disapproval is the only penalty of successful theft. Actually, in village society, nothing of the sort happens. One suspects that some people were never very sure about the snake and had brave hopes of cheating the devil somehow. And one realises that so long as sound and natural social relations persist, it is natural affection to one's relations and neighbours, and not any explanation of how anti-social acts work out in sin and loss and suffering, that prevent people from wanting to do wrong. So long as men are encircled by these ties of kinship and friendliness, Christianity, as a rule at least, enriches the emotions they arouse and can do no harm by destroying venerable but baseless convictions about penalties. The case of men removed from the ties of home and kindred is, as will be described in another chapter, a very different story.

Though cruelty to women, slaves and animals was formerly, as in every primitive society, very prevalent, Africans quickly learn to be pitiful. The worst forms of cruelty were due to the belief that suffering and disease could be prevented and cured only by some one else's pain and loss.

One of the reasons why membership of the Church is confined to a party, even when the general atmosphere of the tribe is Christian, is that the chiefs generally stand fast in

the old ways. Christians who succeed to or are elected to the office generally relapse into heathenism. Their difficulty is the style chiefs have to keep up. They have to entertain largely other chiefs, European visitors, court assessors and, in the case of the more important chiefs, a nondescript crowd of messengers and bailiffs. Fees are paid in kind and are not saleable. Only some chiefs get Government salaries and they are often inadequate. So the time-honoured way of providing hospitality and a show of wealth by having extra wives is resorted to. That is often the only way to get extra ground cultivated so as to provide extra food and beer. The beer drinking customary at funerals, litigations and ceremonies of all kinds also makes it difficult for chiefs to belong to the Church. Formerly most Government officers were known to be unsympathetic with missions. Of late years Government subsidies to mission schools and the joining of the more prominent missionaries in the anti-Indian crusade have brought missions and Government closer together. The Government, especially among the Kikuyu, has appointed several Christians to be chiefs, partly because no others are educated, partly because the Christian party, though a majority in no tribe in Kenya, is in many tribes the most active and influential party.

Former Government nominations to chieftainships were frequently unfortunate, especially in those tribes that had no chiefs of their own. Everywhere indeed bribery in chiefs' courts has become fairly common and excessively difficult to prove and punish, in consequence of the changes whereby chiefs, who at one time depended wholly on popular support and opinion, have now become the paid agents of the Government. It is to be hoped that the new type of chief will do better than the old. That will largely depend on whether he is given by the Government a less unpopular policy to carry out.

Most missions in East Africa prohibit beer drinkings to their members. In many tribes they are the cause of much crime and vice. There are wide differences of opinion among missionaries on the permissibility of a variety of tribal customs and ceremonies. Some of the dances, for instance, are quite harmless, while others have sexual vice for their object. So also with the initiation ceremonies at or near puberty, when instruction is given on sex functions, taboos and social obligations in general. The problem is when to attempt reform and bless, and when to forbid. It is foolish, from any sentimental regard for the past, to blame missionaries for condemning some tribal customs. A great mass of custom and belief in Africa is only fit to survive in text-books of anthropology. A generation ago or more, there was indeed too much indiscriminate condemning of native custom and belief by missionaries. Nowadays probably most of them realise what is the case, that African life is in many respects more merciful and more generous than our own in Europe.

But to some extent the increased tolerance shown by missionaries to African customs and ideas is due less to any belief in their intrinsic value, than to the influence of the now fashionable view that African society should be kept separate from European society, and should be encouraged to follow a separate plan, based on quite different conceptions and ideals. Thus the Bishop of Zanzibar roundly condemns the " indiscriminate freeing of the slaves " in Zanzibar, which town, he says, " the freed slave women have ruined ". The view that freedom is a dangerous drug, the cautious administration of which should be exclusively entrusted to certain unspecified specially wise people, is very prevalent among Europeans in Africa. The real basis of the " segregation " policy, as it is called, is the theory that Africans have natures, capacities and destinies different from and inferior to the rest of mankind.

Many missionaries who would repudiate that theory act nevertheless on the assumption that Africans, in Burke's phrase, are "doomed to live upon trust". Advocates of the segregation policy never seem able to explain just what kind of future segregated Africans are to look forward to. On one point only they seem all to be agreed. They would all keep Africans strictly under authority. Unfortunately for the adherents of this social theory the whole tendency of African life runs the other way. Christians of the second generation in Africa are always restive under any authority, civil or ecclesiastic, which they have no share in controlling. In the same circumstances Europeans would feel exactly as they do.

It is a curious fact that many Europeans in Africa expect more unselfishness, determination, civility—all the difficult virtues of civilisation—from Africans than from Europeans. And indeed discipline in its better sense is easier in an African than in a European boarding-school. That is because in some ways African village life is more Christian than European life is. People share far more and give far more. Difficult things, like house- and bridge-building, are done by the common efforts of all, and are unpaid. Meanness about money is common enough, and the rights of property—in things of personal use only, of course—are clearly recognised. But generosity is in African opinion the supreme virtue. To eat alone is considered despicable. So the life of a mission boarding-school, where boys learn together, play together and work together in field or workshop, is natural and easy. Trouble comes, both on mission stations and in the villages, from two things only, sex appetite and that weakness of resolution, too easy acquiescence followed by unblushing failure even to attempt performance, that is the very essence of barbarism. The civilised are generally reliable, the uncivilised always unreliable.

Most missionaries are extremely zealous and hard working, and some of them are apt to assume that their ordinary converts, and even schoolboys, should spend all their time in worship, lessons and work, with physical drill sometimes added. It seems to give some Europeans violent pain to see Africans idling. To spend some time in idling is as necessary to uncivilised as to civilised people. Young Africans are so docile and so eager to learn that it is painfully easy, even for missionaries, to fall into autocratic ways with them and to ask for obedience rather than understanding.

It is much to be regretted that so few missionaries find time to teach games. Some seem to fail to realise that, apart altogether from their great educational value, they are a necessity of life. The main motive of native dances is not sensuality but the spirit of play. Football and hockey satisfy that spirit. Wherever it is denied satisfaction the thwarted emotions find vent in secret vices and smug hypocrisy.

There is so much conscious and unconscious imitation of the pious phraseology of Europeans that it is very unsafe to trust to what Christian natives say of their own feelings and beliefs. These are, however, often strong and sincere. It is hard for people in Europe to realise how great and various are the effects of the publication of the New Testament in the language of the common speech of a people with no other literature. With us it is an obsolete, even an improper, book for ordinary life and converse. It is a gross breach of manners to quote Jesus' opinion, or Paul's, at a dinner-table or in a smoking-room. Sacred has come to mean irrelevant to ordinary life. Most even of the clergy would feel uneasy if some one in general company alluded to the twentieth chapter of Matthew as expressing Jesus' view of the incomes people should have, as compared with their opportunities, as it obviously does. Most people

regard the Bible as a classic, which all the best judges say is written in beautiful English. By some miracle people have come to think the book uninteresting and as unsuitable for common handling and reference in ordinary affairs as a picturesque ruined abbey would be for living in. One of the reasons for that general opinion is the obsolete language of our version.

In Africa the book is roughly done into the commonplace language of everyday affairs. Its central character is the only figure clearly seen beyond the horizon of village, plantation and mission station, obscured by none of the mists and fogs of history and controversy that trouble us. We cannot see Jesus apart from haloes and dogmas and ceremonies. What is set before Africans is the Jesus of the early records. The response thousands of them make is simply what people always feel about an extremely attractive person. Africans often feel that the requirements and prohibitions of the mission are too hard, but none ever finds anything to repel in the Jesus of the records. They often apply to their case the contrast of the poor with whom he was so lenient with the rich and powerful whom he cursed. Many of his sayings they misunderstand. Of others they get the meanings from missionaries. But the more intelligent get the main outlines for themselves. To them Jesus is the universal benefactor, who healed diseases, drove out demons, was friendly to the disreputable, to whose example and precepts they owe all that is good in the changes that have come to their own lives.

It would be impossible to give any brief answer to the questions why Africans believe the dogmas of the Church and just what their belief amounts to. That belief is real is proved by the fact that it rids life of demons. African life is demon-haunted, crowded with known and unknown terrors. Disbelief in them is the mark of a Christian. And the future world is, largely under the influence of hymns,

transformed from being the grave of human hope in which as the memory of them fades, men's feeble shadows too fade to extinction, in cold and darkness, into a paradise where hopes come true.

All natives of intelligence fasten on what is the central doctrine of the New Testament, if not of mission teaching, that every Christian is a child of God, a King's son, the heir to all the world, a partner by right in the equal fraternity of all Christians. It was a Pope who said that if Catholics had had the Bible to write we should not have heard of Judas's kiss or Peter's tears. So, many missionaries in their hearts regret that in the Magnificat thanks are given for the dethronement of princes, and that the early Church encouraged intermarriage of European and Asiatic, insisting, indeed, that there was no real difference between them. In any case, missionaries say as little as possible about the doctrine of equal brotherhood. It is unjust to blame them. Any one who preached it as unreservedly as Paul did would have to leave the country. Not one European in a hundred in Africa believes that European and African Christians should behave to one another as members of the same family behave. This doctrine, expounded with peculiar appositeness to Africa in the Epistle to Philemon, is the real source of the antipathy to missions among Europeans abroad. For the fact must be faced that it is central in any type of Christianity that gives publicity to the New Testament. In certain circumstances that book plays the part of a revolutionist's handbook. It is as idle to deny that fact as to assert that the book has no other part to play.

Thus the greater popularity among Europeans of Roman Catholic missions is explained. They do not circulate the Scriptures and they teach an ethic suitable to the circumstances and social condition of Africans.

No one with even the scantiest knowledge of European history, during every stage of which the influence of

historical Christianity has been so various and so profound, will believe that this description of Protestant missions in Kenya exaggerates their importance. A movement that in every past age has shown so great a power both of adjusting itself to and of transforming human society finds once more in Africa to-day those very conditions of social disintegration in which it has always exerted its greatest power. What alone in the end really matters in Kenya is what goes on in the minds of Africans. The two institutions that to-day are forming afresh their conceptions of duty and their ideas of society are the modern system of industry and the Christian Church. In comparison with their influence the influence of the Government is negligible. It touches African life only by restrictive laws and regulations and by requiring taxes and labour.

The history of every past age predicts for us that the recreation of society in Africa under these influences will not be a process continuously peaceful and harmonious. The idea held by the present directors of the African Churches that peace can be procured by restricting their activities to what is called personal religion, as if each person were not the organic whole of all his relations to society in thought and action, is totally fallacious. The Church is fated, as Jesus predicted, to have leaders who are ready, by time-serving complaisance, to buy security and the appearance of a position of influence, to make compromises that are surrender. Such compromises never last. In spite of its leaders the Church, unless its long day is indeed over, will repeat the challenge first uttered by its founder before his execution for sedition.

The religious motive is not the only one that determines the attitude of Africans to Christianity. The wish to acquire knowledge and the ambition to gain wealth and influence are nearly always powerful. Government schools for Africans are very few and very costly, as the staff has to

be paid at full market rates. So missions have a practical monopoly of education for Africans. Their appetite for it is enormous, and has far outstripped the missions' power of supplying it.

Three years ago the Colonial Office, under the influence of agitation at home, directed the Government of Kenya to increase its expenditure on native education, which until then had been negligible. It now spends £22,000 a year on African education, as compared with £7200 on the education of Indians, and £23,600 on the education of less than a thousand European children. Much of the money for African education goes in subventions to missions.

Missions, as every one knows, are widely criticised for teaching the great majority in their schools nothing but reading and writing. The criticism is natural, but absurd. The primary object of mission education is to make Christianity intelligible. The Government's chief care is to make Africans obedient subjects and diligent producers of wealth, while the great aim of European planters and merchants is to make as many Africans as possible work for wages.

These obviously different motives involve different educational ideals. Some compromise between them is of course possible and, as things are, inevitable. But it is absurd to pretend, as some missionaries do, that the whole European community in Kenya has the same educational ideal for Africans. And it is quite wrong to devote money given, often at great personal sacrifice, in order to create a Christian society in Africa, to objects thought desirable by people whose incomes depend on Africans working for them.

Missionaries recognise perfectly well that education should not only provide information and stimulate intelligence, but also fit Africans for their place in society. But what is that place?

Industry is, of course, the critical subject. Fifteen years ago there was not a single African in Kenya who was trained to use European tools and methods in any craft. Mr. Macgregor Ross, then the Director of Public Works, was the first to start the systematic industrial training of Africans in the colony. It is only three years since African apprentices were first engaged in the Uganda Railway workshops. The Roman Catholic missions have been training boys for many years to help them in their own semi-commercial undertakings. But industrial training on any scale by both Catholic and Protestant missions began only when, several years ago, Government first gave substantial grants in aid.

Industrial education is inevitably expensive. The apparatus of trade schools is very costly, and suitable instructors are hard to get. Mission boards and committees in Europe and America often hesitate to spend their funds on objects so utilitarian. Also, there is the great difficulty of knowing just what kind of instruction to give. There is, of course, an immense demand for cheap, semi-skilled African labour to replace expensive Indian artisans, now so unpopular with authority. European opinion in Kenya thinks it is the duty of missions to turn out large numbers of workers in metal, stone, bricks and wood, clerks, printers, telegraphists, and so forth for work in both official and private employment. Many missionaries nowadays accept that duty thus urged upon them. Native opinion, indeed, makes any other course almost impossible. In Kenya the disproportion between the wages of the skilled and the unskilled is larger than in Europe. A labourer gets eight shillings a month, a clerk or artisan twenty to forty shillings. Missions have great difficulty in keeping their trained teachers loyal at wages half as great as they would get elsewhere.

It is hard for us to imagine how great are the tempta-

tions of the new opportunities of getting wealth and luxury now suddenly revealed to Africans. Formerly wealth could only take the forms of more wives, more sheep, more beer. Now there are innumerable ways of spending money delightfully: on European food, clothing and furniture, in cinemas, on gramophones, sewing machines, cigarettes. All these and other fascinating novelties are far beyond a labourer's reach. Nor can money to buy them be made in the village. No work is done there but cultivation for food. So every enterprising boy demands from his mission some kind of knowledge, no matter what, that will open to him a career more profitable than the labourer's.

Thus inevitably mission education is increasingly devoted to supplying ordinary commercial demands. Many missionaries deplore this development. The temptations of life outside the villages are often fatal to character. Thieves and prostitutes swarm in Nairobi and other European settlements. All this is just a consequence of sudden liberation from the restraints of village life.

The obvious remedy is the revival of village life itself and the training of natives in crafts that can be pursued in the villages. At present, mission-trained artisans make things for European, not African, consumption. Houses and furniture in the European style are far too expensive for even the better-paid Africans, not to speak of the great majority whose incomes are not more than £8 a year. Mr. Hooper of the C.M.S. is making a brave attempt to raise the standard of living in the Kikuyu country. He realises that agricultural prosperity is the only possible basis. Hitherto, however, all progress in that direction has been frustrated by the action of Government in compelling men to leave home to work for wages, and by the absence of markets and transport for native crops grown for export. A healthy, active and productive village society is in fact impossible,

unless both Government and missions help village agriculture. In this matter the supporters of missions in the Church at home have a great responsibility. The prosperity of the Church in Africa depends on their actions as citizens.

A word must be said about missionary literature. *The International Review of Missions* and *The East and the West* are periodicals which often contain articles written with ability and candour. But the great bulk of missionary literature, books as well as periodicals, is not only worthless but misleading. Even the best of them are spoilt by the odour of sanctity. Every occupation has its jargon. But none can be quite so nauseous as the dialect used in missionary circles. A single illustration will suffice. In a recent article on a political subject a missionary writes of "the holy ideal that has become the burning purpose of our lives in Kenya". The author no doubt had no intention of praising himself. Missionaries often have no idea that ordinary people promptly infer from such words that rectitude so unctuous is proof of hypocrisy. Mrs. Jellaby and Mr. Chadband have left so many descendants that their extermination would seem to be hopeless. But one cannot help wishing the Church would keep them out of pulpits and off platforms. And when one remembers the vast evils that in every age have been due to religious fervour one is apt unfairly to condemn it in even the sincerest and humblest.

The real blame in this matter rests on the shoulders of those at home who prefer edification to truth, and do not see that the enemy of true religion is not irreligion but sham religion. To these people everything labelled Christian is good, and everything labelled anti-Christian is bad. They recognise the devil by his horns and tail, and saints by their haloes.

The question of all others the most important for missions is whether the ethic they teach is the same ethic

that Jesus taught. Some departure from his standard had already taken place by the time the books of the New Testament were written, and wider divergences in later ages were inevitable. If indeed we assume that Jesus' character and teaching had the permanent value and significance that he claimed, we may expect each age to comprehend that character, and its institutions to express that teaching in some partial and inadequate form different from those of other ages. It is plain, for instance, that Jesus' teaching of wealth was simply incredible to the Church of the XIXth century, and is so to most Christians to-day. The spirit of the age tells us in a thousand voices that wealth is a good thing, creditable to its owners, proof indeed both that they deserve more comforts and have more wisdom than the poor. On the contrary, Jesus repeatedly asserted that it was practically impossible for a man to be both rich and good, and forbade his disciples to accumulate wealth for themselves. People refuse to believe these and other facts because they breathe the mental atmosphere of their time. They cannot get their heads clear of it. But it would be quite wrong to regard the Christianity of each age merely as a particular distortion of an easily discoverable original. Jesus himself predicted the growth and enrichment of his kingdom, in spite of retrogressions. In comparatively recent times, for instance, we may claim to have learned, largely from games, the sense of humour and the spirit of fair play. These, we believe, are essentials in the kind of society that Jesus called the Kingdom of Heaven, though there were no terms in use in his age and country by which he could explicitly refer to these virtues.

We may expect, accordingly, that Christian propaganda in our time gives only partial expression to the full Christian scheme. In point of fact it is a movement of recent origin with new methods, only one of many new beginnings made in the course of nineteen centuries by men who saw the

ideal and conceived a plan of its attainment freshly for themselves. Like all others, the founders of the modern missionary movement had conceptions which were limited by what their age allowed them to see. And as always happens, their successors are apt to see only what their predecessors saw, and to make virtues of their limitations and shibboleths of their phrases. What happened to the first high ideals of the monks and friars is already happening in modern missions. The whole movement has come to a parting of the ways. It must either develop, in response both to inward vital impulse and to inevitable outward forces, or it will die like every such movement in the past.

Among Protestants this danger is specially great, as they have no fixed traditions either to steady or to hamper them. In former days missionaries were bold and often successful critics of official policy. Nowadays they more often defend it, and prefer in place of influencing public opinion to exert an influence over events by private interviews with those in authority. The most remarkable of all recent changes in missionary opinion is the one that has turned many of the missionaries into supporters of the demand that the local European community should have the sole direction of policy in Kenya to the exclusion of British public opinion and Parliament. To explain how this change has come about would take too long. Here one need only remark that people who despise politics and openly avow that they give the subject no study are not likely to decide wisely in political matters when exposed in times of excitement to race feeling or some other of the emotions to which unreflective masses of men are liable.

Most people would probably grant that the clergy and Christians in general are liable to be unduly influenced by temporary currents of feeling and opinion. But few probably realise that Jesus foresaw the danger, regarded it as of all others the most constantly present and most

fatal, and described in the most categorical terms the test by which true religion is to be distinguished from false. For this Jewish peasant, of "doubtful birth, wandering life, and ignominious death" was so bold as to claim to judge all nations in every age. He described this infallible and universal test as being the acts men do to their supposed inferiors. The typically good he described as those who, though professing no obedience to himself, behave to the least of mankind as they would to him. And the typically bad he describes as those who, though zealous in what they believe to be their duty, do not regard and do not behave to the least important of human creatures as they would regard and behave to himself, the best and wisest of men. And the acts he specifies in illustration are taken from the commonest economic and social relations of society, providing food and clothing for people and visiting the unfortunate.

Even in Europe the Church does not teach that men are good or bad in proportion as they conform to that test. In Africa it seems intolerably difficult. There are missionaries whose claim to superior capacities and to authority repel many Indians and Africans. There are others who lavish on dirty little African children affection which they cannot give their own, whom they left for the sake of African children, who treat African fathers and mothers with the respect they would have their own parents receive, who display and evoke affection and devotion in every hour and every act.

What Jesus called "the leaven of the Pharisees" was in his view the greatest danger to the Church. His leniency to the disreputable, careless and criminal was scandalous to his contemporaries. Even more scandalous was his severity to the Pharisees, who were sincere, patriotic, strictly moral people, universally regarded as the best part of the Jewish nation. He condemned them

because they tried to enforce restrictions and prohibitions that were easy to them but difficult to ordinary men, and because they treated less reputable people as their inferiors. That to Jesus was the great crime. In every man there is something of the sinner, something of the saint and something of the Pharisee. May it not still be true that the leaven of the Pharisees is still the fatal poison that paralyses the Church, in Africa as in Europe?

A Hindu wrote thus to a European who was thinking of becoming a missionary in India: "Will you be able to make yourself one with those whom you call natives, not merely in habits but in love? For it is utterly degrading to receive any benefit but that which is offered in the spirit of love. God is love, and all that we receive at His hands blesses us. But when a man tries to usurp God's place and assumes the rôle of a giver of gifts and does not come as a mere purveyor of God's love, then all is vanity."

It would be as ridiculous to predict future developments in the Church's life in Africa as for an Englishman in the XVIIth century to have predicted the Evangelical movement or the Catholic revival. Happily we may hope that the insistence, in African missions, upon direct access by all to the authentic records of Jesus' life will be a great safeguard against aberrations and distortions of his scheme. And perhaps we may hope to find the best guide to the defects in the aims and methods of mission work in the difficulties met with by African converts.

The source of their greatest difficulty is the contrast between life on a mission station and life in the general world. Life in the one is a conscious effort to obey the law of love—to use the old term. Life in the other is a competitive struggle in which individuals, classes and races pursue advantages and privileges.

In our civilisation we are brought up to a double ethical code of which the self-contradiction is often unrecognised.

At table, for instance, we follow the golden rule. If, as is the case in most households, there is not as much of the best foods as all would like, we share them equally. But in industry we are each supposed to get as much as we can, and success in the struggle that leaves most of the hardest workers in penury is rewarded by positions of respect and authority in both Church and State. In a tramcar we rise to give place to old people or to women. In a theatre we rush for the best seats ourselves. In playing football a man submerges personal aims in working for the corporate aim, and is even happy in defeat, so long as the game is well played. In shopkeeping a man tries to cut out all others of his trade.

We in Europe are bred to all this, so successfully that most people step unconsciously from a phase of life in which the one rule operates into a phase where the contradictory rule operates. The process by which the switch-over is performed is known as common sense. If we are asked to explain the duplicity of standards, we invent theories about economic laws which are really no more than inferences from the obvious fact that in certain kinds of human relation we do each pursue a selfish aim. Even those who, like the clergy, and the rich, seem exempt from the struggle, are specially deeply involved in it, since their isolation or their comforts are bought for them by the struggles of others with no such rewards of their own.

Now in tribalism no such double standard exists. There is no conscious conflict between egoism and altruism. And if we may say that in no phase of tribal life are personal ends wholly absent, it is also true that they are never unrestrained. It is notably the case, moreover, that one man's success never involves another's failure. In most tribes the chief, until we gave him a different idea of his position, hoed in the field alongside his slaves. In village life there are no good jobs to be competed for, except those we are

beginning to introduce. It never enters the heads of most people in tribal life to see themselves as contrasted with the society they belong to, and as capable either of sacrifice for the general interest or of the pursuit of some advantage in disregard of the general interest.

Both these ideas are introduced by civilisation. In Kenya they appear before Africans in peculiarly sharp contrast. On the mission station the law whereby each gives what he can for common ends, and takes no more than others think he ought to have, prevails or is meant to prevail throughout. In the outer world, which after childhood most have to enter, a man is expected to take all he can get, and is counted wise and happy if he takes more than others can get.

The result on the part of many is lapsing from the Church, and on the part of others the gradual achievement of the kind of duplicity that makes religion to many European Christians a means of periodic escape from the problems of society instead of their reconciliation and harmonising.

Under the existing industrial system in Kenya free growth is impossible to the Church outside the cities of refuge that missions build in their stations. The Church can shelter pietistic groups. It can enjoy for some years, with a State subsidy, the practical monopoly of those avenues to such wealth as educated African wage-earners can get. But it can never fulfil the needs of the age by restricting itself to an ideal conceived of a hundred years ago by men who in their day were derided by the leaders of the Church. Just as in that day the leaders of the Church defended slavery and ignored the beginnings of the missionary movement, so now do their successors approve or condone the new forms in which as ever slavery disguises itself.

One must admit that no revival of the oldest form of the Christian ideal seems to be possible. Neither civil

nor ecclesiastical authority would look with favour on any attempt to found a fully corporate Christian society. Who in Africa would join, and who lead and organise a Society in which men of all races could speak of themselves as a new nation, a new race, a single family?

Two partial movements in that direction are, however, worthy of notice. One of them is the tendency to refer disputed matters among Christians to ecclesiastical rather than to tribal authority. African Christians in Nyasaland feel it to be natural to expect the Church not only to settle quarrels but to legislate in such matters as marriage, inheritance, property and village organisation. Except in regard to marriage, missionaries feel compelled to discourage such developments. But one is reminded how an exactly similar development took place among the first Christians, who were scandalised if any of them appealed for justice to any but an Ecclesiastical Court. The failure also is noteworthy of certain industrial ventures, undertaken at intervals during the past sixty years, in order to find livelihoods for African Christians in a Christian atmosphere. These failures seem to show that there is no room in one world, or at least in one country, for more than a single system of industry.

These instances suggest that the growth of corporate functions in the African Church is, though often instinctive, likely always to be difficult and often completely thwarted. If that is so, may we not hope to find corporate growth in another direction?

Among ourselves opportunities of earning livelihood in social service are not limited to ecclesiastical agencies. In hospitals, schools, asylums, workhouses, as well as in so-called welfare work, and also of course in the case of the clergy, the worker's position differs from the position he is forced to adopt in ordinary trade and industry. The money value of his services is fixed as a rule by public

opinion, and there is no opportunity to make profit such as energy and ingenuity are expected to gain from business. In these occupations, moreover, personal aims are indistinguishable from the public advantage. Thousands in such occupations regard their work as a vocation to which they feel a religious devotion in the older and truer sense of the term. It is in such avocations, organised by men who, as a rule, claim no Christian inspiration and are under no Christian authority, that many find the growth of what Jesus called the Kingdom of Heaven.

May not some such development be looked for in Africa also? Those whose vision is bounded by an African horizon will give no hopeful answer. Some missionaries urge that the local European community must first be persuaded before any social or economic changes in Kenya are carried out. In that case reform is impossible. The policy and aims of the local European community are inevitably founded on the economic interests of its members, as is explained in Chapter VIII. And these interests, they are convinced, are threatened by any policy that would encourage Africans to expend their productive energies in their own villages instead of on European plantations. But opinion in Britain is already ready to accept, and may soon demand the policy regarding land and industry proved to be successful in West Africa.

If that takes place the African Church will have a new opportunity. In East Africa natives have been trained for a generation to believe that they can make a living only by leaving home to work. Home production, after so long a period of successful discouragement, will need encouragement and guidance. In India both Civil Servants and missionaries are employed in organising village agriculture and industry, and in ensuring the use of right seed, tools and methods, and all the other factors, grading, marketing, transport, and so forth which are necessary to

the success of a scheme that many people of influence in Kenya will hope to see fail.

In that coming phase of East African history, will missionary societies and missionaries have the insight to find new opportunities for service? It will be possible, though not easy, in this new development to conserve the old pagan but essentially Christian spirit that once pervaded village economics, and yet to purify it from its evils, such as the place given to women. The simplicity of village communism will have to go. But it may be replaced by one of two systems: either it may grow into a consciously designed co-operative system in which, as in the best mission stations, each has his function in the common service, or it may be swallowed up in that system of industrial autocracy, and ruthless competition and ambition for profit, from which men of every school of thought in Europe are seeking to escape.

The Church in Africa has the opportunity, by such a revival of its ancient ideals, to offer an example to the Church in Europe.

CHAPTER X

ISLAM IN EAST AFRICA

Islam has the great advantage over Christianity of being a precise, complete and unmistakable plan of life. If no one has ever managed to live as Jesus directed, millions have lived as Mohamed told them to. Everything that a Moslem should believe and everything that he should do is laid down in the summaries made, after Mohamed's death, of the book that consists of his sayings and writings. This complete and coherent system of theology and morals, and philosophy and politics, and art and industry is not merely recognised as authoritative by every Moslem, with trifling exceptions. It is also practicable with little difficulty. The Christianity of the New Testament is an ideal that vexes the conscience of the world, because after every failure to achieve it remains so attractive as to compel fresh attempts. No society has ever been successfully Christian, in thought and act. But Islam was a success from the start. In a generation it had reached its final and perfect development.

The Islam of East Africa, however, is not ordinary Islam. It has never grown to maturity. Certain parts of the complete system, such as Moslem criminal law and of course Moslem politics, cannot develop in a society under European control. In a general sense also, what may be called standard Islam is impossible among an illiterate people. Nevertheless, again unlike Christianity, there

is such a thing as a simplified minimised Islam which, so far as it goes, is the real thing.

This minimal Islam found in the interior of Eastern Africa comprises — first, the creed that God is one and Mohamed the revealer of His will for mankind; second, the rite of circumcision and the abstaining from animal food containing blood; third, the obligation to meet for prayer, nominally when possible five times a day, in practice once on Fridays, a practice far from universally observed; fourth, the abstaining during daylight from food, drink and tobacco, nominally for the whole month of Ramadhan, actually in most cases for the first day of the month; fifth, the taking of Moslem names and the wearing of Moslem dress, of which the fez is the minimum not always attained; sixth, the duty of friendliness and generosity to all other Moslems.

The rest of Islam is unknown or unattempted in Eastern Africa, except among the coast Arabs, Indians and Somali. Only the Somali abstain from alcohol always. No one from the interior ever gets to Mecca. The Moslem law, even among confessedly Moslem tribes, like the Yao, is never followed. Moslem prayers are not recited at funerals. The unseen world, before and after death, is, for African Moslems, populated by the same dangerous and unhappy company of demons and ancestral spirits as for African pagans.

This description is not of course true of immigrant Moslems. Many of them are educated and some are zealous. Many of the Indian Moslems in East Africa, as it happens, are Khojas or Bohras, two quite exceptionally heretical Shia sects with eclectic creeds and very modernised social codes. In India they are small sects. They are very clannish, very industrious, rather wealthy, and do no propaganda. All the really African Islam is Sunni and derives from Arab sources, though nowadays both Somali

cattle-traders and Indians have considerable influence over African Moslems.

The embryonic character of African Islam is explained by historic causes. It was the religion of the Arab invaders and conquerors of the interior. There was little deliberate propaganda. Rather did the religion attract as being the religion of the successful and prosperous. It must also be remembered that race feeling is practically confined to Protestant countries, and, except in very recent times in Turkey, is contrary to all Moslem feeling. In the Moslem world a man's nationality depends on his religion, not on his ancestry. To the Arab conquerors of East Africa the standing of an African convert depended not at all on his race, and scarcely at all on his wealth, but rather on his knowledge and ability. Knowledge of the Koran was the kind most greatly prized. At first Arabs and Swahili who could read and write made large sums in teaching African converts. But as translations of the Koran are forbidden, and as Arabic was a dead language to these African converts in the interior, the scholars among them never got farther than learning to repeat, and less often to write, passages from the Koran without knowing their meaning. Few got even so far.

After the collapse of the Arab power in the interior that kind of learning became less and less regarded. Many of the mosque schools, even in the coast towns, have fallen into disuse. One can still meet, in the interior, with courtly and even learned old Arabs whose pupils in former days now support them in poverty. Few now do any teaching. In most Moslem villages in East Africa there are now no schools, and it is increasingly difficult to find men who are able to repeat the prayers at the Friday services.

Over the whole area the absence of any influence from the general Moslem world, the lack of any other literature

than the unintelligible Arabic of the Koran, the loss of Moslem political authority, and the failure of the faith to bring any economic advantage to its professors have hitherto stunted the growth of the Moslem system.

But it remains the creed of perhaps three million people in Eastern Africa, most of them in Tanganyika Territory. Its survival is partly due to encouragement by Governments. The kind of men who are appointed governors in these parts generally thinks and sometimes publicly says that Islam is a very good religion for Africans. Military officers as a rule are of the same opinion. That explains why most of the Africans in East Africa who are trained in the use of arms are or become Moslem.

The influence of that kind of prestige is easy to understand. But it does not explain why Islam in Eastern Africa has persisted in spite of the loss of its early advantage as the religion of conquerors. If one asks an African Moslem what his tribe is, he will generally answer with some pride, "Mwislamu". He may be living in his tribal area and subject to tribal law. His body may have no distinctively Moslem clothing. His face will certainly have the tribal marks. He may know no more than ten words about Islam, and may never in his life have prayed in any mosque. But still in his own eyes his chief relationship is not to his fellow-villagers whose language alone he knows, not to chief nor to ancestors, but to Islam. He may even repudiate being a Mkamba or Makua or whatever his tribe really is. He considers that he tells you everything when he calls himself a Moslem. In that state of mind we find the key to the place of Islam in East African affairs. It is due to the circumstances of East African society. It is by no means an unprecedented state of mind. The early Christians felt and certainly spoke in the same way.

The home men have in tribalism falls in ruins when tribal isolation is broken in upon. In East Africa tribal

authority is no longer the sole, often not even the chief, influence controlling men's lives. The ideas of tribal religion are felt to be inadequate to new experience. The social ties, in short, provided by the tribe, cannot be stretched over men's extra tribal relations. They neither prescribe nor explain how men should think, feel and behave in relations with Europeans and with Africans of other tribes. So men feel about for guidance, not consciously but instinctively, as a man feels for a stair-rail in the dark. And they find Islam, not the Islam of Cairo and Damascus with its elaborate and final plan of life and thought, but a simple, unexacting scheme enough for their simple African needs. It gives a man standing room in the world outside the tribe, with other men on either hand beside him, all with much the same way of feeling and behaving, and it marks that association by certain rules and rites that need not be followed unless they are felt to correspond with some need. They are followed because they do correspond with what are felt to be real advantages. They give a man status, an assured place among disappearing landmarks.

Few Africans consciously abandon tribal ideas. It is rather that these ideas fail them in new circumstances, that the services the tribe once gave are no longer given. These services the East African variety of Islam exactly supply. Of its standard ethic and polity there survives what just fits the homelessness of those who are emerging from tribalism.

Thus Islam supplements rather than replaces tribalism, especially when the tribal authority is nominally Moslem. It scarcely conflicts with any primitive conceptions. It does nothing, for instance, to weaken belief in all-pervading spirit powers. On the coast, where people have been Moslems for centuries, demons and magic flourish as luxuriantly as anywhere in Africa. In the interior the few educated Moslems complain that those who profess the

faith care nothing about it. In a sense that is true. African Moslems refuse to abandon tribal law for Moslem civil law. Now that learning Arabic characters is seen to gain them nothing they will not learn them. They will not trouble to build mosques and will not pay for prayers to be read.

In consequence Islam introduces no new standard in ordinary morals. An African Moslem feels he should not cheat or rob a fellow Moslem, though he often does it, but will have no compunction in cheating a pagan or Christian of another tribe. In one respect, indeed, Islam brings loss, not gain. The sex morality of coast people who introduced the faith into the interior is almost as low as it can be. Ten years ago the number of legal divorces registered in Mombasa was more than half the number of registered marriages, and many divorces are not registered. Unions for life are rare, and few Arab or Swahili husbands expect their wives to be faithful. So the fact is not surprising that the moral standard in matters of sex in Moslem villages is lower than in neighbouring pagan villages. Sexual perversions are also commoner in them than elsewhere, and ceremonial dances are more exclusively orgiastic.

The single idea that Islam always attempts to convey to its followers is the unity of God. There is no question harder to answer than the one that asks for an estimate of the meaning of the Moslem creed to Moslems, literate and illiterate. Many Europeans believe it really means nothing. Certainly any real meaning is often very hard to come at. Probably most of the coast Arabs are sceptics at heart. But to many Somali and Indians faith in God means a great deal. It seems to them important in a way that is difficult for Europeans to understand. Modern Europeans, whether they call themselves Christian or not, rarely believe that God is one. They regard the world of nature, not as

the arena in which God visibly acts, but as an automatic process explained by " evolution ". Even in the world of human affairs, God has nothing recognisably to do, in their view, with those activities that we describe by the words art and economics. A term like " political economy " calls up to the mind something as independent of what is recognised to be God's will or plan as " evolution ". People recognise these phases of life to be orderly and harmonious. But they do not discover any relation between the laws and harmonies of these phases of life and those restricted affairs in which God is concerned. In actual fact the great majority of Europeans, not excluding the clergy, are polytheists. This conception of the world, that different phases of life are governed, not by a single will in accordance with the same plan, but in accordance with separate unrelated plans, is quite as common among Europeans who profess a creed as among those who do not.

It is a conception quite impossible to Moslems with any knowledge of their faith, unless they have come under European influence, as the Turks have. In the Moslem scheme, politics, jurisprudence, commerce—all the various segments life can be cut up into, are equally the subject of divine ordinances, all of which are ascertainable and equally obligatory on all mankind. Subordinate powers of angels and demons are recognised. But these, as in the old Christian cosmogony, are mere harmless survivals. And Allah, though pitiful and patient, is remote, even inaccessible, and incapable of partaking in the grief or happiness, in the sufferings and struggles of mankind. But he is in unchallenged activity in everything. His directions are men's only guide in every phase of life. The old Moslem argument against Christians was that they are tritheists in theory. The modern view is rather that Christians have no discoverable coherent religion at all, that they believe in no one and only God whose will alone men should obey.

Judged by the result of the great Moslem affirmation upon the minds of its votaries in East Africa, East African Islam is of very low grade. As with many Europeans, they say that God is one, but they believe in no one all-powerful God. In place of our evolutionary force, law of supply and demand and so forth, Moslem Africans believe in spirits as the explanation both of the phenomenal universe and of the course of events in human society. These spirits are never thought of as under the direction and control of Allah. They, not Allah, decide whether a man's life is to be happy or unhappy. They must be propitiated. Against them a man must protect himself by magic rites. In Moslem tribes the crimes of witchcraft and poisoning that result from these beliefs are as common as in pagan tribes. In tribes under the influence of Christian missions these beliefs vanish with miraculous rapidity, like fairies at cock-crow. In Moslem and pagan tribes it is the arm of our law that gradually stamps out ritual poisonings and assassinations. Seen from this angle, East African Islam has little or no moral and intellectual value. The always feeble early missionary endeavours of its introducers have quite ceased. Its situation and character in East Africa suggest a last back-wash of some already strongly ebbing tide.

The coast Arabs, as is natural, are pessimists. They say their day is done, and sometimes that the age Mohamed introduced is over. When asked if God's purpose is not to be found in the new age, they say it may be so, but that God will soon overthrow it, since the age has no faith. The Somali have a robuster faith. They believe that God has given power for a time to Christians to test the faith of true believers, and they expect a Saviour who will make Islam everywhere triumphant. Among Indians in East Africa are found a curious medley of anticipations. Some believe in the conversion of Hindus and Sikhs as the preliminary to world conquest: others look to Turkey: some

even say that Japan is a Moslem State and will soon lead a united Moslem Asia against Christian Europe. Few Moslems of African race hear these political speculations. But their result is a widely spread belief that European authority is going to disappear quite soon. That expectation is commoner among Moslems in the interior than on the coast. That hope is, after all, part of the true Moslem creed.[1] True Moslems look on Christians, that is Europeans, as a subject nationality in temporary authority. There is one large tribe in Eastern Africa, not in Kenya, but under British government, which, in the opinion of several Europeans living in its area, may revolt at any time. If it ever does, it will be for the reason that these people resent having to pay taxes to Europeans, who, not being Moslems, are in their view their inferiors.

Some years ago there was a good deal of seditious talk among a set composed of both Indians and Arabs in Mombasa. None of these people had any definite aims or expectations. Letters from the Sherif of Mecca used to circulate all over East Africa. They consisted of exhortations to be faithful to Islam. Emissaries from the Senussi used to travel in Kenya, if not farther south. Mysterious messages in the shape of a painted stone or egg are handed round, and secret societies, sometimes including both Moslems and pagans, arise from time to time. But they are always ephemeral, and their object, apart from sheer

[1] Compare these verses from Sir Alfred Lyall's *Studies at Delhi*.

BADMINTON

Lightly the demoiselles tittered and leapt,
Merrily capered the players all;
North was the garden where Nicholson slept,
South was the sweep of a batter'd wall.

Near me a Musalman, civil and mild,
Watched as the shuttlecocks rose and fell,
And he said, as he counted his beads and smiled,
God smite their souls to the depths of Hell.

mystification, seems to be illicit pleasure rather than political organisation.

But if ever, in Egypt or in Turkey for instance, Moslem nationalism of the old type revives, the type that finds in religion rather than in race the strongest human bond, it will find in East African Moslems people very ready to be persuaded. For East African Islam is essentially anti-European, passively so no doubt, too ill-instructed to be capable of a programme, too inert to take any initiative. But it owes its survival and sluggish spread wholly to the largely unconscious demand for an alternative to the ideas Europeans introduce, various as these are, and to the social system Europe has imposed on Eastern Africa. Powerless to erect any contrasting system of society the religion of Islam keeps the possibility of one in view. It links men's hands in a loose fraternity that attracts for two reasons only, that it shuts out the ideas that govern the behaviour of Europeans to Africans, and that it makes all its members friendly equals.

It is natural for administrators who view with distaste the ambition of many Christian converts to gain the knowledge that is power, to prefer for Africans a religion that keeps them in isolation and in ignorance of modern political and social ideas and ideals. The brotherhood of all Moslems is a less disturbing maxim than the brotherhood of all men. It seems to be compatible with the now orthodox creed of racial dominance, while the other must always be its enemy. But Islam will be false to the whole of its past and will destroy the whole motive of its existence in Eastern Africa if it is content to acquiesce in a status of permanent social and political inferiority. These things may indeed prove to be so. Islam may in fact prove to be as obsolete in the modern world as tribalism is in Kenya. But it is not a political accident that has enabled some Moslem countries alone to resist successfully the economic exploitation and

control that Europe has achieved nearly everywhere else in the world. And in East Africa it is the failure of the tribe to protect from that exploitation during the decay of tribal institutions, and the failure of the Church to create out of men with different racial origins and ideals, a society with a corporate will, that make Africans turn to Islam. There are even rare instances of educated Europeans turning Moslem in disgust with the ideals of Western civilisation.

It is thus that we must explain why many Africans prefer the mental and moral poverty of Islam, though so many other advantages are in the hands of its rival, historical Christianity. Christian missions hold the keys to knowledge and the avenues of wealth, neither of these, indeed, to be won without struggle and self-discipline that Islam asks of no one. Against these Islam offers what in our eyes is an empty and valueless brotherhood. To Africans it is not valueless. So far as it goes it is real. Moslems do stand together. There are no barriers inside Islam, whether between priest and people, race and race, or class and class. Christians do not stand together. Their faith may require a far nobler ideal and their creed attempt to reach without evasions and reservations the answers to unanswerable questions that Islam sees no need to ask. But that ideal and these answers lead to no joint effort in life to overcome the distinctions that keep Christians apart. The church in East Africa offers no brotherhood. It does not even require its members to attempt one. In East Africa it stands, in native opinion, and in much missionary opinion, for the existing order, deliberately built on the barriers to brotherhood of distinctions of race and class.[1] By contrast, Islam is a brotherhood, poor,

[1] In a letter to the *East African Standard* in August 1923 two missionaries write as follows:

"Africa, apart from definitely Mahommedan areas, is determined to develop upon lines of Western civilisation. That civilisation is fundamentally Christian. No one will assert that the modern tendency away from the foundations of Western

uninspiring, too weak to attempt the control of any man's activities, but still a brotherhood.

In Kenya, though not everywhere in East Africa, the trend of African opinion is towards Christianity, not towards Islam. Missions have largely had the field to themselves. Apart from that it is hard to see any future for Islam in East Africa. The facts that it once grew to greatness and has for centuries been declining make its real revival almost inconceivable. As this book is being written the abolition of the Khalifate by the Turks seems, in the opinion of Moslems as well as of non-Moslems, to be an act of suicidal mania. For there is nothing in the special fundamental ideas of Islam which, after the destruction of its institutional forms, is likely to have a continued influence over human thought and practice. Whereas the very fact that Jesus' scheme of life has never had adequate expression in society—in spite of the complacency of many Christians—gives hope that the root of Christianity is eternally alive. Indeed it is probable that while on the one hand a smaller proportion of Europeans now profess the faith than at any time since the IXth century, on the other hand the influence of the ideas of the New Testament has never before been so strong, both inside and outside Christendom. There is every reason to expect another rebirth of the elusive spirit of Christianity, but no reason to hope that Islam, that religion of iron, not destined to grow but merely to persist, can transform itself to serve the new age.

If, however, Islam does come to terms with the age, incredible as it may seem, and from its source of revival sends instructors and exhorters to its backward and ignorant adherents, then Governments in East Africa should beware. A living Islam would be a more implacable enemy of racial

civilisation has improved Europe." They also write: "It is of the very essence of our work . . . to teach Africans to increase production."

disabilities than the kind of Christianity to which missions in Africa are tending. But such a development seems scarcely possible. In East Africa Islam shows no sign of growth—in knowledge or in zeal, or perhaps even in numbers. It will probably follow tribalism and much else beside into a past that men happily forget, as those new circumstances to which it once was so peculiarly fitted give place to newer.

NOTE TO CHAPTER X

Since this chapter was written Canon Gairdner of Cairo has published an article entitled " Islam in Africa " in the *International Review of Missions*. Therein he quotes two unnamed missionary correspondents. One wrote: " The patronising attitude of the white man for the African is the very spirit which leads to the attitude expressed by the European officials towards Islam, namely, that it is a religion which helps the Government by maintaining law and order, but does not put its members on an equality with the official himself. Such men avowedly treat Mohammedanism as an inferior religion suitable for inferior races, and one useful to their rulers on account of the support which it affords to an arbitrary and anti-democratic system of Government."

The other correspondent wrote: " The steamer tied up alongside the beach in the evening. Soon the Mohammedans went ashore to perform their ablutions and worship. Two Government officials on the upper deck immediately commended them for their sincerity, and pointed out to me that Mohammedanism makes ideal citizens, and that this religion is the best and the most suitable for the Africans. About an hour later, some native Christians on the lower deck began to sing hymns. The two officials at once stamped on the deck and called out to them to stop their ' noise '. Needless to say they were treated to a lengthy flow of abusive words such as ' hypocrites, liars, apes '. Even a bush native can see which religion is in favour. Few Europeans, except missionaries, encourage Christianity. Few would make a convert."

The picture drawn in the last paragraph is more typical of life in other parts of Eastern Africa than of life in Kenya.

CHAPTER XI

RESULTS—ECONOMIC

We have now discussed, in some detail, first how it came about that it is only since 1885, when Thomson first crossed the country, that the tribes of Kenya have come into relation with the world at large: next, the conditions of life and industry in these tribes at that time, the structure of their society, and the beliefs and ideas that governed its operation: and finally the methods employed by our own countrymen, whether official agents, missionaries or aspirants to fortune, in developing during the past thirty years a new system of society in Kenya with highly characteristic and original features. Certain of these features remain for discussion, and with them it will be convenient to discuss the results of the whole development of which they form part upon the people who are affected by it.

The size and composition of the European colony have already been described, as have its virtual monopoly of land ownership and its near approach to the monopoly of the industrial activities of the Africans of Kenya. This privileged position in industry is supported by the political privileges described in Chapter VI.

Of local government in its usual sense there is practically none. The local unit is the district with the district officer, not the elected municipality or County Council. Not even in tribal affairs is there any real local government. The only tribal authorities recognised by the law are such as the government appoints. They appear in

statute law, these chiefs and headmen, not as representing powers once independent but now co-ordinate in a recognised relation of protected with protector, but as agents of the Government whom it is necessary to provide with power to compel, as otherwise they would not be obeyed.

There is a Townships Ordinance, but real municipal government only exists in Nairobi. Township rates are extremely low. There are no rates in rural areas. In the absence of elected bodies and of rates for local government, local affairs such as roads and education tend to pass into the hands of boards nominated by the Governor from among those of the planters, farmers and merchants whom he regards most highly.

The Nairobi municipality is confronted by the impossible task of keeping clean and healthy a cosmopolitan town in the tropics on a ridiculously small revenue from rates. Enteric fever, the index of soil contamination, and malaria, the index of inadequate surface drainage, both exist in Nairobi. These and the other intrinsic problems of public health in tropical towns are in Nairobi peculiarly aggravated by two features in the life of the town. One of them is the occupation of some 2700 acres within the municipal boundary by no more than 2235 Europeans of all ages. The other is the overcrowding of the bazaar, where some 4300 souls, the great majority of them Indians, live on a space of seven acres.[1]

The wide distribution of the European population of the town makes the cost of supplying its 2235 European inhabitants with roads, water, public lighting and sanitary services extremely high. The density of population in the European area is less than half that of the whole county of Cheshire. So that the Nairobi Municipality has a task

[1] No recent figures are available. The figures quoted are taken from official medical reports twelve years old. In the interval conditions have certainly become no better.

twice as hard as the various boroughs in Cheshire would have if they had to supply all the houses in the rural parts of the county with roads, drains, water pipes, electric cables and a sanitary conservancy.

The problem of the Indian bazaar is of the very opposite kind. It is the problem of that special kind of slum called, when the Jews lived in such places, the ghetto. It is the problem that is presented by a community denied full civic rights, forbidden by law to own or rent land for building outside the town at all, and restricted inside it to certain areas. Indians, it is true, may have business premises in any part of the commercial area of Nairobi. But they may not live in the choicer, higher and more extensive areas open only to Europeans. They have been offered a larger residential area than the one they now occupy. But this area lies low, along the banks of the Nairobi River, and is unhealthy. It is also owned by people who put a very high value on it, for reasons, presumably, the same as those which have made land in the slums of English cities so expensive. So the Indians refuse to build there, and demand instead the right to build and live on the higher ground in the suburbs, where land costs only £100 an acre or less. As that is denied them, they continue to live in their noisome, squalid ghetto.

At a meeting of the Nairobi Town Council in 1920 Councillor Campos, the representative of those Indians who come from Catholic and Portuguese Goa, gave the following statistics.[1] The European area of 2700 acres with a population of 2235 had 33 miles of roads with 510 public lamps. The Asiatic community of 6689 souls occupied 300 acres, with five miles of road and 30 public lamps. The price of a building plot of a twelfth of an acre in the

[1] Similar data for more recent years are inaccessible. These figures themselves were not challenged at the time and may be taken as substantially accurate, both for 1920 and for 1924.

Grogan River Road Estate he gave as £65. He said the rates paid by the Europeans were £4700, while Indians paid £5900.

Readers acquainted with municipal affairs in this country will be surprised to see how little is paid in rates. The explanation is that there are no poor rates, no education rates and no police rates. The cost of police is borne wholly by the Government, and of European education mainly by the Government and partly by parents, while poor Europeans are simply shipped to London when they become a public charge. The burden on the Nairobi ratepayers is, in fact, thanks to relief from national revenues, paid mainly by Africans, an exceptionally light one. Yet the municipal staff, zealous and efficient though it is, is not given the means to make the town healthy and decent. The reason is partly that the urban European resents the duty of paying high rates while the farmer pays none at all, and partly, no doubt, that as he escapes direct taxation he feels a municipal rate to be specially burdensome. The result is that as the proceeds of a higher rate would benefit Africans and the poorer kind of Indian, the richer minority of Europeans who control the Council keep the rates low.

A second surprising fact is that the size of building plots in the bazaar is so small as 50 feet by 75 feet, or roughly twelve to the acre. When Nairobi was originally planned and built Indians were allowed to build houses consisting of both shop and living premises, at the rate of twelve to the acre. That is the minimum area admissible in English cities where local authorities are faced with difficulties from demolition and from vested interests in land that have lasted for centuries. In a town in the tropics built on Crown land only twenty-five years ago the proportion of twelve houses to the acre should be considered quite inadmissible.

The African population of Nairobi is about 12,000,

most of them temporary residents. All but a few live in shelters that are inferior to village huts and are quite unfit for human habitation. That fact is widely recognised and bewailed in the colony. For many years the accepted remedy has been the wholesale removal of the African population from the frequently unauthorised sheds and hovels at present used to a municipally managed location. Some part of a location is now at length laid out. The difficulty is to get people to build on it. Prospective tenants ask who is to bear the cost of replacing their present homes with the kind of building demanded by sanitary science.[1]

The gist of the whole matter is that an urban proletariat cannot exist decently and healthily on wages of from £6 to £15 a year on land worth from £200 to £500 an acre. Here again the problem under existing economic conditions is simply insoluble.

In Mombasa the situation is, if anything, worse than in Nairobi.[2] There, up to about thirty-five years ago, a building plot of about an eighth of an acre could be bought for five rupees. Now, the cheapest land on the island available for housing Africans costs £200 an acre, while on the outskirts of the town it costs far more. A comparison of wage rates is impossible, since thirty-five years ago no one on Mombasa Island, except the garrison of the fort,

[1] As this chapter is being written the Nairobi paper containing the Nairobi Health Officer's report for 1923 arrives. This report reveals the surprising fact that even now there is no compulsory or even general registration of births among Africans and Asiatics in Nairobi. Registration of deaths has been compulsory for several years. The European death-rate is given as 8·4, the Asiatic as 16·5 and the African as 33·5 per thousand. These are crude rates. No attempt seems to have been made to correct them in the usual way, for the different age groups. In the case of all three races the distribution of the population among the different age groups is favourable to an extremely low mortality.

[2] The writer was at one time Health Officer at Mombasa and has in what follows drawn upon his experience there. He made a report to the Government, when Health Officer, on the social and economic condition of the people of the island, of which what follows here is little more than a summary.

worked for wages. But the following figures, taken from the report on Mombasa for 1908 already referred to, will show some of the facts. At that date average monthly wages of Africans were about 18s. They may now be put at 25s.[1] The kind of house in which the ordinary African lived forty years ago cost in 1908 from £25 to £50 to build, and was already going out in favour of tenements, in which one or more workers lived with one or more families in a single room for a rent of 2s. to 3s. a month. By now, the old type of Swahili house, which at least was well ventilated by the open space always left between walls and eaves, is no longer built. In 1908 both houses and tenements were being built as closely together as their owners cared. In one case the privy of a house built in that very year was only two yards from the verandah of the house behind it.[2] Even in 1908 the minimum price of land on the island was £100, while much of it was worth anything from £500 to £3000 an acre. At that very time the European quarter on the healthy side of the island was laid out beautifully, with tree-fringed roads and paths, a golf course, and adequate police and sanitary services.

Since then there has been some reform. Building regulations are now enforced and main roads are being driven through the overcrowded areas. But no slum clearance and rebuilding are possible unless the Government lays the financial burden on the owners of the land with inflated values, for which originally trivial sums were paid, either to former Arab owners or to Government. The value of the privately owned land on Mombasa Island cannot at existing market values be less than a million

[1] Wage rates are higher on the coast than in the interior, and also higher in towns than in the country.

[2] The builder was unsuccessfully prosecuted. At that time the local bye-laws were utterly useless. And their amendment was rendered difficult—even impossible, according to the authorities—by the existence of Treaty rights possessed by various European Powers.

pounds. European residents in Mombasa pay a municipal rate of 2½ per cent of the annual value of their premises, and a number of them from one cause or another are still exempt from payment. Land values are exempt.[1] Their rating, as is done in nearly all Colonial cities and to some extent in Nairobi itself, would help to bring the price of land down to a level that would make sanitary housing of African labourers conceivable. In any event, the proper housing of Africans in towns in Kenya is quite impossible so long as land values and wages rates are so disproportionate. The various sanitary experts who have from time to time reported on the sanitation of Mombasa and Nairobi ignored that fact. Sanitation is not merely a matter of engineering. In the last resort it depends on personal acts and habits. And these in turn depend on the incomes people have. Our own urban poor were once the despair of sanitarians. They would break up sanitary fittings and use doors and window-frames for firewood. Our partial progress is due mainly to universal and compulsory education and to the rise in real wage rates between 1840 and 1900. The case of the urban workers of Kenya is strictly comparable. Sanitary habits and sanitary housing, on land worth from £200 to £500 an acre, are impossible in the case of people with incomes of 15s. a month, as in Nairobi, or of 25s., as in Mombasa, who cannot read, and have no means of learning to understand what bye-laws mean and are intended to do. The authorities see nothing unnatural and nothing unwise or unhealthy in the political and economic processes by which urban land, from having no value at all, has acquired values so high, while wages have remained so low. They continue to repeat their formula "The remedy is to attract more capital". It is high time the truth was stated. The

[1] The total sum paid in rates in Mombasa must be considerably less than £7000, as that is the total income of the Municipal Committee.

conditions of life of labourers in Nairobi are inferior to those prevailing in the villages. In Mombasa they are inferior to those prevailing in slavery times fifty years ago.[1] Improvement depends not on finding better sanitary doctors and engineers, but on giving the direction of the country to men with different political and economic ideas.

Perhaps one's greatest difficulty in writing about Kenya is to avoid giving too dark a picture. One has to follow such data as are public and available. The stories of the Masai and Giriama, the instances given of miscarriages of justice, and now again urban conditions of life—in all these segments of our subject the bare facts make the picture black. Yet in truth life in Kenya is not so gloomy as these facts suggest. That is, of course, because the social system people live in is not the only influence determining their behaviour. It is a large influence. It is larger in Kenya than elsewhere since there the authorities have disposed of the land at will, and distributed upon it at will the energies of the population as water is distributed to irrigated land by dams and sluices. But even so, however deeply the colour of an all-pervading pattern may penetrate the web of life in Kenya, it cannot stain all its threads. Take the case, for instance, of the Indian merchants. As a class they are intensely avaricious. They admit it, and, when accused of overcharging natives, point in excuse to their political and economic disabilities that are no excuse at all. Their real excuse, of course, is that under the existing system if they did not grasp at every cent they could not live. Here if anywhere one would think that habits forced on men by circumstances would cast character in unchanging mould. But twelve years ago there was an old Indian shopkeeper in Mombasa who gave alms in coppers to all who asked him. He was old, and hoped to find in thus giving to those

[1] Evidence in support of that statement was given in full detail in the official report on Mombasa already referred to.

poorer than himself a road to Paradise. A relation of some kind used to stand outside the shop and try to turn away those who had already been given alms. The old man found out and stopped him, and soon had his wish, to die in poverty, fulfilled. So too with Europeans. There are many farmers who become closely attached to individual Africans, not because they are better than ordinary, but because they know them. And there are many individual Africans who show constancy and devotion to masters who sometimes do not deserve them. All that means just that human nature is indestructible stuff in all races. Hatreds and vices crop up in mission stations, convents, even in heaven itself, according to the old story, while murderers and slave raiders often show extraordinary generosity. That is not to say that the system of society men live under is of no consequence to their actions. It is of immense consequence. But it does not determine life absolutely. And, in Kenya, if in many lives it tilts the balance, and leads to false judgements and cruel actions, there are times and places where ordinary motives of all kinds work out much as they do in other countries and leave on the mind life's common picture of chequered light and shade. Inevitably this book regards what is peculiar to human society in Kenya, since that alone is written of in Blue books and returns and is measurable in statistical data. But the background the reader must picture for himself is not so very unlike the foreground of his own life. There is great need to remember all that, as the corrective of inferences from facts that, though true enough in themselves, are apt to get out of perspective.

It is particularly unfortunate that Africans in Kenya are apt to attribute all they dislike in life to the Government, and to give credit to individuals for what they value in such services, scanty as they are, which the Government renders them. Indeed, in African opinion the Government has no

redeeming feature. It is always interfering, they think, and it has an insatiable appetite for money. The fact is that the system of taxation leaves less than nothing over when both what are strictly necessary to be done—justice, police, tax collection—are provided for and the demands of the European colony are partly satisfied.

The basis of the system of society existing in Kenya is the absence from home, at any given time, of about two-thirds of the adult males of the agricultural tribes, at work on farms, plantations and railways, and in the towns. Before the results of that migration on native society are described we may briefly describe its economic results.

The areas owned by Europeans (about 7400 square miles) and the parts of them under cultivation (336 square miles, or 215,000 acres) have already been mentioned. Of the cultivated area, according to the latest official return, 75,444 acres were under maize, 13,696 under wheat, 43,359 under coffee, 37,118 under sisal (an aloe, from which fibre is made) and 10,209 under flax. The areas under maize increased from 53,395 acres in 1921 to 75,444 in 1922. The official report proceeds: "With the encouragement given to the maize industry through the low 'flat' railway rate and the reduction in shipping freight and in the handling costs at the port it is estimated that an area of about 100,000 acres will be planted in 1923".

The number of cattle owned by Europeans was:

1920.	1921.	1922.
137,600	161,200	172,400

The estimated number of cattle owned by natives is given as 2,642,000. Practically all of these are owned by Masai and kindred tribes. Other tribes cannot keep them, partly because they have neither time, room nor money, partly because the Government will not allow live cattle (for fear of infection) to be exported from the Masai reserve.

The following figures taken from the official statistics of exports from Kenya are interesting:

	Values. 1913–1914.	Values. 1919–1920.	Values. 1920–1921.
	£	£	£
Copra . . .	37,474	35,821	7,499
Simsim (sesame) .	37,355	3,602	30,734
Hides . . .	124,237	42,937	10,038
Coffee . . .	15,694	201,150	464,169
Sisal . . .	19,692	117,682	192,899
Maize . . .	33,102	101,480	47,616

These six articles include between them nine-tenths of the colony's exports. Copra is mainly, and simsim and hides are entirely, native products. Coffee and sisal are entirely, and exported maize mainly, plantation products. The collapse of the exports of native produce is due partly to labour policy, partly to railway policy, and partly to the driving out of Indian traders from the reserves.[1]

Between 1914 and 1920 imports of rice into Mombasa varied between 11,000 tons valued at £214,000 and 4000 tons valued at £94,000.

The following table was published in the local Press in 1919, when the cry was raised that the country's troubles were due to official extravagance. The figures in brackets show exports per head of population and have been added by the writer. It is curious that the publisher of the figures should have failed to see that the one thing the figures do prove is the failure of the colony's industrial policy. Exports per head from the countries where "plantation" industry prevails, in Kenya, Rhodesia,

[1] Later figures cannot be given because trade returns for Kenya and Uganda are now issued together instead of separately as formerly. Exports from Uganda, where a larger proportion of industry than in Kenya is carried on without European direction, have in most years been larger than from Kenya, in spite of everything having to be carried, first over the lake in steamers, and then over the whole length of the Uganda railway.

Nyasaland and, to some extent, in Uganda are quite trivial as compared with the exports from countries with native industries. The latest trade returns show that while Uganda more than doubled its exports during the last four years, the increase in Kenya was only some 20 per cent, while native products exported declined during that period.

ANTI-WASTE

TABLE SHOWING RATIO EXPENDITURE TO EXPORTS IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN AFRICA IN THE YEAR 1918–1919, OR 1919.

Population.	Public Expenditure.	Total Exports.	Ratio of Exports to Public Expenditure.	Exports per Head.
	£	£		£
		RHODESIA		
777,882	1,059,299	4,766,709	4·50	[6·14]
		NORTHERN RHODESIA		
883,830	199,070	454,336	2·28	[0·52]
		NYASALAND		
1,228,579	150,198	504,740	3·36	[0·41]
		NIGERIA		
16,500,000	4,529,176	14,727,000	3·25	[0·89]
		GOLD COAST		
1,000,000	1,781,170	10,814,175	6·07	[10·81]
		GAMBIA		
146,000	143,451	1,553,521	10·86	[10·64]
		UGANDA		
2,962,550	323,601	1,064,000	3·28	[0·36]
		EGYPT		
12,569,000	23,384,326	75,888,321	3·20	[60·37]
		KENYA		
2,785,000	1,570,705	1,167,000	0·74	[0·42]

The latest available figures of the colony's trade and finances will be found in Chapter XIV.

Turning now to such figures as show the results of the industrial system in Kenya to Africans, we are at once met with the difficulty that no reliable estimates of population exist. In an answer recently given to a question in Parliament Mr. Thomas stated that the African population of Kenya at the census of 1901 was estimated to be 1,220,000, at the census of 1911, 3,000,000, after the transfer of two provinces from Uganda, and at the census of 1921, 2,483,500.[1] That answer was very misleading. At no decennial census has any census of Africans been attempted. Several of the earlier governors attempted partial counts and based estimates of total population on them. Both before and during the War medical officers made rough counts of births and deaths in restricted areas. They always found the birth-rates very low and the death-rates very high. The results of these investigations were not published. The only reliable figures of death-rates are those for Nairobi, where in an African population composed mainly of young male adults the death-rate is four times the European death-rate.

In the Colonial Office official lists the population of Kenya was estimated at 4,000,000 up to 1916. The figures given in these lists since that date are:

1917 . . .	2,848,700
1918 . . .	2,786,000
1919 . . .	2,651,000
1920 . . .	2,627,103
1921 . . .	2,627,103
1922 . . .	2,529,133
1923 . . .	2,529,133

For years 4,000,000 was the generally accepted figure and

[1] Official estimates of the population of the two provinces transferred from Uganda have varied between 900,000 and 1,250,000.

was given in all books of reference. It was undoubtedly derived originally from rough and partial counts, and the author believes it to have been, if somewhat overestimated, not hopelessly wide of the mark. The figures since 1917 are based on hut and poll tax returns for the various districts. It will be noted that none of them corresponds with the figure quoted by Mr. Thomas. The writer believes that there has been a steady and rapid fall in the African population of Kenya during the past twenty-five years, amounting altogether in that period to a third of the former number of inhabitants. In spite of official denial he claims that such official data as exist confirm that belief.

The causes of such a fall in the population are obviously not capable of exact definition. We shall have to examine a large number of probable factors that together have both diminished births and increased deaths.[1] Normally, in uncivilised countries the years when there are neither wars nor epidemics are years of rapid increase. Every one marries early and no woman marriageable at all remains unmarried. Everybody stays at home, for there is nowhere else to go, and recovery from war, famine and pestilence is as rapid as the interval between human generations allows. In no recent year in Kenya, on the contrary, has the population increased, so far as we can judge. And if we take the destroyers of life, constant and intermittent, in due order we shall find them no less potent than of old.

First and greatest is disease. Smallpox has ceased to kill, thanks to vaccination of all and sundry. A few lives have been saved, and many thousands have escaped suffering and disfigurement, by the treatment of yaws, by an expensive drug that Government pays for and both Government and

[1] The London *Times* recently stated that the population of the Sudan has increased, under a beneficent British Government, from two and a half to six millions in no more than twenty-six years. Patriotism, like other primitive religions, demands from its votaries a belief in the miraculous.

mission doctors administer.[1] These two diseases are under control. None of the other preventible diseases are, except to some extent in the towns. Of these, malaria and dysentery nearly everywhere, and anchylostomiasis on the coast, are as prevalent as ever. They are indeed probably greater scourges than they were forty years ago.

Neither Government, missions nor European employers are indifferent to the ravages of these and other diseases. All three spend large sums in treating the sick. There is probably no other country in the world where employers, as a class, give so much treatment of disease to their employees. All these hospitals, dispensaries and household remedies undoubtedly relieve the sufferings of thousands. But it is extremely improbable that they diminish appreciably either morbidity or mortality in the country.

An erroneous idea prevails that Africans are immune to African diseases. That is quite untrue of the chief diseases. Nowhere in tropical Africa is the European death-rate known to be so high as the African death-rate. When large numbers of Meru from the slopes of Kenya were sent to work on the Mombasa Waterworks they sickened and died just as Europeans or Chinese would have, though there was a resident assistant surgeon in their camp. That is an illustration of how the existing industrial system actually spreads disease. For the migration of such labourers not only exposes them to new infections, but results also in the migration of the diseases themselves. This is specially the case with dysentery, epidemics of which are constantly breaking out in villages after labour gangs have returned to them. In former times, by contrast, most epidemics tended to stop at tribal boundaries, since their human carriers did not cross them.

Of diseases recently introduced the chief are tuber-

[1] A cheap substitute which, apparently, is of equal efficacy is now coming into use.

culosis and venereal diseases. The first shows an ominous tendency to spread. The latter will be dealt with in a later passage.

Considerations of humanity aside, the large expenditure on the treatment of the sick instead of on the prevention of diseases is sheer waste. The medical authorities of the colony have always recognised that fact. Unhappily the number of doctors engaged in preventive as distinguished from curative medicine has recently, from motives of economy, been reduced from five to three.[1] These three men work in the towns. The difficulties of preventive medicine in villages and labour camps are, in the circumstances, insuperable. The subject demands examination in some detail.

Let us take dysentery first. Epidemics of it are constantly travelling round the country and penetrate everywhere, since migratory labourers do. The disease is contracted by swallowing its germs. The remedy is to prevent soil contamination and the carriage of infected material by flies. Good latrines, used by all, are the means to these ends. That is easier said than done. Water-closets are, of course, out of the question. All other sorts prove more or less offensive to the senses, even when everything that possibly can be done is done. In consequence latrines in camps and villages may not be under the same roof as any one sleeps under. Nor, on the other hand, may they be too far away, as then fear of snakes and leopards will prevent people using them at night and the ground at the doors of the sleeping quarters will get fouled. But we are assuming that our latrines are not excessively offensive. Most latrines in East Africa are, and in fact do more harm than good. To be of any value they must first either

[1] In Nyasaland there is no doctor specially engaged in the prevention of human diseases, but there is a mycologist whose work is to investigate and prevent the diseases of economic plants.

have pits so deep that flies will not visit the bottom, or be composed of shallow trenches where excreta can be covered over at once. The former method involves much expense and labour in digging new pits periodically. The second requires a large area and the services of a caretaker of a different tribe from the others in the camp or village, and is useless at night. Next, the accessible parts of the latrine, if of a permanent or semi-permanent kind, as must be the case in railway stations and near houses, must be impermeable and be washed down daily. Third, there must be a sanitary patrol to ensure that every one uses the latrines, with power to arrest and bring offenders to punishment. Sanitary habits needed to be taught in Europe, and still need to be learned in Africa. Finally, the whole arrangement will need the frequent supervision of a European, or an educated Indian or African. All that means a very great deal of expense and trouble. It is little wonder that labour camps are rarely sanitary. African villages of any size also offend the noses of civilised people. Village sanitation is one of the things that depends on the revival of village democracy. Chiefs chosen by Government for the weight of their hands in dealing with deserters and tax shirkers are not suitable protagonists of sanitary reform.

The prevention of nuisances in farms, camps and villages is theoretically possible. Expense is the only difficulty that in practice prevents it. But nothing whatever can conceivably be done, under the existing economic system, to prevent nuisances constantly arising from the migration, annually or oftener, of nearly the whole adult male population. For most, that migration involves a journey of several days or weeks. Each night a gang seeks, by the roadside, some place not too extensively befouled by previous gangs. Soil, air and streams nightly receive massive pollution and infection. The mystery is, not why bowel infections are so common in Kenya, but how any migrant labourers, and

any inhabitants of the villages near the roads they take, ever survive a single journey.

Malaria is fully as hard a problem. It can be prevented by destroying the breeding-places of mosquitoes and by protecting people by mosquito nets. The first means constant labour in keeping streams and pools clear of the grass and weeds in which the larvae hide. But there is no money in the villages for either drainage or mosquito nets. There are no profitable village industries. The sums that even the most regular and industrious wage-earner can send home suffice merely for the payment of his own and his relations' taxes, and for the scantiest supply of clothing. A mosquito net costs more than a pound.

Similarly with anchylostomiasis, which is due to intestinal parasites that suck the blood of their human hosts. These parasites enter the body from infected soil through cracks in the skin of the feet. Boots are the real remedy. Africans in Kenya go barefoot. How can a man earning from eight to twenty shillings a month, and paying from twelve to a hundred shillings a year in direct taxation, keep his family decently shod?

Sanitation in Kenya, in short, is a part of economics. The penalty for its neglect is the rapid wasting of the capital of industry itself, for men are capital in Kenya. Its exercise, on the other hand, the actual work of preventing disease, is so costly under the existing system as to be prohibitive. In a country where men can be hired for from £5 to £8 a year it does not pay employers to spend large sums in keeping them alive. Common humanity prompts them to dose the sick. But a public health service would have to be paid for out of the profits of industry. And as things are it would be absolutely impossible out of these profits to sanitate either the village homes of the labourers or their places of labour.

The reader must not imagine that every European farm

is a hotbed of disease. Some parts of the alienated area are free of malaria. There are no data to go by, and even if they were carefully compiled by employers they would be useless, since most natives in Kenya try to walk home when they fall seriously ill, generally spreading infection on the road and sometimes dying alongside it. How largely preventible disease operates as a cause of the decline in population none can guess.

Next comes war. It is sad to read, in the earlier reports, of how great a boon we bestowed by stopping inter-tribal war. Since then, our own War has destroyed more life than a generation of intertribal wars. Mr. G. L. Beer, the American representative at the Paris Peace Conference, states that we recruited over 350,000 unarmed porters in the campaign against the Germans in East Africa, of whom 150,000 were raised in Kenya. (About 14,000 natives of Kenya were included in the armed forces engaged.) The officially recorded deaths among these men are:

	Killed.	Died of Disease.	Totals.
Armed forces . . .	1,377	2,923	4,300
Unarmed porters . .	366	41,952	42,318
	1,743	44,875	46,618

Of these 46,618 dead men the relations of 40,645 are still untraced, and unclaimed balances of pay and wages amounting to £155,447 are owed them. Mr. Beer states that the maximum strength at any one time of the German armed forces engaged against British, Belgians and Portuguese was, Europeans 2309, Africans 11,621.

The widows of these dead porters receive no pensions. They have to pay hut tax like other widows. The number of deaths given in the official figures does not include many thousands who died after their return home, from diseases contracted on service. Many of the deaths were due to

starvation rather than to disease. It is quite impossible to estimate how many among the ordinary inhabitants of German East Africa died as a consequence of the War. Destruction of crops and houses by retreating columns on both sides caused the deaths of many thousands.

By contrast, the two kinds of warfare in which the tribes of Kenya engaged in former times were comparatively trifling. The cattle raids of the Masai and other marauding tribes were indeed most oppressive. But there is no evidence that their cost in human life was anything approaching in scale the losses suffered by Africans in the late War. Traditional accounts of intertribal warfare are as reliable as contemporary accounts of mediaeval battles or of the old Jewish wars. The other kind of warfare was for slaves. While we should never forget that our country has been responsible for far more slave wars in Africa than the Arabs, we may certainly take credit for stopping slave raids in Kenya. They were only just beginning when we did so.

Last of the old destroyers comes famine. It was a very great evil indeed in the old days. It is a great evil still. Nowadays it is only in years of special plenty that there is no food shortage before harvest. And it is absurd to pretend that the absence, in the agricultural tribes, of more than half the able-bodied male population is not the chief cause of this chronic scarcity. In addition an excessive share of the work of cultivation is thrown on the women, with consequent injury to their young children. And the kinds of work always done by men, such as house-building, are neglected. These phenomena can of course be regarded from various standpoints. Roscoe[1] describes a certain famine in Busoga as " not due to climatic causes, but to the discontent among the women, and their rebellious spirit, which caused them to refrain from cultivating their plantations because of the forced labour question ". The quota-

[1] *Twenty-five Years in East Africa*, p. 244.

tion is interesting in view of the common allegation that men do no work in the villages.

So that of these three great destroyers of African lives none have ceased to operate under the system of society introduced by Europeans.

The codes which, in civilised countries, have gradually been built up to protect the worker do not and cannot exist in Kenya. There is no Workmen's Compensation Act, for instance, and Africans in Kenya are more liable than workmen in this country to meet with accidents from unfenced machinery. It is high time for the beginnings of protective legislation to be made. Perhaps it would be best to begin by enforcing a minimum standard in the housing of the employees of Government departments.

It is true, indeed, that such legislation is rarely enacted, and never likely to be effective, except when those who benefit by it have votes. In our country for many centuries there have been no dehumanising barriers of colour and race and religion and cultural level. But child labour in mines was not prohibited, nor were industrial accidents compensated out of profits until after the first Reform Act. In Kenya the workers cannot at present obtain citizenship. The wide barrier of difference in race hinders the kindling of mutual comprehension and sympathy which, before a measure of justice was made compulsory, sometimes, in countries like our own, mitigated the hardships of the poor. It is idle for any of us who have lived in Africa to deny that we feel less concern with an African's loss or suffering than with a European's. Yet though natural feeling does so little to protect the worker, the law does less still. The fact that the Legislative Council is under the influence of employers is beside the point. It does not explain why a Protectorate Government has done so little to protect, why those appointed to govern should take the greatest pains to count producers and measure production, to mark down

every labourer and mark up every bale and sack, while the cost of the system in human health and life remains unmeasured. Elsewhere in the world a man is encouraged to live by a few acres of his own. In Kenya every effort is made to make him leave home to work for alien and often absentee landlords. One would think that under so exceptional a system some attempt would have been made to find how it works out in human lives.

A perhaps even greater cause than these of the decline in population is the interference caused by the system with normal family life. The separating of so many husbands from their wives obviously tends to diminish the birth-rate and to encourage sexual irregularities. Prostitution is not the commonest kind of irregularity that results. It is reprobated in native opinion except among the Lumbwa. Twenty years ago there were many Masai prostitutes. But when they came home with venereal diseases they were quarantined, and tribal public opinion has since kept practically all Masai women at home. Prostitutes are common in, but rare outside, the towns and larger camps. Most of the women to be found living with wage-earners are neither married nor prostitutes. They are really temporary wives. Practically all the few thousands of prostitutes in the country and a considerable proportion of the temporary wives have one or both venereal diseases.

Africans hate a diet of nothing but boiled meal or grain. They do not feel properly fed unless the meal is flavoured in some way, even if only with wild leaves of some sort. And the ritual of fire and food is a woman's business with them. When the tax could be earned by a month's wage-earning, the unpleasant food and lodging were put up with as temporary necessities. But when absences from home grew longer and longer wage-earners became more ambitious of comfort. To the African wage-earner comfort means a

woman to grind corn fresh, prepare the meal, cook it, and have it ready when he finishes work. So a demand arose for women who are really temporary wives. Sometimes these women are quite old, widows or former prostitutes. Sometimes one old crone will cook for half-a-dozen men. Most often, of course, the young women whom the exodus of men from the villages leaves unattached are concerned in these irregular unions. By custom they have all the characters of the circumstances they are created to meet. As the usual wage contract is for a month, so the woman is engaged for a month, at from four to six or eight shillings a month, out of which she has to find her own clothing. Of recent years longer labour contracts have become commoner, and so these unions tend to become more permanent. But they are not legal marriages, by either native or European law.[1]

Women in Kenya are even more conservative than elsewhere, because few of them ever leave home. They cling closely to the customs and law that give them their status in village society. By that law, in most tribes, though not among the Kikuyu, the bridegroom must build a home in his bride's village and replace her value as a food producer for her relations by the payment to her parents of money or stock. That payment anchored the man to his new home. Now, of course, he must leave it. But his wife

[1] The marital customs described as prevailing among wage-earners in Kenya seem to be a reversion to a condition of affairs once universal in primitive society. Thus Vinogradoff (*Historical Jurisprudence*, vol. Tribal Law, p. 239): "Contract is not a necessary feature of Aryan marriages in general, but was gradually evolved from loose unions. Indeed we have the curious spectacle of an institution which begins by being entirely fluid, but settles down more and more on a basis of contract with reciprocal rights and duties." We may infer from the general course of human development that lifelong unions among wage-earners in Kenya are not likely to become the rule until the woman can acquire, on marriage, security in the possession of a home and of such property as can mark the permanency of the marriage bond, and can, by its alienation, provide a penalty for any breach of the marriage contract. Among a pure proletariat regular marriage is incongruous with economic circumstances.

may not. On her is thrown nearly all the work of growing food for her husband, children and old folk. She often carries a load of grain to her husband if his place of work is as near as fifty miles away. Otherwise, unless she breaks with old ways altogether, she never leaves home, but is born, bears and rears her children, and dies, under the shade of the same trees, in the narrow circle of the same slowly changing faces.

Every year an increasing proportion of wage-earners fails to return home. In other words they abandon tribal life and tribal and village ties. It is not that they intend to, but rather that duties to aged parents, wife and children, become more and more irksome and apt to be neglected. The temptation to spend money in shops and otherwise, instead of sending it home for the family's taxes, is very great. Nevertheless the great majority do not neglect these duties. The Government is most anxious to ensure that wage-earners should preserve their tribal ties. If their dissolution became general the tax could not be collected in the reserves. But the drift into independence of familial, village and tribal ties is inevitable. Among the migratory kind of labourers, collected in batches by recruiting agents, and drafted off by the score or by the hundred to this employer or that, the village is still felt to be the home. But the increasing class of semi-skilled ploughmen and cattle-men, and rough carpenters and domestic servants and so forth, who are paid twice or thrice as much as ordinary labourers, are clearly the nucleus of a new type in tropical Africa. Employers as a class show greater foresight than the Government in dealing with them. They generally provide them with little huts of the square European kind. Unhappily it is difficult in these huts to give the ventilation that the central fire-place gives in the village hut, and as windows are dear they are rarely provided. For such a semi-permanent home the man will seek a semi-

permanent wife, if, as is usual, his legal wife holds fast by her tribal rights and status.

Some years ago the most influential man among the European colonists at the time wrote to the writer in the following terms:

> The home is what you have got to try and give the civilised African. When I say civilised I mean the man who has given up his tribal habits and come out into the world. The present state of affairs is very bad. I personally do not agree with His Excellency that the best way is only to recognise the Reserve native. The man who lives outside wants giving a status badly.

Since these words were written the view they express has been adopted by the Government. Already before the war an Ordinance was passed providing for the civil marriage of Africans by any magistrate, for a small fee. Few, so far, have taken advantage of the Ordinance. The African finds it hard to regard any union as permanent that is not marked by an equally permanent transfer of property.

In 1918, however, an Ordinance was passed which, by defining and fixing the regular wage-earner's fundamental relations with society, is sure to prove decisive of all else in his life. The purport of this Ordinance is clearly seen in its opening words: " Whereas it is desirable to encourage resident native labour on farms and to take measures for the regulation of the squatting or living of natives in places other than those appointed for them by the Government of the Protectorate." The Ordinance is thus to serve two purposes. It is to encourage the permanent settlement on the estates of Europeans of Africans under obligation to work for their owners. And it is to forbid the settlement of Africans on such estates who are under no obligation to work for their owners.

This latter point demands explanation. It had become a quite common practice for Africans to rent land from its

European owners, especially near Nairobi and all along the railway line. Rents of from ten to forty shillings an acre were paid for small plots on which were grown, besides ordinary food-stuffs, potatoes and other vegetables, as well as fruit, for sale to people in towns. Both the Government and the European colony objected to this " squatting ", since it threatened to turn European concessionaires into functionless landlords, and tended to prove that land would be most fully and profitably used under African rather than European management. So it was decided to stop " squatting ", as has been done in South Africa, and, in order to ensure that any African living outside his tribal area should be prevented from producing independently, to make wage-earning for some European landowner his statutory obligation.

The Ordinance provides, in some detail, that the magistrate of the district shall prescribe to the European occupier the number of African families permitted to live on his land, " having due regard to the labour requirements of his farm " : he may require the occupier to remove any African from his land in twenty-eight days; he may order any " permitted native " to return to his reserve if he works for the European occupier for less than 180 days in any year: it is his duty to witness all agreements laying down the duties of these " permitted natives ", which agreements as a rule provide that they should work for the occupier for the eight months that he may choose out of every twelve; and finally, the magistrate is to see that in these agreements security is given that each permitted native has land enough to provide food for himself and his family.

It is curious to note the similarities of the system thus established by our law with the customary arrangements prevailing in the system of Arab slavery on the coast that we so recently abolished. The slaves of the Arabs worked four days for their masters and had three days to them-

selves. (So Krapf says, though occasionally a five-day week seems to have been required.) Our system requires the similar proportion of eight months out of twelve. The wage-earner has the advantage over the slave of being able, as a rule, to learn more in his work. But he is, as a rule, worse housed than the slave was—twenty years ago thousands of these slaves' houses were still standing. And he is much worse off as regards leisure, since the slave nearly always took his share of his master's crop.

The wage-earner's immense advantage, of course, is that he is free to find a home in his reserve. In practice, however, that is often impossible, both because rights to land by native law are lost when it has been allowed to revert to the wild state, and because heavy direct taxation makes wage-earning unavoidable. The breaking up of the home also would be a great deterrent to the return to the reserve. And finally, we must remember how the whole influence of the administration is used, as was shown in Chapter VIII., to keep able-bodied males at work outside the reserves. Chiefs and headmen dare not allow such men to settle down permanently at home. It has been suggested that the encouragement given during the last year or two to production in the reserves has led to some relaxing of the pressure used to make the able-bodied leave home. The writer has no evidence on the point to offer.

The reader may be tempted to condemn unreservedly this Ordinance and the system it legalises. On the contrary, the Ordinance marks an advance. The compulsory annual migration of labourers was and is the most injurious feature of the existing economic system. These migrants could scarcely ever stay in their homes. Their temporary unions with women, most often of some different tribe, produced few children, made venereal disease inevitable in time, and encouraged the lapse by the women into prostitution. Stabilise a man's economic status and prospects and you

stabilise his marital relations. Venereal diseases are the index of marital infidelity in any community. The rapid spread of these diseases in Kenya is merely a by-product of social disintegration. This Ordinance is one step towards social integration. It will encourage home-making and family life, and will, it may be hoped, produce a type of African notably alert in mind and industrious in habits.

It is a grim fact, nevertheless, that the rights to land given by this Ordinance, the right of residence for twenty-eight days and the right to the garnering of crops of a man's own planting, are the first and only legal rights to land which our Government has granted to any native of Kenya Colony. The taint of servitude that the Ordinance carries with it to African labourers can be removed simply and completely, not by reducing the days of labour, nor by giving greater power to magistrates, but by other measures. When taxation falls lightly on the poor, of whatever race, and heavily on the rich: when every native of Kenya has the enforceable legal right to as much land as he can use for growing crops both for food and for sale—a right very different from his present supposed right to force himself on some perhaps already overcrowded village, the headman of which regards himself as paid to drive every potential wage-earner out of: and when the industry of independent African producers is given an organisation comparable to the one which Government has built up in the interests of European producers—then, and then only, will the African wage-earner be a freeman. He is not free if the terms of his engagement are fixed by a magistrate, the servant of a Government whose avowed policy is to make him work for others. He will be free only when he can choose between what in his own judgement are the relative advantages of village and plantation life.

In his excellent book on *Race Problems in the New Africa* Mr. Willoughby attacks those who demand equality—a

truly ambiguous term—between Europeans and Africans. The weaker race, he says, must be protected, and so long as its protection is necessary, cannot claim equality. But which race, either in South Africa or in Kenya, gets the exceptional advantages of protective laws? To which race does the law give security in either the ownership or the use of land? Forbidden to own land of his own, the African in Kenya found a way to what the cultivators of every country seek, by renting land from its European owners. That, too, is now forbidden him. To talk of equality as prohibited by nature, by the inherent weakness of Africans in competition with Europeans, is sheer self-deception. The African has nothing to fear, in Kenya or elsewhere, from equality before the law. Equality in social relations is outside the law's concern. But if the law is to do justice in Kenya we must sweep away those distinctions which, pretend as they may to protect Africans, in fact force upon him both political and industrial servitude.

CHAPTER XII

RESULTS—SOCIAL

It is universally recognised that profound social changes cannot take place rapidly without disaster. In Kenya an ignorant peasantry has in large part been turned into an industrial proletariat in a single generation. Nothing of the kind has ever happened in the time in the world before. The result has been a social disintegration of which the prevalence of venereal disease and the declining population are mere outward signs. This disintegration is even now recognised by few except missionaries. The authorities not only failed to foresee it, but long after it was plainly visible pressed feverishly on with the economic changes that produced it. The mere speed of these changes, apart from their nature, has been disastrous.

We are all familiar with the evils that accompanied the industrial revolution in England, when millions left their rural fields and cottages for smoky, crowded tenements and factories. The change was an industrial change which at first disturbed none of the bases of English society, religious, political or social. It was introduced by English people themselves into their own country, a country with a tough social structure and a keen sense of national unity. And it gave opportunities of wealth and authority to any one of ambition and intelligence.

But the revolution that has overwhelmed the tribes of Kenya was complete in twenty years. It has split up families as our revolution rarely did. It has deliberately

replaced the indigenous tribal authority by an alien political authority. It has been conducted, regardless of the wishes of the people, by a small body of foreign invaders of superior civilisation, speaking a foreign language, professing a different religion, who offer no place but the lowest in the new social order to the people of the country. Could even the closely knit English society of the early XIXth century have withstood the shock of a revolution which the people could not understand, imposed by foreigners who seized and zealously guarded complete political and economic authority, and who used that authority to seize the greater part of the natural wealth of England and to compel the native English to work for them? The tribes of Kenya have, in short, been subjected to a social revolution so wide in scope, so rapid and so complete, that no co-ordinated adaptations of the structure of their society have been possible at all.

Missions are often blamed for the moral loss involved in the destruction of tribal religion. They never destroy except in proportion as they replace the primitive code by a creed and ethic felt to be more attractive and convincing. The destructive agent has been none other than the economic system introduced by Europeans for their own advantage. The Bishop of Zanzibar is the only prominent missionary who has stated that fact frankly and publicly. But even those missionaries who assume that the existing system is inevitable and believe that it is right acknowledge the fact.

One proviso must be entered here. It is quite wrong to attempt the artificial perpetuation of tribalism. Its survival in the tribes of Kenya is due merely to their long isolation from the outer world. In the general air tribalism inevitably perishes. Those who, as many in authority would wish, attempt to revive or create, by special schools or otherwise, a tribal autocracy or oligarchy, are following a

policy both futile and mischievous. They merely hinder the growth of new social institutions. And these, as they must be adapted to the economic system which Europeans brought with them and imposed, must have the character that in the rest of the world is created by similar conditions. Not the disappearance of tribalism, but the merciless speed of its destruction is to be deplored, as well as the fact that the changes have been unrelated to any desire in the minds of those who experience them. Tribalism deserves a euthanasia, but cannot be galvanised into new life. It is as absurd to expect old organs of authority to function after a social revolution in Africa as in England. If we replace the unconscious social ends of village life by the conscious personal ends followed in modern industry, a chief's authority becomes a mere anachronism.

It is, of course, excessively difficult for us to picture the actual changes in the minds of people plucked out of tribalism and plunged into industrialism. The first point to be grasped is that in tribalism a man has a code that he lives up to, almost without effort. It is not altogether what we call a good code. Some tribes have customs that are little more than a ritual of sexual vice. But both the good and the bad parts of the code are obeyed. An infinity of regulations that a civilised society would regard as intolerably irksome do successfully teach what somehow the members of every civil polity must learn in order to exist at all, that no single person dare obey purely personal appetites and ambitions. In the mind of the African who has learned the ways, not only of Europeans but also of tribes other than his own, these tribal tapus fade away. They can only exist in the atmosphere of universal belief and obedience. They have no root in reason. Narrow, unreflective, and unchanging, the ideas found in tribalism might almost be called instincts but for the fact that they are the furniture of minds which each possess a reason and a

conscience. Undisturbed, they enfold men completely. But, like some long-coffined cerement at last exposed to the outer air, they soon crumble into dust. So too with the actions in which tribal ideas are expressed. After a longer or shorter interval they cease to be done, when cut off from their root of immemorial habit.

In the society which we have provided for African wage-earners certain of these tapus are replaced by new prohibitions. In particular, property is defended by penalties for the lawless as severe as in tribal custom. But sex morals are not. So liberty in that phase of conduct results simply in licence to follow inclination. These are extreme instances of what happens over the whole range of ideas and duties. The old rigidity is gone. In his tribe and village home the individual is wedged tight in an unchanging frame of custom. In employment as a wage-earner he suddenly finds himself liberated except for the inexorable demands of the task his master sets him. But he may change his master at the month's end, and travel a couple of hundred miles to work for a new master among a strange tribe. He may live, if he will, without wife or children or home or tribe, and have no obligations that money cannot discharge. Tribal public opinion, once omnipotent, no longer exists for him. Once he never dreamed of doing anything but what every one else he knew always did. Now, unless he has come under mission influence, no law but instinct and appetite is discoverable. For he cannot carry with him to the new life his old convictions of right and wrong.

And what, we must next ask, is replacing these tribal codes, now no longer possible to Kenya wage-earners? Mention has been made of the fact that our law of property is incumbent on these Africans. What else is required of them in regulation of their conduct, by those who create for them the new life, in towns, on plantations, on railways?

The question is equivalent to asking what religion Africans in Kenya are expected to follow.

The prevalent confusion of ideas on this subject in Europe makes it peculiarly difficult to discuss. Every man in the world has reached conclusions of some kind about the world and his own place in it, and has adopted some general plan of conduct in his relations with his fellow-men. The conclusions may be confused and contradictory, a mere reflection of more consciously based convictions held by others. Similarly, among many Europeans as among Africans in tribalism, the general plan of conduct men follow is not deliberately chosen. But everybody has a code, however acquired, that does actually regulate personal appetites and ambitions and partially adjusts them to the common ends of society. And everybody, voluntarily or involuntarily, explains his code by a creed that contains more or less provisional and more or less confidently held dogmas. Men with no creed are anarchists in theory, and men who obey no code in restriction of their own desires are anarchists in practice. No human society, furthermore, is possible at all unless its members in considerable degree hold the same creed and follow the same plan of conduct. Creed and plan together are men's religion. In this real sense of the word there are no irreligious people in the world, since, outside asylums, there are no people who altogether fail to obey social obligations.

In theory, of course, the code of duties accepted in European countries, and the explanations by which the code is justified, are those which the Church presents. But a Martian visiting the earth would be seriously misled if he took the Thirty-nine Articles, or the Church Catechism, or the ethical principles of the New Testament as accurately descriptive of how Englishmen behave in social, industrial and political relations. The religion of the English is in

fact a creed and code of the most diverse origins. In a sense, each man has his own separate religion, slightly different from any one else's. In another sense each social class, and even each occupation, has a different religion that is to a large extent created by circumstances over which the class or group has only partial control and the individual even less. Thus the moral standard of drapers and grocers is different from the standard of seamen, because life in a shop is different from life in a ship. All the various written creeds that some Europeans profess are ideal and are only partly attempted. Notoriously also, there are wide differences of opinion about the behaviour they actually require. For the rest, people get their religion from an immense variety of social institutions, the family, the school, the club, the political party, the newspaper. A thousand years ago one supreme institution, the Church, attempted the co-ordination of all of these. Now they all grow and change and mingle, each of them at once the creation of some partly corporate group of men and the creator of their habits and ideas. Civilisation consists in the abundance of these social institutions, and in the adequacy of their service of human needs and desires. Liberty consists in the varieties of choice they offer, in which men may find both opportunities for corporate creative effort and the fulfilment of the need of support and guidance in their attempts to transcend merely personal ends. With us every social change, as when the printing-press and the uses of steam were discovered, is at once followed by vital adaptations. In the matted roots of our civilisation new and stronger fibres are constantly crowding out less rational and therefore obsolescent supports. But tribalism is like a fragile orchid, native of some windless forest. Whenever men of two tribes meet and talk each discovers first that the other, soon that he himself, has been believing childish fancies. Change to them is not growth, an inward, imperceptible and organic process,

but a disruption from a past which, howsoever brutish and sensual, imposed a common obedience.

Among us the creeds men actually believe and the codes men really try to follow are the creation of our own past, and respond to every change in our knowledge and desires. The least important by-law cannot be enacted unless it conforms to the general will. All the changes in our history, from tribalism to feudalism, from feudalism to industrial democracy, have been the working out in institutional form of religious ideas that we made our own, whencesoever they were derived.

But in Africa forces purely external in origin have been a devastating flood that scarcely penetrated the mental soil but carried away the old social landmarks. There has been no time for adjustment of ideas and institutions. It is even improbable that the tribes of Kenya are richer for the change, certain that they are not more law-abiding. The immense opportunities for good that the changes have offered have not been taken because they have not been seen.

We can now define more precisely the subject of our investigation as the kind of character likely to be possessed by those Africans who as permanent wage-earners have most completely abandoned their former habits and ideas. It is easy to understand certain influences that must of necessity be formative elements in that character. Surviving tribal ideas and habits form one of these. The Christian ethic, acting through the mission-taught minority, is another. Islam, too, will make its contribution, on the coast a considerable one, in the interior one of trifling importance. More than all these will weigh the conditions of men's ordinary life, the activities that fill the great majority of their waking hours. With these every man's religion must conform. If they are not the creation of his religion then they will compel him to adopt a new religion. In that case they are the creation of the religion of others.

In Kenya, manifestly, the plan of life which, under the system hitherto followed, Africans must increasingly follow, is the creation of the desires of Europeans of influence, official and unofficial. These desires issue in their land policy, and labour regulations, and housing conditions and wage rates. These express that part of the religion of Europeans which is concerned with their relations to Africans, with what they ought to do to Africans and with what they ought to require of Africans. This article of the creed of that religion is short and clear. It is simply that Africans have the duty of labouring for the profit of Europeans. It is claimed, of course, that Africans will thereby be benefited. That claim has been made by the supporters of many servile systems in the past.

It is obviously impossible to give the reader exhaustive proof of the statement just made. It may suffice to quote two representative statements on the subject. An editorial in the principal Kenya newspaper, published in February 1924, if somewhat guarded in expression, states the general opinion clearly enough. Referring to the proposal to have an official inquiry of some sort into the affairs of Kenya, the article proceeds:

> There is one point that we must emphasise. So much has been heard of the "Trusteeship of the Native" that there is real danger in the potentialities of the inexperienced theorist to lead the British Government so far astray that this country will be saddled with an impossible policy which endeavours to ignore the permanent factor of European settlement and influence. . . . Meanwhile we must make our own position quite clear. The members of the British Government are the trustees of the native races in theory only; the real executive is the administration and white community in Kenya.
>
> The people and the officials of Kenya know from practical experience and daily contact what the definition of "Native Trusteeship" is; we know it to be the development of the African upon sound lines so that he may become a useful citizen in his own country,

and a loyal and industrious asset to the British Empire. Kenya does not deal in theory, and any effort which is founded on theory will fail when it meets realities.

Twenty years ago Sir Charles Eliot put the case with more cynical frankness when he wrote in a despatch to the Secretary of State: "Your Lordship has opened this Protectorate to white immigration and colonisation, and I think it well that, in confidential correspondence at least, we should face the undoubted issue—viz., that white mates black in a very few moves." Such sentiments were felt to be so shocking that they cost Sir Charles Eliot his post. But the logic of events has proved him in the right.

By this time we can estimate the meaning of the phrase "Responsible Government", which is the first plank in the programme of the Reform Party to which practically all the elected members of the Legislative Council belong. It does not mean self-government. It means the government by the Europeans resident in Kenya of themselves, of two and a half million Africans with no political rights, and of such Indians as the Europeans may be unable to keep out of the country.

Two proposals for changing the status of Kenya have been made. Some advocate a federated State, of which all the British dependencies in East Africa would be members. Others advocate the forming of the alienated areas in Kenya into a separate political unit. The Europeans of Kenya oppose both proposals. They anticipate that their special interests would be neglected if Kenya were reduced to a provincial status, while if they were given the control of some ten thousand square miles in the highlands they could not support an independent government. For in that case the revenue from hut-tax would have to be spent in the reserves. And if it were earned in the reserves as well the development of the alienated areas would be impossible. So, as they see clearly that their prosperity wholly depends

on the policy followed by those in political control of the natives in Kenya, their aim is to acquire complete authority over the whole country. Their idea is to see the whole able-bodied African population engaged in developing the alienated land, while those left at home in the reserves are engaged solely in growing food. The fact that this ideal has in large measure been attained cannot content them. Under Crown Colony Government its realisation may at any moment be rendered impossible. If a British Parliament, for instance, gave equal franchise rights to Indians and literate Africans, or if it insisted on reversing the policy of denuding the reserves of able-bodied men, the hopes of the European colony would be completely and permanently wrecked. So that with these men it is a case of gain all or lose all. The dogma underlying these claims, that God, or nature, has set an impassable gulf between men with pale and men with dark skins, will be discussed in a later chapter. Here we are concerned only to realise the implications of that dogma to Africans.

Hitherto, moreover, the colonists have succeeded to admiration in exercising power without responsibility. They have managed indeed far better than would be possible under " Responsible Government ". For they not only got the Uganda Railway as a free gift from the British tax-payer, but have persuaded him, as will be shown in Chapter XIV., to give them money—give, since no interest is charged—for new railways, and even to allow them to spend a large part of the gift in meeting deficits in ordinary revenue. Certainly no one can accuse the British tax-payer of lack of generosity when, though paying a five shilling income-tax himself, he continues and even increases his benevolences to people who decline to pay any income-tax at all.

In this country it is supposed that these railways are to serve African producers. To some small extent that is the

case. But the true state of affairs in regard to railway policy can best be understood from a speech made by the present Governor at the opening of the largest of these branch lines. The Nairobi correspondent of the London *Times* reports that "on the arrival of the train Sir Robert Coryndon made a speech in which he paid tribute to the courage and patience of the farmers who had worked unceasingly until the arrival of the railway and who would now reap the reward of their pioneer spirit. He announced that £5000 had been voted for the construction of feeder roads."

No one should grudge these English and Dutch farmers facilities for marketing their produce. Yet surely it is fair to ask why this European population of less than a thousand souls should be favoured by a loan without interest at the cost of the British tax-payer. One is perfectly safe in asserting that, except to connect Government stations, the Government has never spent £5000 on roads in native reserves in the whole history of the colony. Besides these favours from the British tax-payer, the farmers and planters of Kenya, be it observed, enjoy all the advantages of a system of slavery with none of its disadvantages. The State sees to it that the bulk of men available as labourers seek employment, and both prosecutes and punishes them if they desert employment. The employer need neither buy his workmen, nor feed their dependents, nor support the workmen themselves in old age or sickness—all of these obligations which, under slavery, the slave-owner cannot escape. Instead he merely buys labour at his own price—wages being an unfortunate necessity to the revenue of the colony—and is perfectly sure of getting the labour so long as the Government remains under his influence.

The reader will notice that opinion among the European colonists is here always alluded to as if it was homogeneous.

That is not strictly true. There are many who in private sincerely deplore some of the results of the policy that has been followed. But very few indeed can so liberate themselves from the prevailing atmosphere as resolutely to trace these incidental evils to their causes and even in their own minds to challenge the permanent validity of the economic system which creates these evils. And in any case these men now referred to are not vocal. They do not count. They attempt no influence over events. They have no common or coherent plan for such a modification of the system as alone could bring about any change in its social or moral results.

Here again, once more, one would beg the reader not to infer from his probably unfavourable verdict upon the system, that the people who operate it are of bad character. The mere suggestion of such an inference will seem a gratuitous impertinence to people in Kenya. But if they reflect they will realise the real danger of people in England confounding these two things. There is room for legitimate differences of political opinion as to policy in Kenya, if only because it is unique in our Imperial history. There is even a possibility that, as happened in the Belgian Congo, European opinion may insist on sweeping changes. And there is a very real and a very natural danger that, especially if the Europeans offer illegitimate resistance to their country's will, those of them who deserve fair treatment and the just reward of their labours should be treated unjustly. It is no more than their due to state that they have as high a personal standard of justice in dealing with Africans as employers have in other countries. It is true that circumstances largely beyond their control have endowed them with unjust privileges and fostered the growth of illegitimate hopes. They have of all people in the world the least right to decide the policy to be followed in Kenya, since circumstances make any disinterested judgement impossible

to them. One would think that fact obvious enough. Yet one finds governors and ecclesiastics assuming that these men should have what amounts to the power of vetoing any proposal that runs counter to what they regard as their interests. Would our country ever have abolished slavery if she had waited for the slave-owners to be convinced of the wisdom of abolition? Do we allow to the owners of coal mines a power of veto over mining legislation? Both wisdom and justice surely demand that the four thousand unofficial European electors of Kenya, though without doubt as capable of dealing with their own affairs as any other four thousand electors in England or Australia, should, when the concerns of the Africans of Kenya are in question, be regarded as the worst kind of judges but the best kind of witnesses, witnesses who are important, not merely because of their great wealth but also because of their most valuable functions in the industries of the colony. Like the owners of land and capital in every country, they have unique opportunities of serving the community by their wealth and knowledge. In the end they will win for themselves the place their services deserve. But they have no right to assess the value of these services themselves. And when they rate them so highly as to demand the decisive voice in the colony's affairs, they are making a demand that is as unreasonable as a similar demand by the principal owners of the land and factories of England would be. Nor should it be forgotten that neither native interests nor the interests of local Europeans, nor British, nor Imperial interests suffer, where, as in British West Africa, or in Tanganyika Territory, or in India itself, European immigrants have either small political influence or none at all.

This account of the attitude of Europeans in Kenya to their African neighbours was necessary because African opinion is conditioned by it. The changes that take place

in the minds of Africans depend in the main on the general plan followed by Europeans in their behaviour to Africans, so that, for example, these changes are quite different in character in the northern half of Nyasaland from what they are in the neighbourhood of Nairobi. In the one case missionaries, and in the other farmers and planters, are practically the only Europeans permanently resident.

It is common knowledge that Africans did not take kindly to wage-earning when it was first introduced. Even now, if direct taxation of Africans and administrative pressure were done away with, perhaps no more than a tenth, and certainly no more than a fifth of those now employed, would remain in employment, though no doubt higher wages would increase the proportion. What is the usual state of mind of the rest, who work for wages more or less unwillingly?

The first thing to note is that average labourers resent having to pay their wages away in taxation far more than having to work for wages. In other words, they blame the Government rather than private employers for finding themselves so poorly recompensed for their labour. This habit of blaming the Government for everything that goes wrong is quite incurable as things are now. If one tries to argue about it one is simply reminded of the undeniable fact that the Government has made itself responsible for everything. Does a chief take bribes or flog people unjustly? Well, did not the " Serkali " give him the power to do so? Does some farmer defraud his men of their wages? Was it not the " Serkali " that gave him the land? Do the cattle die of some sickness? Was it not the Government which introduced the disease by bringing in foreign cattle, as is proved by the fact that these are always needing veterinary officers to doctor them? These are the arguments the more outspoken Africans use. Most district

officers are popular, and the unpopular orders they have to carry out are laid at the door of a "Serkali" which is so impersonal that it is even, by some, distinguished from the Governor. So great and so universal is this unpopularity as to make it probable that, if any considerable body of the European colonists attempted to overthrow the Government by violence, the revolution would be quite popular. Twenty years ago district officers used to tell the people that unofficial Europeans had no authority and that their affairs were no concern of the Government. But for many years the authorities have instructed them to work in close association with farmers and other Europeans. In fact they are expected to attend the meetings of the local European associations, in order to hear criticisms and answer questions.

This feeling of resentment at the Government is the only common ingredient in average native opinion. Political thinking is probably rare, though one may hazard a guess that it may be going on quietly, in groups, all over the country. Associations for political purposes, and even public meetings to discuss public questions, are forbidden by authority. Chiefs have to keep a watchful eye on people who discuss political grievances. So far repression has been successful. Native opinion has not sufficiently ripened so as to make any seditious movement possible. A whiff of rifle fire made an end of the Thuku movement, and only the mildest of measures have been necessary to prevent its recurrence. The raw material of sedition is present in abundance, grievances about labour and wages, and the tax and insecurity of land tenure, and tribal police, and quarantine regulations and so forth. But grievances have to rankle for a long time before they result in any search for a remedy. The vast majority in Kenya do no thinking except about the necessities and the pleasures of life, about work and money and food, and women and

comfort. Possibly not even in Poland in 1914, nor in Ireland in 1919, did the majority of folk give serious thought to politics.

In Kenya missions teach loyalty, with by no means negligible results. For in that country mission work is in its first stage, at which belief is often easier than disbelief. In Uganda and Nyasaland the harder stage has been reached, in which people contrast what they are taught with the facts of life. Missionaries and others also seek to divert the minds of the people from politics by giving them such innocent delights as football, Boy Scouts, Boys' Brigades and so forth. In truth these efforts are altogether excellent, but as remedies for political evils they are scarcely adequate.

The Government, of course, does all it can under the system to ensure loyalty. Unfortunately the only measures open to it rather have the opposite effect. It strengthens tribal authority, as it supposes, by giving chiefs authority such as they never had formerly. But as these chiefs always have to be carrying out unpopular orders, squeezing taxes out of this village and that, or driving men out to work, or tracking down deserters, or compelling people to be vaccinated, it is little wonder that in the result the chiefs come merely to have some small share in the Government's unpopularity.

This question of loyalty demands a frank examination of its nature. Of old times loyalty was not rendered consciously out of a sense of duty. It was only the malefactors in a tribe who saw that their personal interests could be in conflict with the general interest, and those of them in whom the conflict remained unresolved were either killed or banished. As the old tribal codes were the sum total of a unanimous general will, they were perfectly and instantly responsive to every movement of that will.

Under European influence tribal politics suffer a two-

fold change. The individual is liberated. He sees himself on the background of society as a separate person with separate aims. He can choose his own creed, spend his own money, forget and ignore his own past. So the former complete identity of the general will with the will of the tribal authority is no longer possible. Nevertheless room for these changes might have been found without disruption of tribal unity if it had not been for the other influence that Europeans have exerted. By that other influence the tribal authority has been rendered responsive no longer to the tribal will but to the will of strangers. In none of the tribes of Kenya was there formerly any autocracy. The tribal authority merely asked of all what each expected of his neighbour and was ready in return to render him. Now the tribal authority must bend all its energies to exact from all, services and payments to an extra-tribal authority. The common interest, indeed, is not lost sight of. It is to the common interest that no one who is fit to earn wages wherewith to pay the taxes due from his village is allowed to stay at home. But such a sharing of the burden merely makes all feel its weight.

Any criticism in detail of the things specifically required of Africans by the Government would be irrelevant, and even unjust. Under the existing system it is impossible for the Government to regard tribal opinion, or to attempt to modify its demands in accordance with tribal feeling. The never-ceasing demand for money and for labour is as irksome to district officers as to those who have to obey their orders. It renders any tribal authority of a representative kind impossible, since its first action would be of protest. We should frankly admit that the Government's action in forbidding any Africans except its own paid agents to take any concern in politics is quite unavoidable. The general opinion in Kenya that all political activity

among Africans must inevitably be seditious is perfectly correct.

But, the reader may ask, are there no benefits bestowed by the existing system on which to base an appeal for loyalty? Before any answer is attempted, let us ask what loyalty really means. All foreign governments must at first rely on force, since loyalty to them is never natural. But Governments never rest content with the kind of obedience that is given to superior strength. They soon demand obedience as a duty. Thus in Kenya the Government expects people who a generation ago quickly learned to say "we dare not", to learn now to say "we ought not". In a word, it demands not merely obedience but loyalty.

But loyalty, like personal affection, is never felt merely because it is demanded. It is a wholly natural growth, instinctive under free institutions, but under an alien government arising only when that government so acts as to compel the governed to believe that their happiness and advantage are its sole concern. No one in any country, or any age, is loyal because he believes he ought to be. But people are always loyal, even to those who are quite unworthy of loyalty, when they believe that the devotion they feel is felt also by the object of their devotion.

There is a very great deal of loyalty in Kenya. It is often shown to missions, especially by those of its servants, European as well as African, who could earn many times greater sums in other kinds of employment. A slightly different kind of loyalty arises from the comradeship and sharing of danger by officers and men in the King's African Rifles. Of a similar feeling to the Government there is, among the common people, no trace.

Let us recount the benefits which might show the Government in such a character as would evoke loyalty. It once claimed, but now can claim no longer, to have made

war impossible. Schools, Africans regard as the gift of missions, not of Government. It is useless to urge to an African that railways prevent the miseries of the old system of human porterage, since both the evil and its cure were of the Government's introducing. Government doctors do a good deal, though probably less than the missions do, for African sick, but unfortunately it is the general belief that many new diseases, both of animals and of man, came to the country with Europeans; and that unhappily is true both of East Coast fever, the worst cattle disease, and of venereal diseases, though no doubt the Arabs were partly responsible for introducing them. One claim Africans are compelled to admit, that vaccination has rid the country of epidemic smallpox.

Probably the greatest single benefit the Government has bestowed is our legal system. Its value is seriously affected by the character of some of the local ordinances and by the partiality shown in the courts to offenders of different races. Miscarriages of justice, due to ignorance in African litigants, to inability from poverty to engage counsel, and to the dependence of magistrates on interpreters, are commoner than they should be. The two last causes of injustice could easily be dealt with. No man should be tried for his life without expert help in defence. Magistrates who decline or are unable to learn any African languages should be regarded as unsuitable to the country. But in spite of all imperfections our courts and laws are a great formative influence over African character and opinion.

Then, of course, there are all the undefinable influences that at every turn people with a higher culture exert over a race with a lower culture. The fact that the benefits of these influences are often ludicrously exaggerated should not lead us to ignore them. It is sheer humbug to pretend that unremitting toil is ennobling. And though the artificially low level of wages encourages the doing of much

drudgery by hand which in other countries is done by machinery, there is a large class that is learning a great deal in their work for Europeans, about agriculture, live stock, machinery and much else.

But in this matter also the natives do not discover the Government as a benefactor. Missionaries, of course, are to them a class apart, men who offer great boons at a price in money, effort, and self-restraint very hard to pay. Other Europeans are all, in African opinion, engaged in making money out of Africans. They will say that the Government gave so and so land, and made so and so a magistrate in such a place, the implication being that it provided each of these men, as a benevolence of some sort, with a position to which a certain income derived from Africans is attached. The reader must realise that the most overwhelming fact of life to Africans is the tax. They argue about it endlessly, how they get the money in wages from employers, who sell what Africans produce for their own needs, and how they no sooner get it than they have to pay it to the Government. Their general conclusion is that, except for the little Indian shopkeepers get, wages are a device for getting the salaries of officials paid by the indirect means of the tax. This simple but most regrettable interpretation of the functions of Government is encouraged by the fact that farmers of good reputation who fail to succeed in farming are often given subordinate posts in the Government.

It is the case, of course, that some part of the half million pounds paid in hut-tax is spent in the reserves, in wages to police for instance. But the police are not particularly popular. In fact the only popular way in which the Government could spend the tax money is in schools. Of the £23,000 so spent, natives know nothing about the £8000 paid in aid of mission education, while the rest is spent on educating less than a thousand Africans, largely in towns.

So inevitably, in the view of Africans, they are like bees in a hive, kept busy in making honey that others eat. Among such ideas loyalty is an impossible growth. It is possible to chiefs, to some native clerks, to many of the mission educated. Among ordinary Africans it does not exist. To them the Government is not *their* government. In their view, everything it does, the tax, labour regulations and all else, is done for the benefit of Europeans. It is complained of, in native talk, not so much for being unjust as for being exacting. Africans, by this time, think it a quite natural and proper thing that Europeans should require their money and their labour of them. But they think the demands distinctly overdone.

Thus ordinary native opinion in Kenya is best described as being very bewildered and considerably aggrieved, without having formulated any remedial plan. No doubt individuals have taken this further step, but no European is likely to know about such men. As things are, it is doubtful whether it is ever right for a European to discuss politics with natives. They have no constitutional ways of representing their grievances, far less any means of redressing them. Until a beginning is made with their removal, it is to be hoped that Africans will remain politically asleep. The least movement of protest would be far too dangerous to the protestors to deserve encouragement. The whole European colony is organised for defence against African rebellion, while, except for troops and police with European officers, Africans and Indians are unarmed.

But will Africans in Kenya always submit passively to the system of life we have imposed on them? That they dislike it is undoubted. Is the lack of active loyalty about to pass into disloyalty? Was the Thuku affair a precursor of larger movements perhaps even now fermenting in Kenya, as already admittedly has happened in Uganda as well as in

South Africa? These are the questions on the answers to which the whole future of Kenya turns.

The mere discussion of this subject will be felt to be offensive by Europeans in Kenya. To them it is an article of faith that Africans are a Gideon's fleece, exempt from those influences which have already so stirred the world as to make self-government the recognised goal everywhere. In giving its assent to that dogma the Government has committed itself to a policy of repression, even though it be, as hitherto, of the mildest kind. Thuku was an unworthy person, but one does not find worthy persons coming to the fore in political agitation that is by definition unlawful. The constant unvarying demand for obedience implies that those in authority who make the demand regard Africans as sub-human. If, on the other hand, they are ordinary human creatures, in whom learning to read, and Christian and Moslem doctrines, and political agitation by Indians, produce their ordinary results, then the policy now being followed will produce the consequences it has produced everywhere else in the world, the rise of a movement during which the sympathies of the masses of the people are increasingly alienated from the Government and from those Africans who depend for their privileges on its support.

Those who think the rise of such a movement in Kenya impossible will point to the complete absence of evidence to prove its possibility. The incident described in the next chapter is no doubt too exceptional to found any general statement upon. But those who have never lived in the curious mental atmosphere of East Africa, in which political commonplaces turn into paradoxes, will recognise that certain facts themselves predict an East African nationalism. These are, first, a nearly uniform political system, covering Eastern Africa from the sources of the Nile to the frontier of Natal; second, a nearly uniform industrial system which removes men from their tribal

homes, throws men of different tribes into the closest relations, and in most cases compels new associationships every year; third, the existence of extensive Christian propaganda and Moslem belief, these the great unifiers of the past; fourth, the close racial and linguistic kinship of nearly all those concerned; fifth, a publicly conducted agitation certain to be long continued for the extension of the political and economic privileges and monopolies of Europeans to Asiatics. It is only a matter of time for these nearly uniform influences to bring about their inevitable results. If these results were to have been prevented, it should have been made a punishable offence, as it was once in the Southern States, to teach an African to read. The political situation in East Africa is unique, not because its inhabitants are incapable of the kind of attitude with which we are only too familiar in other subject peoples, but because there is still time to make that attitude an impossible one. We can either make the cry "Africa for the Africans" our own or wait for five, ten or twenty years until we suddenly discover that Africans have become ungovernable, and are compelled, as we have been in Egypt and elsewhere, to make a humiliating withdrawal. Society in Kenya cannot be restored to health without a fresh creation of tribal authority on as wide a popular basis as it had forty years ago. Meanwhile, fortunately, there are several steps the Government could immediately take which, as they would both strike the imaginations and affect the interests of all, would evoke enthusiastic response. It could make the labour market absolutely free, so that all who may wish to might live and work in peace at home. It could allow wage rates to reach their natural level. It could impose direct taxation on the rich and reduce the direct taxation of the poor. And it could spend in the reserves, on education and on organising native agriculture, the money raised by taxation in the reserves. The colony spends

fourteen times as much on troops and police as on the education of Africans. If the authorities want to evoke loyalty from the common people they must spend what they receive from native taxation on books and slates and ploughs and ginneries, rather than on machine-guns that can only ever be used for killing Africans.

The people whom the writer knew best in East Africa were the coast people, both slaves and free in origin. Their little State preserved its independence for generations from both Muscat and Europe, and had all the rudiments, and some of the later growths, of civilisation. They even practised verse-making, of the artificial, highly allusive kind. Being Moslems, they have none of the humility of pagan Africans. Those of them whose fathers were formerly slaves might, more than any other class in East Africa, be expected to recognise how they have gained from the new order of society. Yet they often talk of the past as if it had been a golden age. They admit they would not wish to return to it. But they insist that in many ways it was a better age than the present. They say that their food was cheap and abundant; that slaves had greater leisure than wage-earners now have; that each man had a house of his own, instead of, as now, a room or part of one in a tenement: then, land cost nothing, coral and poles to build with cost nothing, while now they not only have to be bought but have to pay Government royalties as well. One has to admit much of all that. But it comes as a surprise[1] to learn that these people say they are not free. They admit they are not slaves. But their word for a free

[1] The death-rate on Mombasa Island is only about 25 per thousand. The reasons for a rate so low are these. The soil is composed of coral rock, through which infected discharges and other filth rapidly percolate into the sea. It shares in the supply of pure water in pipes that was introduced as a necessity to the port. The population is largely composed of young male immigrants. And, finally, the birth-rate, except among the Indians, is extremely low, probably less than half the death-rate.

man used to mean a man who was his own master. And they say that if a man who has worked twelve hours in a ship's hold (at a temperature of 110° or more) has to go on working for twelve hours more under penalty of dismissal, just because another ship is waiting for discharge, he is not better off than a slave. Most Arabs were too lazy and inefficient to be exacting slave-drivers. Whether from climatic reasons or not, Mombasa dockers, though often immigrants of good physique, break down under half the work European dockers do. They are quite unorganised, but have several times indulged in strikes, though striking is a criminal offence.

It is particularly among the workers who are permanent residents that one sees the worst results of modern industrialism, in the absence of any protective code for the workers. Many, too, of the raw natives imported from the interior for work in the port lose their feet. Relatively high wages, the strong beer of the coast, prostitutes, all the glitter and noise and bustle of a seaport town, amid all these it is difficult for the child of nature to find a school of virtue. Yet many do. Quite a large number learn to read in night classes. But for most, compensation for toil in stifling heat, followed by rest in stifling tenements, is found in the pleasures and vices of life. Through the kinema these urban workers of Kenya have some admittance into our Palace of Art. By its means the man freshly emerged from tribalism can see into the life that rushes past him, the marvellous spectacle of things he cannot hope and scarcely wishes to share. At the pictures he sees women, the fairest of their sex, ogling and languishing half-dressed; criminals enjoying glorious adventures before they are miraculously caught by the far less romantic protectors of society; handsome and reckless heroes capturing thrones and princesses. There he gets to know what life in Europe really is, what Europeans actually do when free to be happy

with the money they go to Africa to get. The splendour of courts, the charm of domestic interiors, the accepted methods of making love, the haunts of crime, all are familiarly known. Thus is the African introduced to the true character and greatness of our imperial race.

On the coast, the influence of the old Arab aristocracy, though declining, is still considerable. The great majority bitterly regret that their Sultan gave their country to the British. They find nothing good in the new age, and, as a rule, will not even send their children to the free school that the Government has specially provided for them in Mombasa. They resent the new code of manners increasingly obeyed by Europeans in their dealings with all others. In that code, which always grows up when human relations are purely economic, civility is the duty of inferiors alone. These Arabs were given no time to make the transition from cultivation by slaves to cultivation by wage-earners or rent-paying tenants. The flood of capital from Europe carried these former slaves into the interior or into the port of Mombasa and Kilindini. So the Arabs sold their land to European and Indian speculators for trivial sums. Most are now penniless, and many depend on the bounty of former slaves for food. A few, who have more or less nominal posts under the Government, have won an insecure position in the new order.

These Arabs feel that in this commercial age there is no standing room for them. Their lands are gone, and their place of honour and authority. Wealth despoiled has usually little difficulty in persuading the common people that their grievances are due to its losses. But these coast Arabs, gentle folk though they are, are a mere anachronism. No doubt the survivors among their children—and they have very few children—will be absorbed by the mingled African and Asiatic population of the coast. The Arabs see their own past through the long rays of a setting sun

that gives departing lustre to what in its noonday we know to have been tawdry and unworthy of preservation. As like as not, even if they had been given time to change, had known sooner that the new owners of new wealth would force them to fight for life by harder toil than they had compelled their slaves to undergo, they would have refused.

CHAPTER XIII

A MINOR REBELLION IN NYASALAND

The Thuku Episode was, strictly speaking, premonitory. There had been nothing like it in Kenya before. It is the sort of episode common enough in countries with a long experience of alien government, but no one, even of those who looked for such incidents to happen ten years hence, expected it to happen so soon in Kenya.

A false impression of placidity was the natural consequence of the cessation of the tribal risings so troublesome during the first stage of the European occupation. These risings were due, essentially, to the discovery of what that occupation inevitably involved, the loss of tribal independence, with taxation and demand for labour as its signs and proofs. The treaties with tribal authorities made no mention of such things. The wonder is that when the tribes, one by one, discovered that the coming of the stranger brought them nothing new but taxation and demand for work, they did not all make a strenuous resistance.[1]

[1] The official reports say that in native opinion the tax, at that time a trifling imposition, was regarded as fair payment for relief from slave raids and cattle raids. Truthful books, such as Lugard's, describe native opinion as apprehensive rather than grateful, and a few years later it was impossible to discover any survival of the idea that the tax was paid for value received. In Nyasaland, by contrast, gratitude for relief from the appalling horrors of slave raiding is still widespread and strong. But the missions rather than the Government are the object of that gratitude. And the writer has never heard any native in Nyasaland associate the tax with the cost to Europeans of suppressing slavery. For one thing, slavery was suppressed years before the tax was first imposed. In any case, no one in either country has any doubt that the object of the tax is to make people work for wages. And war is a word which Europeans in Eastern Africa should never mention in the hearing of Africans without shame.

For the taxes they paid and the work they did brought no return that they could recognise to be beneficial. Yet, except in the case of the Nandi, no whole tribe was involved in any of these tribal risings. The secret of this readiness to submit lay partly in the instinctive respect paid by the tribes to superior civilisation, and partly to the exceptionally high character of such men as Lugard, Jackson and Hardinge. Sir Arthur Hardinge, the first Governor, used to assure the people of the country that their laws and rights would, so far as possible, be free from interference, and he acted up to his promises.

The minor but fairly numerous tribal risings that did occur ceased, not because natives began to recognise that the tax money was spent to their benefit, nor because they became fond of leaving home for work, but because they were always hopeless failures. Naked spearmen fall in swathes before machine-guns, without inflicting a single casualty in return. Meanwhile the troops burn all the huts and collect all the live stock within reach. Resistance once at an end, the leaders of the rebellion are surrendered for imprisonment, and of the rest of the tribe, some return to build their homes again, while others go to work for the conqueror in order to find money to pay the tax on these homes.

Risings that followed such a course could scarcely be often repeated. A period of calm followed. And when unrest again appeared it was with other leaders than tribal authorities and other motives than tribal independence.

The Chilembwe rising in Nyasaland in 1915 so clearly illustrates the character and motives of this new kind of unrest as to deserve narration as a footnote to the analysis of the situation in Kenya. It is specially instructive, because a larger proportion of people in Nyasaland are mission educated than in Kenya, and because there is a better general feeling between Europeans and Africans in Nyasaland than

in Kenya. Use has been made of the report of the Commission officially appointed to inquire into the rising. The writer was also able to talk with many of the survivors of the rising who were in prison in Zomba. And he got most valuable information from the Rev. Robert Napier, of the Scottish Mission, who knew Chilembwe better than any other European.[1]

The first Europeans to live in the highlands of Nyasaland were a party of "artisan colonists" sent out by the Church of Scotland. These men for some years, until the arrival of administrative officials allowed the mission to confine itself to its ordinary work, interfered in native affairs to stop the murders and anarchy resulting from the slave trade, then (1876) still actively engaged in between Nyasa and the coast. Some of these artisans bought large areas of land, then mainly derelict, from the chiefs, left the mission, and set up as coffee planters, using as their labourers the natives who had gathered round the mission for protection. At first very profitable and well-conducted, these plantations attracted many natives of the Anguru tribe from Portuguese territory. That tribe was then much broken by slave raids and was composed of bands of ignorant, suspicious and quarrelsome people under no acknowledged tribal authorities. Parties of these Anguru, ultimately several thousands in all, settled down permanently on these coffee estates on the customary condition of giving two months' free labour in lieu of rent.

A number of these estates had, in 1915, long since passed into the hands of a syndicate with no object other than profit. In the whole of its area of nearly three hundred square miles, with several thousand inhabitants, the syndicate allowed neither school, nor church, nor mission work of any kind, though its very existence had been

[1] Mr. Napier, best of missionaries and best of men, joined the forces during the War as a scout, and was killed in action in East Africa.

rendered possible by the mission, which was only twenty miles away from the headquarters of the estate. The official commission appointed after the rising reported that the " treatment of natives by the manager was often unduly harsh ", and " the treatment of labour and the system of tenancy on the estates were in several respects illegal and oppressive ". In particular the European staff frequently imposed fines and floggings for misdemeanours among their labourers and tenantry.

A native of the district called John Chilembwe had been sent as a boy by one of the smaller missions to America, where he acquired a good education. On his return to Africa no mission would give him the position that in his opinion his abilities entitled him to. He set up a sect of his own, just outside the boundary of the large estate referred to. He there built a church that is said to have cost £380, most of it raised in Nyasaland, an immense sum in a country where the standard wage was five shillings a month. Chilembwe was a better-read man than most of the Europeans he met, and had pleasant, straightforward manners. But he became embittered by the treatment he received from many Europeans, who in Africa often show their dislike of Africans who are educated and wear European clothes. He gradually came to believe that his people were oppressed, and cast himself for the part of their deliverer. He got his inspiration from the Old Testament, a book that has inspired so many insurrections in history, and preached to many hundreds every week sermons in which the example of the Jews in their national struggle with Egyptians, Philistines and others was held up for their admiration and imitation.

Eventually he organised a revolt. He found a quick response among not only the Anguru but also the more civilised employees on the estate already referred to. He sounded some of the chiefs of the surrounding tribes, many of whom seem to have promised support without intending

to give it. His plan was to get the people on the estate to murder their masters, and then to bring about a general rebellion. He had a list of all the Europeans in the country, of whom some were to be killed out of hand; others, including the women and children, were to be expelled from the country; while a few, men and women, were to be allowed to remain as teachers, but without political authority.

The first part of the rebellion succeeded according to plan. The staff of the estate, five in all, were murdered by their personal servants and estate workers. Their wives and children were sent some miles away, hurriedly, but with no intentional unkindness. The rebels even paid women to get milk and eggs for the children, and to hold banana leaves over them on the journey to keep the sun off them. The general rising failed completely. Though at the first alarm all the Europeans for fifty miles around fled, very wisely of course, to military camps and townships, no one joined Chilembwe except the people on the estate concerned and some half-dozen others.

Chilembwe cut off the head of the estate manager, who was specially hated, took it to his church, and preached a sermon with it in front of him on the pulpit, in reminiscence no doubt of episodes both in Jewish and in our own history. Next day, on the approach of a column of Europeans and armed police, he and all his followers fled, and were hunted down in a few days.

Of those who were captured and came to trial less than twenty were executed, and the rest were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. Chilembwe himself, old, nearly blind and, some say, insane, was shot down in the long grass with most of the ringleaders.

The rising was due to a number of related causes which, like those that explain Thuku's career, can have effect only when Africans have enjoyed years of European control and influence.

First of these is the existence of Africans with knowledge and ability. It is unreasonable to expect that missions can protect all these men from the vice of ambition. The necessity of giving them a position in native government, in industry and in general society, to correspond with their influence on native opinion, is described elsewhere. An even greater danger than disappointed ambition among educated Africans is the result on them of their treatment by Europeans of the baser sort. Lord Morley once said that in India bad manners are a crime. So they are in Africa. Unhappily many Europeans in Africa think it good form to be rude to educated Africans. They do not realise that while it does not lie in their power to keep education from Africans, they can make the education of Africans a danger to both races alike.

The second cause of the rising was the ignorance and lawlessness of the people who followed Chilembwe, a character that was due to the absence of schools, and to the destruction of tribal authority. Revenge may be motive enough for a few men in a rebellion, but most must be given hope of success. Schools might have prevented the rising, not alone by giving people proof that a rising must fail, but also by encouraging them to go to a magistrate for redress when assaulted by Europeans. In Kenya, mission-trained natives are almost the only ones who ever do so. In Kenya, as in Nyasaland, a chief may forbid his people to have a school, and a private landowner also may forbid schools on his estate.

The third cause of the rising was economic. The great majority of those concerned in it were serfs surrounded by people living rent-free. Chilembwe no doubt dreamed of an Africa for Africans, but the bait he tempted his followers with was land of their own, and release from the necessity of work without wages in order to pay rent and taxes. Wherever in Africa governments have given land

to Europeans there is land hunger among Africans with less free land than they think they need, and among all alike the fear of losing land. That desire for free land and for security in the use of it, security which events have proved to Africans does not now exist, is an incalculable force in all Eastern Africa to-day. One whole province in Nyasaland, with sixty thousand inhabitants, is owned by the Chartered Company of South Africa. The Company charges no rent to its native tenants, who, curiously enough, have no idea that the land they cultivate belongs to any one but themselves. The Company has leased some small areas to Europeans, but the rents so derived are not nearly enough to cover the land-tax which it has to pay to the Protectorate Government.

It is highly doubtful whether anything will ever convince the people of Kenya that their land is secure, short of a successful action in the courts by some native claimant against the Government. Actions of the kind have several times succeeded in West Africa. The terms of the Crown Lands Ordinances make them impossible in Kenya.

The fourth cause of the rising was the kind of treatment given to the Africans on the estate by the European staff. These severities were due to the fact that the staff felt it to be necessary, in order to satisfy the absentee owners of the estate, to get the maximum possible amount of work out of the tenantry in lieu of rent. The members of the syndicate, who alone received the profits of the estate, were responsible for the loss of life in the rising, both European and African. Brutality was its immediate occasion. But brutality is merely one of the evils that result from the control of ignorant people by men who are encouraged to live by the profit of their labour. Africans are great scandalmongers and delight, round the evening fire, in village or in camp, to make one another's ears burn with tales, most of them quite false, of clever Africans outwitting Europeans, or of African simpletons being outwitted or ill-treated by European

ogres. Murder stories are thought specially choice. No European ever kills a native, but the story, with embellishments, goes round the whole country. Africans regard Europeans in the lump as bad, even though they regard all whom they know personally as good. Those who doubt that statement can never have listened unseen to camp-fire or village talk.

In early days employers generally punished their own employees instead of taking them to a magistrate. Natives sometimes prefer thus to be punished by a master with the reputation of being just. But as every European in Kenya thinks he has a reputation of the kind, the authorities are wise in discouraging these private jurisdictions.

At least two of the Governors of Kenya have supported the claim of the local Europeans to have unpaid magistrates appointed among them, with power to try Africans for minor offences. The claim has always been resisted by the Colonial Office. It is being revived again, and it is expected that a Bill with the purpose of providing for the appointment of unpaid magistrates will come before the Legislative Council this year.

It is impossible to give too much importance to the fact that the law in Eastern Africa does not treat crime by Europeans and crime by Africans equally. There is always some reason, even if it may often be a bad reason, for racial discrimination such as is to be found in Ordinances like the Registration Ordinance and the Squatters' Ordinance. Greater by far are the evils that ensue from the fact that the same offence which is severely punished in an African by a magistrate is scarcely punished at all in a European tried before a judge and jury. How important this whole matter is, is shown when we consider that probably no seditious outbreak in Eastern Africa is possible except as the consequence of the brutality of some European, against whom adequate redress in our courts is regarded as impos-

sible. The other factors in sedition, able and desperate leadership; ignorance so great that it allows men to cherish foolish and futile hopes of success; some long-continued economic grievance, which, whether reasonable or not, is widely felt, even though, perhaps, experienced by few—all these together will not, it is most probable, produce rebellion in Eastern Africa without the spark of some widely known injury or cruelty that turns smouldering resentment into flame. Burke's statement that rebellion does not arise from a desire for change but from the impossibility of suffering more is by no means always true of rebellion in Europe, but is certainly true of rebellion in Africa. Rebellions are never mainly the work of criminals, though bad men often lead them. If only criminals were concerned in them they would never be dangerous. The great majority of people who engage in rebellion are otherwise ordinary people who do so because they regard its danger to themselves a smaller hardship than submission to continued injustice. And the only difference between sedition in Africa and sedition elsewhere is that Africans are exceptionally docile and patient, and, perhaps, that a secret known to hundreds can be specially well kept.

The officially appointed Commission that investigated the Chilembwe rising made a variety of recommendations. Some have been carried out. It is now impossible for a pulpit to be used for sedition. A law has been passed requiring landowners to accept rent in money instead of in labour, but no solution has yet been found of the extremely difficult problem set by the existence of many tens of thousands of Africans in Nyasaland whose only homes are on privately owned land. The Government has not even carried out the modest proposal of the Commission to "introduce some system of life tenancy for individual natives". The Commission also advised that the Government should have power to inspect and, if thought necessary,

close any school in the country. These powers are allowed to the Government of Kenya in a Bill now before the Legislative Council.

It must not be imagined that seditious opinions are common in Nyasaland. On the contrary, though the hardships and loss of life from disease and starvation suffered by the forced levies during the War caused much discontent, loyalty to the Government is practically universal in the country, except among the Moslem Yao. These Yao were the tools of the Arab slavers. The other tribes have not forgotten that they owe their lives as well as their liberties mainly to European missionaries, and also to European officials and Indian troops.

Little likely, then, as any native rising may be for some years, either in Kenya or in Nyasaland, it is far from impossible that one may happen any day. If, some morning, the readers of this book open the morning paper over their breakfast coffee and read of some other Chilembwe or Thuku, they must not expect that some particular act of policy or the unwisdom of some Governor is the cause. They should look on the rising as a by-product of the system under which the very coffee they are drinking is produced. Nor must they blame Governor and Colonial Secretary for repressing the rising with slaughter. That is the kindest way of dealing with native risings. The fact that most of the people who engage in them are in no real sense criminally inclined makes it no less necessary to shoot them. Those who object to the shooting must go deeper.

There would be no native risings in Africa if most of the money raised by direct taxation of natives were spent on native education, if every family had as much rent-free land as it could use, and if those Africans who prefer to live and work at home were left undisturbed by Europeans who think Africans ought to work for them instead of developing land of their own.

CHAPTER XIV

SINCE THE WAR

The War caused injury to the property of very few Europeans in Kenya. Its economic effects were stimulating. The cost of subduing the Germans in East Africa is credibly reported to have been greater than the cost of the South African War. The base of the main forces was for long in Kenya, and the shopkeepers of Mombasa and Nairobi, European and Indian, reaped a rich harvest from the money spent by the War Office and the troops. The Government of Kenya nevertheless, unlike the Governments of most other British Colonies and Dependencies, has found itself unable to afford any contribution to the cost of the War. The reason will be explained in this chapter. The Masai made a gift of several hundred cattle to the forces.

The boom after the War allowed many of the earlier colonists to sell land at the high prices mentioned in Chapter VI. Then followed the world-wide collapse of trade. It was nowhere felt more severely than in Kenya. Even before it arrived, however, the Government of Kenya had got into great financial straits.

A year or two before the War the revenue of the colony, thanks to the stimulants of the large and steady import of capital in credit form, and of the consequent rise in the price of land, had at length caught up with its expenditure. The local treasury was thus liberated from the control of the Imperial treasury, which is always strictly enforced upon dependencies in receipt of Imperial subventions. During

the War expenditure was diverted from civil to military purposes, while the artificial prosperity of trade due to the War caused a large increase in the revenue from Customs.

But when, after the War, the country was thrown on its own resources, these were soon found to be quite inadequate to the needs of the Colonial Exchequer. The Government proposed to double the hut-tax from eight to sixteen shillings.[1] The Colonial Office reluctantly consented, but only on condition that Europeans and Indians contributed by a land-tax, and by an income-tax, to the increased taxation. The proposal to have a land-tax was received by the dominant interests in the country with the same enthusiasm as the devil is said to show for holy water. It was soon buried in oblivion. The Bill imposing an income-tax at the rate of a shilling in the pound was passed, on the instructions of the Colonial Office, by the official majority, against the wish of the representatives of the European Colony. The tax was met by the skilful and organised, though no doubt strictly legal, resistance of those Europeans who were in a position to offer it. The proportion of the total assessment falling on the different occupations proved to be as follows:

	Per cent.
Civil servants	31·7
Commercial	28·8
Employees	15·4
Professional	4·9
Farming and planting	3·0
Others, including banks and shipping companies	16·2
	100·0

The tax contributed to the colony's exchequer for only one year. It was seen to fall with obvious injustice on those

[1] The following figures are taken from official returns:

Hut and Poll Tax.		*Non-native Poll Tax.*	
1913–14	£171,770	1913–14	£11,221
1920–21	£658,414	1920–21	£25,542
1922	£506,414	1922	£25,391

who did not, or could not, conceal their incomes, and was repealed.[1]

The writer is unable to offer any adequate explanation of the fact that the profits of agriculture were so small a proportion of the total assessment. A very partial explanation was given in the Legislative Council by Sir Northrup Macmillan, whose words were thus reported in the local press: "He felt, however, that it was impossible to tax farmers, many of whom derived their incomes from other countries where it was already the subject of taxation". That statement may be true of a third at most of the farmers and planters in the colony. It is also true that the tax fell to be paid when trade depression was at its worst. It is nevertheless doubted by no one in the colony that during the War, just after the War, and again during the past two years, very large profits indeed have been made out of sisal fibre and coffee, and during the last period, out of maize as well. Profits are, as a rule, proportionate to the numbers of labourers employed, since their wages are quite a small part of the cost of production.

The repeal of the income-tax, and the reduction of the poll-tax from 16s. to 12s. after the Thuku Episode, made the financial position of the colony worse than ever. A Committee was appointed to discover where the various public departments could economise, and to discover revenue-producing alternatives to the ill-fated income-tax.[2]

[1] The Europeans who successfully resisted the income-tax are the most influential people in the colony. Africans who attempt to evade or who refuse to pay the hut-tax are punished, in accordance with the law, by having their homes burnt down.

[2] The appointment of this Committee was preceded by an agitation in which Major Grogan took a prominent part. He began the economy campaign by a most courageous speech, in which he pointed clearly to the real source of the financial embarrassment of the colony. He showed that the expenditure of the Government was about three times the value of the colony's exports. And he was so bold as to criticise the excessive consumption of alcohol in the colony. The sums spent on alcohol in the colony are indeed prodigious, amounting to at leas £150,000 a year. For several years the price of spirits was little more than half

One of the members of the Committee was the owner of the largest wheat-growing estate in Kenya, another the owner of the largest timber concessions in the country. The Committee advised that imported wheat, flour and timber should bear an *ad valorem* duty of 100 per cent and that Government Departments should be forbidden to use any but local timber.[1] These duties were actually twice carried through the local legislature, although on the second occasion the disapproval of the Secretary of State had been announced. In the end a general protective tariff was imposed, of which duties of 30 per cent on wheat and flour, and of 50 per cent on timber, form part. This tariff has brought in far less than was expected. It seems not to have been foreseen that Africans who had to pay increased direct taxation out of scarcely increased wages would spend less on trade goods. The imports of the most important of these, cotton-piece goods, fell by more than half.

During the past four years the colony has been plunging deeper and deeper into debt. Judged by any ordinary standard it is bankrupt. Needless to say, the course that has been followed would have been impossible if the British Treasury had remained in control. Before 1921, annual deficits were met by the sale of stores and out of accumulated balances. In 1921, £500,000 was borrowed and appropriated to ordinary revenue. The Colonial Treasurer, in his report for the year 1922, wrote that "on the 31st Dec. 1921 the colony had borrowed on general account from its loan funds a sum of £879,059". And also that "the balance

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the price in this country. In the township of Rumuruti, where once the officer in charge of the Northern Masai Reserve had his station, there were, in one recent year, four licensed premises among a population of six European adults.

The unprecedented disproportion between the value of the colony's exports and its public expenditure is due, of course, to the fact that it has been living on imported credits, which were expended, in the main, on buying land at inflated prices rather than on works necessary to production of goods.

[1] A local wag once classified the timber grown in Kenya as of two kinds, the kind you cannot drive a nail into, and the kind that splits when you do.

sheet now submitted clearly reveals the fact that the amount due from General Account to Loan Account stood at the end of the year at £1,304,715, that is, the amount had increased during the year by £425,656". By the end of 1922, £5,000,000 had been borrowed on the London market, ostensibly for the building of branch railways and a deep-water pier at Kilindini.[1] By 31st December 1922, £2,924,550 out of the £5,000,000 had been spent as follows: £600,000 in repayments of advances and purchase of reserve stores for railway and steamer services, which in previous years had been spent without replacement; £90,755 in interest; £1,103,912 in repaying previous loans;[2] £423,544 in "expenses of issue and deduction for discount". The balance of £706,339 was presumably spent on the railways and harbour works for which the whole loan was ostensibly raised. The proportion that sum bears to the total seems surprisingly small to any one not a financial expert.

In the financial report for 1922 the revenue is given as £1,649,032 and the expenditure as £1,972,221. An unexplained windfall of £152,123 from the Uganda Railway was included in ordinary revenue. In these annual financial statements in recent years one invariably finds that both loans and interest on loans are spent as if they would recur annually, while if less of a loan than had been calculated is spent on some public work, the interest on the surplus money is reckoned as ordinary revenue.

Fifteen or twenty years ago the Uganda Railway used to contribute substantially to the colony's revenues. The sum thus paid, in one year, amounted to as much as 2 per

[1] The British Government declined to guarantee the interest on this loan. The lenders asked the Government to allow the Crown lands, consisting mainly, of course, of native reserves, to be pledged in security for the loan. The Colonial Office rejected that proposal.

[2] The writer has been unable to discover whether any of this sum was spent on works of a reproductive nature. Most probably not.

cent of the railway's capital cost, which of course has been borne entirely out of Imperial funds. In recent years revenue has been insufficient to cover working expenses.[1] The reason is not bad management, but the policy of fixing freight charges on export produce of certain kinds at less than cost.

The draft estimates of the colony for 1923 showed a deficit of £381,800 on an expenditure of £1,823,909. "Interest" showed an increase of £315,583. It was proposed to reduce expenditure on education from £69,320 to £53,175, while the military vote was to fall from £189,032 to £180,724 (exclusive of £113,764 to be spent on armed police). The revenue of the country from taxation is derived, in three almost equal parts, from the hut- and poll-tax, from Customs duties, and from miscellaneous sources. In the Budget for 1922, the last printed, the chief items of revenue besides hut-tax and import duties were harbour fees, registrations, game licences, liquor licences, stamp duties (£36,000), court fees and fines (£33,000), motor vehicles tax, widows and orphans pensions contributions (£10,000), Mombasa water supply revenue (£15,000), hospital fees (£7000), school fees (£5200), Mombasa municipal revenue (£7000), "Rents of lands" (£38,000), "Stand premia for farms and town plots" (£5441), and the sum of £55,000 which is described as derived from the interest on "unanticipated receipts from the investment of surplus £5,000,000 loan funds". Loans seem to be a prolific source of blessings in Kenya.

[1] In 1923 trade was exceptionally good in Kenya, and even better in Uganda. In consequence the railway had a surplus of £300,000, which was due entirely to cotton exports from Uganda. The tonnage of goods carried across the lake to and from Uganda and Tanganyika increased by 55 per cent as compared with 1922. During 1923, while the number of European and African employees of the railway increased, the number of Indian employees was reduced by 18 per cent. In other Government departments also the Indians are being rapidly eliminated. It is little wonder that Indians, both in India and in the colony, give no credence to the claim of the Colonial Government to be impartial.

The reader has been given these facts in detail to enable him to judge for himself the value of the answer given in Parliament recently to a question which asked what the sums are which the members of each race in Kenya contribute to the revenue of the country. The Under Secretary of State in his answer gave the following figures:

	Taxation.	Customs.
European	£162,775	£222,300
Indian	46,790	96,900
African	501,615	218,900

The figures in the second column are easily understood. They have been arrived at by dividing up the duties paid in proportion to the estimated consumption of the various articles by the various races. Assuming that this estimate coincides with the facts, two inferences of consequence are clear. One is that an average European family of five persons in Kenya pays £115 in Customs duties, largely to benefit the 1892 persons engaged in agriculture and the numerous absentee owners of land and capital. For the great majority this taxation of the necessaries of life is far more onerous than an income-tax several times heavier than the one that was so much resented. It would also appear that the average European in Kenya consumes goods imported from abroad that pay £23 in Customs duties. The average African consumes imported goods that pay in Customs duty 1s. 10d. Let Lancashire manufacturers and operatives ask themselves why the African buys less than one two-hundredth of what the European buys and why he goes bare-backed and barefoot.

But the first column of figures in the answer is the interesting one. The figure for African taxation is simply the sum paid in hut- and poll-tax. The figures for Europeans and Indians include, of course, the £25,000 paid in non-native poll-tax, 30s. by every adult male non-

African. The balance of some £152,000 stated to have been paid in taxation by Europeans, and of £32,000 paid by Indians, must be composed of the items already detailed as the chief sources of miscellaneous revenue. The reader should run his eye over these items once more, and judge for himself whether any one of them can be considered comparable with the hut- and poll-tax. Yet Members of Parliament, and those members of the public who are anxious for justice to be done to the wards of Empire, were no doubt soothed and satisfied by these not altogether ingenuous estimates of the taxes paid by Europeans and Indians.

A few figures showing how the colony's revenue is expended may be of interest. The following figures are taken from the latest published budget:

Prisons cost . .	£39,793
Police . . .	113,764
European education .	21,140, or about £22 per child of school age.
Indian „ .	8,720, or about £2 : 5s. „ „
African „ .	22,680, or about 1s. „ „
Military . . .	173,336

Two curious items are: £916 spent in "maize export subsidy" and £9365 paid in "compensation to purchasers of Government flax seed".

The two following quotations provide an interesting contrast. The London *Times* published in January 1924 a despatch from its Nairobi correspondent. Therein he reports a considerable trade revival, and the beginnings of cotton-growing in the reserves. But he concludes:

> The financial position of Kenya is the only dark spot in an otherwise bright outlook. On paper the Budget for 1924 shows a surplus of about £30,000, but the expenditure still remains at over £1,900,000, while the revenue estimates are still generous, particularly Customs receipts, although the experience of 1921 and 1922 proves

that Customs duties were a broken reed. The colony faces the future with a floating debt of £374,000 and an overdraft with the Crown Agents—most of which is due to a policy of borrowing in advance upon the strength of the proposed £3,000,000 loan—of over £2,000,000.

In March 1924 Reuter's correspondent in Accra sent the following telegram, as reported in the press on the 7th of that month:

GOLD COAST BUDGET SURPLUS

Promising Cotton Report

ACCRA, *Thursday.*

Opening the annual Budget session of the Legislative Council of the Gold Coast to-day, the Governor of the colony, Sir Gordon Guggisberg, said the revenue was £3,481,000, exceeding the estimate by nearly half a million. The surplus on the year was £750,000, and the trade tonnage was the greatest on record, beating that for the boom year by 180,000 tons. A record was created by the export of 198,000 tons of cocoa. Manganese, the Governor added, was now being exported at the rate of 18,000 tons a month. Raw cotton exports had increased, and there was a promising future for the cultivation of cotton. Fifty miles of the Central Province Railway would be opened to traffic in the coming years.—*Reuter.*

The policy pursued in Kenya of taxing the poor instead of taxing the rich, of alienating unoccupied lands to Europeans, and of forcing Africans to work for Europeans, seems to have proved imperfectly successful as compared with the West African policy of leaving Africans in the secure possession of African land and allowing them liberty to cultivate their own fields.

It is easy now to understand both why Kenya is making no money contribution to the cost of the War and why she asked, over and above the £5,000,000 borrowed on the open market, of which half has been spent in the manner just described, for a further loan from this country of

£3,500,000 free of interest for five years. It is not so easy to understand why it was granted.

Soon after the end of the War the Secretary of State directed that meanwhile no more Crown land was to be alienated.[1] The reason given was the uncertainty arising from the disputed claims of Indians to own land. No doubt other motives have also been operative. The alienation of the 4000 or more square miles of Crown land already surveyed and earmarked for European settlement is one of the planks of the political programme of the Reform Party to which nearly all the European colonists belong.

Since the War, the Indian agitation has so absorbed the attention of the public in Kenya as to have enabled people to forget that the country's finances are bankrupt. In brief, the Indians demand three things: the continuance of free immigration, the right to buy land from Europeans, and a franchise law which, while it would continue the existing adult franchise enjoyed by Europeans and require of others a fairly high property or educational qualification, would place all the voters in each constituency on a common electoral roll. The Indians also oppose any approach to "responsible government" in Kenya. They consider that the Secretary of State and Parliament should have complete control of policy in Kenya, and that the representatives of the electorate of Kenya should have none but advisory powers and duties. Constitutionally, these are all they have at present, but the inactivity of Imperial Parliament has allowed them in practice the chief influence over events. The Indians base their claims on the promise made after the

[1] There is no map in existence showing alienated areas, areas of Crown land described as native reserves, and areas of Crown land intended for alienation. There is an official map of that sort that was published in 1909, but the various areas referred to have quite different boundaries now.

The latest Nairobi papers provide information that the alienation of Crown land has been resumed. Thirty farms were auctioned, in the manner described in Chapter VI., during May 1924.

Indian Mutiny by Queen Victoria that her Indian subjects would be treated no differently from her other subjects. The Europeans defend their existing exclusive right to the ownership of land in the highlands of Kenya by appeal to a pledge given by a former Secretary of State. But on examination that pledge proves merely to be a declaration that it was the policy of the Government to confine alienations of land in the highlands in the first instance to Europeans. It did not prohibit the sale of land by Europeans to Indians. At that time grantees were not allowed to sell their land at all. When they obtained the right to sell it, the law forbade them to sell to any but Europeans. That is the restriction which the Indians ask should be abolished.

The Wood-Winterton agreement, as approved by the last Coalition Ministry, admitted the Indian claims to the franchise and to free immigration, but supported the exclusive right of Europeans to the ownership of land in the highlands. The Devonshire despatch approved by the last Cabinet (1923) gave a communal franchise to Indians and left the question of immigration open. How it was dealt with by the Government in Kenya will shortly be described. The Devonshire despatch also strongly supported the doctrine of trusteeship for the natives of Kenya, and described responsible government as out of the question in any measurable time.

The bearing of this subject on the central problem of Kenya will be discussed in the next chapter. At this point it may be useful to mention one or two points of more than controversial importance. One of them is the fact that European immigration has not filled, and cannot fill, the spaces in Africa left empty by the slave wars, and by the kind of exploitation which since slavery was abolished has prevailed in the French and Belgian Congo as well as in Kenya. Indian immigration could fill these empty spaces. Also, our Empire contains immense scantily populated

areas, in Canada and Australia, which Asiatics may not enter. Second, it is necessary to warn the reader against the usual explanation of the state of mind prevailing among people of British descent in the Colonies. It is often said to be economic in nature. It is urged that an Asiatic, or an African, can subsist on far less than a European, who would thus, under free racial competition, be crushed out. That is not true. The quantities and ingredients of food necessary to health are identical among Europeans, Asiatics and Africans. There are millions subsisting in European cities to-day on less than the inhabitants of the more prosperous parts of Africa get to eat. Race feeling, furthermore, is never so fierce as when the race formerly content with inferior conditions of life demands food and wages as good as those enjoyed by Europeans. In Kenya, race feeling reached boiling-point only when Indians demanded the removal of all the disabilities, whether legal or customary, which prevent Indians from reaching, among other things, the standard of living, in such things as housing and wages, enjoyed by Europeans. No doubt certain fallacious economic ideas are enlisted in support of race feeling, such as that the greater the amount of labour needed to produce what the world needs the better, and that one set of men are impoverished instead of enriched when another set of men does the same work as they do. But the true cause of race feeling is not economic. The thing itself is an emotion, definable only in dogmatic terms, and expressed in economic life like every other dogma which people really hold. The ordinary Colonial European feels kindly disposed to " natives " so long as they are ready to stay " in their place ", by which he means in a state of submissiveness like that of a well-trained dog. But the stage of admiring submissiveness is inevitably very short, and is as inevitably succeeded by a display of all the characters that are revealed when the ordinary human mind is awakened. It is this exhibition of

ordinary human nature, and the consequent demand for ordinary human rights, and for opportunity to reach full human development, which excite race feeling.

The importance to Africans of the contention over the demands of Indians in Kenya is that it suggests what is probably the only way of solving the problem set by the exclusive privileges of Europeans in Kenya. It is always excessively difficult to abolish or contract such privileges. The attempt to do so generally results in a revolution of violence. The alternative way of dealing with privileges is to extend them. Under the Wood-Winterton agreement it would have been easy to extend the franchise to African Chiefs and to a few hundred other Africans who could pass a strict educational test.

In the end the franchise is the only weapon by which a subject race or class can win emancipation. It would no doubt have been wiser if Africans in Kenya had been encouraged to develop their own tribal institutions and to acquire by that means a preliminary political education. Events have made that impossible, though, no doubt, the prosperity of agriculture in the reserves would allow of the revival of the old communal spirit and of the growth of new organs for its expression.

But the fact that the interests of Africans in Kenya are no longer mainly tribal gives them the right to some influence over events in the whole colony. It is absurd to pretend that there are no Africans in Kenya who are as well equipped for using the vote wisely as most Europeans. The conditions of enfranchisement should be such as, while excluding the masses of people who are now unfit to judge political questions, would not exclude any who in future may show by their knowledge and ability that they are fit for full citizenship.

The publication of the Wood-Winterton agreement[1] was followed by a violent political storm in Kenya. The

[1] See Chapter VI. p. 19.

European colony determined on resistance. The Governor, who, with practically all his advisers, was known to be hostile to so considerable a surrender to the claims of the Indians, was informed that, if he attempted to pass the agreement into law, he would be deposed by armed rebellion. This contingent rebellion was most thoroughly organised. Every European neither an official nor a missionary was given a form of oath to sign, by which he would pledge himself to obey a Directorate appointed by the Convention of Associations, the body that represents the whole unofficial European community. Practically every one signed. Statistics of munitions, cars, petrol and so forth were collected. Commandants, whose names were supposed to be known only to the Directory, were appointed to the military command of each district. It was hoped that a large number of officials would consent to serve under the Directory, and it was proposed to send out of the country those who refused to do so. The missionaries were approached, in view of their influence over native opinion, and asked what their attitude would be in the event of this projected revolution. Some score of them gathered to discuss the matter in Nairobi. They discussed it all day. It is significant that some at first were in favour of neutrality. But in the end all agreed to the sending of a letter to the Governor on their behalf, strongly deprecating any unconstitutional action.

How far, if at all, the Colonial Office was informed of this whole matter is a point on which the writer had no reliable information. In any case the Governor was given permission to go home to consult with the Secretary of State. He travelled in the company of the representatives of the people who had used methods of persuasion so powerful and successful. In the result, as has already been mentioned, the last Government was induced to throw over the Wood-Winterton agreement.

The author can offer no proof of the facts described in the last few pages. He has spoken with, or heard by letters from, several men who have seen the forms of oath that have been mentioned, and has also spoken with one of those who were present at the meeting of missionaries. Those who propose to engage in rebellion are not given to provide the public with documentary proof of their intentions. The author can only say that he has taken what pains he could to arrive at the truth. One of his informants is of opinion that the whole movement was intended as a "bluff". All the others are sure it was not. Just how many would have actually used force none can estimate, nor—what is more to the point—just how much resistance the Government would have offered. There is no doubt that the movement was directed by determined men. In any case it succeeded. Once again the verdict of our country was reversed at the bidding of the European Colony, and a British Government allowed six or seven thousand men, women and children in Kenya to add immensely to the difficulties of governing the many millions of India.[1]

The spirit and intentions of the Government in Kenya to-day may be judged from this description by the Nairobi correspondent of The London *Times*, of a bill for regulating immigration into Kenya:

Employers desirous of importing clerks, salesmen, artisans, or other employees must first satisfy the authorities that they are unable

[1] Reading between the lines is not always a fair thing to do. But the hints contained in the following resolutions are broad enough to bear some intelligent amplification by the reader. They are samples from a number which were passed at the time by unanimous meetings of Europeans in the various farming districts. One of them pledges those present to "take such action as may be considered necessary by the Central Committee of the Convention to prevent any legislation contrary to these principles"—the demands of the European community are thus referred to—"from taking practical effect". At another meeting, which was attended by the leader of the European colony, it was resolved "that such action as may be taken shall be of a persuasive character as far as possible, physical pressure only being resorted to in so far as it may be required". So amiable reluctance to use "physical pressure" is surely most praiseworthy.

to obtain what they want locally. When an immigrant, not otherwise entitled to enter, declares his intention to carry on a trade or occupation other than that in which he is qualified, the immigration officer must be satisfied that an opening exists for the trade and that it is in the interests of the Africans. If he is unsatisfied the would-be immigrant is prohibited from entering the colony. Heavy penalties and expenses are imposed on all those who seek to evade the law. Cash or sureties are required of intending immigrants at the discretion of the immigration officer, for the purpose of covering the return passage and the cost of maintenance should entry not be allowed. The Bill gives the power of deportation if within three years after arrival it is found that the person concerned was ineligible for admission. Powers of arrest without warrant are contained in the Bill where there is reason to suspect evasion. In cases where prohibited persons desire temporarily to visit the colony or to re-embark for another destination, visiting passes may be given subject to heavy cash deposits.

This Bill is meanwhile suspended, pending the issue of new discussions on the Indian claims in Kenya now (April 1924) going on between representatives of the Government of India and the Colonial Office. Obviously such a law would allow the Government to stop Indian immigration altogether. No one can imagine an Indian with attainments so unique, whether as doctor, lawyer, merchant, clerk or artisan, that the work he proposed to do in Kenya could not be done by some African or European already in the country. Nor, if the principle were applied impartially to Europeans as to Indians, would they fare much better. For instance, the largest crop grown by European farmers is maize. Maize is the staple food of half the Africans in Kenya. They can, and do, grow it quite as successfully as Europeans. Why not then exclude any European immigrant who proposes to grow maize ? In point of fact, of course, every one in Kenya knows that the Bill is not intended to restrict any immigration except that of Indians.

The methods are well known whereby, as in Australia, language tests with which Europeans could not comply are

used to exclude Asiatic immigrants. So also are the devices whereby, in Natal and Rhodesia, all except a handful of Africans are kept off the franchise roll, although self-government in Natal was only granted on condition that Africans were not discriminated against. But it is something new for a Crown Colony to attempt such discriminations and restrictions. Indians are being reproached in the London press for declining to emigrate in large numbers to British Guiana, where they are under no legal disabilities, instead of demanding admittance to countries where they are not wanted. The reason of their reluctance is obvious. A generation ago they were welcomed to Natal. But when Europeans in Natal got political control and found that Indians were making rapid advances in knowledge and civilisation, they imposed one humiliating disability after another on them. And then, when poverty and ignorance and overcrowding in urban slums have done their work, people point to the diseases and vices these engender as proof that their victims are unfit for liberty.

During the months that have elapsed between the writing of this book and its final revision in August 1924, a variety of things have happened which portend a period of struggle and change in Kenya. This book describes society in Kenya as it was between 1893 and 1920. The appointment of the Committee now engaged in investigating certain of its affairs may be expected to mark the beginning of a new era in its history. The appointment is due to the influence of a number of men who have been offering, for several years and to several religious and political circles, evidence to prove the need of authoritative inquiry.

These activities, as well as partial exposures of the facts in Parliament and the press, have had considerable result in Kenya itself. Except for the beginnings of cotton-growing in 1923, nothing new has actually been done. But there is gain in the mere fact that past policy is being challenged.

At the moment, while events still follow their former course, people are conscious that new currents are gaining strength. Thus, while various reactionary proposals are being made or revived, such as the new Education Bill, the proposal to have an office for land sales in London, and the proposal to appoint landowners and merchants as magistrates, we find the missionaries at last publicly advocating the restoration of native rights in land. Only a few years ago these same men were decrying those who suggested that these rights needed any protection other than the solemn pledges of a succession of Governors. The Bill, introduced in June 1924, for the Establishment of Native Councils is evidence of an even more remarkable change of attitude. It is discussed in Chapter XVI. It is amusing to observe how those who propose these reforms are anxious to disclaim the influence of agitation in this country and of long-feared Commissions of Inquiry. Meanwhile the reader may be assured that no real reforms will get much support in the colony. Land is still being alienated. Indians are still being driven from the public services. Perhaps the plainest evidence that the old spirit is still predominant is found in a Bill dealing with education which is now before the local Legislature.

Some of the features of this Bill are these. It gives the management of all schools, public and private, to district committees, of which all the members are to be nominated by the Governor. The Director of Education may close any school if he is "satisfied that any aided or private schools are being conducted to the detriment of the physical, mental or moral welfare of the pupils". Every "local manager" must satisfy the Director of Education "regarding the management of the school and the curriculum". Any authorised person is empowered to stop any child found loitering or playing in a public place between 9 A.M. and 4 P.M.

The following quotations are from leading articles in the press on the subject of this Bill: "Every single school, including private and mission institutions, will only be allowed to carry on as a place of instruction providing that it holds a certificate of registration from the Government. . . . Should the Department of Education be satisfied . . . that such school is undesirable as an educational establishment in any shape or form, the Department may close the school immediately."

Some comment on this Bill is provided by the fact that the Government is withdrawing the grants made, now for several years, in aid of elementary education in mission schools and continuing its subventions to those mission schools only which teach technical education in approved trades.

This Bill shows the persistence of the same spirit whose workings have been traced out in the preceding chapters. The African is to be regimented by super-Prussian regulations which prescribe to him what he must grow, how he must employ himself, where he must live, what he must and must not learn. It seems almost incredible that men should exist who think themselves so wise as to have the duty of prescribing other people's lives for them so meticulously. One can only suppose that such a theory of government is a consequence of disbelief in liberty for its own sake. But it seems strange that there is no one to remind those in authority in Kenya both that the people of these islands do believe in liberty and that in the past every such attempt as they are making has in the end been utterly overthrown.

NOTE TO CHAPTER XIV

1923 was a year of unprecedented prosperity in Kenya and Uganda. The following are the figures for trade in that year:

	Imports.	Exports.
Kenya	£3,187,747	£1,561,955
Uganda	£1,114,827	£2,434,447

Exports from Kenya are about a third more than they were five years ago, so that the figures given in Chapter VIII. are no longer accurate, though there is no reason to believe that during these five years Africans in Kenya have got any richer. The figures for 1923 clearly show the superiority of purely native industry in Uganda over plantation industry in Kenya. The Governor of Uganda estimates that the cotton crop of 1923 put £3,000,000 into the pockets of its African producers. He was able to report that the country's revenue for the year exceeded its expenditure by £60,700, and that the total surplus balances in its treasury were £441,830.

ADDENDUM

Since this chapter was written there has been a debate in Parliament on the loan that is to be free of interest for five years. In that debate Sir Robert Hamilton, for long the Senior Judge and then Chief Justice in Kenya, is reported as follows: "This is part of a scheme for spending £8,000,000 which is to be devoted to the building of railways for the development of Kenya, particularly in connection with cotton-growing. We are asked to vote the money now being considered on the ground that it would develop cotton-growing in Kenya. I lay special stress on that, because I wish to ask the Minister particularly on what lines this money is to be spent. If we look at the scheme that is before us, we will see that the line which is called the Nakuru-Turbo line is to be prolonged to Uganda, probably to Lusinga, with branch lines in the Kavirondo country, which is typical cotton-growing country. There is also a proposed line to Kitale, which is not in a cotton-growing country, but in what might be called a white area. There is a proposed branch line to Solai, which is in a white area also, and to Nyeri, which is in a white area and not in cotton-growing country. For those three branches £1,000,000 is set aside.

"The Committee ought to know clearly whether the sum we are asked to vote to-night, or any part of it, is to go

to those three branch lines, because we are being asked to devote a sum of money to the development of cotton-growing in the Empire.

"I want to call the attention of the Committee to the remarkable alignment of the Nakuru-Turbo line. The idea of the line was to open up the plateau lying to the north of the Uganda Railway. The line could have been taken from the Uganda Railway at the summit perfectly easily. In fact the line was taken off about 50 miles farther back at Nakuru on the floor of the Rift Valley, and a new line was built parallel with the old line at a distance of only something like 10 miles from the old line. It ran along for 55 miles parallel to the old line to a point near the Mau Escarpment, which perfectly easily could have been reached from the old line at much less expense.

"I am told that an estimate was made by the Public Works Department in Kenya for a line from Mau to the point of which I speak. The estimate was £80,000. I think we are entitled to ask why the line was settled in that way, by whom it was settled, and why there has never been any inquiry allowed, though it has been asked for by responsible people in Kenya. We have only to look at the area through which that line has been taken to ask ourselves the question, what was the reason, if any reason there was, why that line should have been dealt with in that way? The public in Kenya have demanded that an inquiry should be held. No inquiry has been held. There the line is. Now we are asked to vote this large sum of money for extending that line. Before the Committee votes the money I think we should have an assurance that the alignment of that railway will be the most suitable for the purpose for which we are asked to spend the money, namely, the development of cotton-growing."



This map shows the branch railway serving the district called the Wasin Gishu, nearly all of which is owned by Europeans. A Forest Reserve, and a small Native Reserve, surrounded by European farms, will be observed. The map also shows why the branch line runs parallel to the main line for fifty miles, instead of following the direct route by Mau Summit.

CHAPTER XV

SUMMARY

In this chapter it had been intended to give a series of summaries, in each of which some single aspect of the facts of life in Kenya, commercial, financial, industrial, political and religious, should be presented in bare outline. The published data, however, proved inadequate to any presentment of the commercial and financial facts. Less inadequate, though far from complete, the industrial facts may perhaps be made to bear a brief analysis. The total labour force of the African population in Kenya is engaged in three kinds of productive effort. Some produce articles for sale as wage-earners; others produce similar articles as an independent peasantry; the rest are employed in growing food for the other two classes as well as for themselves. As we have seen, the first class consists of about two-thirds of the able-bodied males (and a few others also), who receive in cash wages £1,000,000 a year, or possibly a little more. Independent producers, both able-bodied males and others, are, the writer estimates, about a tenth of the total labour force, and the annual value of their produce may be £400,000. This total cash income of £1,500,000 seems to be spent in practically equal parts on taxation, direct and indirect, and on goods and services, in school fees, for instance, as well as on imported goods, such as cotton for clothing.[1]

[1] Exports from all parts of tropical Africa were larger in 1923 than ever before. From Kenya the increase, which was less than from most other African countries, was in round figures 30 per cent as compared with the figures given in

From another angle, the Africans in Kenya are engaged, first of all in supporting themselves by producing food and other necessaries, and second, in making certain obligatory payments, in cash and in labour, to Europeans. Taxation is one ingredient in the total sum thus paid. As we have seen, much of what Europeans and Indians pay to Government is not really taxation at all, but payment for goods or services rendered in direct return. Rents and school fees are examples of this kind of so-called taxation. When such sums are deducted, the £750,000 paid in taxation by Africans is seen to be at least two-thirds of the whole tax revenue. Next comes a similar proportion, amounting to £350,000, of the interest and sinking fund on the £8,000,000 of debt. We cannot expect British taxpayers to pay nearly £500,000 a year indefinitely for the debt. And there is no hope of revenue from the things for which the debt has been incurred. Indeed, a third of the total has been shown to have been spent in meeting ordinary revenue deficits. Third, Africans will have to earn by their labour for Europeans such a sum as will provide to the owners of the alienated land a minimal annual

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Chapter VIII., on which the calculations in this chapter are based. Coincidently, the average number of Africans employed on European estates—who form apparently slightly less than half the total number of African wage-earners in the country—rose from 54,000 in 1920 and 67,000 in 1921, to 71,000 in 1923. The figures in this chapter would accordingly need to be increased by some similar proportion to be made applicable to 1923. But though most of the large plantations in Kenya made profits amounting to considerable fortunes during the year, there is no reason to believe that the cash income of the African population substantially increased. In spite of the fact that complaints of shortage of labour were more numerous than for several previous years, the standard wage paid on the farms near Nairobi was still, in the spring of 1924, eight shillings a month without rations, and but little higher in other parts of the country.

The agricultural report for 1923 contains an estimate, the first known to the author, of the value of the goods produced for sale by Africans in Kenya. This sum is estimated to have been less than £250,000 in 1923. Eight or ten years ago the annual value of native produce sold was certainly far greater, even considerably greater than the sum of £400,000, the author's estimate for 1919 and 1920 given above. The reader may guess the quality of the encouragement to African growers of cotton and maize given by authorities who have already brought the trade in native produce nearly to extinction.

return on its value. That annual sum cannot be less than a million pounds. It will have to be earned almost wholly by Africans, since landowners do not earn their own rent. It is a necessary obligation since, unless it is met, the value of the land will disappear, a contingency not to be thought of under the existing system. Fourth, and last, the Africans of Kenya must earn the bulk of the sum necessary to make the industries of Kenya profitable. That sum is obviously quite beyond computation. It must in any case be greater than the rent charge.

These last three charges, interest on the debt, rent and profit, are at present only being met by Africans to some small extent. They can only be met in full by two means, by an increase in efficiency resulting in production of greater value, and by diverting some part of the £750,000 expended on goods and services to meeting the charges, in taxes, and rent and profit, detailed above. It appears to the writer to be quite impossible for the Africans of Kenya to meet these charges. He believes that the condition of the Colony's finances is thus to be explained. With wages artificially low, and land values artificially high, and production per head, in spite of the unprecedentedly complete control of industry by Government, far lower than anywhere in the world outside Eastern Africa, there seems to be nothing lacking to complete a picture of industrial failure.

We shall do well, furthermore, to remind ourselves how vitally we in Europe are concerned in the industries of the tropics. Measured in value, the wealth produced in those parts of Europe with which we were unable to trade during the War largely exceeds the wealth production of the whole of the tropics. But the deprivation of imports from Europe which we suffered during the War was far less serious than any interruption of our trade with the tropics would have been. It is scarcely too much to say that our civilisation depends on the workers of the tropics, who send us, in

return for manufactured articles, cotton, rubber, oils, and many other things that we now could scarcely exist without. Increasingly these articles are being produced, not as formerly by an independent peasantry, but on the plantation system. That system encourages practices that are contrary to the interest of the European consumer, who demands a cheap and abundant supply. In regard to cotton, and, most notoriously, of course, in the rubber industry, an organisation controlling production has operated to raise prices and restrict supply. These operations are due to no demands on the part of the workers. In the rubber industry their wages amount to less than 10 per cent of the price of rubber.[1] By contrast, it would be impossible for any organisation among an independent peasantry either to restrict production, as has been done in the rubber industry with the sanction of Imperial Parliament, or deliberately to manipulate a crop so as to keep profits high, as has happened with coffee. The European public has not as yet discovered that the raw materials of industry derived from the tropics are frequently, by such means, given inflated values. It is certain that of all the types of industry now existing, profits are largest and wages smallest in those tropical industries that are capitalistically conducted. The vested interests thus created, and the all-pervading influence of the wealth that is at stake, are, in Kenya as elsewhere in the tropics, the skilful and insidious enemies of justice. It need scarcely be added that the difficulties that ensue when the people of countries under alien government become politically conscious are greatly

[1] Figures ascertained by the writer some years ago indicated that wages bear a similarly low proportion of the costs of production in Kenya. The part-owner of the largest sisal plantation in Kenya was reported in the Nairobi press of March 1924 to have stated that each labourer produced £80 worth of sisal hemp. Even supposing that wages on this plantation are half again as much as the ordinary rate in the district, a labourer's wages for a year would still be less than a tenth of £80. The manufacture of sisal requires expensive machinery. Even so, it would seem that both the cost of European supervision and the profits of the industry must be enormous.

aggravated under the plantation system. That stage has not been reached in Kenya. But we can imagine how infinitely aggravated the situation in India would be to-day if the majority of able-bodied Indians had been induced, by the methods pursued in Kenya, to cultivate lands alienated to Europeans.

Another outline to be traced in the affairs of Kenya is political. Nominally the Governor, who can dispose of an official majority in his councils, is under the control of the Colonial Secretary, who in turn is responsible to Parliament. Actually the influence of the European colonists has hitherto been decisive of events. Governors are frequently referred to in public as the colonists' defenders against the Colonial Office, and most recent governors have acquiesced in such a conception of their position.[1] The passage in the Duke of Devonshire's despatch, in which he dismisses the proposal of responsible government, is not taken seriously by the European Colony, but is regarded as one of those merely formal statements whereby humanitarian sentiment in England is satisfied.

[1] An interesting illustration of this attitude is provided by the proceedings of the Convention of Associations in a meeting at which, as is now usual, the Governor of the time was present. The meeting was held in support of the action of the Local Government in issuing the circular on the labour question (quoted in Chapter VIII. and in the Appendix), which had been condemned by Parliament and by public opinion in this country. At that meeting, as reported in the Nairobi press of 12th February 1920, the principal resolution passed was in these terms: "That this Convention views with cordial approval Labour Circular No. 1, of the 23rd October 1919, in so far as it definitely establishes the principle that the labour requirements of private individuals are the legitimate and proper concern of the Native Administration, and earnestly hopes that no attempt will be made to relieve District Officers of the duty of 'exercising every possible lawful influence' on the chiefs and elders of the duty of 'rendering all possible lawful assistance in the endeavour to meet such requirements'."

A supporter of this resolution said that "it was most gratifying to see the spirit of co-operation shown in the Circular, and to notice that, in its tone, Government and the farmers were no longer in opposite camps".

Later in the proceedings, the paper reports: "His Excellency stated that the Government had not the slightest intention to weaken the circular in any particular whatever; the only consideration was how it could be strengthened". (Applause.)

There are many instances in history of the government of a majority by a resident minority of another race, though in our time such oligarchies are to be found only in British Africa. And we are even more familiar with that economic system under which most of the arable land in a country is owned by some small minority of the population. There have even been occasions when alien conquerors have acquired the ownership of large areas of land as well as political control, as after the Norman conquests and after the Aryan invasion of Northern India. But in every previous age the political and industrial machinery whereby an oligarchy could turn its control into profit necessitated legal enslavement. In our age alone has it been found possible for an oligarchy to obtain the profits of the labour of the governed of different race, without creating property rights in their bodies. That is the unique feature of society in Kenya. It is true that Ordinances like the Squatters and the Registration Ordinance assume the existence of a servile status. But they cannot be said to create it. It is rather the creation of a series of co-ordinated administrative acts of cumulative force, which depend for their efficacy on the fact that Africans in Kenya have no political rights or influence.

In a sense, the essence of the economic situation in Kenya is that it is the full and perfect expression of the capitalist system.[1] That is said without casting any reflection on its merits. No economic system is perfect, and the faults of every system are most easily seen, and most unfairly judged, when in response apparently to forces apart from human volition as well as to human volition itself, it is about to pass into some new system. Men once hated feudalism

[1] Compare the fact that now if we wish to get a picture of feudalism in perfect flower we have to turn, not to the countries of its origins, but to the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem. The crusading princes of Western Europe, when they applied their own legal code and their own economic arrangements to the Arabs of Syria, were conscious of as little incongruity as were the men who introduced the capitalist system to Eastern Africa. No doubt both alike imagined that their own order of society was fixed and eternal.

as now many hate capitalism. But the arguments about capitalism, whether in defence or in attack, that are valid for Europe are not valid for East Africa. In Europe the system has grown up alongside and has been deeply influenced by the quite different movement towards political democracy. It is true that wealth in Europe is potent in the political as well as in the industrial sphere. But it has never had things all its own way. With every extension of its power, and every improvement in the machinery of its exercise, extensions of the franchise, and increased ability and desire to use the franchise, have given countervailing power to the proletariat. But in Kenya the conceptions and desires that are the creative forces of capitalism have had the field to themselves. Transplanted to virgin soil where the forces of other growths fail to hinder its solitary development, it has shot up in a night, like the bean tree in the story, until it covers the sky. It is, so to speak, capitalism at its worst, grown rankly into an unnatural monstrosity.

For this, it must always be remembered, the European colonists are not chiefly responsible. They have merely worked out to their full extent the ideas of their time and class which they took to Africa with them. If, as Sir Charles Eliot predicted, white has " mated black in a very few moves ", that is because black had no one to show him how to play his pieces. It is foolish and unfair to blame white for playing a good game. Governors and Colonial Secretaries and clerks in the Colonial Office have been playing black's pieces for him. We may say, now that black has so plainly lost the game, that black's defenders played badly, that indeed they played as if they wanted white to win. But if we are to do justice we should blame ourselves for that. These people have been the agents and mouthpieces of British public opinion. If that opinion does not care to provide itself with impartial information, if it is careless of

the agents appointed to represent it, if it lays down no principle to be followed, and awakens only with the noise of some scandal and is easily soothed by any specious explanation of it, then in effect it resigns its affairs into the hands of interested parties who at least act vigorously in pursuit of their own aims. The Aborigines' Protection Society has been doing what it can for a century. It is hindered by two things chiefly. It knows of many abuses of authority which it cannot publish, since its informants will not let their names be used. And it has no money to spend on investigation. Let every reader who has any income from countries where the workers have no votes send a tenth of it to that society.

But, after all, it is the Colonial Office that should be the protector of the aborigines under its control. It is for Parliament to require of the Colonial Office the policy it approves. And it is for the public to appoint to Parliament men to whom Imperialism means justice to all the wards of Empire.

Providence has entrusted to our country this ultimate political problem. There is no other, and in a sense there can be no other, so hard to solve. For there is no other part of the world where millions have suddenly emerged from barbarous ignorance to be plunged, defenceless, into the current of forces which in civilised countries are kept under control, but which in Kenya have burst all their banks. Extremes have met, in the forms of primitive tribalism and of capitalism in the height of its power and the perfection of the machinery of its exercise. The result has been an economic failure, and the social disintegration and rapid diminution of a race which, even under slavery in America, was robust, industrious and prolific.

Scarcely anything is wanting to aggravate the extreme difficulty of governing Kenya to-day. Indian opinion is

inflamed and jealous, intensely resentful of the scarcely veiled partiality to Europeans of the local authorities. Local European opinion, fearing that at the last moment it may be baulked of its ambition, is determined to resist, by violence if need be, any substantial extension of its exclusive privileges, either to the people of the soil or to Asiatics. While the Africans of Kenya, fortunately rather bewildered than embittered, will need generations of quiet for the growth of social reintegrations to replace those which an unrestrained commercialism has destroyed, and not a few years for the restoration of those normal motives of industry, whereby in place of being forced and taxed to work, they may hope to spend their wages on the comforts and amenities of life. We do not expect people who have worn splints for months to run very fast when they are first taken off. The next few governors will have a Herculean task. And if this country decides on the reform of the system in force in Kenya it will need to have much patience and determination.

The political situation in Kenya is unique, not alone by its display of an unrestrained commercialism in sharpest contrast with the political immaturity and weakness of those who have been surrendered to its influence. It happens, by a strange chance, to be the meeting-place of by far the most incalculable and therefore the most dangerous of the political forces in the world.

Nationalism in Europe has just destroyed its votaries, and for the first time, at least, will call men to new battlefields in vain. And the hope is growing that that other secular struggle between those who defend and those who would overthrow the distinctions and privileges of class, will be settled gradually, and peacefully, by the method of government by majorities. But the third great source of hatreds, jealousies and war—race feeling, and privileges founded on differences of race—is yearly rising in higher flood. In Kenya the issue is fairly joined. European and Asiatic face

one another more implacably than in any other country. In its most naked form that issue is whether race, as distinguished by dermal pigment, is the true distinguishing mark of social superiority and political capacity. But the political issue, like the supernatant part of an iceberg, is merely the visible part of what moves in the unfathomed depths.

The subject has a vast historic background. The emotion of race feeling seems to arise at intervals in one part of the world after another, and die away again, sometimes leaving and sometimes failing to leave its mark on the institutions of the age. In the earliest age of the Roman Empire it seems to have been fairly strong. But Augustus had the genius to foresee an Empire with a universal citizenship. Race feeling died away and left scarce a mark on Roman laws and institutions. For hundreds of years, when the power of the Empire was at its height, and during those generations when, in the judgment of Gibbon, its subjects were happier and more prosperous than in any earlier or later society, race feeling can hardly have existed at all. The highest posts of the empire were open to, and not seldom filled by, the children of men as barbarous as Masai or Zulu. Men were jealous of these upstarts, just as now the old rich dislike the new rich, but race feeling seems to have been no important source of the jealousy. Such dividing lines as are visible in that age of the empire were neither national nor racial but religious. Even an aristocrat like Gibbon was compelled at times to praise a policy that evoked loyalty so successfully from the conquered.

By contrast, our kinsmen by race, the Aryan invaders of India, gave to pride of race and ambition of domination a permanent form in the institution of caste. It is one of the ironies of history that their descendants to-day find their situation completely reversed. They in their turn find themselves subject to disabilities similar to those which

they once imposed, and have begun to strive to uproot the very institution of caste on which their own supremacy was built.

In our own country the Crusades seem to have increased our respect for Asiatics. To the people of Shakespeare's time differences of colour and race involved Othello's marriage with Desdemona in no disgrace, while to Scott Saladin was a hero who could lift his eyes to an English princess without presumption. Our ancestors, in fact, treated Asiatics and Africans as ordinary men and women. In the eighteenth century a quarter of the seamen in the British Navy were coloured. Race feeling in our country, as distinct from ordinary dislike of foreigners, seems to have arisen about the time the slave trade was abolished.[1]

From a different angle, the antagonism between Europeans and Asiatics to-day is merely the most recent phase of a conflict in which Helen and Paris, Xerxes, Darius and Alexander, Saladin and Richard the Lion-hearted, played each in his age his famous part. So regarded, waves of conquest, now from Asia, now from Europe, endlessly ebb and flow, the siege of Vienna by the Turks marking the crest of one wave, and our own conquest of India the crest of another. But it is surely a mistake to regard these military conquests as the essential phase of the conflict. Not one of them has been permanent, and the traces they have left are due not to the marks made by the weapons of the conquerors, but rather to the ideas they diffused. But the conflict of ideas has never been a racial conflict, though it has often had phases when it seemed to be. Its nearest approach to a solution was clearly when the Church attempted an incorporation of Semitic and Greek thought, and succeeded, for the time, in welding Asiatic and

[1] The first British Governor in Capetown worshipped in church in the same pew with his African servants. For any Governor of Kenya to do so now would outrage European sentiment.

European into a single society with no national emblems other than those of the Christian faith. In that union the elements of which it was composed were so indistinguishable that in our time some regard historical Christianity as the vehicle of the invasion of Europe by Asiatic ideas, while others look on it as a Western religion unsuited to the people of the East.[1]

The attempt by historical Christianity to abolish distinctions based on race and to exercise race feeling has obviously, whether for the time or permanently, broken down. But the problem set to our age by the revival of these distinctions and that feeling remains an essentially religious problem, incapable of any but a religious solution. It does not exist outside Protestant Europe and America, and it is only in our Empire and the United States that it exists in any dangerous form. The emotion from which it arises is felt neither in France, nor in Southern Europe, nor in Spanish and Portuguese America.

The British public has succeeded in postponing any final decision in this question by the device of allowing to considerable British communities settled abroad an independent authority over the people already inhabiting these colonies. Our own laws contain no single clause creating any distinction on the ground of race. But events in Kenya are forcing our country, indeed have already forced it, to come to a decision. Kenya is the only part of the world under the control of the British Parliament where Asiatics and Africans rest under statutory disabilities.[2] As we have seen, evasion of any such issue results,

[1] An amusing instance of the latter view is found in Kipling's assertion that "there ain't no Ten Commandments" east of Suez, when in fact they are recorded to have been promulgated almost within sight of that place.

[2] At least one statutory disability also exists in British Malaya, where, however, as a most trustworthy correspondent states, the Government has played a far more creditable part than the Government of Kenya in protecting its subjects from exploitation.

not in its postponement, but in local interests making decisions.

The arguments that have been used, mainly by American authors, to support the theory that the Nordic race is superior to the other races of mankind are quite valueless. They have simply been invented to prove what was already an article of faith. Very few of the world's greatest men have been Nordic in race. The great majority of them, including the greatest men of British stock, have belonged to either the Semitic or the Mediterranean race. The arguments, similarly, that are based on economic considerations are, as has already been shown, as wholly irrelevant. Whether they are right or wrong, those who believe in the colour line believe, not because they have been convinced by economic considerations or by ethnological researches, but because they feel they are right in so believing. And that belief is held passionately by millions.

Laws, regulations and custom reasonably require in every country that certain functions necessary to society should be performed only by those who are qualified by having reached a certain standard of character, intelligence and knowledge. Tests of these qualities are applied in the case of entrants to all the skilled occupations except the commercial. But these are not the grounds on which, in South Africa, Africans are prevented from engaging in skilled trades, or on which in Kenya, Indians are denied a place on a common electoral roll. It is, in fact, notorious that these differences, which the law rightly recognises, exist within every race. Society rather imposes duties than grants privileges in the case of individuals of superior ability and civilisation. But there is abundant proof that Asiatics are as capable of civilisation as Europeans, and no scrap of proof that Africans are not. In any case, the colour line is used not to separate the civilised from the uncivilised,

but to prevent equal opportunities of civilisation from being given to persons of certain races. Why else has the Government of Kenya borne most of the cost of educating European children, while it refuses subventions to mission schools in which African children are taught to read, and only gives subventions for teaching Africans trades that make them useful to Europeans?

A good many years ago the author happened to be the chairman at one of the dinners given by Scotsmen on St. Andrew's Eve in Eastern parts to citizens of other European countries. This dinner was held in Mombasa. He took the liberty of pointing out that if St. Andrew himself, or his master, had arrived at Mombasa that very day he would not have been allowed to land unless he had a sum of money which no wandering apostle would be likely to have, and certainly his master never had; that if he were allowed to land, a Syrian Jew would be allowed to do no work but a labourer's; that he would be refused admittance to the dinner held in his honour; and that most of those who were partaking of it would refuse to take him by the hand. To all of these restrictions we may now add, that if the present proposals of the Government were carried into effect, no native of Syria could land in Kenya if the authorities considered that the work he proposed to do could be done by any one already in the country, and that if our modern St. Andrew proposed to teach in Kenya he would have to register himself and his school, and could teach only what the authorities approve.

It is natural that we should turn to inquire how the Church to-day is dealing with this problem. Its confessed task is to solve the disharmonies and conflicts and separating differences in human society, whether they have personal or racial or any other origin whatever, by living on the plan described and exemplified by its founder. Those who follow that plan live as the children of one father. That is

the theory of Christianity. It is idle to say that the problem would be solved if every one became a Christian. That statement is either a truism or a falsehood. It is a falsehood if it means that those who do not call themselves Christians must bring themselves to behave like those who do so call themselves. It is a truism if by Christian is meant a man whose every relationship in life is fraternal. By that reckoning Christianity is nearly, if not quite, as common outside as inside the Church.

The fact deserves notice that distinctions of race are not permitted in the Church of Rome. In that Communion the races do not worship separately, as is almost invariable among Protestants. By exception, in Southern India the Roman Church admitted caste, a couple of centuries ago, within its own borders. Separate buildings are even provided for people of different castes to worship in. The author knows of no other instance of the abandonment by the Church of Rome of its consistent tradition of unity in worship, which no doubt has been powerfully aided, as has also been the case with Islam, by the invariable use of a single language.

A stifling air of unreality hangs over our thought on this subject. There are those who urge that the Christianising of Africans would be easier in the absence of Indians. As well proclaim some new remedy for heart disease, but in the same breath admit that it is useless in the presence of one of its most prominent signs. As reasonably claim to have solved some problem in chess, with the proviso that some single piece forming part of the problem is removed.

Again, the claim is often advanced that Christians show their true unity by all alike partaking in that rite which beyond all others Christians account the most sacred. In Africa the races nearly always partake separately. But when they do so worship together they celebrate a rite that was intended as a symbol. Its purpose is to show that no sacrifice whereby mankind's common lot can be shared is

ever too great, no gift too extravagant to serve the need of the least worthy, and that those who share the symbols of that ancient gift and sacrifice seek to share without stint or regret all that lies on life's table with all who sit around it. The rite is sacred, not as being unique, not as contrasting, for its partakers, with their common ideas and actions, but as being their pattern. Lacking its counterpart in every phase of life, it is not sacred but infamous.

It is one thing to say, as most of us do to-day, that such a religion is impossibly hard even in Europe, and in Africa unimaginable. (Yet some men and women do so live and are happy.) But to pretend that the Church can evade such difficulties or prescribe for them some easy solution in accordance with the fashion of the times is to falsify its very spirit. Race feeling offers a problem to the Churches in the twentieth century far harder than it was in the first century, not only because it is now at its height and was then scarcely felt by any except the Jews, but because the Church seems to have lost its capacity of corporate action. Any action in regard to racial distinctions at all possible for it to take would at once cause disruption, just as during the war disruption would have been the result of action in regard to war. No pronouncement by Bishops, Assemblies or Conferences, even if such could be imagined, could, on any disputed living issue, carry with it the support of every member. (The Society of Friends offers the only exception.) But the fact is of some importance that the Church of to-day professes still to be bound by the doctrines of its earliest age. In that age the Church claimed to be, and was attacked for being, a separate race or nation, within which all other distinctions, whether of race or class, were obliterated. Its great leader even made the dogmatic assertion that there were no real differences between race and race. He held, as we should say, that the obvious distinguishing marks of race are extrinsic, not intrinsic, comparable, as it were,

to those differences that arise from wealth, which are eliminated when all are equally obliged to work and have the same standard of luxury and comfort. Even if one gives full weight to the favourable conditions of that age, it remains an astonishing achievement to have created a society in which people of all sorts lived like the members of a single family, in which all hindrances to solidarity that were not personal, and many that were personal, disappeared. There is abundant evidence that varieties of opinion in this remarkable society led to constant hot disputes. These are not incompatible with family life. What the close intimacy between Jew, Greek and barbarian rather implied was a social union and all that it involved, a common language, the same table manners, similar fashions in dress and such like.

There is no doubt also that the early Church regarded its family character, as we may call it, as essential to its existence. Everything was forgiven but divisions. What seems so surprising to us is that, except just at the very first, the dividing lines that threatened, that did indeed in the end interrupt the common family life, were due to differences, not of class, nor of race, but of opinion. The fusion which the heat of the first fervour had achieved was so successful that fission was only possible along new lines. Ideas and ideals such as these are so foreign to our thought, so contrary to what we regard as sensible, that we can only grasp them by a resolute effort. They are worth grasping, because this theory that mankind is composed wholly of blood relations, and that separating differences of class and race are not inherent but due to exterior and remediable causes, was not only in extensive and fairly successful operation for many generations, but is still a vast creative influence. The contrary theory, that inherent differences are the basis and justification of the exclusive distinctions between races and classes, is not working very successfully in practice.

There is a well-known man in Nairobi who finds Scriptural authority for the dogma of the superiority of the European, and proves from the Old Testament the inalienable right of the children of Japhet to rule over the children of Shem and Ham. Like all truly religious men, this man feels compelled to relate his religion and his politics. If most Europeans in Kenya see no need to relate them, that is because their ostensible religion is not dominant of life, and because to them the conviction that Asiatics and Africans are their inferiors is essentially a religious conviction that stands above all creeds and laws.

In its two thousand years of history the Church has suffered many strange distortions of its ideal under the influence of local or temporary movements of opinion and practice. But surely this is the strangest of all, that people who profess to worship an Asiatic and to serve a Church that in its foundation successfully obliterated racial distinction between Asiatic and European, should deny to Asiatics, as such, privileges which they themselves enjoy. It is perhaps little less strange that they justify this distinction by pointing to the Christianity of the existing order of society in Europe as contrasted with the non-Christian society of which men like Ghandi and Tagore are the popular leaders.

If modern Christianity is something apart from the world's real evils, from its springs of hatred and oppression and misery, then already, in spite of all appearances, it is as dead as the worship of Mithra. Most certainly any Church that admits distinctions on the ground of race, in the lives of its members, can have none but temporary success in Asia and Africa. In every recent struggle to extend men's liberty or to abate their miseries the Church has taken no corporate action, and as many of its members have been on what proved to be the wrong side as on the side which now all recognise to have been right. So each victory of the right won without the Church's help and in spite of the opposition

of its leaders, as when slavery was abolished, or child labour in mines, weakens its appeal to be the guide of men's consciences. This struggle over race domination and racial disabilities, in which innocent millions may perish, seems to threaten its very life. Europe and Asia, Europeans and Asiatics, European and Asiatic thought have for many centuries been drifting apart. Science, industry and politics have at length re-established a contact that every year grows closer. But without a common sharing of the things of the mind, and of something of the fellowship of a corporate society, increasing contact can only bring increasing antagonism. If that antagonism grows, the struggle of many ages, of which Greek and Persian, Saracen and Crusader were transitory protagonists, will again be renewed, but on a vaster, more destructive scale than ever before. None can foresee how reconciliation can come, whether from a Church in which the spirit of its founder is renewed, or from some new and as yet invisible source.

CHAPTER XVI

THE FUTURE

In a book written to explain and defend the African policy of the Allies at the Paris Peace Conference, Mr. G. L. Beer, the American delegate specially concerned with colonial questions, justifies the action of the Allies in depriving Germany of her African colonies by her failure to rid herself of the evil plantation system, as Belgium, and to some extent France, had successfully done. He says: "The German Government shortly before the war recognised the folly of discouraging native production and had reversed its policy, but the European planters were bitterly opposed to this change, and it had not been effective".[1] Mr. Beer states that "the plantation method disrupts tribal life and leads to

[1] *African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference*, by G. L. Beer, p. 140.

Those who succeeded the Germans in the occupation of their plantations seem also to have acquired ideas appropriate to their situation. They so greatly dislike restrictions on their liberty of dealing with the African population of Tanganyika Territory that they are demanding to be transferred, together with 40,000 square miles of land, to Kenya. It is significant that this demand has been made to the Convention of Associations in Nairobi, as the power behind if not yet upon the throne. The Convention received the proposal with enthusiasm, tempered by the caution that is necessitated by the circumstance that Tanganyika territory, unlike Kenya, is scarcely theirs to dispose of. Thus Lord Delamere is reported (*East African Standard* of 5th July 1924) to have "emphasised during the debate, that it would be much sounder to take two bites in dealing with the problem ; in the first place to suggest that the B mandate for these areas be transferred to Kenya, that it be gradually improved into a C class mandate, and finally full incorporation would come about automatically".

Let the reader ask himself why policy in native affairs and the prospects of gaining political power enjoyed by European immigrants should be so different in the area governed under the authority of the League of Nations from what they are in the area governed under the authority of Imperial Parliament.

depopulation". He even goes so far as to say quite generally that "it has led to the depopulation of Middle Africa in the last thirty years". He describes how "in the Belgian Congo the Leopoldian principles had been discarded and the land system inaugurated in 1909 was based upon the principle that the natives had the first title and right to the soil". His conclusion is that "it is difficult to see, however, how the incipient African plantation industry, based as it was, in the German and Belgian Colonies on hired labour and European supervision, can ever effectively emerge from the experimental stage in which it existed at the outbreak of the War. This system of capitalistic exploitation has never worked successfully in Africa. . . . The consequence must be that many of the colonies, practically all except the British, will have to change so fundamentally as almost to begin their economic life anew." Throughout the book Kenya and the other East African British dependencies are scarcely referred to, partly, no doubt, because their trade is so small. But it is characteristic of the ignorance of East African affairs that generally prevails that an admitted expert like Mr. Beer should apparently be unaware that in Uganda, Nyasaland and Rhodesia, as well as in Kenya, the plantation system is in operation exactly as it was, and to some extent still is, in the parts of tropical Africa that are, or were, under the control of the French, the Germans, the Belgians and the Portuguese, and that, under whatever flag, it produces nearly identical results.

Nevertheless, in spite of all that needs to be said in criticism of the plantation system—whereby the ownership of the soil belongs to Europeans, while to Africans is left the duty of exploiting it under European direction—there is good reason for refusing to regard it as an incurably evil system, fit merely for destruction out of hand. In Kenya especially we cannot blot out the past or abolish its conse-

[1] *Loc. cit.* pp. 118 and 180.

quences by an edict or series of edicts. The authorised agents of our country have given to some three thousand individual Europeans certain extremely valuable rights in land, and have allowed to these Europeans an influence over legislation that has enabled them to give to their rights and privileges a nearly complete statutory protection. These rights and these laws cannot be swept suddenly away without serious injustice. If we could wipe out the past and begin once more in East Africa, then, no doubt, we should follow the British West African policy of permitting the exploitation of the soil by its original native owners. But as a different policy has in fact been followed, its results are what we have to deal with. Wisdom demands that during the next ten years we should make allowances in half a hundred directions; should listen to all sorts of contradictory claims and projects; should ensure that, radical and unmistakable as the change in policy must be, they will spoil the life and alienate the loyalty of no man, of whatever race, whose services are valuable to Kenya.

The plantation system, the author believes, should be permitted in Kenya, Uganda and Nyasaland. The evils which Mr. Beer describes quite accurately as the direct consequences of the system are not, strictly speaking, inherent in the system. The writer would venture to suggest that they would disappear if two conditions were fulfilled. These conditions are: first, the prevention of political control by the concessionaires over the countries in which their estates lie; and second, the pursuit of such a policy in the land outside the alienated areas as would give to every native of the soil the opportunity of supporting himself by his own exertions. The author believes that if these two conditions are fulfilled by Parliament, by Downing Street, and by our country's agents in Africa, the existence of farms and plantations owned and managed by Europeans in the various divisions of British Eastern Africa will prove

beneficial to the people of these countries. Hitherto they have not been fulfilled. The Government of Kenya has sided with European landowners and employers and against African peasants and wage-earners. But it will be quite possible to fulfil these two conditions during the next five years. Provided that is done, everything possible should be done to prevent hardships and losses to which the European community may be exposed during the period of transition.

But there is one contingency that must be faced and provided for. Any violent or unconstitutional resistance to the expressed will of the Imperial Parliament must be followed by the expulsion of the offenders and the confiscation of their estates. We cannot afford to let a community of seven thousand men, women and children (excluding as disinterested in the matter public servants and missionaries with their families) destroy our country's good fame before the world and alienate beyond restoring the confidence of all the Asiatic and African subjects of the Crown. The Europeans in Kenya should be clearly assured that this is no party question in England. It was a Conservative who saved India from spoliation of her lands and wealth, and to-day the bulk of men in every party are still jealous of the honour of the Empire. If it is unmistakably shown in advance that Parliament is not to be coerced, the Europeans of Kenya will not be so insane as to rush to their ruin. It remains for us to consider how, by what steps and in what order, the transition in policy is to be carried out, so as both to cause least disturbance of existing rights and interests, and to ensure for the Africans of Kenya the greatest benefit from the presence in their country of European landowners and merchants.

Some hint of forthcoming changes has already disturbed European opinion in Kenya, and it may be as well to give here a further example, as recent as possible, of what Europeans in Kenya are thinking.

Mr. T. J. O'Shea was the successful candidate in a contested election to the Legislative Council held in April 1924. He is reported in the *East African Standard* of 29th March as having addressed a meeting of his constituents in these words:

" My statement at various meetings that I regard self-government as the only possible basis on which we could look forward to security of tenure in this country is no mere electioneering platitude." He then referred to the " proposal for turning Kenya into a cotton-growing area for the Lancashire mills ", and deprecated the proposal to allow " the natives to be exploited in the interests of Lancashire ". After impressing on his audience the danger that over-production of cotton would result in a price for cotton that would prove disappointing to its African producers in Kenya, he continued: " And consider our own position. If the natives are induced to go in for cotton-growing in the reserves on a large scale, what is going to be the labour position in the European areas where millions of capital have been sunk? Our present labour difficulties will be intensified to such an extent that we should be ruined, as you may be sure that once the native had tasted comparative luxury from his cotton-growing he would not be prepared to come back to work on our farms at the present rate of wages when the boom was over and cotton was no longer what it is to-day."

At the close of the meeting, in reply to a question whether he was in favour of Government recruiting for settlers, Mr. O'Shea said that "it was not a question of what he was in favour of. Whether we liked it or not we must recognise that a Government was now in power in England with very different views from ours on the subject, and he very much feared that Government recruiting of private labour was a thing of the past ".

It will be observed that Mr. O'Shea rejects the two

conditions that are necessary to prevent the evils which have hitherto resulted from the plantation system in Africa. He would have Kenya governed by its European residents. And he would have the Government refuse to allow opportunities and to give encouragement to independent African producers of wealth equal to those which it allows and gives to European landowners.

Assuming, as surely we may, that public opinion in this country is about to demand reform in Kenya, let us examine how the reforms will affect European landowners and farmers. Chiefly in two ways. First, the labour force available for employment will be both smaller and more expensive. But we may also expect that the men who will in future work for wages, not as an unavoidable and disagreeable necessity but from choice when the relative advantages of plantation and village life have been weighed, will be far more efficient than the labourers of to-day. The wage rates of eight to sixteen shillings a month paid to-day are preposterous. Judged by exports, the value per head of the goods produced by wage-earners in Kenya is unprecedentedly low. Migratory labour, it may be hoped, will altogether cease. We may expect rather to see farmers gather round them a class of permanent employees, skilled and efficient, free, should they wish, to cultivate land of their own, but preferring service with Europeans. In other ways, no doubt, farmers will have to learn new methods. They will have to use steam or motor ploughs, and motor transport. So much the better. Incompetent farmers and unpopular employers will go under. Again so much the better. The owners of immense areas, speculators in land, and absentee landlords, will have to abandon part or the whole of their holdings. Once more, so much the better. For, as we have seen, there is not the smallest hope of cultivating all the alienated area by the existing population. The empty spaces in Africa can only be filled by the

immigration of genuine cultivators of the soil. Where they are to come from we need not stop to inquire. But we may be certain, whoever they may be, that they will demand land of their own.

We must also realise that there are certain tropical products which can best or can only be produced on a large scale and with the help of expensive machinery. The profits of growing these articles are exceptionally great. Sisal fibre is such a product.[1] Tobacco and rubber and tea, for the present, at least, belong to the same class. By contrast, cotton, sim sim, maize, rice and other grain crops, and probably also coffee, can be grown quite as well and far more cheaply without European capital. In their case the European investor, and the European supervisor, are merely redundant. In Kenya they swallow up the bulk of what the crops sell for, with the result, as has been shown, that wages are below subsistence level. In Kenya, it may safely be predicted, European farmers will increasingly be restricted to those crops which demand capital or special skill.

But the European farmer will be affected by a redistribution of taxation as well as by a redistribution of labourers. The system whereby the poorest of the population have to pay at least a quarter of their incomes in direct taxation while the richer part of the population pay scarcely any, is utterly indefensible. If reform in Kenya is to be real it must include the direct taxation of European and Indian merchants and shopkeepers, and of European landowners and farmers. Fortunately it will be easy to discriminate in taxation between the working farmers and

[1] The part owner of the largest sisal plantation in the colony claimed at a public meeting held recently (1924) that each of his labourers produced sisal fibre worth £80. Even supposing he pays his labourers half as much again as they commonly get in neighbouring plantations, it is plain that cost of European supervision and profits must absorb nine-tenths of the selling price of the fibre.

the owners of vast areas of land, whether resident or absentee, who leave their development to others. The self-governing colonies tax the real farmer and the functionless landlord quite differently. By a land-tax which would, in the cases of landowners and landholders, replace an income-tax, and which would be based on annual unimproved value, the speculators and owners of excessive areas could be made to bear the chief burden and leave the people whose energy and skill are of real value to the colony lightly taxed. No doubt large areas would revert to the Crown, and thus render possible a true scheme of colonisation.

Such a policy in regard to the alienated land roughly corresponds with the policy pursued, in response to the demands of our own Government, in the Belgian Congo. There, indeed, concessionaires were compelled to restore large areas to the State. Some of these were areas with a large native population, which fortunately have scarcely any parallel in Kenya. The remaining concessionaires in the Belgian Congo pay, in taxes on land and incomes, a third of the revenue of the colony.

When wealth in Kenya is equitably taxed it should be possible not merely to reduce the hut- and poll-tax but to change its incidence. At present it falls with most iniquitous hardship on widows and the old. It should be replaced, district by district, by a land-tax such as is levied in India. In addition, the direct taxation of the rich should enable the Government to repeal the import duties on the necessaries of life.

An impartial inquiry into all the relevant facts will no doubt, and reasonably, be demanded before any complete and systematic reforms are attempted. That inquiry should be by a Royal Commission, as suggested by Mr. J. H. Oldham. By no other means can the true situation be presented completely and impartially to the public. The inquiry should include in its scope Uganda, Nyasaland

and Northern Rhodesia, where also the plantation system is in operation.[1] Meanwhile the author would venture to make certain suggestions capable of being acted on at once, all, or nearly all, of which British opinion of all shades may be expected to support.

It is first of all necessary to stress the importance of sincere and sustained effort in encouragement of native production. In every district the district officer should be instructed to call a meeting of the chiefs and headmen, at which he would read a message from the Governor. That message might begin with the usual advice to be industrious, but should contain explicit prohibition of any pressure by any public servant, European or African, to induce any African to leave his home to work. It should lay down as the permanent policy of the Government that henceforth it would take no concern whatever as to whether the people work for themselves or for Europeans. Copies of this pronouncement, in the language of the district, should be posted up in every Government office. It is quite possible that the Government of Kenya may represent that the issue of such a proclamation would be followed by the collapse of plantation industries, even though the prediction would be a virtual confession that wage-earners do not work now of their free choice. If the Government

[1] The Committee just appointed will no doubt make valuable preliminary investigations. The members who are to visit Eastern Africa will learn at first hand the views of the local Europeans, whose evidence will no doubt be given the weight it certainly deserves. But one hopes that these members will realise that they cannot, in a week or two, gain any knowledge of African life. That knowledge can most easily be got in London from men who, as administrators and missionaries, have spent their lives in getting to know Africans and in studying the results of our influence over them. They will also, it is greatly to be hoped, remember that the people who know most are not those who fill or have filled high positions in such places as Nairobi, but rather those who live and have lived closest to the people.

This Committee, however, can in any case form no final judgement. It is not to be allowed to investigate the problems set by the existence of Asiatics in East Africa. It has no power to take evidence on oath. The full facts, in short, cannot be properly investigated except by a fully constituted Royal Commission.

should have any such apprehension it would no doubt be wise to give a year's public notice of the change of policy, to allow employers time, by raising of wages and otherwise, to adapt themselves to a free labour market.

It would not be honest to avoid the mention of the great difficulty in the way of independent native industries. The senior officials in Kenya comprise many of the men by whose hands the existing policy has been built up. For years governors and others in authority have been sedulously inculcating the doctrine that officials should closely identify themselves with the interests, or the supposed interests, of the unofficial European community. Practically all the few known opponents of the plantation system among the senior men have been weeded out. On the other hand, the Agricultural Department seems to contain men who have great faith in native producers and production. And the great majority of the junior men in every department will welcome with enthusiasm the policy of encouraging native industries.

It must never be forgotten that the natives have for half a generation been taught that they must not stay at home, and that it may take a year or two for them to realise their new-found liberty. Also, it will be necessary to build up some organisation for a native export trade. Precautions to ensure that merchants offer fair prices will be necessary if, as is possible, an attempt is made to form "rings". The restrictions which now prevent traders, both European and Indian, from settling and touring in the reserves must also be removed.

Another reform that should be begun without delay is the forming of settlements where Africans who have lost their claim on their tribes, or who, as is the case with former slaves, never had any, can live and work as independent cultivators. These men would be quite ready to pay a rent to the Crown, and would only ask security of tenure. This step was

advised by the official commission that reported on the Chilembwe rising. It is most necessary both in Nyasaland and in Kenya. The only possible reason why the step will be objected to is that it would provide men who now live by earning wages with the opportunity for supporting themselves independently. In a country containing, on both alienated and Crown land, vast undeveloped areas, to which there has been introduced by the Government a colony of men from another continent, provision should be made, and can be made, to ensure that any native of the country who desires to live and work in security as an independent cultivator can do so. The Glen Grey and other settlements in Cape Colony provide a precedent for the establishment of groups of holdings on individual tenure, and it would be wise to borrow the services of some South African with special experience to prevent the making of avoidable mistakes in forming settlements of smallholders in Kenya.

Agricultural Shows of the kind already established by the energy and foresight of the Rev. Handley D. Hooper of the C.M.S. will play a large part in stimulating native production, and in ensuring the good quality of the products, and should at once be instituted by Government in every tribe and district.

As this chapter was being finally revised news arrived of the introduction into the local Legislature of a Bill to establish Native District Councils. The Governor's speech on the occasion showed that he had gathered, during his service under the Chartered Company, a wide and exact acquaintance with tribal politics in South Africa. The Bill was received by the unofficial legislators with much foreboding. But the Governor, as reported in the local press, assured them that he did not think there was " the slightest risk of the Native Councils taking away the control of affairs of this Colony from this Honourable Council ". (The reader will note this further evidence that the authorities

give the Legislative Council a place far higher than that of a purely advisory body, which is its true constitutional status.)

This Bill would leave the constitution and powers of District Councils entirely in the hands of the Governor and his advisers. They are to have district officers as chairmen, and are to concern themselves with sanitation, roads and bridges and, in time, education. But nothing seems to have been said during the debate about the central difficulty, how to ensure that Africans nominated by their alien governors should be representative of African opinion. Alien governments in the past never have solved that problem. What makes it specially difficult in Kenya is the fact that any body of men genuinely representative of the opinion of any tribe in Kenya would, if allowed free expression of its wishes, make demands of a kind very unwelcome to the authorities.

For that and other reasons it would be unwise at first to have a native electorate. District officers will know best how to find the men who can carry out the duties of a tribal executive with some degree of efficiency. But we may be certain, both that the demand for popularly elected councils will soon arise, and that, once arisen, it must be complied with. We introduced autocracy to the tribes of Kenya, and if we attempt any degree of restoration of tribal self-government we must be ready for a revival of the idea that all have the right to participate in forming the tribal will. These councils will in fact be shams so long as they derive their authority from Nairobi instead of from the general opinion of their tribes. And tribal institutions of a representative kind will be unsafe until some at least of the legal and administrative reforms urged in this book are carried out.

The reader who may care to know, three or four years hence, whether the reforms which by that time may have been set on foot are real and in some degree adequate,

should watch the policy followed by the Government in regard to these tribal councils. When they are popularly elected, and when they are allowed to discuss, without the intrusion of Europeans, the most important problems of their village, tribe and country, as freely as our ancestors, when they likewise lived in tribalism, discussed the affairs of moot and tribe and shire, then the Imperialist to whom Empire means not domination but liberty may know that in Kenya the worst is over. Meanwhile, for a year or two, and until real reform in the country is begun, these tribal or district councils cannot safely be given real power. The wise policy of self-effacement advised by Mr. Temple for district officers to follow, will at first in Kenya be impossible to them. They, and not the tribal councils they must control, must for a time be responsible for tribal government. They will be wise indeed if they are ready to demit authority when tribal opinion demands tribal responsibility.

It is most necessary that immediate action should be taken to discover the exact facts of the decline in the population. It is scandalous that while large sums are spent in counting producers and measuring their produce, there is no effective registration of births even in Mombasa and Nairobi. Groups of villages in several parts of the country, each containing a thousand or two thousand families, should be chosen for providing exact vital statistics. It will, naturally, be difficult to trace the men who leave these selected areas for employment. But it is high time human losses as well as material gains were measured in Kenya.

Another matter demanding immediate attention is the urban housing of Africans. As already explained, the problem is excessively difficult. The right attitude, however, is to hold fast to the axiom that industries which cannot provide their workers with material conditions superior to those found in ordinary village life have no right to exist. To say that the country's finances, or this employer or that,

cannot bear the cost of housing Government or private employees decently is quite irrelevant. The one cost the country cannot afford is the cost in lives now being paid.

The systematic reform of the large number of Ordinances which impose statutory disabilities on the ground of race had best await the investigations of a Royal Commission. The Indians will regard this proposal with disappointment and impatience. They must reflect that reform is of far greater importance to Africans than to themselves, and that it is in the true interest of every one in Kenya that such changes in the law as the new policy may render necessary should be made only when the facts of the situation have been fully and exactly ascertained. There is, however, one Ordinance which should simply be repealed without delay. The Registration Ordinance costs directly £20,000 a year spent in paying a staff of 200 persons, and indirectly a far larger sum. It is a source of great oppression and a cause of great unrest. A subterranean dispute seems to be going on in the colony over certain amendments of the Ordinance proposed by the Colonial Office and objected to by the colonists. The latter are perfectly correct in believing that the amendments, such as the proposal no longer to employ the police in hunting out employees who leave their employers without permission, will make the Ordinance nugatory. The Ordinance is, in fact, the strongest buttress of a servile industrial system.

Finally, it is most urgently necessary that a scheme should be drafted which will provide schools for most of the children in the country in twenty years. Training colleges for teachers both of ordinary subjects and of trades and agriculture should be organised at once. The money can be got largely by reductions in military expenditure. Kenya has no military enemies, and there is no excuse whatever for spending £300,000 on troops and police as compared with £23,000 on the education of Africans.

There is, unfortunately, the very greatest danger lest any scheme for education would be influenced by the ideas hitherto prevailing both among those in authority and among the European colonists. The latter say quite plainly that the only kind of education Africans should be given is what will make them producers of wealth.[1] That idea has been powerfully supported by a Commission of American origin that has been touring the colony. Its leader, Dr. Jesse Jones, is not always clear in expressing his ideas. But the most distinctive of them seem to be that scholastic education is unfitting for Africans in general and that they should be instructed merely in agriculture and handicrafts, and also that, "it seems to us very important that the education programme in Africa—in Kenya—shall include two phases, the education of the masses and the education of a sympathetic and constructive teaching force and leadership. The elements of constructive leadership are those that I have discussed before, hygiene, industry, character formation."[2] One prefers the conciseness of "w-i-n-d-e-r, winder, go and clean it". This educational theory, of course, is of hoary antiquity. People in every age have held that it is the business of the common herd not to think for themselves, but to do what they are told, with as much skill as can be imparted to them, so that "better living" will bring to them as well as to their betters the material comforts that are the antidote to the evils resulting from free inquiry. It is curious how persistent the illusion is that it is possible to choose certain children, in Kenya sons of chiefs and other comparatively wealthy persons, and ensure by their training that they are fit to bear authority while the rest are trained to

[1] During the 1924 electoral campaign one candidate, who was afterwards elected, complained to his constituents that in a Government school in the Kamba country, which is intended as a training-place for future chiefs, there was far too much instruction that was not strictly useful. Though in point of fact every pupil in the school is given manual training, this legislator advised that the boys should be conducted round the district building houses for the European farmers!

[2] Report of an interview by the editor of the *East African Standard*.

obedience. As if ever in the world's history the men whom some alien government has trained for the purpose ever become popular leaders.

It is no doubt true that the kind of poverty found in our age is far more disabling and at times debasing than poverty of other types in former ages. It amounts indeed to a disease. Opinions as to the remedy notoriously differ. Some readers will find it difficult to have patience with the theory that the true remedy is that the poor should be more industrious, when, as all know, they are already more industrious than the rich. But it is undoubtedly the case that the movement to which Dr. Jones belongs has done a great deal in America to improve the lot of the negro worker, to make him a better cultivator and give him a cleaner home. One must also admit that greater wealth is indispensable to the prosperity of village society in Kenya. But that does not mean that wealth production should be the chief educational aim. There could not, in fact, be a worse aim than this, which in our day so many Gentiles and Jews alike seek after.

As for character training, one can only say that if Americans have really discovered any specific means of making boys and girls good, it is a pity that they describe it so obscurely. Most people in this country think that if we succeed in getting the young to enjoy the records of past greatness and virtue in such books as the Bible, Shakespeare and Scott, they will learn for themselves better lessons than any course of moral instruction can provide. Fortunately, thanks to missions, which often translate the *Pilgrim's Progress* as well as the New Testament into African languages, many Africans already are under the influence of great literature. One has the right to be suspicious of any man who thinks any other educational influence comparable to it. No doubt there are modern Mr. Gradgrinds who consider the ant and the bee examples more suitable for

Africans than the birds of the air and the lilies of the field. Napoleon attempted, without conspicuous success, to exclude political and speculative subjects from the instruction given in the colleges of France. Authoritarians in Kenya are not likely to be more successful. The importance of political and economic facts to Africans in Kenya is so obvious that it is quite impossible to educate people in that country without making them think politically. And how, one would ask, can people be taught hygiene unless they have some general education? The reader may consider that too much attention has been paid to these false educational ideals. He may be assured that in Africa the obscurantist is an even greater danger than the exploiter. What the African in Kenya needs is knowledge, enlightenment, the acquisition of the appetite which makes men seek the truth. He needs these exactly as the whole human race needs them. He not only needs them but wants them. It is fashionable in Kenya to gibe at the middle-aged men who crowd into the schools and are often seen singly or in groups on the roadside, in trains—anywhere, poring over a primer, expecting to find in it the key that will unlock all doors. Perhaps they are not so far wrong. No people in the world has a keener appetite for education or a greater aptitude for learning. They have as much right as we to understand the world we both live in, and far greater need of knowledge as a defence against oppression. Those who, in our country, owe their own liberation to knowledge, and have hope, through greater knowledge, of better days for their children, will, we may surely expect, see to it that Africans in our generation are not denied what for so many centuries was withheld from the workers of all races.

Looking back over the bygone years one remembers East Africa as a hard country. The clear, tenuous air of the highlands, the aromatic odours of trees and herbage, the sudden miracle, when the rains break, of trees bursting

into flame with flowers, while the earth is swept with a flash of green, the prospects at every rise in the path, illimitably vast, with scarce a sign of man's handiwork, intoxicate one with the sense of unknown splendours and undreamt-of opportunities for human effort. But one soon begins to understand why the land has been for so many ages resistant to man's endeavour. The plants are often poisonous, the herbage tears one's hands and clothes, snakes move silently in the tussocks, the rustle in the bushes may be a leopard, disease lurks in the streams and flies in the very air. The sun, to us in Europe a friend, twists every blade and leaf, and withers in its intolerable glare all thought and energy. Only at night do leaves expand and does the multitudinous animal and insect world have active life. Who that has heard its incredible noises ever forgets his first night in the African bush? The whole forces of Nature, with us so docile and familiar, seem, though marvellously prolific and various, untamed and unfriendly. All that vast work of human hands, which in Europe has covered the earth, is in Africa still to do, so that every tree and bush is of man's planting or intending, every expanse covered by the homes men live in and the crops they reap, and even the very hills are scored with water channels and walls. Who can tell for how many centuries men will toil in Africa before its deserts blossom as the rose?

There are two moments in the African day when Nature herself strikes confidence into the heart. Just before sunrise all the night sounds cease. The whole earth is still, and exhales a quiet breath before the sun blinds and smothers it. It was surely then, in ancient times, that Memnon's strains were heard. At that moment one knows great things can indeed be done. The other moment one remembers best at the coast, when, just before sunset, the earth seems, after the long day's heat, to be restoring its light to the air from every particle. The palm, the house roof, the

fisherman's boat on the reef, bloom in new colours, and shine sharp and clear as if luminescent. In that moment one knows that Africa is beautiful, and will respond generously by greater beauty to the best that man can do for man. One forgets the endless scroll of past failure on which the names of men of every race are written, and the miseries they have inflicted on this continent of suffering, and remembers only those who with patient fidelity gave their lives to bring nearer in Africa the long-delayed victory of justice. To one of these men, A. J. M. Collyer, whose grave lies among the people he served, these words are fittingly addressed:

> " Content thee, howsoe'er, whose days are done;
> There lies not any troublous thing before,
> Nor sight nor sound to war against thee more,
> For whom all winds are quiet as the sun
> All waters as the shore."

APPENDIX

EAST AFRICA PROTECTORATE

S. No. 17371. Labour Circular No. 1

Nairobi, 23rd October 1919.

Native Labour required for non-Native farms and other private undertakings.

There appears to be still considerable shortage of labour in certain areas due to reluctance of the tribesmen to come out into the labour field; as it is the wish of Government that they should so so, His Excellency desires once again to bring the matter to the notice of Provincial and District Commissioners, and at the same time to state that he sincerely hopes that by an insistent advocacy of the Government's wishes in this connection an increasing supply of labour will result.

2. His Excellency trusts that those Officers who are in charge of what is termed labour supplying districts are doing what they can to induce an augmentation of the supply of labour for the various farms and plantations in the Protectorate, and he feels assured that all officers will agree with him that the larger and more continuous the flow of labour is from the Reserves the more satisfactory will be the relations as between the native people and the Settlers and between the latter and the Government.

3. The necessity for an increased supply of labour cannot be brought too frequently before the various native authorities, nor can they be too often reminded that it is in their own interests to see that their young men become wage-earners and do not remain idle for the greater part of the year. They should be informed that the Government is now taking steps to keep all native labourers while out of their Reserves under supervision, and the conditions of camps, etc., regularly inspected.

4. In continuation of previous communications on this very

important subject, His Excellency desires to reiterate certain of his wishes and to add further instructions as follows:—

(1) All Government officials in charge of native areas must exercise every possible lawful influence to induce able-bodied male natives to go into the labour field. Where farms are situated in the vicinity of a native area, women and children should be encouraged to go out for such labour as they can perform.

(2) Native Chiefs and Elders must at all times render all possible lawful assistance on the foregoing lines. They should be repeatedly reminded that it is part of their duty to advise and encourage all unemployed young men in the areas under their jurisdiction to go out and work on plantations. They should be encouraged to visit plantations where their people are employed.

(3) District Commissioners will keep a record of the names of those Chiefs and Headmen who are helpful and of those who are not helpful, and will make reports to me from time to time for the information of His Excellency. The nature of these reports will be communicated to the Chiefs. In cases where there is evidence that any Government Headman is impervious to His Excellency's wishes, the fact should be reported to me for His Excellency's information together with any recommendations you may desire to make.

(4) District Commissioners will, as often as occasion requires, hold public meetings at convenient centres to be attended by the native authorities. At these meetings labour requirements, places at which labour is offered, nature of work and rates of pay must be explained. District Commissioners will invite employers or their agents to attend such meetings.

(5) Employers or their agents requiring native labour will be invited and encouraged to enter freely any Native Reserve and there get in touch with the Chiefs, Headmen and Natives.

(6) Requirements of native labour for Government Departments should be met as far as possible from the more remote areas which do not at present supply an appreciable number of men for labour on plantations.

5. His Excellency instructs me to state that constant endeavours will be made by this Government to obtain labour from the adjacent

Conquered Territory in order that the supply of native labour in this country may be augmented. The Native Authorities might be informed of this, and it be pointed out to them that should any considerable number of natives be so introduced into this country it will probably mean less money going into our native districts.

6. It is hoped that the Resident Natives Ordinance, 1918, and the Natives Registration Ordinance, 1915, will soon become operative. The provisions of these Ordinances should help to ameliorate the position.

7. Should the labour difficulties continue it may be necessary to bring in other and special measures to meet the case; it is hoped, however, that insistence on the foregoing lines will have appreciable effect.

JOHN AINSWORTH,
Chief Native Commissioner.

The Bishops' Memorandum

Native Labour

A recent memorandum, from the Chief Native Commissioner, published in the East African papers, October 27, 1919, gives rise to serious thought.

With the main purpose of that memorandum, the prevention of idleness, and the meeting, by all legitimate means, of the demand for necessary labour, we are in entire accord. Labour must be forthcoming if the country is to be developed as it should.

2. There are, however, certain features in the memorandum which seem to us to be open to grave objection.

"Forced Labour"—like Slavery—is an ugly term, and suggests a great deal more than it necessarily involves. "Compulsory Labour" has a less repugnant sound to British ears; but even this term rouses suspicion, and is therefore generally avoided. It is carefully avoided throughout this memorandum. But while the *term* nowhere finds a place, how far the thing is suggested is certainly open to question.

3. The Government is up against an undoubted difficulty. On the one hand the country has been thrown open to settlers. They have poured in, are pouring in, and will pour in in increasing numbers. Every one of these settlers is a potential employer of labour, many of

them on a large scale; all of them depend, for their very existence as farmers, on native labour. On the other hand there is the native population, a large but limited source of supply, living in their own Native Reserves, hardly as yet accustomed to travel outside in search of employment.

4. Hitherto the Government has stood between the two, in its proper rôle of Governor of both, has granted facilities to employers of labour to recruit, but has steadily refused to compel natives to work for the private benefit of European settlers.

5. The difficulty has become acute, increasing pressure is being brought to bear upon the Government to induce it to reconsider its native policy, and use its influence in inducing the native population to meet the demand of the labour market.

6. In the present memorandum technically no "Compulsion" is to be exercised, but "it is the wish of the Government that natives should come out into the labour field". To the native mind a hint and an order on the part of the Government are indistinguishable, particularly when the Governor himself calls upon the Administrative Officials, Provincial Commissioners, and District Commissioners, to exercise "an insistent advocacy of the Government's wishes in this connection". No District Commissioner can mistake the significance of these terms.

7. If any doubt should remain, the "wishes" of para. 1 have in para. 4 developed into definite "instructions": "All permanent officials in charge of native areas must exercise *every possible lawful influence to induce* able-bodied male natives to go into the labour field". Such influence, from such a quarter, acting on a primitive people, will unquestionably "induce" many natives to go out into the labour field.

8. But if the work of thus influencing potential labourers were confined to British officials, little harm might be done. It is when the further step is taken, and native chiefs are charged with the business of recruiting labour, that the door is flung wide open to almost any abuse. In the words of the memorandum, "The necessity for an increased supply of labour cannot be brought too frequently before the various native authorities". Again: "Native chiefs and elders must at all times render all possible lawful assistance on the foregoing lines. They should be reminded that it is *part of their duty to advise* and encourage all unemployed young men in the areas under their jurisdiction to go out and work on *plantations*." The italics through-

out are our own, but no one who knows anything of native life can have a moment's doubt as to what will be the effect on a native chief who is told by his District Officer that he must do a certain thing, and that it is part of his duty as a chief to do it. The words "advise" and "encourage" will, in such circumstances, acquire a very sinister meaning. The advice given and the encouragement afforded by the native chiefs will take a very practical form.

9. If any chief should show any reluctance to carry out his instructions, he too is to be induced, in a very practical way, to take action. "District Commissioners will keep a record of the names of those chiefs and headmen who are *helpful* and of those who are not *helpful*, and will make report to me (the Chief Native Commissioner) from time to time for the information of His Excellency. The nature of these reports will be communicated to the chiefs. In cases where there is evidence that any Government headman is impervious to His Excellency's wishes, the fact should be reported to me for His Excellency's information together with any recommendation he may desire to make." He would be a bold chief who, in the face of the foregoing, refused to carry out the Government's "wishes" in this matter. The suggestion in the case of any recalcitrant chief suggests that the capacity to send men into the labour market is to be the test of the efficiency or inefficiency of a chief. We confess we do not like this.

10. Nor does the memorandum confine itself to able-bodied *men*. "When farms are situated in the vicinity of a native area, *women and children* should be *encouraged* to go out for such labour as they can perform." This forms part of the instructions issued by the Government to its officials. Such instructions cannot but give rise to anxiety.

A circular, issued by the District Commissioner, Kyambu, 17th October 1919, shows that this anxiety is only too well founded. The circular reads as follows: "As I understand that a considerable amount of additional labour will shortly be required to get in the coffee crop, and as in view of this *I intend to arrange for a temporary supply of child labour* from the Reserves, I shall be glad if any coffee growers who may like to employ these children will write his name hereon, stating the number required, the time for which they may be most needed". Against such temporary employment of such children as voluntarily go to the plantations to help in the picking of coffee we have not a word to say; but we may fairly ask whether it is the business of the District Officer to arrange for such supply of child labour, what will be

the effect on native education of such action, and what actual steps would be taken by the District Officer or by the native authorities to secure the service of these children?

11. With regard to the whole memorandum there are certain observations which should be made.

It introduces *compulsory labour*. Whether this is a good thing or a bad thing we are not now concerned to say. We confine ourselves for the moment to the fact. Labour may be made compulsory in one of three ways: by force of *circumstances*, as in civilised countries; by *law*, as with ourselves during the war; or by official pressure, which stops short of actual command, but aims at securing the identical results. Without the sanction of definite enactment, no native chief, who is told that it is the wish of the Government that he should find labour—who has the matter insistently brought before him, who is reminded that this is part of his official duty, and who is periodically reported as one who is helpful or not helpful to the Government in this respect—can or will mistake the meaning of it all. He must and will, to the limit of his powers, compel his people to go out to work; technically, there is no compulsion; practically, compulsion could hardly take a stronger form.

12. The memorandum apparently assumes that the choice lies between useful work done for the European and idleness in the Reserves. No one who has lived in a native Reserve will deny that there are days or months of practical idleness; but no one who has lived in a Reserve and had the opportunity of closely watching native life but will realise that the native has also his months of strenuous work, cultivating and planting, harvesting, building, etc. The native has also his home, his crops, and his plans for development. The demands on his time may not be constant, but they are insistent. To leave his own plantation, perhaps at a critical time, for the benefit of some one else's plantation; to leave his house unthatched, his crops unreaped,his wife unguarded perhaps for months at a time, in return for cash which he does not want on the "advice" of his chief—which he dare not disregard—is not a prospect calculated to inspire loyalty to the Government from whom the advice emanates. That Government must needs, in fairness, look at the native as well as at the European side of the question. No measure can be justified which involves, or may involve, injustice to the individual and threatens seriously to hinder the economic development of the native areas of the Protectorate.

13. The decision to "encourage" women and children to labour,

bearing in mind the meaning that will inevitably be read into the word "encourage", seems to us a dangerous policy. The children below a certain age should be at home or at school. The women must work at home; the plantation, the supply of the daily food, the cooking, the care of the children and of the home, depend upon the mothers and wives. To "encourage", as a native headman (with the fear of dismissal behind him) would "encourage", women and girls to go out from their homes into neighbouring plantations would be to court disaster, physical and moral. Whatever labour legislation is introduced, the women and children at any rate must be left out of it.

14. We do not disguise our anxiety, not as to the intention, but as to the practical effect of this memorandum.

Yet, when we have said this, we recognise that much in this memorandum is good and indeed necessary. Compulsory labour is not in itself an evil, and we would favour some form of compulsion, at any rate for work of national importance and provided that—

(*a*) It is frankly *recognised as compulsion* and legalised as such, not veiled under such terms as advice, wishes, encouragement. The native understands a definite order; he does not understand Government wishes as distinct from command.

(*b*) It is *confined to able-bodied men*, for in no case could it be tolerated that employers should indent for the labour of women and children. Certainly no British law will sanction this.

(*c*) The work be done *under proper conditions*, guaranteed by the Government. This is clearly the Government intention. "Chiefs should be informed that the Government is now taking steps to keep all native labourers, while out of their Reserves, under supervision; and the condition of camps, etc., regularly inspected", and, further, native chiefs are to be encouraged "to visit plantations where their people are employed".

It would be unwise on the part of settlers who depend on the Government for labour, and on the chiefs for their goodwill, to resent such inspection or visitation. The more open the whole thing can be the more easy will the labour question become.

(*d*) The *time of employment be limited and defined.* A man who has done his full share of work on the plantations should be free from further pressure. The tendency is always for the willing horse to be worked to death and the rest to go free. We would suggest sixty days as a maximum period of compulsory service in each year.

Compulsory labour may be regarded as taxation paid in the form

not of cash but of labour: and it would be well if it followed the same general lines. Taxation in the form of cash is legally imposed, and is of a fixed and known amount. It falls evenly on all, and when the amount has been paid in full the man who has paid it is free. It would be disastrous were the Government, in need of money and in the absence of legal sanction to collect it, to induce native chiefs to supply the deficiency by " encouraging " their people to contribute, with the knowledge that each chief would be reported on, favourably or unfavourably, according to the amount of money he had succeeded in collecting. Such a policy would make native life an intolerable burden. A known and fixed obligation is understood, and it is as necessary in questions of labour as in questions of cash. Each able-bodied man should know definitely the extent of his liability to the State, and when that has been discharged he should be free to attend to his own affairs.

(*e*) Compulsion be *exerted uniformly* and the willing tribes, as the Kavirondo or Kikuyu, be not pressed, and the unwilling, as the Masai, be excused. That the weaklings of a tribe, or those who are unpopular with the Chief, be not sent out and the best of the young men and the favourites of the Chief retained. Nothing short of a complete list, kept and checked by the District Commissioner in each District, recording the labour of each man, will prevent this.

(*f*) The labourer be *free to choose his sphere of service*, *or* at least that no man be compelled to work for any European or Indian employer who has proved himself incapable of managing native labour.

(*g*) *Reasonable exemptions to be allowed.* All in regular employment as headmen, teachers, shop assistants, house boys, etc., should be exempt, and all whose work, while done for private gain, is yet of national economic importance. In this respect it must be remembered that an increasing number of Africans as well as Europeans are interested in the commercial development of the country.

(*h*) *As far as possible compulsory labour be used for Government work*, leaving voluntary labour available for work on private estates. This policy is foreshadowed in the memorandum.

15. With these provisions we would favour compulsory labour, as long as it is clearly a necessity. But we feel that the memorandum, as it at present stands, is liable to grave abuse, and places the Administrative Officers working in the Reserves, to whom the welfare of the people under their care is a primary consideration, in a very difficult position.

In any case it will be necessary to watch carefully the actual working of the present policy, and to see that compulsion, so long as it is practically necessary, shall be attended by a minimum of hardship.

16. We realise the difficulty in which both the Government and the Settlers are placed. We have no wish to add to that difficulty. We do not believe that there is the least intention, on either side, of exploiting natives for private ends; but experience has shown that it is highly dangerous to place in the hands of Native Chiefs and Headmen vague and undefined powers, and still more dangerous to expose to these powers not only men but women and children.

17. Any form of compulsory service is certain to be intensely unpopular with the natives. There is no more fruitful source of native discontent in any country than the Corvée. *Some form, however, of compulsory service we believe, in present conditions, to be a necessity.* It remains to find the best form in which the compulsion may be exercised. We believe that the straightest road is the best: that the work will be best done directly, by Europeans, rather than indirectly through the native headman: and legally, by definite enactment, under which each man knows his obligations and their limits, rather than by incessant appeals and demands, which leave the natives in a state of bewildered irritation, and will, we believe, fail to reach the desired end.

Summary

We believe that ideally all labour should be voluntary. We recognise that, at present, this is impossible, and that some form of pressure must be exerted if an adequate supply of labour necessary for the development of the country is to be secured.

We are convinced that the present proposals for securing labour, which stop short of definite enactment, but put large undefined powers in the hands of native chiefs, will lead to very unsatisfactory results, and that these powers will inevitably be abused.

We are strongly of the opinion that—

1. Compulsory labour, so long as it is clearly necessary, should be *definitely legalised.* Such a legal obligation would, from the native point of view, be more satisfactory than indirect pressure brought to bear through native Chiefs.

2. It should be *confined to able-bodied men.* No Government pressure should be brought to bear on women and children. When they work on plantations it should be of their own accord.

3. All compulsory work should be done *under proper conditions*, guaranteed by the Government, and secured by regular inspection and visitation.

4. The labour obligation of each man should be *clearly defined*, and the man be free on the completion of his time to follow his own business.

5. Such work should be exacted uniformly, from each tribe, and each individual man in the tribe.

6. Each man should be free to choose his own employer, none being forced to any particular plantation against his will.

7. Reasonable exemptions should be allowed; of all those in permanent employment or engaged in work of national importance.

8. The compulsory labour should be *directed primarily to State work*, leaving the voluntary labour available for work on private estate.

The Missions welcome His Excellency's general policy, as expressed in his recent memorandum, and recognise, in his labour proposals, the earnest effort to meet by all possible constitutional means a great and pressing need. We believe, however, that it places far too great a power in the hands of native chiefs and headmen, and we therefore desire to see it modified on the lines above suggested.

R. S. MOMBASA.
J. J. UGANDA.
J. W. ARTHUR,
Church of Scotland Mission.

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